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This study aims to counter right-wing discourses of be-
longing. It discusses key theoretical concepts for the 
study of home, focusing in particular on Marxist, femi-
nist, postcolonial, and psychoanalytic contributions. The 
book also maintains that postmodern celebrations of no-
madism and exile tend to be incapable of providing an 
alternative to conservative, xenophobic appropriations 
of home.
In detailed readings of one film and six novels, a view is 
developed according to which home, as a spatio-tempo-
ral imaginary, is rooted in our species being, and as such 
constitutes the inevitable starting point for any progres-
sive politics.
“[A] thoroughly impressive, productive and useful work. 
[... T]he writing is admirably lucid and engaging.” – Ran-
dall Stevenson, Professor of Twentieth-Century Litera-
ture, University of Edinburgh
“[E]ach chapter is insightful and [... the] use of a very 
wide range of theorists to provide different angles of 
vision is deftly and impressively handled.” – Pam Morris, 
author of Realism (New Critical Idiom series) & Jane Aus-
ten, Virginia Woolf and Worldly Realism
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“I kept my head down, staring at the gravel lane, as if immersed in a book, a
series of beautiful and soothing words spelled out across the roadside to lead
me home.” Scott Heim, Mysterious Skin (276)
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Prefatory Note
This study is driven by an explicitly political agenda: to counter right-wing
discourses aimed at monopolizing the meaning of belonging. The success over
the years of such discourses among the Swiss electorate has seriously compli‐
cated my affection for the land I call home, and though I write from a position
of safety and privilege, my – far from traumatic – memories of growing up gay
in a heteronormative society have left me not entirely unfamiliar with the feeling
of being out of place. This inquiry into the concepts of home and belonging is
thus to some extent a deeply personal matter. Nevertheless, I will refrain from
using the first-person singular in the remainder of this study, opting for the
‘inclusive we’ instead. This constitutes an attempt on my part to create a sense
of communal endeavor. Should anyone find this stylistic choice alienating or
awkward, then this may serve as a salutary reminder of how easily gestures of
inclusion can turn into strategies of coercion, even if not intended as such. Fair
warning, dear reader? Let us go then, you and I.
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1 I would like to thank Antoinina Bevan Zlatar and Anja Neukom-Hermann for their
comments on the first draft, as well as Sarah Chevalier for her feedback on the final
version of this chapter. Some of the arguments presented here are based on my essay
“Resisting Governmental Illegalization: Xenophobia and Otherness in Steven Spiel‐
berg’s E. T.: The Extra-Terrestrial.”
Introduction – Theories of Home: Alienation and
Belonging in Steven Spielberg’s E. T.: The
Extra-Terrestrial
Abandoned by his loved ones and exiled from home, E. T. is arguably the most
famous illegalized alien in motion picture history.1 At the beginning of Steven
Spielberg’s film, we see E. T. and others of his kind peacefully exploring their
terrestrial surroundings – when suddenly a group of humans appears, aiming
to capture the foreign ‘invaders.’ While the other aliens reach the safety of their
spaceship, thus managing to elude their human pursuers, E. T. is left behind,
stranded on an unfamiliar planet. In panic, E. T. runs off and hides in a field
behind a suburban house, where he is later discovered by a ten-year-old boy
named Elliott, whose own home was recently disrupted when the boy’s father
left his mother, Mary, for a younger woman. Initially, E. T. and Elliott are afraid
of each other, yet soon fear is replaced by fascination. Elliott smuggles his new‐
found friend to the safety of his room, where at one point the boy places his
hand on a globe that stands on his desk. Looking at the alien, Elliott explains:
“Earth. Home.”
In describing earth as home, Elliot’s point is evidently not that all humans
feel perfectly at home in the world; the boy is not referring to profound feelings
of belonging, but simply notes that earth is, for better or worse, the planet we
humans inhabit, and where we must try to live our lives. And yet, it would be
misleading to suggest that Elliott uses the word home merely as a spatial marker,
for he is in fact interested in learning more about E. T.’s history. More precisely,
Elliott tries to explain the meaning of the word home because he wants to find
out what kind of being E. T. is: where he comes from, and how he got here (Kath
Woodward 48). Home, in other words, also raises questions about origins and
the journeys we make, and therefore has a temporal as well as a spatial dimen‐
sion (Agnes Heller 7; Cecile Sandten and Kathy-Ann Tan 3). Moreover, home
involves our relations with others: those with whom we share our places of
2 The diagram simplifies matters, of course. For example, it is possible to have more than
one home (e.g. the apartment where one lives and the house of one’s parents, where
one grew up). For some of us, the diagram would thus have to have more than one
center.
shelter; those with whom we feel we belong but from whom we may at present
be separated; and those with whom we are forced to struggle and engage because
we simply have no other place to go (Jan Willem Duyvendak 120). Finally, even
if we limit ourselves to the meaning of home as merely a kind of habitat – the
place where we happen to reside – the concept’s range remains nothing short
of astonishing. Home, as we try to explain it to others, can denote small-scale
places of shelter – a house, for instance, or a tent – but also neighborhoods,
nations, entire planets: “Earth. Home” (FIGURE 1).2
FIGURE 1: The idea of home ranges across various scales (diagram adapted from Fox 19).
This conceptual range is far from a critical disadvantage. Rather, home is a
powerful tool for literary and cultural analysis precisely because it is a
multi-scalar and open concept that allows us effortlessly to relate our smallest
and most intimate concerns to matters of truly global importance. Indeed, it is
by focusing on the manifold dimensions of home – as a place of residence or
shelter; as a network of given as well as of chosen relationships; as a repository
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(a)
(b)
(c)
of both individual and collective ideals (Alyson Blunt and Robyn Dowling 100;
Fox 6); as a story of origins, waypoints, and destinations; or as a site of violence
and exclusion (Rose Marangoly George 9; Sandten and Tan 8) – that we can
develop critical questions, especially in situations where the term’s multiple
meanings are difficult, or indeed impossible, to reconcile. As a theoretical con‐
cept, in short, home allows us to explore a dialectic movement of alienation and
belonging that, in turn, is able to generate extraordinary passion, in all the senses
of that word: desire and yearning; fervor, agony, and rage; but also feelings very
much like love.
Fictions of Home: Theoretical Framework
The core theoretical assumption of this study is that fictions are home-making
practices, and we will soon examine this idea more closely. It may be helpful,
however, first to say a word or two about the way in which this chapter is
structured, as well as to comment on the general trajectory of this study. If, for
instance, this first subsection is entitled “Theoretical Framework,” then this is
because the ideas developed here will not be discussed explicitly in the main
chapters of this study. Instead, they constitute a way of framing the overall
argument, and will accordingly be revisited in the concluding chapter. In addi‐
tion, the discussion of E. T. in the remainder of this introduction is not intended
to develop a comprehensive reading of Spielberg’s film. Rather, the aims of the
discussion are:
to introduce key ideas and concepts relating to home and belonging, as
they have been proposed by various theoretical schools;
to exemplify the interpretive power of these concepts by applying them to
Spielberg’s film;
to indicate, roughly, which of these ideas and concepts are central to which
of the six main chapters of this study.
We will also examine briefly the choice of primary texts, as well as some im‐
portant caveats regarding the scope of the overall argument. The introductory
chapter does not, however, summarize the findings of the six main chapters;
these will, instead, be presented in the conclusion.
If, in this chapter and the ones that follow, the argument will often have a
meandering quality, then this is a matter of conscious choice, for in order to ‘get’
home – in the sense of understanding it – we must be willing to travel wide and
far: to explore its connections to the wider world, as well as its complex internal
relations. Home-making thus requires a degree of patience, and the style of the
argument is to some extent meant to reflect this fact. At the same time, being
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patient is not the same as tolerating aimlessness or boredom, so that a plea for
the former ought not to be misconstrued as an appeal for the latter.
The key ideas formulated in the remainder of this introductory chapter can
be summarized in the form of seven partly overlapping precepts:
1. Even in a secular analysis of home, we must bear in mind the foundational,
metaphysical dimension of questions of belonging. This means to con‐
sider, among other things, religious beliefs and motifs (such as the idea
of a transcendental home) as well as agnostic or atheist accounts of ex‐
istential angst or trauma (in the sense of a not-being-at-home in the
world).
2. References to other texts (especially canonical ones), as well as to estab‐
lished generic traditions, can be understood as home-making practices
because they add a dimension of familiarity to an unfamiliar text. How‐
ever, at the same time, we need to analyze carefully the precise way in
which these intertextual references relate (a) to the text in which they
occur, and (b) to each other, as this may alert us to important intertextual
entanglements, which in fact serve to defamiliarize and critique the tra‐
dition.
3. Familiarity, predictability, and a sense of control are essential features of
homely homes; they arise, among other things, from habitual practices
and ritual actions, and they constitute ‘energy-saving devices’ that allow
humans to focus their limited mental and physical resources on tasks of
their choice (rather than having to expend all their energy on the chal‐
lenges of everyday life). However, too much familiarity can constitute an
obstacle to understanding and (self-)knowledge, which is why alienation
effects and defamiliarizing practices are necessary tools for critical in‐
quiry (whether deployed in works of art or by critics, scholars, and other
analysts).
4. It is by no means a coincidence that the terms community and communi‐
cation are so similar to each other, as communication is central to the
establishment and maintenance of a sense of home. One factor that fa‐
cilitates successful communication is a shared cognitive background (es‐
tablished, for instance, through shared experiences), while another crucial
factor is the distribution of communicative resources. As this distribution
is unequal, some will find it easier than others to establish and maintain
a sense of home (e.g. in the case of diasporic communities).
5. Psychoanalysis provides us with powerful concepts for analyzing home –
both through Freud’s notion of the uncanny and, more generally, through
complex techniques of decoding that allow us to unearth the unconscious
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3 The search was performed on August 2, 2017.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
forces that shape personal as well as collective identities, and which in‐
fluence the very form of works of art.
6. Even the supposedly private home is a site that is permeated by relations
of power, and we must always take into account the political forces that
help to shape the home (as well as the individual and collective identities
associated with that home). These forces include:
the marginalization of others on the basis of race or ethnicity;
cultural discourses about ideal homes – including the construction
of ‘normal’ as opposed to ‘deviant’ forms of desire – and how they
are diffused through various media, even in the home itself;
the gendering of domestic space and how it relates to structures
of domination (e.g. patriarchy as a social system);
class relations (e.g. the production of social stratification through
economic inequality, and how it appears in, and sustains or un‐
dermines, particular types of home).
7. Any critical analysis of home must focus not only on the content or in‐
gredients of home, but also on their formal arrangement. Indeed, the core
theoretical assumption of this study is formal in nature: that the concepts
of fiction and home are structurally akin to each other because they in‐
volve the same form of fictionalizing negotiation between the two realms
of the real and the imaginary. One implication of this assumption is that
a better understanding of fiction also contributes to our understanding of
home and belonging.
Evidently, each of the subsequent chapters constitutes an attempt to follow these
precepts, and they may be judged accordingly.
Two caveats, however, are in order. First, the fact that this study covers only
texts from between 1850 and 2000 means that all claims and findings must be
treated with due caution when applied to earlier periods. Second, the six primary
texts discussed in the main chapters do not constitute anything like a represen‐
tative sample of fictions of home. One simple reason for this is the sheer number
of texts that explicitly make home and belonging their theme. A quick search
on Amazon.com, for instance, yields 16,944 titles in the category “Literature &
Fiction” that feature the word home in their titles, and this is of course only the
proverbial tip of the iceberg, as the theme of belonging can easily be central to
a novel that does not announce this fact in its title.3 At the same time, the prin‐
ciple of selection for the primary texts used in this study is not entirely random:
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4 Elisabeth Bronfen uses a slightly different term in the subtitle of her study Home in
Hollywood: The Imaginary Geography of Cinema (2004), but the terminological reversal –
‘imaginary geography’ vs. ‘spatial imaginary’ – arguably signals a difference in em‐
phasis rather than a fundamental disagreement about the components that must enter
the equation.
three of the texts are English (The Mill on the Floss, Mrs. Dalloway, and Union
Street), while the other three are American (Moby-Dick, Absalom, Absalom!, and
The Virgin Suicides); three of the texts were written by men (Herman Melville,
William Faulker, and Jeffrey Eugenides), while the other three were written by
women (George Eliot, Virginia Woolf, and Pat Barker); and the texts date,
roughly, to the beginning, the middle, and the end of the period covered in this
study (i.e. 1851 and 1860; 1925 and 1936; 1982 and 1993). There is thus at least
some socio-historical breadth to the corpus, though serious limits remain (e.g.
all the English authors are women, whereas all the American authors are men;
all six authors are white). At the same time, one aim of the six readings presented
in the main chapters is to open up each of the primary texts to a wider range of
themes, and thus hopefully to make it easier for readers from various back‐
grounds to discover, perhaps in unsuspected places, a little piece of that place
called home.
The fact that home is such a fundamental and complex concept also means
that it would be difficult to provide a comprehensive overview of the previous
critical literature on the topic. Fortunately, this is also to some extent unneces‐
sary, as Alison Blunt and Robyn Dowling’s study Home (2006) constitutes an
excellent survey of key concepts and debates (with a particular focus on the
fields of geography, sociology, and anthropology, but by no means limited to
them). Moreover, it is difficult to think of a more concise definition of home than
the one suggested by Blunt and Dowling, who contend that home is “a spatial
imaginary: a set of intersecting and variable ideas and feelings, which are related
to context, and which construct places, extend across spaces and scales, and
connect places” (2; original emphasis). Home, for Blunt and Dowling, is thus
neither purely imaginary nor entirely reducible to the places and contexts that
form the concept’s material basis.4 Crucially, the phrases “variable” and “related
to context” in Blunt and Dowling’s definition also hint at the temporal dimen‐
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5 Other texts will be discussed throughout, but it may be useful to provide a list of the
most important recent studies available in English here: Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics
of Space (1958); Witbold Rybczynski, Home: A Short History of an Idea (1986); Nancy
Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel (1987); Rose
Marangoly George, The Politics of Home: Postcolonial Relocations and Twentieth-Century
Fiction (1996); Raffaella Sarti, Europe at Home: Family and Material Culture, 1500 – 1800
(1999); David Morley, Home Territories: Media, Mobility, and Identity (2000); Peter Blickle,
Heimat: A Critical Theory of the German Idea of Homeland (2002); Michael McKeon, The
Secret History of Domesticity: Public, Private, and the Division of Knowledge (2005); Bill
Bryson, At Home: A Short History of Private Life (2010); Jan Willem Duyvendak, The
Politics of Home: Belonging and Nostalgia in Western Europe and the United States (2011);
John Hill, At Home in the World: Sounds and Symmetries of Belonging (2010); Judith
Flanders, The Making of Home (2014); Imogen Racz, Art and the Home: Comfort, Alien‐
ation and the Everyday (2015); Michael Allen Fox, Home (2016); Thomas Barrie, House
and Home: Cultural Contexts, Ontological Roles (2017). In addition, there are many
shorter contributions, the most thought-provoking of which include: Doreen Massey,
“A Place Called Home?” (1992); Mary Douglas, “The Idea of Home” (1993); Orlando
Patterson, “Slavery, Alienation, and the Female Discovery of Personal Freedom” (1993);
Agnes Heller, “Where Are We at Home?” (1995); John Durham Peters, “Exile, No‐
madism, and Diaspora: The Stakes of Mobility in the Western Canon” (1999);
Douglas A. Marshall, “Behavior, Belonging, and Belief: A Theory of Ritual Practice”
(2002); Nicholas Howe, Introduction to Home and Homelessness in the Medieval and
Renaissance World (2004); Marco Antonsich, “Searching for Belonging: An Analytical
Framework” (2010); Cecile Sandten and Kathy-Ann Tan, “Home: Concepts, Construc‐
tions, Contexts” (2016). See also David A. Ellison, Home (2009) and Klaus Stierstorfer,
Constructions of Home (2010).
6 While it may seem tempting to replace the adjective spatiotemporal with the term
chronotope – which Bakhtin defines as “time space” and which he coined to express “the
intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically ex‐
pressed in the literature” (“Forms of Time and the Chronotope in the Novel” 84) – I
refrain from doing so because the term, in Bakhtin, applies specifically to artistic rep‐
resentation, whereas the definition of home provided here is intended to cover non-fic‐
tional uses of the term home as well.
sion of home noted earlier (highlighted as well by Sandten and Tan 3).5 To render
this aspect more explicit, we ought perhaps to amend their formula and say that
home is a spatiotemporal imaginary.6
The dual quality of home as simultaneously extending into the realm of the
imaginary and into spatiotemporal reality, in turn, constitutes the main reason
why analyzing fiction can contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon
of home as such. In The Fictive and the Imaginary (1991), Wolfang Iser rejects
the conventional binary opposition between fiction and reality, positing instead
that we ought to envisage a triadic relationship between the real, the fictive, and
the imaginary. According to Iser, a fictional text necessarily incorporates aspects
of lived reality, but at the same time it is never reducible to this referential
dimension. Instead, the act of fictionalizing also involves components and effects
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7 In the German original, the key passage runs: “Das Oppositionsverhältnis von Fiktion
und Wirklichkeit würde die Diskussion des Fiktiven im Text um seine entscheidende
Dimension verkürzen; denn offensichtlich gibt es im fiktionalen Text sehr viel Realität,
die nicht nur eine solche sozialer Wirklichkeit sein muss, sondern ebenso eine der Ge‐
fühle und Empfindungen sein kann. Diese gewiss unterschiedlichen Realitäten sind
ihrerseits keine Fiktionen, und sie werden auch nicht zu solchen, nur weil sie in die
Darstellung fiktionaler Texte eingehen. […] Bezieht sich also der fiktionale Text auf
Wirklichkeit, ohne sich in deren Bezeichnung zu erschöpfen, so ist die Wiederholung
ein Akt des Fingierens, durch den Zwecke zum Vorschein kommen, die der wieder‐
holten Wirklichkeit nicht eignen. Ist Fingieren aus der wiederholten Realität nicht
ableitbar, dann bringt sich in ihm ein Imaginäres zur Geltung, das mit der im Text
wiederkehrenden Realität zusammengeschlossen wird. So gewinnt der Akt des Fingie‐
rens seine Eigentümlichkeit dadurch, dass er die Wiederkehr lebensweltlicher Realität
im Text bewirkt und gerade in solcher Wiederholung das Imaginäre in eine Gestalt
zieht, wodurch sich die wiederkehrende Realität zum Zeichen und das Imaginäre zur
Vorstellbarkeit des dadurch Bezeichneten aufheben” (Das Fiktive und das Imaginäre 20).
8 Arguing from a Jungian perspective, John Hill makes a rather similar claim about home:
“As a symbol it mediates between outer reality and inner truth” (5).
that do not form part of the represented reality, and which must therefore stem
from some other source. Iser suggests that this other source is the imaginary,
and in his view the act of fictionalizing constitutes the creative force that ne‐
gotiates between the imaginary and the real. More precisely, the act of fiction‐
alizing ‘de-realizes’ the real by relating it to the imaginary, just as it gathers or
‘concretizes’ the free-floating impulses of the imaginary into a comprehensible
shape or Gestalt (The Fictive and the Imaginary 1 – 4).7 The fictive, in short, is the
result of a dialectical confrontation between the real and the imaginary, and as
such it is precariously poised between these different realms.
Considering that fiction’s precarious negotiation between the two poles of
the real and the imaginary also applies to the concept of home, we may now
propose that home is itself very similar to fiction: not in the sense of being
‘untrue’ or simply opposed to the real, but in the sense that any particular idea
of home is the result of a fictionalizing act that intermingles the real with the
imaginary (and vice versa).8 Fictions of home are therefore not merely narratives
that happen to thematize the dialectic of alienation and belonging; they are also,
as fictions, structurally akin to the mental processes that allow for the con‐
struction and maintenance of home in the first place. More specifically – as
Franco Moretti suggests in Signs Taken for Wonders (1983) – fictional texts con‐
stitute formal compromises between the real and the imaginary, and as such they
train us “without our being aware of it for an unending task of mediation and
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9 If Elisabeth Bronfen asserts that “a knowledge of the uncanniness of existence haunts
all attempts at devising protective fictions that will allow us to make sense of the
contradictions and contingencies of reality,” then she is in effect expressing the same
idea, albeit in a psychoanalytic rather than a Marxist idiom. After all, the phrase “un‐
ending task” in Moretti’s formulation signals that he, too, regards the formal compro‐
mise effected by any fictional text as inherently precarious and unstable.
10 Perhaps it is this idea of fiction as a home-making practice that Martin Heidegger has
in mind when he claims, in “ … Poetically Man Dwells …” (1951), that “poetry first causes
dwelling to be dwelling” (213), defining poetry as a way of “measuring” (219): “This is
why poetic images are imaginings in a distinctive sense: not mere fancies and illusions
but imaginings that are visible inclusions of the alien in the sight of the familiar” (223).
The German original runs: “Darum sind die dichterischen Bilder Ein-Bildungen in
einem ausgezeichneten Sinne: nicht bloße Phantasien und Illusionen, sondern Ein-Bil‐
dungen als erblickbare Einschlüsse des Fremden in den Anblick des Vertrauten” (“ …
dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …” 195). Robert Mugerauer succintly sums up Hei‐
degger’s view: “The poet attempts to find a true home by wandering out into the
foreign” (119).
11 For a brief account of the intellectual lineage that defines fiction as an imaginary sol‐
ution of real-life contradictions see Haslett (67).
(a)
(b)
(c)
conciliation” (40).9 Fictions themselves, that is to say, are best understood as
symbolical home-making practices, in the broadly Marxist sense that they invent
“imaginary or formal ‘solutions’ to unresolvable social contradictions”
(Jameson, The Political Unconscious 64).10 Conversely, if fictions are imaginary
attempts to reach formal compromises between real-life contradictions, then
this implies that one important task for literary critics is to unearth the problems
that fictions attempt to solve (i.e. to ‘unpack’ the conflicting forces that led to
the fictional compromise in the first place).11
And yet, even though home is structurally akin to fiction, the concepts differ
in two important respects, the first of which has to do with different types of
truth claims. The question of truth in fiction is, of course, a thorny issue (e.g.
Eagleton, The Event of Literature 106 – 166; Lamarque 220 – 254), but for our pur‐
poses it will suffice to say that fictional texts involve three basic truth claims:
claims about what is true within the fictional world or with regard to the
fictional text (i.e. intra-fictional truth claims);
claims about the adequate representation of types of real-world phe‐
nomena, or kinds of real-world experiences (i.e. generalizing truth claims);
claims about the correspondence between, on the one hand, information
provided in the fiction, and, on the other, a particular state of things in the
real world (i.e. truth claims of one-to-one correspondence).
Crucially, these three truth claims differ with regard to the grounds on which
they can be contested. In the case of intra-fictional truth claims (e.g. ‘In Shake‐
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12 As Lamarque rightly notes, literary truth “is not always to be found spelt out explicitly
in literary works,” which means that readers are often “called upon to construct their
own generalizations” (236). Accordingly, the opening line of Pride and Prejudice is used
here as a simplified example, for the sake of the argument. In the context of Jane
Austen’s novel, it should, of course, not necessarily be taken at face value.
speare’s play Hamlet, the protragonist marries Ophelia’), the information pro‐
vided in the fictional text itself forms the only basis on which we may accept or
reject such a claim (‘No, the text makes it very clear that Hamlet and Ophelia
never get married’). In the case of generalizing truth claims, by contrast (e.g.
‘Jane Austen is right when she writes: “It is a truth universally acknowledged,
that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife”’;
Pride and Prejudice 5), we must refer to evidence pertaining to the real world
when formulating a counter-argument (‘What about men who are attracted to
other men?’).12 In the case of fictional truth claims of one-to-one correspond‐
ence, finally (e.g. ‘In 1991, Zurich was the capital of Switzerland’), readers are
free to take note of divergences between the fictional world and real life (‘In fact
it was Berne’), but as it is essential to the game of fiction that constraints on
truth claims of one-to-one correspondence be playfully suspended, such diver‐
gences do not constitutes lies, or even inaccuracies. Instead, counterfactuals in
fiction prompt a series of interpretive questions: What is the function of these
divergences within the fictional text? Do they contribute to or detract from the
text’s aesthetic and rhetorical effectiveness? And is it morally justifiably to ‘play
around’ with the particular facts in question? Even in the case of fiction, in short,
truth claims of one-to-one correspondence remain open to critical debate, but
they cannot be challenged directly on the basis of their divergence from fact –
and this is what distinguishes the fictional compromise between the real and
the imaginary from the structurally analogous compromise of home as a spa‐
tiotemporal imaginary. In the case of truth claims about home, constraints on
one-to-one correspondence remain in full force, and it is therefore legitimate to
challenge any divergences of this kind directly (‘No, Dietikon is not your home
because you have no relation to that place and in fact don’t even know where
it is’).
If these different rules for how to challenge truth claims provide us with one
criterion theoretically to distinguish the concept of home from that of fiction,
then the second criterion pertains to these concepts’ respective degrees of clo‐
sure. In the case of fiction, the compromise between the real and the imaginary
is necessarily expressed in a definite shape (i.e. a finished product, such as a
written text or a film). By contrast, home as a spatiotemporal imaginary remains,
for the most part, implicit, or is expressed piecemeal, either by individuals or by
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13 Note, however, Thomas Barrie’s important caveat that “estrangement from the world
is found pan-culturally and trans-historically,” albeit with different inflections and
evaluations (4). For Barrie, one of the functions of architecture may be precisely “to
ameliorate humanity’s homeless condition” (6).
collectives, in evolving communicative situations. Home as a mental structure
is thus generally fuzzier, and likely to be less internally consistent, than fiction –
which means, conversely, that the pressure to find satisfactory compromises is
much higher in the case of fiction, as fiction must give a much more clear-cut
form to the compromise between the real and the imaginary than is the case for
constructions of home. This, in turn, allows us to speculate that the need for
fictions becomes particularly acute precisely in those moments when socio-his‐
torical pressures bring to the fore certain contradictions in the (usually implicit)
spatiotemporal imaginary of home. Fiction’s formal compromise, though per‐
haps unable truly to resolve such crises, at least serves temporarily to dilute and
reduce the contradictory stresses that threaten our sense of home and be‐
longing – which is merely to reiterate, in slightly different form, that fiction
itself is a home-making practice.
The Metaphysics of Home: Religion, the Canon, and Existential Trauma
As we have seen, home is a spatiotemporal imaginary, and as such it is concerned
with our place in the world, both in the sense of our geographical location and
of our position within the larger scheme of things. Accordingly, an inquiry into
the nature of belonging may quickly lead us beyond questions of daily existence,
toward the realm of metaphysical speculation. More specifically, inquiries into
the nature of home are likely to spark questions of a religious nature because
religions tend to hold forth the promise of a final, transcendental home. In the
Judeo-Christian tradition, for instance, humanity appears as tragically fallen:
expulsed from Eden, and exiled in the desert of earthly existence (an idea pow‐
erfully expressed, for instance, in John Milton’s Paradise Lost). As John Durham
Peters observes, there is thus at least one similarity between Judeo-Christian
and poststructuralist thought, for in both these traditions human identity is seen
as inherently incomplete and discontinuous with itself (“Exile, Nomadism, and
Diaspora” 22).13 According to Peters, Christian discourse in particular has come
to be suffused with nomadic imagery, with St. Paul’s ideas being particularly
influential: “The human body for him is a temporary, mobile dwelling in which
mortals sojourn on earth” (27 – 28). In this view, humans are wanderers on the
face of the earth, and only in death, when we have finally left our nomadic bodies
behind, is it possible for us to recover our transcendental home in God, with
whom we will forever rest in peace.
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14 Another visual reference to the Judeo-Christian tradition comes when the spaceship
that takes E. T. back home leaves behind a rainbow – an allusion to the biblical story of
the flood, after which God places a rainbow in the clouds as “the sign of the covenant”
between him and all living beings (Genesis 9: 8 – 16).
15 If, in Lawrence’s novel, Lady Chatterley also believes that “home,” like all the other
great words, has somehow been “cancelled for her generation” (62; ch. 6), then this bleak
assessment has much to do with the traumatic impact of World War I (Stevenson,
Literature and the Great War 48) – as well as with the novel’s rejection of industrial-cap‐
italist modernity in general.
Steven Spielberg’s E. T. explicitly draws on this religious narrative of aliena‐
tion and belonging in order to enhance the significance of little Elliott’s quest.
As already noted briefly, Elliott’s own father is absent from the home; he has
left the mother and moved to Mexico with his new partner. Elliott longs for the
absent father, and E. T. assumes the role of a Messiah who will guide the boy
towards a new sense of belonging. Indeed, as Thomas Sebeok has noted, E. T.’s
emotional power depends to a large extent on its “subliminal religious infra‐
structure” (662). Spielberg’s film tells the story of an otherworldly being who,
we will find, has the power to heal little Elliott’s wound when the boy cuts
himself on a sawblade; a being who dies, is resurrected, and who, in the final
scene, ascends once again to his heavenly home (Alexander 25; Tomasulo 275).
The film’s religious subtext is also apparent visually, as when E. T.’s glowing
heart alludes to the iconographic tradition of the Sacred Heart of Jesus (FIGURE
2).14 In fact, even the film’s advertising campaign has incorporated this religious
dimension, with official posters pointing to Michelangelo’s depiction of the cre‐
ation of man in the frescoes of the Sistine Chapel (FIGURE 3). In E. T. – as in many
texts about home – a protagonist’s attempt to find a place in the world thus
assumes a profoundly metaphysical dimension, and it is arguably for this very
reason that the eponymous heroine of D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover
(1928) includes home in her list of the “great words” (the others being love, joy,
happiness, mother, father, and husband; 62; ch. 6).15 At the same time, to say that
Elliott’s quest gains in metaphysical depth, as well as emotional resonance,
through the film’s use of religious imagery is not to argue that E. T. is in fact a
religious film; the point is, rather, that intertextual references affect our reac‐
tions to the film. More generally, references to religious and other texts that are
widely familiar can enhance the spectator’s sense of belonging, as they place
the individual work of art within a larger system of meaning.
Historically, it was the literary canon – or in Matthew Arnold’s famous
phrase, “the best that has been said and thought in the world” (Culture and
Anarchy 5) – that was to provide men and women with a sense of belonging to
a higher order that was not, strictly speaking, transcendental, but that at least
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transcended the spatiotemporal limits of these individuals. Indeed, the term
canon – which originally referred to the list of biblical books “accepted by the
Christian Church as genuine and inspired” (OED) – itself bears witness to the
quasi-religious function envisioned by Arnold for the monuments of high cul‐
ture. In fact, Arnold and other Victorian thinkers (e.g. Thomas Carlyle) had quite
explicitly conceived of ‘high culture’ as a means both to cultivate the soul and
to ensure social cohesion in the absence of religious certainties (Philip Davis
133 – 134; Eagleton, Literary Theory 21). Agnes Heller has captured well the uto‐
pian hope embodied in this high-cultural home that, ideally, would form the
basis for universal belonging:
This home is not private, everyone can join it, and in this sense, it is also cosmopolitan.
The assurance that everyone can join, refers both to the works that this home entails
and to the visitors who enter with nostalgia and a quest for meaning. […] At the outset
few works were admitted, now almost everything is. At the beginning there were also
few visitors but later their number began to grow. Now, this, originally European […]
home is visited by millions with all possible cultural backgrounds. (9)
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FIGURE 2: The iconography of the Sacred Heart of Jesus is reflected in E. T.’s glowing heart.
(Screenshot from E. T.; © by Amblin/Universal Studios, used by permission)
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FIGURE 3: Michelangelo’s depiction of the creation is echoed in official ads for E. T.
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Heller herself notes, however, that the canon, as envisioned by Arnold and
others, can only fulfill this function of creating a sense of universal belonging
if it remains limited and exclusive; as soon as too many works are included, the
canon’s ability to serve as a discursive home begins to crack and, ultimately,
collapses (10). The Arnoldian ideal of the canon as home is thus in one sense
inherently contradictory, for it can only serve as a discursive medium of uni‐
versal inclusion if it simultaneously remains thoroughly exclusive in terms of
the works it incorporates. Many will, in other words, not be directly represented
in this assembly of high culture, and will therefore simply have to trust that
those who are included will speak on their behalf. The logic of canonization thus
resembles closely Victorian arguments for a limited franchise – a parallel that
is arguably not accidental.
At any rate, those who happen to be unfamiliar with the canonical texts that,
supposedly, form part of “a common cognitive background” (Heller 10) may find
that intertextual references can also have a profoundly alienating effect. Com‐
edies, for instance, are a highly allusive type of genre – and therefore they travel
rather less well across cultural borders than other types of texts, for as Franco
Moretti has observed, “laughter arises out of the unspoken assumptions that are
buried very deep in a culture’s history: and if these are not your assumptions,
the automatic component so essential to laughter disappears” (“Planet Holly‐
wood” 99). When exposed to a comedy from a very distant time or place, we
may thus not experience the relief of shared laughter, but instead find ourselves
puzzled and disoriented. More generally, allusions to unknown texts may con‐
fuse rather than reassure, provided the allusion is nevertheless recognized as
such. In E. T., for instance, the film’s religious infrastructure arguably does not
feel particularly alienating for anyone because it remains largely subliminal; it
is perfectly possible to watch the film without ever realizing that it draws on
biblical imagery, so that even those who are unfamiliar with the story of Jesus
are unlikely to feel excluded from the film’s intended audience. However, E. T.
also contains a reference to Peter Pan (to which we will return later), and because
this reference is more explicit, it is possible that those who have never heard of
this text will, at least momentarily, feel alienated by its intertextual inclusion.
Let us briefly recapitulate the relation between religious transcendence and
the literary canon as a secular attempt to replace a lost metaphysical home.
Victorian intellectuals not only worried about statistics that indicated a sharp
decline in religious observance, but also themselves suffered from a sense of
metaphysical ‘unbelonging’ prompted, among other things, by Darwin’s theory
of evolution; at the same time, they hoped that the secular religion of high cul‐
ture, as encapsulated in the canon, might serve to alleviate the socially disruptive
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16 Indeed, C. A. Bayly argues that, from a global perspective, the nineteenth century in
fact witnessed an expansion of the major world religions (7), and while secularization
certainly gained ground in twentieth-century Britain (e.g. Turner 49), religion remains
central in many other countries – very much including the United States (which, inci‐
dentally, would make it possible to read E. T.’s messianic subtext as simply a cynical
attempt by Hollywood producers to convert Americans’ faith in religion into the more
tangible stuff of box-office gold).
17 In the German original, the relevant passages are: (a) “Diesen in seinem Woher und
Wohin verhüllten, aber an ihm selbst um so unverhüllter erschlossenen Seinscharakter
des Daseins, dieses ‘Dass es ist’ nennen wir die Geworfenheit des Seienden in sein Da,
so zwar, dass es als In-der-Welt-sein das Da ist” (Sein und Zeit 135); (b) “In der Angst ist
einem ‘unheimlich’. Darin kommt zunächst die eigentümliche Unbestimmtheit dessen,
wobei sich das Dasein in Angst befindet, zum Ausdruck: das Nichts und Nirgends. Un‐
heimlichkeit meint aber dabei zugleich das Nicht-zuhause-sein” (188).
effects of unbelief or agnosticism (a term that, tellingly, was coined by T. E.
Huxley in 1869; see Philip Davis 57). This is not to suggest that there was, at
some moment in the nineteenth century (or, indeed, in the century that fol‐
lowed), a total collapse of religious belief amongst each and every segment of
the population.16 Rather, the point is to emphasize that those who have no faith
in a transcendental home also lack that sense of metaphysical belonging that
religion has, for many, been able to provide. Bereft of a metaphysical home, these
unbelievers may therefore seek other, more secular types of spiritual shelter.
Following Georg Lukács, we may describe the condition that results from a
loss of faith as “transcendental homelessness” (40 – 41): a sense that human ex‐
istence is purely contingent, and that humankind is adrift in a universe that is
indifferent to human happiness or suffering. Secular individuals can, in other
words, no longer find comfort in the idea that life is securely anchored in tran‐
scendental meaning, but instead experience the Heideggerian anxiety of finding
themselves thrown into being or Dasein (Being and Time 131): an existential
angst that Heidegger explicitly describes as a sense of “not-being-at-home” (182;
see Agnes Heller 4; Mugerauer 43; O’Donoghue 139).17 Dominick LaCapra has
suggested the term structural or existential trauma to express the disturbing
nature of this experience, though at the same time LaCapra is careful to distin‐
guish this phenomenon from what he dubs historical trauma, which by contrast
“is related to specific events, such as the Shoah or the dropping of the atom bomb
on Japanese cities” (History and Memory after Auschwitz 47). In the case of E. T.,
we might therefore say that the film threatens to elide the distinction between
the existential threat of transcendental homelessness, and Elliott’s more limited,
historical trauma of losing the comforting presence of his father. More generally,
moreover, we may regard trauma as one of the most dramatic symptoms of
not-being-at-home in the world, and the discussion of Herman Melville’s
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18 For a recent, book-length study of Barrie’s story (including adaptations and sequels)
see Kirsten Stirling, Peter Pan’s Shadows in the Literary Imagination (2012).
19 See Ann Yeoman, Now or Neverland (1998) for an extended Jungian reading of Peter Pan
as a puer aeternus.
20 This may, of course, be a misleading dichotomy – but the point is that the text establishes
it as such.
Moby-Dick in chapter one will revolve precisely around such questions as tran‐
scendental homelessness and how it relates to existential and historical forms
of trauma.
Growing Up: Redefining the Meaning of Home
Returning to the discussion of Spielberg’s E. T. and its second important intertext,
Peter Pan, we must first note that, in J. M. Barrie’s story, the process of growing
up is conceived as a dialectic of exile and homecoming.18 Early on in the story,
Peter Pan – “the boy who wouldn’t grow up,” according to the subtitle of the
original stage version (179) – leads Wendy and her two little brothers away from
the family home, taking them with him to Neverland. There, Wendy and her
brothers have all kinds of dangerous adventures, but ultimately they return to
the family home where, in time, they grow up and become adults. Years later,
when Wendy tells her daughter Jenny about her adventures in Neverland, the
girl wonders why Wendy is no longer able to fly, which apparently she had been
capable of as a child. Wendy, however, knows exactly why adults, unlike chil‐
dren, remain earthbound: “they are no longer gay and innocent and heartless”
(174; ch. 17). And it is true that Peter appears heartless throughout Barrie’s story;
we learn, for instance, that with regard to heroic deeds, “it was his cleverness
that interested him and not the saving of human life” (82; ch. 4). Indeed, as Annie
Hiebert Alton rightly notes, Peter’s heartlessness is that of a very small child
who “seems unaware of the feelings of others” (174n1). Accordingly, as an
eternal child Peter is free from the ties that bind one to others, and can simply
do whatever he pleases.19 This freedom, however, comes at the cost of familial
belonging, for as we learn at the end of a chapter entitled “The Return Home” –
in which Wendy and her brothers are reunited with their parents – Peter “had
ecstasies innumerable that other children can never know, but he was looking
through the window at the one joy from which he must be for ever barred” (169;
ch. 16). In Peter Pan, in short, there is an irreconcilable conflict between, on the
one hand, freedom from interference with one’s desires, and, on the other, the
freedom to belong and be part of a family home – with everyone except Peter
eventually opting for the latter.20
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21 See Jan Willem Duyvendak: “Nostalgia is not necessarily problematic, so long as we
understand that nostalgia says more about contemporary society than it does about the
past” (107; see also Kirk 606; Peters, “Exile, Nomadism, and Diaspora” 30).
The idea that as children we enjoy a greater degree of freedom than is the
case later in life may, of course, be merely an instance of nostalgic idealiza‐
tion – and nostalgia is in fact a crucial concept in any discussion of home because
it can be understood, like trauma, as one particular symptom of alienation and
unbelonging. According to Kimberley K. Smith, the term nostalgia was coined
in 1688 by the physician Johann Hofer, who used it to describe a severe, even
potentially fatal illness diagnosed among Swiss mercenaries, and in Hofer’s view
caused by the mercenaries’ physical absence from home (509). In the course of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Smith continues, the concept’s
meaning broadened and complicated: “Once defined simply as a desire to return
home, to a specific place, nostalgia was gradually being conceptualized as a
longing to return to a former time – and usually a time the patient only imagined
to be better” (512; original emphasis). Smith’s main point, however, is that we
should not simply dismiss the longing for the past as “mere nostalgia,” but in‐
stead regard nostalgic desires “as a valuable basis for social critique” (523). While
we may all agree that it is impossible to simply return to a past state, nostalgic
subjects may nevertheless have perfectly valid reasons for rejecting the current
state of affairs. More generally, nostalgia is an expression of individual or col‐
lective values and desires that, as such, may very well be legitimate.21 If Elliott,
for instance, longs for the time before his father left the family home, then a
certain degree of nostalgic idealization may well be involved, but this does not
invalidate the boy’s desire to be reunited with a person he loves. At the same
time, Roberta Rubenstein suggests that “nostalgia, or homesickness […] is the
existential condition of adulthood” because the process of growing up turns as
all into “exiles from childhood” (4 – 5) – an idea symbolized in Peter Pan through
adults’ exile from Neverland.
At any rate, the implications of growing up as depicted in Peter Pan match
precisely some key concerns of E. T., as the latter, too, tells the story of a child
who must learn to respect the feelings of others as part of the process of coming
of age. The importance of a respect for the feelings of others is made clear early
on in Spielberg’s film when Elliott, after his first brief encounter with E. T., fails
to convince his mother (as well as his brother and sister) that he has really
stumbled upon something unusual in the field behind the family’s suburban
home:
30 Introduction – Theories of Home
MARY
[M]aybe you just probably imagined that it happened.
ELLIOTT
I couldn’t have imagined it! […] Dad would believe me.
MARY
Maybe you ought to call your father and tell him about it.
ELLIOTT
I can’t. He’s in Mexico with Sally. (Mathison 63)
Elliott’s mother is evidently shaken by her son’s heartless reference to the fa‐
ther’s new lover, and eventually leaves the kitchen in tears. Michael, Elliott’s
older brother, is furious: “Damn it! Why don’t you … grow up? Think of how
other people feel for a change!” (Mathison 64). Michael thus explicitly defines
Elliott’s task as the need to be more empathetic, and it is thus significant that
Mary will later read the story of Peter Pan not to him, but to his little sister,
Gertie, who is still young enough to be “gay and innocent and heartless,” whereas
Elliott has already left behind the stage of infantile narcissism and begun his
journey toward adulthood. Indeed, the film’s mise-en-scène during the sequence
discussed above emphasizes Elliott’s transitional state, as Elliott is shown sitting
on one side of a rather oddly-shaped, triangular kitchen table, with Gertie placed
on her own on another, and both Mary and Michael positioned at the third
(FIGURE 4). Elliott is thus situated symbolically between a very small child and
two more adult figures, while at the same time the framing of the shot makes
him appear as still closer to his younger sister. The remainder of Spielberg’s film
then tells the story of how Elliott is saved from the error of his former, childish
ways by his encounter with E. T. the Messiah. Accordingly, when at the end of
the film E. T. is ready to go back home, it is no longer Elliott, but Gertie who is
in need of spiritual guidance from the alien, whose message to her is as simple
as it is clear: “Be good” (Mathison 146).
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22 For a different (and more detailed) reading of the parallels between E. T. and Peter Pan
see Patricia Read Russel’s essay “Parallel Romantic Fantasies.”
FIGURE 4: Elliott is placed symbolically between a small child and two more adult figures.
(Screenshot from E. T.; © by Amblin/ Universal Studios, used by permission.)
And yet, above and beyond these rather homely pieties, the film’s juxtaposi‐
tion of Peter Pan with elements from the story of Jesus Christ also has some
rather more unsettling effects, which becomes apparent if we examine closely
the scene in E. T. in which the two intertextual references are most explicitly
intertwined. The scene in question occurs roughly in the middle of the film and
shows Elliott and E. T. hiding in the closet of Gertie’s bedroom while Mary is
reading to Gertie from Peter Pan. The passage Mary reads to Gertie tells the story
of how Peter tries to save the fairy Tinker Bell by breaking the frame of the
fictional world and appealing to the children in the audience:
MARY
“Her voice is so low I can scarcely tell what she is saying. She says, she says she thinks
she could get well again if children believed in fairies. Do you believe in fairies? Say
quick that you believe!” […]
GERTIE
I do, I do, I do! (Matthison 104; cf. J. M. Barrie 145).
It is precisely during this scene about children’s belief in fairies that Elliott,
hidden in the closet, cuts himself on a sawblade and starts to bleed, which
prompts E. T. to heal the boy’s wound with the gentle touch of a finger (Mathison
103 – 104). This surprising juxtaposition suggests a parallel between, on the one
hand, a belief in the healing powers of a Messiah, and, on the other, a belief in
fairies – as if the two were one and the same.22 This, in turn, illustrates the extent
to which intertextual play can develop a dynamic of its own, with various
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23 A more detailed account of the idea that intertextual frames create various kinds of
friction can be found in Simone Heller-Andrist’s monograph The Friction of the Frame
(172 – 244).
24 One classic example of such a critique is Chinua Achebe’s attack on Joseph Conrad’s
Heart of Darkness, a text that Achebe regards as profoundly racist because it portrays
Africa as “a place where man’s vaunted intelligence and refinement are finally mocked
by triumphant bestiality” (783). Note that J. Hillis Miller has formulated a nuanced
reassessment of Achebe’s argument in an essay entitled “Joseph Conrad: Should We
Read Heart of Darkness?” (Others 104 – 136).
strands of references becoming entangled and sometimes tied up in complicated
knots. Put differently, the interplay between E. T.’s combined references to Peter
Pan and to the story of Jesus Christ shows that the use of canonical intertexts
may – intentionally or not – lead to moments of friction that end up defami‐
liarizing the well-known originals.23 In this way, literary traditions are opened
up to critique – as is the case in George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss, which we
will examine in chapter two, and which, like E. T. and Peter Pan, revolves around
the problem of growing up, the protagonists’ occasionally nostalgic relation to
home and belonging, and the critical use and reexamination of established dis‐
cursive traditions (including genres such as the Bildungsroman and tragedy).
The Question of Racism and the Politics of Home
In the case of E. T., we can widen the political scope of intertextual critique if we
focus on a third set of references that relates, on the one hand, to other films
featuring aliens, and, on the other, to one of the most canonical of English novels:
Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. Admittedly, Robinson Crusoe is far less promi‐
nent a presence in the film than is Peter Pan or the story of Jesus. Nevertheless,
relating E. T. to Defoe’s novel helps us capture more precisely some of the film’s
political import. The most famous section of Defoe’s novel tells the story of how
Crusoe ends up stranded on an island that he soon regards as his “little kingdom”
(109). Accordingly, many critics have insisted that the novel’s ideology is deeply
colonialist; after all, it depicts a white man appropriating new territory that he
subsequently defends against native ‘intruders’ – with the exception of one,
whom he turns into his personal slave, imposing on him a new name, a new
language, and a new religion (e.g. Carter and McRae 154 – 155; Stam 71 – 74).
Given this colonialist ideology, one may begin to wonder for whom, precisely,
the canon comprises “the best that has been said and thought in the world” –
and critiques of this kind have of course long been central to the larger project
of postcolonial studies.24 In the context of our discussion, however, it is sufficient
to note that the story of Robinson Crusoe contrasts markedly with Spielberg’s
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E. T., whose title character, like Crusoe, is stranded alone on alien shores, but
who, unlike Crusoe, harbors no aspirations to dominate the natives.
The contrast between E. T. and Robinson Crusoe is all the more remarkable if
we bear in mind that, in the decades following the 1950s, a large number of
American films featuring aliens had revolved precisely around the threat of
invasion (e.g. Booker, Alternate Americas 5). This is not, of course, to claim that
there had never before been films in which aliens were portrayed as benevolent
creatures. For instance, in The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951), the alien Klaatu
is on a mission to save rather than destroy the human race by forcing it to
abandon its self-destructive ways. Moreover, Spielberg himself had previously
scored a huge box-office hit with Close Encounters of the Third Kind (1977), which
also features benevolent aliens. The point, however, is that, in E. T., the agents
of the government behave as if the aliens were aggressors (as many other fic‐
tional aliens – including Crusoe – in fact had been). Home is, in short, not a
pre-political space, but a conflictual terrain that usually involves the systematic
exclusion of those perceived as alien (Rosemary Marangoly George 9).
One way to account for the irrational fear exhibited by the government agents
in E. T. is to use Stephen D. Arata’s diagnosis that imperial centers may at times
suffer from an “anxiety of reverse colonization.” In a reading of Bram Stoker’s
Dracula, Arata argues that the Transylvanian Count serves as a mirror-image
of Western colonizers: an alien from the East who has spent much time and
effort to acquire useful knowledge about the Occident, and who plans to use this
knowledge “to invade and exploit Britain and her people” (638). According to
Arata, Stoker’s novel must be read against the backdrop of a fin-de-siècle per‐
ception of decline of Britain as an imperial power (622). This narrative of im‐
perial decline, in turn, explains a widespread anxiety of reverse colonization,
which Arata defines as the impression that “what has been represented as the
‘civilized’ world is on the point of being colonized by ‘primitive’ forces” (623).
Arata insists, however, that geopolitical fears are only half the story, with met‐
ropolitan guilt constituting a second key ingredient:
In the marauding, invasive Other, British culture sees its own imperial practices mir‐
rored back in monstrous form. […] Reverse colonization narratives thus contain the
potential for powerful critiques of imperialist ideologies, even if that potential usually
remains unrealized. (623)
In Arata’s view, then, anxieties of reverse colonization project the colonizing
practices of the metropolis back onto the screen of an alien Other, who may then
serve as a fantasied scapegoat figure.
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25 The fact that the color of E. T.’s skin cannot simply be dismissed as a random and in‐
significant feature is nicely summarized by Adam Roberts, who observes in his study
of science fiction: “Aliens, as popular consciousness knows, are differently coloured:
green-skinned, blue-skinned or (more latterly) grey-skinned. Skin colour, in other
words, is reflected by SF [i.e. science fiction] as the key vector of difference” (105).
26 Alexander in fact argues that E. T. as a whole is a racist fantasy in which the symbolic
representative of the oppressed turns out to be reassuringly “good-hearted and harm‐
less,” and is ultimately sent “back to where he came from” (33). I have tried to defend
Spielberg’s film against this particular charge in my essay “Resisting Governmental
Illegalization,” and would only like to add here that the association of E. T. with Jesus
is potentially anti-imperialist in its implications, for as Terry Eagleton notes, Christ was
murdered “by the Roman state and its supine colonial lackeys, who took fright at his
message of mercy and justice, as well as at his enormous popularity with the poor, and
did away with him in a highly volatile political situation. It did not help that a number
of his closest friends were probably Zealots or anti-imperialist revolutionaries” (Trouble
with Strangers 289). However, for a reading that is closer to Alexander’s, see Robin
Wood (160).
27 The suburban home and lifestyle of Elliott’s family in E. T. is, of course, inextricably
entangled with the history of race relations in the United States. For a more detailed
discussion of this problem, see chapter six of the present study.
If it is true that Dracula constituted a projection of late Victorian British
guilt, then E. T. – that dark-skinned alien who secretly enters a white suburban
home – perhaps fulfills a similar scapegoat function for a guilt-ridden United
States Empire.25 William Alexander, for instance, argues that E. T. is suffused
with markedly racist sentiments. In the film, Alexander contends, E. T. is sub‐
liminally associated not only with monkeys (by being shown next to a monkey
doll; FIGURE 5), but also with primitivism (he comes from the woods and pos‐
sesses magic powers) and with the ‘non-white’ places of the earth (at one point
E. T. is shown standing in front of a globe on which the audience can see Asia
and Africa; FIGURE 6). For Alexander, the verdict is therefore clear:
[Spielberg’s film] brings the threatening, righteously angry figure – the unemployed
black youth, the guerrilla fighter of Central America who has said ‘enough’ to the
centuries of hunger, the starving Latin American child, the napalmed Vietnamese
peasant we are trying to forget, the minimum wage worker, the potential disrupter of
suburban comfort and economic status – into the suburb. (33)26
E. T., the illegalized, dark-skinned alien, violates the boundaries of white sub‐
urbia, and the government acts quickly to try and re-establish control over the
imperial nation’s privileged social space.27 Moreover, on the larger scale of the
national home, the U. S. government’s determination to capture any illegal alien
also involves an act of force against its own citizens, whose suburban home is
invaded in E. T. by state officials (FIGURE 7). As the internment of Japanese
35Introduction – Theories of Home
28 Likewise, when placed in the context of South African history, the term ‘homeland’ is
itself decidedly unhomely, as it was used by the Apartheid regime to designate ten
preponderantly rural areas assigned as mandatory places of residence to the country’s
black population (Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1).
Americans during World War II (David M. Kennedy 748 – 760) or more recent
US policies in the wake of 9 / 11 or have shown, when ‘homeland security’ is
supposedly at stake, the oft-proclaimed sanctity of the private home quickly
becomes irrelevant for the very powers supposed to protect it.28 Both these his‐
torical examples highlight the crucial analytical importance of relating partic‐
ular, small-scale homes to their broader social, cultural, and historical contexts –
and it is precisely the politics and ethics of homes situated in a metropolitan
center that will constitute a key theme in the discussion in chapter three of
Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway.
FIGURE 5: E. T. happens to hide right next to a monkey doll. (Screenshot from E. T.; © by
Amblin/ Universal Studios, used by permission.)
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FIGURE 6: The globe next to E. T. shows two ‘non-white’ continents: Africa and Asia.
(Screenshot from E. T.; © by Amblin/ Universal Studios, used by permission.)
FIGURE 7: Government officials invade the home they are supposed to protect. (Screen‐
shot from E. T.; © by Amblin/ Universal Studios, used by permission.)
The Return of the Repressed: History, the Family, and the Freudian
Uncanny
While homes in general are shaped by larger power structures, the particular
agents of domination often reside in the home itself, with some inhabitants
exerting a truly tyrannous control over the minds and bodies of others
(Douglas, “The Idea of Home” 277). Children, for instance, are often seen as key
inhabitants of truly homely homes, but many parents do not grant them much
“agency in the running or representation of these homes” (Blunt and Dowling
115). Such familial domination in fact plays an important part in E. T., for it is
because Elliott’s mother would surely not allow E. T. to stay that the boy hides
him from her. Indeed, given that Elliott at one point literally keeps E. T. in the
closet, his fear of parental sanction may productively be read from a queer
perspective: the alien, it seems, must not come out. More generally speaking,
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what counts as a ‘proper’ or ‘homely’ home very often depends on individuals’
physical and moral conformity to cultural ideals and prejudices, and the sup‐
posedly private family home often serves as one key site where these values are
passed on to future generations.
To some extent the formative influence of childhood homes explains the
widespread assumption that learning more about someone’s home tells us
something about the kind of person they are. As we have already seen, it is
precisely this assumption that motivates Elliott to convey the meaning of
“home” to E. T.: the boy wants to find out where the alien comes from in order
to understand what kind of being he is. Such a “conflation of home and self” is,
as Rosemary Marangoly George points out, a central trope in various disciplines:
“literary theory, architecture, sociology, political science, geography, philos‐
ophy and psychology” (19). At the same time, Marangoly George highlights the
danger inherent in conflating home and self, as those who are homeless, or who
happen to live in ‘deviant’ homes, may easily come to be judged as faulty selves
(24). This is all the more so because, as Blunt and Dowling observe, in any given
society or culture “a central feature of imaginaries of home is their idealiza‐
tion: certain dwelling structures and social relations are imagined to be ‘better’”
(100). Historically specific ideals of a ‘stable home’ help explain, for instance,
why ‘unsettled’ nomads have repeatedly been regarded as a threat to societal
order, with the nineteenth century in particular witnessing a worldwide on‐
slaught on nomadic ways of life (Bayly 434; Osterhammel 173).
In addition, the formative influence of childhood homes is one reason why
the family is of such crucial importance to the discourse of psychoanalysis. In
her study Figurations of Exile, Barbara Straumann even suggests that psycho‐
analysis is “the most paradigmatic critical discourse of twentieth-century cul‐
ture to address questions of identity and belonging as well as the fundamental
dislocation subtending all subjectivity” (13). Freud, for instance, famously used
a bourgeois domestic metaphor when he argued that the ego “is not master in
his own house” (Introductory Lectures 285), and such concepts as the family
romance and the Oedipal triangle between mother, father, and child, are of
course central to psychoanalytic endeavors. In addition, in later texts – such as
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) or Civilization and Its Dis‐
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29 Another example for the psychoanalytic concern with home would be the collection of
essays by D. W. Winnicott, Home Is Where We Start From (1986). Examples from Jungian
or analytical psychology would include John Hill’s At Home in the World (2010) as well
as the essays published in On Home and the Wanderer, a special issue of Spring: A Journal
of Archetype and Culture 85 (2011).
30 The German original runs: “[Das] Unheimlich ist wirklich nichts Neues oder Fremdes,
sondern etwas dem Seelenleben von alters her Vertrautes, das ihm nur durch den
Prozess der Verdrängung entfremdet worden ist” (“Das Unheimliche” 264).
31 Jung’s concept of the shadow is in fact very similar to Freud’s notion of the double. This
becomes apparent, for instance, in Jung’s essay “Archetypes of the Collective Uncon‐
scious”: “[T]he meeting with ourselves belongs to the more unpleasant things that can
be avoided so long as we can project everything negative into the environment. But if
we are able to see our own shadow and can bear knowing about it, then a small part of
the problem has already been solved” (20; § 44). The German original runs: “[D]ie Be‐
gegnung mit sich selbst gehört zu den unangenehmeren Dingen, denen man entgeht,
solange man alles Negative auf die Umwelt projizieren kann. Ist man imstande, den
eigenen Schatten zu sehen und das Wissen um ihn zu ertragen, so ist ein erster kleiner
Teil der Aufgabe gelöst” (“Über die Archetypen des kollektiven Unbewussten” 23). For
a good summary of Jung’s concept of the shadow see Murray Stein, Jung’s Map of the
Soul (105 – 124).
contents (1930), Freud explicitly addresses the question of belonging to larger
social structures.29
The most frequently evoked text by Freud on the issue of home is, however,
his essay on the uncanny: a type of fear that arises when one is confronted with
something that seems other to oneself, but which in fact represents a repressed,
unassimilated part of the self. Noting that the German word unheimlich (‘un‐
canny’) not only contains the word heimlich (‘secret,’ ‘hidden,’ or ‘covert’), but
is also related to the homely and familiar (e.g. das Heim, heimelig; “The Uncanny”
126 – 134), Freud argues that the uncanny is best understood as “something that
was long familiar to the psyche and was estranged from it only through being
repressed” (148).30 The double or Doppelgänger is, for Freud, one particularly
frequent motif associated with the uncanny (141), and E. T. in fact functions as
the uncanny double for Elliott. As Julia Kristeva notes, initially one’s encounter
with the double “is a shock” (Strangers to Ourselves 188) – and in Spielberg’s film,
shock is Elliott’s first reaction at seeing E. T. when the boy stumbles upon him
in the field behind his suburban home.31 Crucially, E. T.’s reaction mirrors El‐
liott’s precisely, and they flee from each other in panic. In time, however, Elliott
overcomes his initial reaction of shock and coaxes E. T. to the safety of his room.
There, E. T. soon becomes sleepy, and Elliott, too, drifts off to sleep, as if to
emphasize the extent to which they mirror each other. In a later sequence, in
the course of which Elliott explains the contents of his room to E. T., the alien
tries to eat Elliott’s toy car, prompting the boy to exclaim: “Hey, wait a second!
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32 For a brief summary of these mechanisms see Freud, The Joke and Its Relation to the
Unconscious (20 – 21).
No! You don’t eat ’em. Are you hungry? I’m hungry” (Mathison 69). The emo‐
tional parallel between them thus continues, and while Elliott goes to the kitchen
to grab some food, E.  T. explores the boy’s room and finds an umbrella. Suddenly,
the umbrella opens and startles, not only E. T., but also Elliott, who is still down‐
stairs in the kitchen. This moment makes it clear to the audience that there is a
mysterious telepathic link between the two – and Freud explicitly mentions
telepathy as yet another motif typically associated with the uncanny (141).
Given E. T.’s function as Elliott’s (initially) uncanny double, there is a good
case to be made that the alien in fact represents Elliott’s unconscious. Thomas
Sebeok, for instance, has pointed out that E.  T. and Elliott are not merely friends,
but in a profound sense “identical, as the boy’s very name, ElliotT, insinuates”
(661). From ‘Elliott’ to ‘E.  T.’ by means of condensation and displacement: we
are faced with two of the crucial mechanisms of the Freudian unconscious.32
Moreover, in one scene in Spielberg’s film E. T. makes a notably appreciative
noise when seeing Elliott’s mother, Mary, in a tight-fitting Halloween costume,
as if Elliott’s Oedipal desire for Mary had been displaced onto his alien friend.
In fact, a scene was cut from the final version of the film that would have ren‐
dered this Oedipal dimension much more explicit, with E. T. going into Mary’s
room and leaving some candy on her pillow to imply “that E. T. had a crush on
Mary” (Mathison 104). One may therefore speculate that the filmmaker’s deci‐
sion to cut the scene constituted an act of censorship in the precise psychoana‐
lytic sense of an attempt to repress inadmissible desires.
Another sequence, at the end of which Elliott kisses a girl in school, not only
strengthens the idea that E. T. embodies Elliott’s unconscious, but also suggests
that even desire itself – that seemingly innermost part of our nature – is in fact
shaped at least in part by public forces. In this complex sequence, the film in‐
tercuts two different scenes: on the one hand, we see E. T. exploring the family
home while everyone is away at school or work, and on the other hand we follow
Elliott’s adventures in the classroom. Throughout the sequence, the telepathic
link between E. T. and Elliott is emphasized, as when E. T. drinks some beer that
he discovers in the fridge, which leaves not only him, but also Elliott notably
inebriated (with E. T. bumping into the kitchen cabinet, and Elliott winking at a
pretty girl and then slowly sliding off his chair, onto the classroom floor). Both
the alien and the boy eventually recover their wits, and we see E. T. watching
TV while Elliott is now in biology class, where he and his classmates are expected
to anesthetize frogs and then to dissect them. Elliott, however, when looking at
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33 For a more general account of this Lacanian claim that Žižek makes in The Pervert’s
Guide to Cinema (dir. Sophie Fiennes) see Žižek’s Looking Awry (6). For two similar
accounts of the self as inseparable from otherness see Julie Kristeva, Strangers to Our‐
selves (1988), and Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (1990).
34 Note that Terry Eagleton describes the symbolic order as a structure in which we are
“never entirely at home,” in part because the imaginary always remains with us as a
kind of excess (Trouble with Strangers 84).
the helpless, lonely frog on his desk, is suddenly reminded of E. T.; muttering
“Save him” to himself, the boy first frees his own frog and then proceeds to
liberate the others (Mathison 88) – which, unsurprisingly, leads to chaos in the
classroom. The film now cuts back to E. T. watching TV, and we find him
watching a “soppy love scene” from the movie The Quiet Man (Mathison 90).
E. T. watches engrossed as the male protagonist grabs the arm of his female
counterpart, pulling her close in a dramatic sweep and kissing her as passion‐
ately as only movie heroes can. Next, we return to the classroom, where Elliott
will soon re-enact this heterosexual fantasy scenario with the pretty girl he had
winked at earlier on. The scene thus bears out Slavoj Žižek’s claim that cinema
“doesn’t give you what you desire; it tells you how to desire” (The Pervert’s Guide
to Cinema) – which in turn implies that our desires are to some extent alien to
ourselves, shaped and mediated in crucial ways by the public media discourses
to which we are exposed even in the privacy of our homes.33
It is at this point that we must note that E. T.’s role as a representation of
Elliott’s unconscious shifts from being at first associated with the Id (e.g. Oedipal
desire) to becoming an embodiment of the super-ego. If E. T., in the beginning,
provides Elliott merely with a mirror image of his own psychic drives, then after
his death and resurrection the alien becomes an awe-inspiring, messianic figure
who urges Gertie to “[b]e good,” and who thus voices – very much in the Name
of the Lacanian Father – the moral imperative commonly associated with the
super-ego (Homer 57 – 58; Thurschwell 48). In passing, we may observe that E. T.
tells only the female child to be good, and that this is perhaps due to the mi‐
sogynist bias that Phyllis Deutsch detects in Spielberg’s film (12 – 13). More im‐
portantly, for the time being, we must note that E. T.’s death is the moment when
the telepathic link between the alien and Elliott is finally broken, as if to em‐
phasize that the boy has now moved beyond his earlier, narcissistic identification
with the double or mirror-image, and instead accepted the symbolic call of a
newfound father figure.34 It is precisely such intimate notions as desire and the
uncanny, as well as the question of how the father’s material and symbolic po‐
sition within the familial home relates to wider socio-historical contexts, which
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35 For a highly accessible introduction to feminist criticism see Pam Morris, Literature and
Feminism.
will be explored in detail in the discussion of William Faulkner’s Absalom, Ab‐
salom! in chapter four.
Alienation and Oppression at Home: Feminist and Marxist Critiques
Some of the most powerful critiques of the father’s position within the family
home have arguably come from feminist thinkers. The institution of marriage,
for instance, has historically been deeply problematic for women – an insight
that is memorably expressed by Bathsheba Everdene in Thomas Hardy’s Far
from the Madding Crowd (1874), when she explains to Liddy, her maid and con‐
fidante, why simply to run away from an unhappy marital union does not con‐
stitute a viable solution for her:
A runaway wife is an encumbrance to everybody, a burden to herself, and a byword –
all of which make up a heap of misery greater than any that comes by staying at home,
though this may include the trifling items of insults, beating and starvation. Liddy, if
you ever marry – God forbid that you ever should – you’ll find yourself in a fearful
situation; but mind this, don’t you flinch. Stand your ground and be cut to pieces. (299)
In a deeply patriarchal society, where married women are seen as belonging to
their husbands in the sense of being their rightful property, it seems illusory to
Bathsheba that leaving her husband would result in anything as desirable as
freedom. On the contrary, for a woman in Victorian Britain such an act would
mean enduring consequences that are so severe that it appears preferable to
Bathsheba to stay in a home where one is exposed to “insults, beating and star‐
vation” – which is, as feminists have long pointed out, a sadly appropriate de‐
scription of the kinds of home in which many women have been forced to live
(Blunt and Dowling 125 – 126). In short, true to the belief so memorably expressed
in the slogan that ‘the personal is political,’ feminist critics have explored the
extent to which the private space of the home is in fact intricately related to,
and indeed inseparable from, the gendered division of the public sphere char‐
acteristic of patriarchal society.35
One key historical moment in the construction of modern gender difference
is the so-called Age of Enlightenment. Jean-Jaques Rousseau, for instance, ar‐
gued that women were by nature made to be subjugated, dependent on the
judgment of men, and unsuited to abstract and speculative thought (Émile 411,
418, and 448) – views vehemently opposed even at the time (e.g. by Mary Woll‐
stonecraft in A Vindication of the Rights of Women). As Dorinda Outram points
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out, the ideas of philosophers like Rousseau attempted to limit women’s sphere
to the domestic world, and some historians suggest that industrialization con‐
tributed to such a ‘sexual division of labor.’ The association of women with the
domestic sphere in fact preceded the period of industrialization, and as Outram
notes the true Enlightenment innovation was its use of medical or biological
‘evidence’ to naturalize earlier ideas about gender difference (91). At the same
time, Outram continues, women in fact assumed eminently important functions
in the creation and maintenance of an Enlightenment public sphere, both as
hosts of salons and as authors (94 – 96). Accordingly, critics like Amanda Vickery
have cautioned against the assumption that men and women truly lived in en‐
tirely ‘separate spheres’ (413; see Sharon Marcus 6 – 7; Michael McKeon, The
Secret History of Domesticity 168 – 170).
Nevertheless, there are of course countless literary texts that evoke this
ideology of separate spheres, from little-known Victorian novels like Annie
Lucas’s The City and the Castle (“[F]rom the calm, tender eyes of a noble, loving
wife, shone the faithful, comprehensive love, that makes the light of an earthly
home”; 427) to African American interwar classics like Zora Neale Hurston’s
Their Eyes Were Watching God (“She’s uh woman and her place is in de home”;
69). Similarly, Ania Loomba has shown that in nationalist struggles against
colonial masters, women are “usually cast as mothers or wives, and are called
upon to literally and figuratively reproduce the nation” (180). Male nationalists
have, in other words, often deployed women’s supposedly private position in
the family home for eminently public purposes. The key feminist insight is, in
short, that in the critical analysis of home, we need to pay close attention to the
way in which home participates in, and perhaps even underpins, the gendering
of social space (including the public-private divide).
In the case of E. T., for instance, Phyllis Deutsch argues that Elliott’s mother,
Mary, is systematically devalued as a character as part of the film’s promotion
of a patriarchal agenda. Deutsch observes, among other things, that the male
children in the film never blame the absent father for their parents’ separation.
Instead, they lovingly remember the father while directing feelings of frustration
at their mother. Moreover, according to Deutsch the film emphasizes Mary’s
inadequacy as a single parent in a scene where she calls the police because Elliott
has temporarily gone missing:
[A] policeman grills Mary trying to find out if anything has happened in the family
that might have caused her son to run away. Mary tearfully replies that her husband
has gone and that “it hasn’t been easy on the children.” Clearly, she’s the one at fault:
she’s at home and not doing a proper job raising the kids. […] In the viewer’s mind,
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daddy’s departure is subliminally excusable: would you want to live with such an
unstable woman? (12 – 13)
The film, Deutsch continues, in effect portrays Mary as a comic buffoon who
“constantly misses the obvious,” and the film’s religious infrastructure only
serves to support this misogynist bias because it moves “from father to king to
God with sweeping grandeur,” leaving “a lot of troubled women in its wake” (12).
If Mary, by the end of the film, does seem more emotionally stable, then for
Deutsch this is not a sign of her progress as a woman, but instead appears as
related to a “nice male scientist” who stands next to Mary in the movie’s final
scene (13). All homes, in short, need a competent mother, but for Deutsch E. T.
makes the sexist point that female competence ultimately depends on the pres‐
ence of a male – and although Deutsch’s account of the portrayal of Mary may
be somewhat too scathing, her argument certainly supports William Ale‐
xander’s more cautious claim that the film’s “sexual politics are not the most
advanced” (27).
Crucially, feminism’s insistence that the privacy of the home is inseparable
from societal structures of domination constitutes its most direct link to the
Marxist tradition, according to which social alienation necessarily affects a per‐
son’s entire being. In a sense, this Marxian insight is already encapsulated in the
etymology of the word ‘economy,’ which nowadays refers predominantly to
public activities in the capitalist market, but which originally derives from the
management of the oikos: the Ancient Greek term for ‘household’ or ‘family’
(OED; see McKeon, The Secret History of Domesticity 7 – 8). Moreover, the im‐
portance for classic Marxism to pay close attention to the material shape of the
home is evident in Friedrich Engels’s The Condition of the Working Class in
England in 1844:
I assert that thousands of industrious and worthy people – far worthier and more to
be respected than all the rich of London – […] find themselves in a condition unworthy
of human beings; and that every proletarian, everyone, without exception, is exposed
to a similar fate without any fault of his own and in spite of every possible effort.
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36 The German original runs: “[I]ch behaupte, dass Tausende von fleissigen und braven
Familien, viel braver, viel ehrenwerther als sämmtliche Reichen von London, in dieser
eines Menschen unwürdigen Lage sich befinden, und dass jeder Proletarier, jeder ohne
Ausnahme, ohne seine Schuld und trotz allen seinen Anstrengungen, von gleichem
Schicksal getroffen werden kann. – / Aber bei alledem sind diejenigen noch glücklich,
die nur noch ein Obdach irgend einer Art haben – glücklich gegen die ganz Ob‐
dachlosen. In London stehen jeden Morgen funfzig [sic] Tausend Menschen auf, ohne
zu wissen, wo sie für die nächste Nacht ihr Haupt hinlegen sollen” (45).
But in spite of all this, they who have some kind of a shelter are fortunate, fortunate
in comparison with the utterly homeless. In London fifty thousand human beings get
up every morning, not knowing where they are to lay their heads at night. (43 – 44)36
The poor are either homeless or live in the most unworthy conditions, and
Engels insists that in such filthy circumstances “only a physically degenerate
race, robbed of all humanity, degraded, reduced morally and physically to bes‐
tiality, could feel comfortable and at home” (75). Engels argues, then, that the
industrial proletariat suffers from such precarious conditions at home that their
humanity itself threatens to become deformed.
Meanwhile, if Engels focuses on the material conditions in workers’ homes,
Marx turns his attention to the process of production that, he argues, reduces
the workers’ sense of belonging or being at home. According to Marx, the force
underlying proletarians’ sense of unbelonging is their continual experience of
estranged or alienated labor:
What, then, constitutes the alienation of labor?
First, the fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his
essential being; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies
himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and
mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only
feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside of himself. He is at home
when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labor is
therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction
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37 The German original runs: “Worin besteht nun die Entäusserung der Arbeit? / Erstens,
dass die Arbeit dem Arbeiter äusserlich ist, d. h. nicht zu seinem Wesen gehört, dass er
sich daher in seiner Arbeit nicht bejaht, sondern verneint, nicht wohl, sondern un‐
glücklich fühlt, keine freie phsysische und geistige Energie entwickelt, sondern seine
Physis abkasteit und seinen Geist ruiniert. Der Arbeiter fühlt sich daher erst ausser der
Arbeit bei sich und in der Arbeit ausser sich. Zu Hause ist er, wenn er nicht arbeitet
und wenn er arbeitet, ist er nicht zu Haus. Seine Arbeit ist daher nicht freiwillig, sondern
gezwungen, Zwangsarbeit. Sie ist daher nicht die Befriedigung eines Bedürfnisses, son‐
dern sie ist nur ein Mittel, um Bedürfnisse ausser ihr zu befriedigen” (Ökonomisch-phi‐
losophische Manuskripte 514; original emphasis).
38 See Marx’s remarks in the third volume of Capital: “[T]he realm of freedom does not
commence until the point is passed where labor under the compulsion of necessity and
of external utility is required. […] Just as the savage must wrestle with nature, in order
to satisfy his wants, in order to maintain his life and reproduce it, so civilized man has
to do it, and he must do it in all forms of society and under all possible modes of
production. [… There] always remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that de‐
velopment of human power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which,
however, can flourish only upon that realm of necessity as its basis” (Capital 954 – 955).
The German original runs: “Das Reich der Feiheit beginnt in der Tat erst da, wo das
Arbeiten, das durch Not und äussere Zweckmässigkeit bestimmt ist, aufhört […]. Wie
der Wilde mit der Natur ringen muss, um seine Bedürfnisse zu befriedigen, um sein
Leben zu erhalten und zu reproduzieren, so muss es der Zivilisierte, und er muss es in
allen Gesellschaftsformen und unter allen möglichen Produktionsweisen. [… Es bleibt]
immer ein Reich der Notwendigkeit. Jenseits desselben beginnt die menschliche Kraf‐
tentwicklung, die sich als Selbstzweck gilt, das wahre Reich der Freiheit, das aber nur
auf jenem Reich der Notwendigkeit als seiner Basis aufblühen kann” (Das Kapital 355).
of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. (Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts 74; original emphasis)37
Marx thus suggests that all humans have a right to feel at home when at work –
indeed, that the freedom to choose one’s work according to one’s abilities and
desires constitutes the very essence of humanity as such (whereas animals are
not in general able to make such choices; Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
74 – 75).38 However, in Marx’s view, for the vast majority, the capitalist system
of production reduces work to a mere means of survival – i.e. to its ex‐
change-value – which in turn leaves the experience of work devoid of any
use-value: of the specifically human pleasure that one can gain through creative
self-expression.
In the case of E. T., the effects of a social system where exchange-value trumps
use-value can be seen most clearly in the technocratic approach of most of the
film’s adults to non-human life. The scene at school in which Elliott and his
classmates are set the task of anesthetizing and dissecting frogs, for instance,
confronts us with a society that inoculates its children with a disregard for other
life-forms in the name of scientific knowledge: perfect evidence for Louis Al‐
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39 In her novel Ceremony, Leslie Marmon Silko formulates a similar critique of the
school’s role in accustoming children to a disrespect of animal life by contrasting it to
Native American beliefs (incidentally also using frogs “bloated with formaldehyde” as
an image to bring across the point; 194).
40 In the French original, the full sentence runs: “Car ce n’est pas une légére entreprise de
démêler ce qu’il y a d’originaire & d’artificiel dans la Nature actuelle de l’homme, & de
bien connoître un Etat qui n’existe plus, qui n’a peut-être point existé, qui probablement
n’existera jamais, & dont il est pourtant nécessaire d’avoir des Notions justes pour bien
juger de nôtre état présent” (lvii – lviii; the spelling of the 1755 edition is retained).
thusser’s thesis that schools form part of what he calls ideological state appa‐
ratuses (132 – 133).39 Given this kind of education, it is not surprising that the
government agents and scientists do not pay any heed to E. T.’s needs and desires,
but instead simply try to capture, immobilize, and exploit him in order to gain
new knowledge. Accordingly, when the scientists finally get their hands on the
alien, they do not hesitate to link him up to their machines and to isolate him
from Elliott, his only friend – just as the industrial laborer’s experience of mech‐
anized work often isolates him or her from fellow workers. In short, inured to
scientific violence through years of training and therefore no longer knowing
what they do, the scientists hasten E. T.’s Christ-like death. (We may add, inci‐
dentally, that Jesus happened to be the son of a working man.) We will revisit
the problem of alienated work, as well as the question of how it relates to
gendered spaces and bodies, in the discussion in chapter five of Pat Barker’s
Union Street.
Nature, Technology, and Communication
To the extent that the social system depicted in E. T. seems to have fostered
alienation from nature as well as alienation between men, we may also relate
the film to some of the theories proposed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Arguing
against Thomas Hobbes, and echoing Michel de Montaigne’s concept of the
noble savage (Garrard 125), Rousseau can be seen as the first secular theorist of
alienation. Rousseau suggested that man in the state of nature had been virtuous
and innocent but had since become corrupted through the pressures of society
towards conformity and dissimulation. In the preface to A Discourse on In‐
equality, Rousseau calls the state of nature “a state which no longer exists, which
perhaps never existed, and which will probably never exist” (68), thus admitting
freely that the concept may merely be a theoretical fiction that does not neces‐
sarily refer to a particular historical reality.40 Moreover, as Andrew Biro con‐
tends, Rousseau did not advocate a return to nature in the naive sense of aban‐
doning society altogether; rather, Rousseau “tried to articulate solutions to the
problem of alienation from nature” while at the same time conceiving of human
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41 After all Rousseau maintains, in The Social Contract, that society is inevitable because
“there is a point in the development of mankind at which the obstacles to men’s
self-preservation in the state of nature are too great to be overcome by the strength that
any one individual can exert” (54; bk. 1, ch. 6). The French original runs: “Je suppose les
hommes parvenus à ce point où les obstacles qui nuisent à leur conservation dans l’état
de nature, l’emportent par leur résistance sur les forces que chaque individu peut em‐
ployer pour se maintenir dans cet état primitif” (Contrat social 20).
beings “in a social (or postnatural) state” (Biro 60).41 For Rousseau, alienation is
thus a historically conditioned phenomenon that can, for that very reason, be
overcome (or at least mitigated) through changes to the social structure.
And indeed, E. T., too, does not dream naively of total regression to some
pristine state of nature, but instead develops a critique of society’s alienation
from nature precisely along Rousseauian lines. At the beginning of Spielberg’s
film, we encounter E. T. and his fellow aliens in the deep night of a Californian
forest, peacefully engaged in collecting samples of plants. The aliens do not
simply cut off these plants, but instead remove them together with their roots
as well as some soil to ensure that they can continue to thrive. Subsequently,
the film’s mise-en-scène emphasizes the contrast between, on the one hand, the
aliens’ quietly harmonious presence in the forest, and, on the other, the disrup‐
tive government agents, who arrive in droning cars with glaring lights and ex‐
haust pipes spewing forth their toxic fumes. The contrast between these cars –
metallic, angular contraptions – and the aliens’ soft-glowing, chubby spaceship
could, indeed, scarcely be more pointed. At the same time, the scene makes clear
that Spielberg’s film is not hostile to technology as such. Rather, in showing that
the ecologically sensitive aliens have mastered the technology of interplanetary
space travel – an achievement that has so far eluded the technocratic humans –
E. T. suggests that a more respectful kind of science (i.e. one not driven exclu‐
sively by the logic of exchange-value) would in the long run be both more pro‐
ductive and beneficent.
The idea, however, that the alien way of life could serve as a model for a better
society no longer works if the aliens in E. T. are conceived as by nature funda‐
mentally other than humans – and according to William Alexander the con‐
struction of such an essential difference is precisely the ideological point of
Spielberg’s film. We have already examined Alexander’s suggestion that E. T.,
as a dark-skinned alien, must be interpreted in racialist terms. However,
Alexander further contends that the film E. T. attempts to naturalize racial dif‐
ference, and that the scene in which Elliott saves the frogs from being anesthe‐
tized and dissected is crucial to this ideological project: “Elliott, E. T. in mind,
releases his frog and urges the other pupils to release theirs, chanting ‘Back to
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the river and forest,’ a refrain the other children pick up” (31). Both E. T. and the
frogs, Alexander maintains, are thus portrayed as being “out of their native
habitat”; they are, the implication is, depicted as naturally unfit for life in a white,
suburban environment, and must therefore “go back to where they came from”
(31 – 33). For Alexander, that is to say, E. T. superficially promotes tolerance and
acceptance, but is ultimately an attempt at cementing exclusion. Accordingly,
as the film progresses, E. T. becomes increasingly sick, which would only seem
to confirm that there is indeed something in the earthly environment to which
the alien is simply unable to adapt. At any rate, if Alexander’s claim that E. T.
naturalizes difference is correct, then this would undermine the idea that the
aliens could become role models for the humans, as it hardly makes sense to
emulate those who are clearly unfit to cope with the natural conditions that
apply on earth.
However, Alexander’s argument in fact fails to do justice to Spielberg’s film
because it does not take into account the central role of communication. Early
on in the film, E. T. and Elliott are not really able to communicate with each
other at all, and only gradually does the alien learn to use human language. Once
he is able to make himself understood, however, E. T. is quick to point out to
Elliott that he would like to re-establish contact with his fellow aliens: “E. T.
phone home” (Mathison 100). Accordingly, we do not necessarily have to at‐
tribute the fact that E. T. becomes increasingly sick in the course of the film to
his supposedly natural ‘unfitness.’ Instead, we may suggest that his illness is the
consequence of a crushing sense of isolation: hostility from all sides in the host
community, and an utter lack of communicative ties with the home com‐
munity. Indeed, what supports this interpretation is the fact that E. T.’s resur‐
rection towards the end of the film occurs at the precise moment when the other
aliens, having picked up a signal of distress from a device that E. T. built espe‐
cially to re-establish contact, are finally about to return to earth. E. T.’s illness
thus does not serve to naturalize his absolute Otherness, but instead suggests
that his suffering arises from a lack of communal support, either from aliens or
from humans (with the exception of a handful of children, who are not in a
position of power and on whom E. T. therefore cannot depend in the long run
for protection).
Communication – or the lack of it – thus prove vital to the notion of home
as it is encapsulated in E. T., and several critics have likewise noted that com‐
munication in the form of language and cultural conventions is crucial to our
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42 See Evetts-Secker for a Jungian interpretation of the importance of formulaic expres‐
sions in creating “a language in which the soul is at home” (138).
43 The German original runs: “Es genügt noch nicht, um sich einander zu verstehen, dass
man dieselben Worte gebraucht; man muss dieselben Worte auch für dieselbe Gattung
innerer Erlebnisse gebrauchen, man muss zuletzt seine Erfahrung miteinander gemein
haben. Deshalb verstehen sich die Menschen Eines Volkes besser unter einander als
Zugehörige verschiedner Völker, selbst wenn sie sich der gleichen Sprache bedienen;
oder vielmehr, wenn Menschen lange unter ähnlichen Bedingungen (des Klima’s, des
Bodens, der Gefahr, der Bedürfnisse, der Arbeit) zusammen gelebt haben, so entsteht
daraus etwas, das ‘sich versteht,’ ein Volk” (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 253; § 268; original
emphasis).
sense of belonging.42 For instance, in his study Migration in World History, Pat‐
rick Manning notes that those “who move from one community to another must
learn not only a new language, but also an accompanying set of customs” (4).
Likewise, Agnes Heller emphasizes the importance of cultural conventions for
our sense of being at home:
A home is always a human habitat, a network of human bonds and ties, a community
of kind. At home, one talks without footnotes but one can talk without footnotes on
the condition that one talks to someone who understands. And if one understands the
other from a few words, allusions, and gestures, a common cognitive background is
already presupposed. (10)
Heller emphasizes that communication is facilitated by a “common cognitive
background,” and Friedrich Nietzsche – who is otherwise notoriously skeptical
about language and the value of communication (Grimm 24n26) – concedes that
shared, lived experience greatly facilitates the exchange of ideas:
It is not sufficient to use the same words to understand one another: we must also
employ the same words for the same kind of internal experiences, we must in the end
have experiences in common. On this account the people of one nation understand
one another better than those belonging to different nations, even when they use the
same language; or rather, when people have lived long together under similar cir‐
cumstances (of climate, soil, danger, requirement, toil) there originates therefrom an
entity that ‘understands itself’ – namely, a nation. (Beyond Good and Evil 213 – 214;
§ 268; original emphasis)43
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44 In an extended discussion, one would also have to bear in mind that not all languages
have a word that is synonymous with home. Judith Flanders, for example, distinguishes
between “home and house languages” (4). The home languages – English, the Germanic
and Scandinavian languages, as well as the Finno-Ugric group – distinguish between
the concepts of home and house (3). The Romance and Slavic languages, by contrast,
“have just one word for both meanings” (4). See also Anna Wierzbicka, who in Impris‐
oned in English (2014) cautions against the uncritical assumption that concepts which
exist in English – “the first ever global lingua franca” (64) – necessarily exist in all
languages, even if they do not have a specific word for a given concept.
Nietzsche’s remarks point to the eminently social nature of language, which
acquires its meaning in reference to shared experiences, where words can be
measured against their context in an intersubjective process of negotiation.44
To say that the seemingly immaterial homes of language and communication
are social phenomena necessarily implies that the ability to communicate is
determined by decidedly material conditions. As Aijaz Ahmad rightly insists,
the idea of ‘determination’ is not to be understood as implying an utter lack of
human agency; rather, it refers “to the givenness of the circumstance within
which individuals make their choices, their lives, their histories” (6; original
emphasis). For example, in Spielberg’s film, E. T.’s ability to communicate with
his fellow aliens is determined by the meager resources at his disposal: an elec‐
tronic toy, an umbrella, and some other items he can find in Elliott’s home.
If E. T. nevertheless manages to build a device that allows him to send a signal
of distress to his fellow aliens, then it is reasonable to assume that he would
have been able to construct a much more powerful and reliable device if he had
been welcomed by his host society and given access to a wider range of re‐
sources. John Durham Peters is thus right in insisting that communication is
not merely a question of semantics, but “more fundamentally a political and
ethical problem” (Speaking into the Air 30).
More generally, we can say that an individual’s possibilities for
‘home-making,’ and specifically the odds for or against that individual’s ability
to maintain multiple and spatially dispersed homes, change significantly de‐
pending on the social and material resources at hand. For instance, while some
theorists celebrate nomadic identities as an alternative to oppressive power
structures (e.g. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition 45 – 47; Deleuze and Guattari,
A Thousand Plateaus, 60; see also Tally, Melville, Mapping and Globalization
65 – 67), others emphasize that “the resources for self-invention are unequally
distributed,” and that accordingly the nomadic identities of a select few, though
intended to subvert oppressive power structures, in fact depend on these op‐
pressive structures (Peters, “Exile, Nomadism, and Diaspora” 34). Likewise,
Blunt and Dowling have pointed out that the creation and maintenance of dia‐
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sporic homes is greatly facilitated by easy access to particular types of media
and communication (206; see Manning 160). Moreover, given the importance for
diasporic communities of everyday rituals of food preparation and consumption
(Blunt and Dowling 216), it is clear that those who cannot afford the foodstuffs
required are also excluded from communal rituals. We will revisit such consid‐
erations of the link between community, rituals, and forms of communication –
as well as humankind’s relation to the natural world (e.g. through the construc‐
tion of a pastoral space) – in the discussion in chapter six of Jeffrey Eugenides’s
The Virgin Suicides.
Knowing Home: The Uses and Abuses of Defamiliarization
By way of concluding this introductory chapter, we need to explore briefly the
importance of conventions for establishing a sense of home (as well as, more
generally, the relation between home, familiarity, and knowledge). Commenting
on the role of conventions, Theano S. Terkenli insists that it is precisely through
repetition, routine, and ritual that we turn places into homes:
[H]abits that repetitively unfold in specific contexts differentiate these locales or cir‐
cumstances from the rest of the known world. […] Over time an individual develops
numerous behavioral, cognitive, and affective routines by investing resources and
emotional commitment. The same process occurs at a group level in the creation of a
collective home in the form of a common cultural background and a common home‐
land. (326)
The conventions and routines of home thus allow us to save both cognitive and
affective energies, thus making it possible for us to employ these psychic ener‐
gies for other purposes. This idea is not of recent origin, for as early as 1815,
Percy Bysshe Shelley argued in his essay “On Life” that the “wonder of our
being” is in a sense far too great, and that therefore we depend on a “mist of
familiarity” that shields us “from an astonishment which would otherwise ab‐
sorb and overawe” (633). In other words, the limited economy of psychic life
renders familiarity eminently desirable.
At the same time, however, too much familiarity may blind us to the world
around us, which is why the Russian Formalists and others before them insisted
on a need for carefully administered doses of defamiliarization. The concept of
defamiliarization or ostranenie (‘making strange’) was introduced by Victor
Shklovsky in 1917 in an essay entitled “Art as Technique.” In this essay,
Shklovsky suggests that when “perception becomes habitual,” it retreats “into
the area of the unconsciously automatic” (19). To combat the resulting mental
numbness, art must attempt to ‘de-habitualize’ perception:
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45 See also Jacques Rancière: “[I]t is in the moments when the real world wavers and seems
to reel into mere appearance, more than in the slow accumulation of day-to-day expe‐
riences, that it becomes possible to form a judgement about the world” (19).
46 The German original runs: “Das Bekannte überhaupt ist darum, weil es bekannt ist,
nicht erkannt” (24).
The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not
as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms
difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of
perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. (20)
According to Shklovsky, it is the form in which an object is presented in the
work of art that forces us to perceive this object as if we were “seeing it for the
first time” (21). In this way, defamiliarization may reveal the strangeness that
lies hidden at the heart of the familiar – an idea that has prompted Nicholas
Royle to observe that defamiliarization bears more than a passing resemblance
both to Freud’s notion of the uncanny and to the Heideggerian concept of ex‐
istential angst (4). Likewise, Royle points out, the idea that defamiliarization
may revolutionize our way of perceiving the world underpins Bertolt Brecht’s
concept of a Verfremdungs- or alienation effect (5).45 This point, too, had already
been developed by Percy Bysshe Shelley, in his 1821 essay “A Defence of Po‐
etry”:
[Poetry] strips the veil of familiarity from the world, and lays bare the naked and
sleeping beauty which is the spirit of its forms.
[… I]t purges from our inward sight the film of familiarity which obscures from us
the wonder of our being. It compels us to feel that which we perceive, and to imagine
that which we know. It creates anew the universe after it has been annihilated in our
minds by the recurrence of impressions blunted by reiteration. (698)
For Shelley, as for the Russian Formalists, it is poetry or art that re-infuses life
and vitality into a universe annihilated by repetition, tearing the veil of famili‐
arity from our eyes and thus allowing us to experience – and know – the world
anew and, therefore, more profoundly.
In fact, the idea of familiarity as a threat to real understanding goes back even
further, to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who claims, in the Preface to his
Phenomenology of Spirit, that “the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cog‐
nitively understood” (18; § 31).46 Indeed, Hegel even posits a need for the style
of truly philosophical writing to be so unfamiliar and difficult that such texts
might have to be read repeatedly before they can be understood (39; § 63 – 65).
Importantly, whereas Shelley and the Russian Formalists tend to see in defami‐
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liarization the essence of ‘poetry’ or ‘literariness’ – i.e. a primarily aesthetic
technique – for Hegel it is a necessary step in the acquisition of true knowledge
as such, and thus not strictly speaking ‘merely’ an artistic, but instead a philo‐
sophical enterprise. In a sense, it is this idea that Oscar Wilde picks up on in his
dialogue “The Critic as Artist,” where one of the interlocutors suggests:
An age that has no criticism is either an age in which art is immobile, hieratic, and
confined to the reproduction of formal types, or an age that possesses no art at
all. [… T]here has never been a creative age that has not been critical also. For it is the
critical faculty that invents fresh forms. The tendency of creation is to repeat itself.
(254)
For Wilde’s speaker as much as for Hegel, the new, unexpected, and unfamiliar
is thus not the effect of the creative impulse, but instead the product of the
“critical faculty.”
In E. T. there is at least one scene that illustrates perfectly how it is possible
implicitly to critique a particular state of affairs by confronting the audience
with the familiar as seen through unfamiliar eyes. In the scene in question, Elliott
tries to explain the contents of his room to E. T., but for the audience it is clear
that the alien cannot but find Elliott’s explanations confusing:
Coke, see? We drink it. It’s, uh, it’s a drink. You know … food. [Showing E. T. two action
figures.] These are toys. These are little men. This is Greedo, and then this is Ham‐
merhead. […] And look, they can even have wars. Look at this. [Taking two plastic
fishes, a smaller one and a shark.] And look, fish. The fish eat the fish food. And the
shark eats the fish. But nobody eats a shark. See, this is Pez. Candy. See, you eat it.
You put the candy in here, and then when you lift up the head, the candy comes out,
and you can eat it! You want some? [Pointing to his peanut-shaped piggybank.] Oh,
this is a peanut. You eat it. But you can’t eat this one, ’cause this is fake. This is money.
See? We put the money in the peanut. You see? Bank. You see? [Showing E. T. a tiny
toy car.] And then this is a car. This is what we get around in. [Offering the toy car
to E. T.] You see? (Mathison 68 – 69)
What on earth, for instance, is E. T. to make of the idea that we “put the money
in the peanut”? And how is he to understand Elliott’s explanation that “this is
a car. This is what we get around in” – given the fact that Elliott is showing him
a toy car, which is far too small for any human to get around in? This notably
comic scene in E. T. is, in short, also an exact application of one technique of
defamiliarization that Shklovsy identifies in Tolstoy: making the familiar seem
strange by prompting the audience to see things from an unfamiliar point of
view, for example a horse’s (21) – or, as in our case, an extra-terrestrial’s. Sud‐
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47 The German original runs: “Beim Erkennen ist es überhaupt darum zu tun, der uns
gegenüberstehenden objektiven Welt ihre Fremdheit abzustreifen, uns, wie man zu
sagen pflegt, in dieselbe zu finden” (Die Wissenschaft der Logik 351; § 195).
48 “Die Philosophie ist eigentlich Heimweh, ein Trieb überall zu Hause zu sein” (Schriften
179).
49 For an interesting recent overview of ideas concerning the concept of the everyday, see
Bryony Randall, “A Day’s Time: The One-Day Novel and the Temporality of the Ev‐
eryday” (2016).
denly we see the strangeness at the heart of a boy’s room: it harbors fantasies
of war – the fighting action figures – and generally reflects a world where the
small fish are eaten by the sharks, and which, already, revolves around money
and, of course, cars: that ultimate symbol of individual freedom through con‐
sumption. Terry Eagleton thus rightly insists that we “can engage with the wider
world simply by recording what goes on at home” (The English Novel 322) –
provided that we manage to see the familiar as if we were perceiving it for the
first time.
At the same time, even if we accept that defamiliarization is a necessary
technique for any critical enterprise – very much including the present one –
we should not therefore see it as the binary opposite of a desire to belong. Rather,
as Hegel suggests, the ultimate “aim of knowledge is to divest the objective world
that stands opposed to us of its strangeness, and, as the phrase is, to find our‐
selves at home in it” – and this, for Hegel, involves a dialectical return to be‐
longing as a complement to previous acts of self-alienation (Logic 289; § 194).47
It is, presumably, the same idea that the German poet Novalis wanted to express
in a frequently quoted aphorism: “Philosophy is actually homesickness – the
urge to be everywhere at home” (Philosophical Writings 135; original emphasis).48
To relinquish the quest for a sense of home altogether would thus defeat the
very purpose of defamiliarization. Moreover, as Terry Eagleton observes, to in‐
dulge in the denigration of home, the familiar, and the everyday is tantamount
to accepting a peculiarly modernist bias against the common life: “In the tran‐
sition from realism to modernism, a fascination with the texture of everyday
living gives way to a mandarin scepticism of it. Common experience is now the
locus of illusion, not of truth” (Trouble with Strangers 277).49 To assume, that is
to say, that everything about the places we call home is false and coercive is just
as problematic as blindly to accept everything that is familiar. When studying
home, we may therefore want to bear in mind the words of Friedrich Dürren‐
matt’s Inspector Bärlach when he talks about the idea of loving one’s country:
“One should not be ashamed of one’s love, […] only it has to be stern and critical,
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50 The German original runs: “Man soll sich seiner Liebe nicht schämen, […] nur muss sie
streng und kritisch sein, sonst wird sie eine Affenliebe.” In English translations, the
inspector’s last name is usually given as Barlach.
otherwise it turns into the love of a monkey” (183; my translation).50
Home-making requires patience as well as, at times, critical effort. But ought
we therefore to privilege the pain of unbelonging? It is this tension between
alienation and belonging that lies at the heart of the six readings that follow,
starting with Moby-Dick in chapter one.
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1 51 I would like to thank Simone Heller-Andrist and Christa Schönfelder for their com‐
ments on early versions of this chapter, as well as Sarah Chevalier and Anja
Neukom-Hermann for their feedback on the final version.
1 “Another Orphan”: Trauma and Transcendental
Homelessness in Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick: or,
The Whale
To understand home we need to understand homelessness, and in few other
novels is home as fundamentally absent as in Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick: or,
The Whale (1851).1 We find, for instance, that the crew of the Pequod and its
monomaniac leader, Captain Ahab, spend most of the narrative far from home,
with only one of the mariners returning from the voyage to tell the tale. We
learn, too, that the loved ones who have remained at home can only communi‐
cate with the Pequod via letters entrusted to outward-bound whalers – letters
that may take years to reach their addressees, and perhaps will never arrive at
all (196; ch. 53). The sailors’ physical absence from home is thus exacerbated by
an almost complete lack of communicative ties to their home communities.
In what follows, we will focus in particular on Ishmael’s and Ahab’s sense of
unbelonging, and on how it can be read in relation to such diverse ideas as
Emersonian self-reliance, post-traumatic stress disorder, and Hegel’s
master-slave dialectic. We will begin the discussion by examining Ishmael’s
profound sense of alienation, which he attempts to combat through discursive
constructions of universal belonging that seem persuasive but which, on closer
inspection, turn out to be highly problematic. One way of interpreting Ishmael’s
alienation is to see it as arising from his lack of self-reliance – in contrast to
Ahab, who in many ways embodies Emerson’s ideal. At the same time,
Moby-Dick undermines any simple binary opposition between Ishmael and
Ahab, and the novel in effect constitutes a sustained critique of the concept of
self-reliance as such. Moreover, we will find that both Ishmael and Ahab come
from broken homes, and that both suffer from very particular kinds of unbe‐
longing: social alienation in the case of Ishmael, and mental alienation (or
‘madness’) in the case of Ahab. Ultimately, though both experience moments of
spiritual comfort that could in fact help them to combat alienation, neither Ish‐
mael nor Ahab manages to overcome their profound sense of homelessness.
2 While the layout may vary from one edition to the next, it always remains striking and
unusual.
If belonging proves elusive for Melville’s characters, for us as readers it is
likewise difficult ever to feel at home in a novel that, from the very outset,
confronts us with highly unusual kinds of textuality. The following, for instance,
are the opening paragraphs of Moby-Dick:
Etymology
(Supplied by a Late Consumptive Usher to a Grammar School)
[The pale Usher – threadbare in coat, heart, body, and brain; I see him now. He was
ever dusting his old lexicons and grammars, with a queer handkerchief, mockingly
embellished with all the gay flags of all the known nations of the world. He loved to
dust his old grammars; it somehow mildly reminded him of his mortality.]
Etymology
“While you take in hand to school others, and to teach them by what name a
whale-fish is to be called in our tongue, leaving out, through ignorance, the letter H,
which almost alone maketh up the signification of the word, you deliver that which
is not true.”
Hackluyt.
“WHALE. * * * Sw. and Dan. hval. This animal is named from roundness or rolling;
for in Dan. hvalt is arched or vaulted.”
Webster’s Dictionary.
Even in purely formal terms, these paragraphs are likely to strike one as odd:
square as well as round brackets, indented quotations, asterisks and a title –
“Etymology” – that appears twice, once in a larger font and once in italics. Like‐
wise, these paragraphs prove unsettling in terms of content, as they confront us
with an eccentric figure who is no longer alive (“Late Consumptive Usher”; em‐
phasis added), as well as with the twin possibility of mockery and untruth
(“mockingly embellished,” “you deliver that which is not true”).2 It does not help,
moreover, that this first section on the etymology of the word whale is followed
by a longer and equally puzzling section containing eighty quotations on whales
from a seemingly random array of texts (e.g. the Book of Genesis, Montaigne’s
Apology for Raimond Sebond, and Captain Cowley’s Voyage round the Globe).
These “Extracts,” as they are referred to in the text, were apparently “Supplied
by a Sub-Sub-Librarian,” whom the narrator calls a “painstaking burrower and
grub-worm of a poor devil” (8; original emphasis). In short, the opening of
Moby-Dick is one of the oddest in the literary canon, and perhaps the best indi‐
cator of just how unhomely it feels to most readers – including some leading
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3 For a slightly different and more detailed reading of “Extracts” and “Etymology,” see
Robert T. Tally, Jr., Melville, Mapping and Globalization 54 – 61.
4 See Benedict Anderson, who defines the nation as “an imagined political community –
and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (6). For an illuminating dis‐
cussion of the concept of the Great American Novel, see Lawrence Buell, “The Unkillable
Dream of the Great American Novel: Moby-Dick as Test Case.” One of Buell’s key points
in this essay is that “a great American novel project must be transnational and also
transgeneric” (138).
5 See also Robert T. Tally, Jr., who notes the strong tendency by critics to read Moby-Dick
“as an essentially American national narrative,” but who himself emphasizes “the pow‐
erful postnational energies” of Melville’s novel (Melville, Mapping and Globalization 51
and 54).
literary critics – is the fact that they tend simply to ignore these sections, pre‐
tending instead that the novel opens with the first phrase of chapter one: “Call
me Ishmael” (e.g. Eagleton, How to Read Literature 23; Edinger 22; Peretz 36).3
More generally, we will find that Moby-Dick is “a work that breaks all boundaries
of genre” (Robert K. Martin 11) – a novel that juxtaposes various styles and reg‐
isters and that continually raises expectations which it then proceeds to thwart.
In Moby-Dick, characters as well as readers thus find it exceedingly difficult to
establish a sense of home; significantly, the novel’s final word is “orphan” (427;
“Epilogue”).
Moby-Dick has often been read as a Great American Novel (Buell 138), and
the desire to do so – i.e. to use it, as Nick Selby puts it, to “define what American
literature might be” (8) – perhaps constitutes an indirect response to the fun‐
damental sense of homelessness conveyed by the text: a desire to fill the void of
unbelonging by turning Melville’s novel itself into a symbolic key to the imag‐
ined community of the American nation.4 And indeed, we will see that there is
good reason to read Melville’s tale as an allegory of the ship of the American
state – a ship that has strayed dangerously far from its intended course. How‐
ever, we will also find that the novel simultaneously discourages allegorical
readings.5 Like the Pequod’s crew, readers are thus tossed to and fro on the
stormy seas of Moby-Dick, unable to find that “final harbor, whence we unmoor
no more” (373; ch. 114); like Ahab, we eventually begin to wonder “whether the
world is anchored anywhere” (385; ch. 121). Both formally and thematically,
Moby-Dick is thus a deeply agnostic novel: admitting to, even longing for, the
possibility of transcendence, but failing truly to believe in the existence of a
transcendental home. Indeed, Melville’s novel even suggests that an uncondi‐
tional belief in transcendence is likely to lead to personal as well as political
disaster, and it is only in the most fleeting of moments that it seems possible to
discern, on the horizon of Moby-Dick’s narrative universe, a utopian alternative
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to orphaned existence: moments of common endeavor and bodily comfort in
which the question of transcendence is suspended in favor of a home in the here
and now.
Alienation and Home-Making Practices
The problem of homelessness and alienation proves central to Ishmael’s narra‐
tive from the very beginning – and Ishmael provides us with notably contra‐
dictory explanations for his sense of ‘unbelonging.’ Looking back, as a narrator,
to the time before he joined the Pequod’s crew, Ishmael attempts to explain his
fateful decision to go to sea. At first, Ishmael’s light-hearted tone suggests that
this decision was entirely incidental: “[H]aving little or no money in my purse,
and nothing particular to interest me on shore, I thought I would sail about a
little and see the watery part of the world” (18; ch. 1). However, we can reason‐
ably doubt whether Ishmael’s decision is indeed based merely on the whim of
a moment, both because he in fact admits to a lack of financial resources (“little
or no money”) and because the phrase “nothing particular to interest me on
shore” barely conceals a fundamental sense of isolation: Ishmael has no interest
on shore – neither financial, nor intellectual, nor emotional. There is, in short,
nothing and no one there who could make him want to stay. Ishmael’s subse‐
quent remarks confirm that we are dealing here with an underlying problem:
Whenever I find myself growing grim about the mouth; whenever it is a damp, drizzly
November in my soul; whenever I find myself involuntarily pausing before coffin
warehouses, and bringing up the rear of every funeral I meet; and especially whenever
my hypos get such an upper hand of me, that it requires a strong moral principle to
prevent me from deliberately stepping into the street, and methodically knocking
people’s hats off – then, I account it high time to get to sea as soon as I can. (18; ch. 1)
Ishmael’s use of the word “whenever” in this passage reveals that a profound
sense of alienation is a recurring problem in his life, and that his going to sea is
a rather desperate attempt to prevent himself from committing random acts of
aggression against innocent bystanders (“methodically knocking people’s hats
off”). His genial tone should thus not seduce us into underestimating the extent
of his crisis of unbelonging.
The idea that Ishmael’s sense of alienation is more fundamental than it ap‐
pears at first sight is confirmed by his very name, which constitutes an inter‐
textual link to biblical exile. According to the bible, Ishmael is one of the sons
of Abraham, and God prophesies before his birth that Ishmael’s “hand will be
against every man, and every man’s hand against him” (Genesis 16: 12). The
name Ishmael is therefore, as Wadlington Warwick observes, “a synonym for
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6 Warwick further argues that the pseudonymous nature of the name is evidenced by the
fact that no character ever calls the narrator Ishmael. While this claim is not quite
correct – Captain Peleg does so when Ishmael enlists as a sailor on the Pequod (77;
ch. 16) – the oversight does not invalidate Warwick’s general point, since it is perfectly
possible for narrators to misrepresent the ‘actual’ events, and to have characters use
pseudonyms instead of the ‘real’ names.
7 “Es kommt hinzu, dass das Gleichnis einer Verwendung fähig ist, welche eine Erleich‐
terung der intellektuellen Arbeit mit sich bringt, wenn man nämlich, wie zumeist üblich,
das Unbekanntere mit dem Bekannten […] vergleicht und durch diesen Vergleich das
Fremdere und Schwierigere erläutert” (Der Witz 181).
alienation between the name-bearer and all other men” (141). Moreover, the
phrase Melville’s first-person narrator uses to open his tale – “Call me Ishmael”
(emphasis added) – sounds as if we were not given the narrator’s real name, but
instead a pseudonym chosen “for patently symbolic reasons” (Warwick 141; see
also Eagleton, How to Read Literature 23).6 Like the deceptively light-hearted
passages discussed above, the narrator’s name thus indicates that all is not well
between him and his fellow men.
At the same time, it is possible to read the choice of the name Ishmael as one
instance of what Samuel Kimball calls Ishmael’s desire to “make a narrative
home of homelessness” (541): to mitigate his own sense of alienation by re‐
fracting his experience through the stories of others. Sigmund Freud, for in‐
stance, suggests that comparisons and analogies have the capacity to reduce
unfamiliarity: “[W]e compare the less familiar with the more familiar, […] and
use the comparison to explain the item that is more difficult and unfamiliar”
(The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious 202; see Punter 90).7 Accordingly, if
the name is indeed a pseudonym adopted by Melville’s narrator, then the implicit
comparison between his own experiences and the familiar biblical story of Ish‐
mael may be read as an attempt symbolically to reduce his sense of isolation.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the intertextual reference serves to reduce
unfamiliarity on the part of the reader – at least, that is, if we assume “that writer
and audience possess a common knowledge” (Warwick 141), for the allusion
only has this effect for those who are familiar with the biblical narrative. This,
in turn, reminds us of the double-edged quality of intertextual home-making
practices, as those readers who are unfamiliar with the biblical narrative may
end up feeling excluded from the novel’s implied readership (see introduction).
Examining further the biblical parallel established in Moby-Dick, we find that
both the novel’s narrator and the biblical Ishmael are treated badly by their
step-mothers, which may imply that there is a link between alienation in later
life and the lack of a stable childhood home. In the biblical account, Abraham’s
wife, Sarah, at first proves unable to bear children, and so Abraham “went in
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8 McLoughlin, by contrast, argues that Ishmael’s biblical name links all sailors to out‐
casts” (61).
9 Later in the novel, Perth forges a new harpoon for Ahab shortly before the climactic
chase of Moby Dick (370 – 372; ch. 113).
unto Hagar,” Sarah’s maid, who eventually gave birth to Ishmael (Genesis 21:
16; KJV). Immediately there is strong tension between Sarah and her maid, and
when many years later Sarah miraculously gives birth to Isaac, she urges
Abraham to banish Ishmael and his mother: “Cast out this bondwoman and her
son: for the son of this bondwoman shall not be heir with my son” (Genesis 21:
10; KJV). Initially Abraham is reluctant, but when God assures him that he will
protect Ishmael, Abraham complies with Sarah’s wish to have Ishmael removed
from the community. The relationship between Sarah and her stepson can thus
hardly be called particularly loving. Similarly, in Moby-Dick, the narrator recalls
that his stepmother “was all the time whipping me, or sending me to bed sup‐
perless” (37; ch. 4). This, in turn, explains the narrator’s choice of metaphor later
in the novel, when he speaks of a “step-mother world, so long cruel – forbidding”
(405; ch. 132). Never fully at home even as a child, Melville’s Ishmael remains
unable to belong in later years.8
The resulting desire to “make a narrative home of homelessness” (Kimball
541) explains, among other things, why Ishmael is so interested in the character
of Perth, a blacksmith, whose alienation from society, too, is connected to a
broken home. Ishmael introduces Perth, whose function on the level of plot is
relatively marginal, with a detailed account of the story of his life.9 Formerly an
“artisan of famed excellence,” with a “youthful, daughter-like, loving wife, and
three blithe, ruddy children,” Perth becomes fatefully addicted to alcohol and
eventually goes bankrupt, with his wife and children dying in abject poverty
(368 – 369; ch. 112):
Death seems the only desirable sequel for a career like this; but Death is only a
launching into the region of the strange Untried; it is but the first salutation to the
possibilities of the immense Remote, the Wild, the Watery, the Unshored; therefore,
to the death-longing eyes of such men, who still have left in them some interior com‐
punctions against suicide, does the all-contributed and all-receptive ocean alluringly
spread forth his whole plain of unimaginable, taking terrors, and wonderful, new-life
adventures […]. (369; ch. 112)
Forever estranged from the “equally abhorred and abhorring, landed world”
(369; ch. 112), Perth seeks refuge in the oblivious infinity of the “all-receptive
ocean” – partly because of “some interior compunctions against suicide.” This
latter point is important because Ishmael, too, has felt tempted to end his life,
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10 The following passage may serve to exemplify Freud’s position: “The fateful question
for the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent their cultural
development will succeed in mastering the disturbance of their communal life by the
human instinct of aggression and self-destruction” (Civilization and Its Discontents
111; see also Thurschwell 88 – 89). The German original runs: “Die Schicksalsfrage der
Menschenart scheint mir zu sein, ob und in welchem Masse es ihrer Kulturentwicklung
gelingen wird, der Störung des Zusammenlebens durch den menschlichen Aggressions-
und Selbstvernichtungstrieb Herr zu werden” (Das Unbehagen in der Kultur 256).
but opts for going to sea instead, as a “substitute for pistol and ball”: “With a
philosophical flourish Cato throws himself upon his sword; I quietly take to the
ship” (18; ch. 1). Both Perth and Ishmael, then, are trying to escape from the
memories of broken homes, and going to sea is an attempt to prevent aggression
not only against others, but also against themselves: a truly Freudian sublima‐
tion of a seemingly implacable death drive.
Of course, in Freudian psychoanalysis, the death drive is not merely the bane
of unhappy individuals with difficult pasts, but a universal condition of human
life.10 Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that Ishmael – after initially por‐
traying his urge to go to sea as merely an incidental, individual problem – sud‐
denly suggests that all humans necessarily suffer from a similar sense of alien‐
ation. Ishmael at first remains relatively cautious, asserting only that “almost all
men in their degree, some time or other, cherish very nearly the same feelings
towards the ocean” (18; ch. 1, emphasis added). However, he quickly abandons
any such show of circumspection, suggesting instead that man’s mysterious
attraction to the ocean is an inevitable by-product of human selfhood as such:
Why upon your first voyage as a passenger, did you yourself feel such a mystical
vibration, when first told that you and your ship were now out of sight of land? Why
did the old Persians hold the sea holy? Why did the Greeks give it a separate deity,
and own brother of Jove? Surely all this is not without meaning. And still deeper the
meaning of that story of Narcissus, who because he could not grasp the tormenting,
mild image he saw in the fountain, plunged into it and was drowned. But that same
image, we ourselves see in all rivers and oceans. It is the image of the ungraspable
phantom of life; and this is the key to it all. (19 – 20; ch. 1; emphasis added)
Gone are such guarded phrases as “very nearly” or “almost.” Instead, Ishmael
now claims that all of us (“we ourselves”) share Narcissus’s fatal attraction to
watery reflections.
Ishmael’s theory thus has strong affinities with Jacques Lacan’s account of
the development of subjectivity. Lacan describes the mirror stage as an irrever‐
sible process of subject-formation through alienation:
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[T]he mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously from in‐
sufficiency to anticipation – and, for the subject caught up in its lure of spatial iden‐
tification, turns out fantasies that proceed from a fragmented image of the body to
what I will call an ‘orthopedic’ form of its totality – and to the finally donned armor
of an alienating identity that will mark his entire mental development with its rigid
structure. (“The Mirror Stage” 78)
Lacan is a notoriously difficult thinker, but Pam Morris has provided an excellent
paraphrase of his argument regarding the mirror stage and its role in the for‐
mation of the subject:
According to Lacan, at the mirror-phase of the infant’s development, it achieves a
joyful perception of itself as a unified being, physically separate and independent from
its surrounding world – an image of itself such as it might indeed see in a mirror. This
recognition of a specular image offers a wholly desirable self in contrast to the infant’s
actual state of total dependence, uncoordinated motor skills, and boundary uncer‐
tainty between itself and the world. It is, however, misrecognition, since self can never
be identical to image. Thus the narcissistic desire for a unified self initiated in the
mirror stage and pursued throughout life is always for a phantasy, for the imaginary
ego-ideal. This first splitting of the subject into a perceiving self and a self as imaged
is repeated in the next phase of development – entry into the Symbolic Order. A sense
of individual subjectivity is constituted with the acquisition of the first person pro‐
noun singular, but as with the specular image there exists an unclosable gap between
the ‘I’ who speaks and the ‘I’ which is the subject of that discourse. These two phases
of development, the mirror stage and entry into language, constitute the subject’s
sense of self as an autonomous individual, but, since this image is an imaginary ideal,
the subject is decentred and driven always by narcissistic desire after the unified
ego-ideal it can never attain. (Dickens’s Class Consciousness 4 – 5)
As Morris observes, the Lacanian subject is decentered and driven by narcissistic
desire, and Sean Homer rightly argues that Lacan defines the ego as “the effect
of images” – a function of “misrecognition; of refusing to accept the truth of
fragmentation and alienation” (Homer 25). All humans, in this view, are alien‐
ated, and in a sense the ego’s work is to disguise this fact from the subject. The
mystifying work of the ego in turn renders it necessary for exceptionally in‐
sightful individuals – such as Lacan or Ishmael – to draw our attention to the
hidden fact of alienation as a universal human condition. In short, while Ishmael
initially portrays his decision to go to sea as merely his own individual problem,
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11 For extended discussions of the myth of Narcissus and its significance for literature and
subjecthood in general see Jeffrey Berman, Narcissim and the Novel (1990) and Steven
Bruhm, Reflecting Narcissus: A Queer Aesthetic (2001).
he later tries to convince us that the condition is in fact rooted in the alienated
subjecthood he shares with Narcissus and, indeed, with us all.11
Ishmael’s Rhetorical Shifts
We ought to note, however, that Ishmael misrepresents the myth of Narcissus –
a fact that should alert us to the possibility that his rhetoric, though powerful,
may at the same time be misleading. In Ishmael’s account, Narcissus dies by
drowning, yet this is not the case in any of the extant versions of the myth. In
traditional accounts, Narcissus either kills himself with a sword, or he dies of
thirst because he no longer dares to disturb the water that reflects his beloved
mirror-image (Bremmer 712; Grimal 302). Harrison Hayford is of course right
in arguing that Ishmael’s presentation of the myth is better suited to Melville’s
novel (660), since the story of Narcissus’s death by drowning in the first chapter
beautifully foreshadows the drowning of Ahab and his crew at the end of the
Moby-Dick. However, in contrast to Hayford, we need to emphasize that Ish‐
mael’s version of the myth of Narcissus is “the key to it all” – as Ishmael himself
puts it (20; ch. 1) – not because this story discloses a universal truth, but precisely
because it constitutes a case of misrepresentation on Ishmael’s part. After all,
while Ishmael’s Lacanian view of an inherently alienating selfhood may be con‐
vincing as such, it clearly fails to answer the question he originally posed to
himself: What is it that compelled him (and not anyone else, or even all of us)
to go to sea? A theory of universal alienation cannot explain Ishmael’s particular
choice, and accordingly we must remain skeptical of his rhetorical shift from
contingent circumstances (lack of money and emotional “interest”) via aliena‐
tion as a recurring problem in his life (“whenever it is a damp, drizzly November
in my soul”) to alienation as a basic human condition. Indeed, rather than ac‐
cepting Ishmael’s interpretation of alienation as a universal truth, we should see
it as yet another attempt to make a home of homelessness: a measure of Ishmael’s
desire to belong and simply be just like everyone else.
In order better to understand the problematic elision underlying Ishmael’s
rhetorical sleight of hand, we may adopt Richard Schmitt’s distinction between,
on the one hand, the precondition for alienation, and, on the other, alienation
itself. According to Schmitt, alienation “is a threat in human lives because we
live as persons we did not choose to be in a world not of our own making” (48).
For Schmitt, the body illustrates well that though we may have a good deal of
influence on our life, we can never fully control or understand it; we cannot
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12 Terry Eagleton is one of many critics who have expressed similar ideas: “Human beings
move at the conjuncture of the concrete and the universal, body and symbolic medium;
but this is not a place where anyone can feel blissfully at home” (The Idea of Culture 97).
13 Richard Schmitt here refers to a condition that Miranda Fricker has termed “herme‐
neutical injustice” (1).
exist without a body, nor can we choose our body freely. Moreover, as our body
constitutes both the basis of our existence and the root cause of our mortality,
our relationship towards it is, in Schmitt’s view, fundamentally ambivalent
(46 – 47). Schmitt further contends that this ambivalence is related to Martin
Heidegger’s notion of Geworfenheit (‘thrownness’):
Because we are geworfen (thrown) into this world, we do not know it […]. We find
ourselves in the world, as we grow up, and need to discover its traits. We are not born
understanding the world, nor do we know who we are ourselves but must discover
that as life goes on. (48 – 49)
Just as the body is a home in which we can never feel fully at home, so do both
the world and the self necessarily retain an unhomely (or uncanny) core.12
However, while all humans share this precondition for alienation, circum‐
stances will shape the way in which they will have to confront it. Accordingly,
Schmitt rightly insists that “the struggle against the precondition of alienation
is much more difficult for some people than for others” – not least because some
lives “are too burdened by external conditions” (51). Some people, that is to say,
lack the material or mental resources to deal adequately with the fundamental
ambivalence of the human condition, either because of individual experiences
(e.g. a traumatic childhood), or because they live in societies that “systematically
starve their members of the opportunities to learn how to live” (Schmitt 76).13
In other words, while it is impossible to remedy the precondition of alienation –
or what Dominick LaCapra has called “structural or existential trauma” (History
and Memory after Auschwitz 47) – we may distinguish between those societies
that enable their members to cope with the Geworfenheit of human existence,
and those societies that withhold the necessary resources or even exacerbate
alienation. Applying Schmitt’s distinction to Moby-Dick, we can thus say that
Ishmael subtly shifts from a more specific sense of alienation as the result of
particular circumstances to the precondition for alienation (i.e. the idea that
human selfhood itself makes alienation possible), thereby obscuring the bio‐
graphical and social roots of his own condition.
And indeed, once we begin to view Ishmael’s rhetoric more skeptically, we
find that some of his other explanations, too, fail to solve the problems he pre‐
tends to address. For instance, after having – ostensibly – answered the question
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why he decided to go to sea, Ishmael tries to explain why he chose to do so as
a common sailor rather than as a passenger. The first reason he offers is, once
again, pecuniary: “For to go as a passenger you must needs have a purse, and a
purse is but a rag unless you have something in it” (20; ch. 1). Ishmael’s decision
is thus due primarily to his want of financial resources. However, he immedi‐
ately adds that he would rather be a sailor than a passenger anyway because
passengers generally “do not enjoy themselves much” (20; ch. 1). Moreover, Ish‐
mael claims that he prefers being a “simple sailor” to being “a Commodore, or
a Captain, or a Cook” because he strongly dislikes “all honorable and respectable
toils” (20; ch. 1). Not only is this assertion at odds with his later arguments for
the dignity of whaling (e.g. ch. 82, “The Honor and Glory of Whaling”); it is also
difficult to reconcile Ishmael’s first two explanations – lack of money, and a
preference for lowly work – with the third reason he gives for deciding to be‐
come a sailor: “It is quite as much as I can do to take care of myself, without
taking care of ships, barques, brigs, schooners, and what not” (20; ch. 1). In yet
another rhetorical shift, Ishmael now claims that his becoming a sailor rather
than a commander was not truly an act of choice, but instead derives from his
awareness that he is barely able to take care of himself and therefore quite simply
unable to assume any responsibility for others. There is thus, once again, a move
from an apparently contingent cause – Ishmael’s lack of money, combined with
a proud disdain for the easy life of the passenger – to an underlying, more gen‐
eral problem in his life.
Furthermore, not content with this shift from free choice to inability, Ishmael
then tries to remold his argument into a general philosophy of life. In order to
explain why he is perfectly content to bear the indignities associated with the
life of a common sailor, Ishmael resorts to a lofty notion of metaphysical justice:
What of it, if some old hunks of a sea-captain orders me to get a broom and sweep
down the decks? What does that indignity amount to, weighed, I mean, in the scales
of the New Testament? […] Who aint [sic] a slave? Tell me that. Well, then, however
the old sea-captains may order me about – however they may thump and punch me
about, I have the satisfaction of knowing that it is all right; that everybody else is one
way or other served in much the same way – either in a physical or metaphysical
point of view, that is; and so the universal thump is passed round, and all hands should
rub each other’s shoulder-blades, and be content. (21; ch. 1)
Ishmael here transforms what could be a cause for discontent – i.e. the fact that
his decision to go to sea was dictated by poverty – into a philosophy of political
quietism: one should simply be content with whatever life happens to offer
because everybody is a slave in one way or another. Friedrich Nietzsche would,
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14 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche describes slave morality as follows: “Supposing that
the abused, the oppressed, the suffering, the unemancipated, the weary, and those un‐
certain of themselves, should moralise, what will be the common element in their moral
estimates? […] The slave has an unfavourable eye for the virtues of the powerful” (203;
§ 260). The German original runs: “Gesetzt, dass die Vergewaltigten, Gedrückten, Lei‐
denden, Unfreien, ihrer selbst Ungewissen und Müden moralisieren: was wird das Glei‐
chartige ihrer moralischen Wertschätzungen sein? […] Der Blick des Sklaven ist ab‐
günstig für die Tugenden des Mächtigen” (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 242; § 260).
arguably, deride Ishmael’s humility as one variant of what Nietzsche called
“slave morality”: a morality of the oppressed that values “the kind, helping hand,”
and that regards power as inherently evil (Beyond Good and Evil 203; § 260).14 At
any rate, even if we are less polemically inclined than Nietzsche, Ishmael’s claim
that he prefers working as a common sailor to being a commander “because of
the wholesome exercise and pure air of the forecastle deck,” as well as his sug‐
gestion that it is often “the commonality [who] lead their leaders,” look suspi‐
ciously like wishful thinking (21; ch. 1). What Ishmael wants us to believe, in
effect, is that he dislikes both the “honorable toils” of a commander (which he
is unable to perform) and the comfort of the passenger (which he cannot afford),
preferring instead a life of indignities because such indignities are, ultimately,
shared equally by all – at least from a metaphysical point of view. In short,
Ishmael prefers to do what he cannot help doing because it is morally correct
anyway (“I have the satisfaction of knowing that it is all right”). This may be a
comforting philosophy for our narrator (as well as for others who find them‐
selves in dire straits), but it is hardly a convincing analysis of the situation. And
indeed, even Ishmael himself admits that he is at a loss to explain why he decided
to enlist on a “whaling voyage” rather than to join a merchant ship, as he had
done on previous occasions. He concludes that this mystery must form “part of
the grand program of Providence” (21 – 22; ch. 1). What began as a simple ques‐
tion of money – or, to be precise, the lack of it – has thus miraculously meta‐
morphosed into the providential shape of a transcendental necessity.
The key point of the discussion so far is that Ishmael does everything in his
rhetorical power to mitigate a fundamental sense of unbelonging. His humorous
tone, for instance, constitutes an attempt to downplay the seriousness of the
condition he describes. In addition, he goes out of his way to find other stories
that are similar to his: the biblical Ishmael’s, Perth’s, and even the myth of Nar‐
cissus. However, Ishmael succumbs to the temptation to use these stories – par‐
ticularly the myth of Narcissus – to diffuse the historical particularity of his
situation; he no longer appears as an alienated outsider, but as someone who
shares in a universal human condition. This strategy provides Ishmael with
symbolical comfort, but it also comes at a political cost, as it leads him to embrace
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15 There is, in fact, historical evidence that Melville “was reading Emerson when he was
composing Moby-Dick” (Gray 132). Indeed, Melville read sections of “Self-Reliance” ei‐
ther “not long before, and possibly during, his composition of Moby-Dick”
(McLoughlin 79).
16 McLoughlin also notes that Ishmael’s use of the concept is “a far cry from the concept
of ‘the joint-stock company’ in ‘Self-Reliance’” (80).
a quietist worldview in which resistance to injustice finds little conceptual space.
We discover, in short, that there is sometimes a very thin line between, on the
one hand, the desire to belong, and, on the other, a problematic kind of moral
conformism that impairs one’s ability to question the status quo.
A Soul Not at Home: Ishmael, Ahab, and Emersonian Self-Reliance
Rather than accept Ishmael’s own theories, we should therefore look for alter‐
native explanations for his decision to go to sea, and one productive option is
to regard it as resulting from a lack of what Ralph Waldo Emerson calls “Self-Re‐
liance.” Comparing Emerson’s 1841 essay with Melville’s novel, we find that
there are many surprisingly literal links between the two texts.15 For instance,
in “Self-Reliance,” Emerson explicitly mentions whaling (191), and he later
writes of his preference for “the silent church before the service begins” (192) –
a scene that Ishmael describes in great detail early on in Moby-Dick (ch. 7 – 8).
Similarly, Ishmael’s depiction of the Pacific Islander Queequeg’s quick recovery
from illness towards the end of the novel (366; ch. 110) echoes very closely
Emerson’s claim that the white man has lost the “aboriginal strength” that “the
savage” still possesses (200). Given these strikingly direct parallels, it seems
reasonable to bring the two texts into a more sustained dialogue.
For a start, we must note just how far Ishmael is from embodying Emerson’s
ideal of a self-reliant man. Ishmael’s idea of a “joint-stock world” (64; ch. 13), for
instance, closely parallels Emerson’s notion that society “is a joint-stock com‐
pany” (“Self-Reliance” 178) – yet Melville’s narrator uses the expression in an
emphatically positive sense (i.e. to explain why Queequeg risked his own life to
save someone else’s), whereas for Emerson the phrase designates a market-place
mentality that leads to conformity and slavish dependence.16 Given these dia‐
metrically opposed points of view, it is perhaps not surprising that Ishmael fails
to heed one of Emerson’s central admonitions: not to mistake “mechanical” (i.e.
physical) isolation from society for “spiritual” isolation, which alone can lead to
“elevation” (192). Emerson insists that “the great man is he who in the midst of
the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude” (181), and
that a person “who travels to be amused, or to get somewhat he does not carry,
travels away from himself” (198). For Emerson, the self-reliant man should thus
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17 See Emerson’s warnings against an excess of “intellectual nomadism” in his essay on
“History”; while the “home-keeping wit” faces the peril of “monotony and deteriora‐
tion,” the intellectual nomad “bankrupts the mind through the dissipation of power on
a miscellany of objects” (161 – 162). Emerson’s distinction between “intellectual no‐
madism” and the “home-keeping wit” will be discussed in more detail in the concluding
chapter.
18 “[T]he greater, more manifold, more comprehensive life is lived beyond the old mor‐
ality; the ‘individual’ stands out, and is obliged to have recourse to his own law-giving,
his own arts and artifices for self-preservation, self-elevation, and self-deliverance”
(Beyond Good and Evil 208; § 262; original emphasis). The German original runs: “[D]as
grössere, vielfachere, umfänglichere Leben [lebt] über die alte Moral hinweg […]; das
‘Individuum’ steht da, genöthigt zu einer eigenen Gesetzgebung, zu eigenen Künsten
und Listen der Selbst-Erhaltung, Selbst-Erhöhung, Selbst-Erlösung” (Jenseits von Gut
und Böse 248; § 262; original emphasis).
19 “[E]verything that elevates the individual above the herd, and is a source of fear to the
neighbour, is henceforth called evil; the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equal‐
ising disposition, the mediocrity of desires, attains to moral distinction and honour”
(Beyond Good and Evil 113; § 201; original emphasis). The German original runs: “[A]lles,
was den Einzelnen über die Herde hinaushebt und dem Nächsten Furcht macht, heisst
von nun an böse; die billige, bescheidene, sich einordnende, gleichsetzende Gesinnung,
das Mittelmass der Begierden kommt zu moralischen Namen und Ehren” (Jenseits von
Gut und Böse 134; § 201; original emphasis).
“be admonished to stay at home,” and to put his genius “in communication with
the internal ocean” (191 – 192; emphasis added).17 Ishmael, by contrast, cannot
stay “with perfect sweetness” amongst the crowd, but is tempted to knock peo‐
ple’s hats off; he does not aim at spiritual elevation, but opts for mechanical
isolation instead: for leaving home and traveling on the world’s external seas.
Seeing that Ishmael fails to meet Emerson’s standards of self-reliance, one
might suppose that Ahab, the non-conforming and awe-inspiring commander
of the Pequod, must figure as his polar opposite: a kind of Nietzschean Über‐
mensch who, instead of subscribing to a humble “slave morality,” manages to
subordinate others to his will. According to Emerson, the self-reliant man does
not obey the customs of society, but lives “wholly from within”; no law is sacred
to him but that of his own nature: “[I]f I am the Devil’s child, I will live then
from the Devil” (“Self-Reliance” 179). It is a small step from this Emersonian
belief that “the only right is what is after my constitution” (179) to Nietzsche’s
notion of the great individual who, rather than following external laws, creates
his own values and laws (Beyond Good and Evil 208; § 262).18 Nietzsche insists
that mediocre people fear everything that lifts the individual up over the herd,
and that therefore they decry such a person as evil (113; § 201).19 By contrast,
Nietzsche himself holds that truly “noble” men not only live beyond good and
evil, but are also humanity’s only hope for salvation:
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20 “[W]ohin müssen wir mit unsren Hoffnungen greifen? Nach neuen Philosophen, es bleibt
keine Wahl […]. Dem Menschen die Zukunft des Menschen als seinen Willen, als ab‐
hängig von einem Menschenwillen zu lehren und grosse Wagnisse und Gesamt-Ver‐
suche von Zucht und Züchtigung vorzubereiten, um damit jener schauerlichen Herr‐
schaft des Unsinns und Zufalls, die bisher ‘Geschichte’ hiess, ein Ende zu machen […]
– : dazu wird irgendwann einmal eine neue Art von Philosophen und Befehlshabern
nöthig sein, an deren Bilde sich alles, was auf Erden an verborgenen, furchtbaren und
wohlwollenden Geistern dagewesen ist, blass und verzwergt ausnehmen möchte” (Jen‐
seits von Gut und Böse 138; § 203; original emphasis).
21 “[I]ch meine jenen unverrückbaren Glauben, dass einem Wesen, wie ‘wir sind’, andre
Wesen von Natur unterthan sein müssen und sich ihm zu opfern haben” (Jenseits von
Gut und Böse; 251 – 252; § 265).
22 See also Mikics, who notes as a shared concern of Emerson and Nietzsche “the wish to
be perfected and to be guided by the allure of the exemplary (Emerson’s central or
representative man, Nietzsche’s Übermensch)” (1); and Weber, who argues that the true
man, for Emerson “just as later for Nietzsche, is necessarily beyond the common mor‐
ality” (75).
[W]here do we have to fix our hopes? In new philosophers – there is no alternative […].
To teach man the future of humanity as his will, as depending on human will, and to
make preparation for vast hazardous enterprises and collective attempts in rearing
and educating, in order thereby to put an end to the frightful rule of folly and chance
which has hitherto gone by the name of “history” […] – for that purpose a new type
of philosophers and commanders will some time or other be needed, at the very idea
of which everything that has existed in the way of the occult, terrible, and benevolent
beings might look pale and dwarfed. (117; § 203; original emphasis).20
Such a new philosopher or commander, for Nietzsche, has an “unalterable belief
that to a being such as ‘we,’ other beings must naturally be in subjection, and
have to sacrifice themselves” (212; § 265).21 Nietzsche thus agrees with
Emerson, who maintains that “the strong spirits will overpower those around
them without effort” (“The Transcendentalist” 256). Indeed, George J. Stack has
suggested that “the parallels between Nietzsche’s depiction of the Übermensch
and Emerson’s scattered descriptions of sovereign individuals could be multi‐
plied beyond necessity” (333), and accordingly Stack speaks of an elective af‐
finity between the two philosophers.22 Though Emerson is generally more op‐
timistic than Nietzsche, retaining a belief in an “eternal trinity of Truth,
Goodness, and Beauty” (“The Transcendentalist” 255; see Mikics 230), both phi‐
losophers share a sense that contemporary society weakens its members, and
that there is a need for exceptional individuals (such as Ahab) who dare to fly
in the face of custom.
If we now examine the episodes in which Ahab, the sovereign individual,
overpowers the weaker humans around him, we once again find striking par‐
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allels between Moby-Dick’s plot and Emerson’s philosophical imagery. Ahab’s
charismatic personality is first presented fully in a scene where he announces
his quest for revenge against Moby Dick to the sailors under his command. The
crew soon find themselves carried away by their captain’s rhetoric, gazing “cu‐
riously at each other, as if marveling how it was that they themselves became
so excited” (138; ch. 36). Within a few moments, the sailors grow “frantic” (142;
ch. 36), and Ishmael admits both to a dread in his soul – what Nietzsche would
arguably interpret as the mediocre person’s fear of the exceptional – and to a
“wild, sympathetical feeling” that made Ahab’s feud seem Ishmael’s own (152;
ch. 41). Moreover, a later episode that illustrates Ahab’s power to dominate
weaker spirits literalizes effectively a series of metaphors from Emerson’s essay
“The Transcendentalist.” After Ahab, in a burst of rage, has destroyed his quad‐
rant (378; ch. 118), we find the Pequod trapped in a thunderstorm and enveloped
by glowing “corpusants” (i.e. St. Elmo’s fire). The sailors cower in superstitious
fear and even utter “a half mutinous cry,” but Ahab snatches his harpoon – from
the steel barb of which comes “a levelled flame of pale, forked fire” – and
threatens to kill anyone who defies him (383; ch. 119). Let us now compare this
to a passage from Emerson:
[I]n society, besides farmers, sailors, and weavers, there must be a few persons of purer
fire kept specially as gauges and meters of character; persons of a fine, detecting in‐
stinct, who betray the smallest accumulations of wit and feeling in the bystander.
Perhaps too there might be room for the exciters and monitors; collectors of the heavenly
spark with power to convey the electricity to others. Or, as the storm-tossed vessel at sea
speaks the frigate or ‘line packet’ to learn its longitude, so it may not be without its
advantage that we should now and then encounter rare and gifted men, to compare
the points of our spiritual compass, and verify our bearings from superior chronom‐
eters. (“The Transcendentalist” 257; emphasis added)
Emerson mentions “exciters,” “sailors” and a “storm-tossed vessel”; we read of
a “spiritual compass” and a “collector of heavenly sparks,” who can “convey the
electricity to others.” In short, the episode in Moby-Dick incorporates Emerson’s
imagery almost verbatim, which underlines Ahab’s position as a self-reliant,
Emersonian individual (and simultaneously as a Nietzschean Übermensch).
However, the catastrophic outcome of Ahab’s quest to kill Moby Dick ought to
make us wary of reading Ahab’s self-reliance in an overly positive light – a point
to which we will return.
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23 For a reading that places much more emphasis on Ahab and Ishmael as polar opposites,
see McLoughlin (67).
Ahab, Trauma, and the Community of Suffering
While in many ways Ahab offers a stark contrast to Ishmael and his humble
“slave morality,” we must also acknowledge the many similarities between the
two characters. For instance, like Ishmael, Ahab comes from a broken home; he
is the son of a “crazy, widowed mother, who died when he was only a twelve‐
month old” (78; ch. 16). In addition, both Ishmael and Ahab believe that the body
(and material existence in general) is ultimately insubstantial when measured
against the transcendent soul, for just as Ishmael sees in his body “but the lees”
of his “better being” (45; ch. 7), Ahab insists that “immaterial are all materials”
(396; ch. 128). Of course, John Wenke is right when he points out that Ahab – in
contrast to Ishmael (and Emerson) – is an “inverted Platonist” who believes that
the transcendent source of life is malignant (706). However, the key point in this
context is that neither Ahab nor Ishmael question the idea of transcendence as
such. Similarly, Ishmael’s statement that humankind seems, for the most part,
“a mob of unnecessary duplicates” (356; ch. 107) strongly resembles Ahab’s view
on the matter, which the latter makes explicit in a conversation with his first
and second mates: “You two are the opposite poles of one thing: Starbuck is
Stubb reversed, and Stubb is Starbuck; and ye two are all mankind; and Ahab
stands alone among the millions of the peopled earth, nor gods nor men his
neighbors!” (413; ch. 133). The many differences between Ishmael and Ahab
should thus not blind us to the fact that they also share certain views and char‐
acteristics.23
As Wenke observes, this spiritual convergence between Ahab and Ishmael
has “its culminating, and most teasing, manifestation” in one of world litera‐
ture’s great textual cruxes (710): a speech that has been attributed to both Ahab
the character and Ishmael the narrator, and which is therefore worth quoting in
its entirety:
Oh, grassy glades! oh, ever vernal endless landscapes in the soul; in ye, […] men yet
may roll, like young horses in new morning clover; and for some few fleeting mo‐
ments, feel the cool dew of the life immortal on them. Would to God these blessed
calms would last. But the mingled, mingling threads of life are woven by warp and
woof: calms crossed by storms, a storm for every calm. There is no steady unretracing
progress in this life; […] once gone through, we trace the round again; and are infants,
boys, and men, and Ifs eternally. Where lies the final harbor, whence we unmoor no
more? In what rapt ether sails the world, of which the weariest will never weary?
Where is the foundling’s father hidden? Our souls are like those orphans whose un‐
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wedded mothers die in bearing them: the secret of our paternity lies in their grave,
and we must there to learn it. (373; ch. 114)
In the first edition of Moby-Dick, this speech on orphaned souls and man’s fun‐
damental homelessness was printed without quotation marks, and though they
were added in later editions to make clear that the speech is Ahab’s and not
Ishmael’s, their earlier absence points to a potential ambiguity that surely must,
as Hershel Parker and Harrison Hayford put it with admirable understatement,
have “implications for any critical argument that takes Ishmael and Ahab as
embodying opposing values” (373n1). Both Ishmael and Ahab believe in tran‐
scendence, and both feel deeply alienated; both come from broken homes; and
both become obsessed with Moby Dick: Ahab with capturing the whale itself,
and Ishmael with mastering the telling of its tale.
If we ask why, precisely, Ahab is bent on killing Moby Dick, one possible
answer is to relate his obsession to a post-traumatic crisis. Ahab was mutilated
in an encounter with Moby Dick, losing his leg (108; ch. 28) and consequently
suffering a profound violation of his bodily integrity: a defining characteristic
of traumatic events (Fricke 14). Moreover, as is typical for the development of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), some time elapses between the traumatic
event and the appearance of the patient’s post-traumatic symptoms:
[When Ahab] received the stroke that tore him, he probably but felt the agonizing
bodily laceration, but nothing more. Yet, when by this collision forced to turn towards
home, and for long months of days and weeks, Ahab and anguish lay stretched to‐
gether in one hammock, rounding in mid winter that dreary, howling Patagonian
Cape; then it was, that his torn body and gashed soul bled into one another; and so
interfusing, made him mad. (156; ch. 41)
This brief account opens with Ahab feeling an “agonizing bodily laceration” –
in other words, the kind of sensory overload that, once again, is characteristic
for traumatic events (Fricke 15 – 17). Later, like other victims of trauma (Schön‐
felder 64, 146), Ahab suffers from bouts of depression alternating with fits of
feverish hyper-arousal, as well as from a pronounced desire to take revenge.
Indeed, hyper-arousal and the desire for revenge coincide in the scene where
Ahab discloses his desire to kill Moby Dick to the Pequod’s crew. Only a few
moments earlier, Ahab had seemed to be sunk in impenetrable gloom (131;
ch. 34); however, Ahab now mesmerizes his rapt audience with a countenance
that is “fiercely glad and approving” (137; ch. 35). Since post-traumatic crises
negatively affect patients’ interpersonal relationships (e.g. Herman 56), even the
fact that Ahab generally remains “inaccessible” to the other members of the crew
(Moby-Dick 131; ch. 34) may be the symptom of PTSD rather than simply a
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character trait. Moreover, in Dominick LaCapra’s terms, Ahab’s trauma is not
structural or existential, but historical (i.e. it “is related to specific events”; His‐
tory and Memory after Auschwitz 47).
Interestingly, in Moby-Dick Ahab feels drawn to others who have suffered
from similarly traumatic experiences. For instance, when the Pequod meets a
whaling ship from London, Ahab learns that its commander, Captain Boomer,
has lost an arm because of Moby Dick. Ahab immediately wants to meet his
fellow sufferer, and he greets Captain Boomer in an uncharacteristically sociable
manner: “Aye, aye, hearty!” (336 – 337; ch. 100). Similarly, Ahab responds keenly
to the fate of Pip, the black ship’s boy who, on two occasions in the novel,
becomes so frightened during the chase of a whale that he jumps overboard.
While the first time the others immediately abandon the chase to pick Pip out
of the water, the second time they simply leave him behind. Although the sailors
rescue Pip once the chase is completed, from that traumatic moment “the little
negro went about the deck an idiot” (321; ch. 93). Significantly, when Ahab be‐
comes aware of Pip’s altered condition, his reaction betrays intense emotions:
Lo! ye believers in gods all goodness, and in man all ill, lo you! see the omniscient
gods oblivious of suffering man; and, though idiotic, and knowing not what he does,
yet full of the sweet things of love and gratitude. Come! I feel prouder leading thee
by thy black hand, than though I grasped an Emperor’s! (392; ch. 125)
Ahab, usually so “inaccessible,” suddenly feels that community of suffering
which, according to Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, often arises between people with
shared experiences – especially if these experiences are of an “extraordinary if
not traumatic quality” (47).
Of Masters and Slaves: Power, Isolation, and Recognition
What makes Ahab’s affection for young Pip particularly notable is that the latter
is depicted as the very lowest person on board the ship (Fanning 217). For in‐
stance, the narrator points out that, “if there happen to be an unduly slender,
clumsy, or timorous wight in the ship, that wight is certain to be made a
ship-keeper” (319; ch. 93). Moreover, when Pip jumps overboard for the first
time, the second mate Stubb upbraids him for being a coward and explicitly
warns him that he may not be picked up so quickly next time: “[A] whale would
sell for thirty times what you would, Pip, in Alabama” (321). Stubb, in other
words, brutally reminds Pip of his status as a potential slave – a powerful threat
in antebellum America, where slavery remained a terribly real threat for
someone like Pip.
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24 Though the terms slave is a rather problematic translation of the term Knecht, I have
decided to retain it not only because the phrase master-slave dialectic is commonly used
in discussions of Hegel’s Phenomenology, but also because Hegel does actually use the
term Sklav(e) in other works (Buck-Morss 52n90).
25 “Beide Momente sind wesentlich […] als zwei entgegengesetzte Gestalten des Bewusst‐
seins; die eine das selbständige, welchem das Fürsichsein, die andere das unselbständige,
dem das Leben oder das Sein für ein anderes, das Wesen ist” (Phänomenologie des Geistes
140 – 141).
Given Pip’s position as the ship’s ‘symbolical slave,’ it is productive to read
the relationship between Ahab and Pip in the light of Hegel’s account of the
master-slave dialectic. In Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel examines “how simple
sensuous certainty mutates into a series of more advanced shapes of conscious‐
ness and, finally, into absolute knowing or speculative philosophy” (Houlgate
67). The analysis of the master-slave dialectic constitutes a crucial step in
Hegel’s argument, for it is intended to demonstrate that no self-conscious being
can ever exist as an entirely self-sufficient entity. When two consciousnesses
fight for recognition, one initially becomes the dominant “master” or “lord”
(Herr), while the other assumes the subservient position of “slave” or
“bondsman” (Knecht).24 The master and the slave are, for Hegel, “two opposed
shapes of consciousness; one is the independent consciousness whose essential
nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent consciousness whose essen‐
tial nature is simply to live or to be for another” (115).25 However, since for Hegel
self-consciousness can only exist if it is recognized by another consciousness
(112 – 114), the master also depends on the slave. This in turn renders the rela‐
tionship between master and slave inherently unstable, for if the former depends
on the latter, he cannot be seen as the unconditional master. Full self-conscious‐
ness is, then, only possible if recognition occurs between equals: when the
master-slave dialectic is overcome or, to use Hegel’s term, sublated (aufge‐
hoben) in a higher unity (Findlay xvii; Houlgate 68).
If we read the relationship between Ahab and Pip in the light of this
master-slave dialectic, it becomes significant that Ahab explicitly bemoans his
inescapable dependence on others. Ahab, the supreme master of the Pequod,
curses “that mortal inter-indebtedness” that makes it impossible for him to “be
free as air” (360; ch. 108) – or, we might add, to be truly self-reliant. Fittingly,
when Ahab inspects the images on a Spanish doubloon that he has nailed to the
Pequod’s main mast as a prize for whoever first sights Moby Dick, he reveals
himself as the consummate narcissist:
[L]ook here, – three peaks as proud as Lucifer. The firm tower, that is Ahab; the
volcano, that is Ahab; the courageous, the undaunted, and victorious fowl, that, too,
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26 cf. Edwin F. Edinger on Ahab’s reaction to Pip: “This is the first of several incidents
indicating a growing self-awareness in Ahab, which begins to humanize him even if it
is not sufficient to avert his tragic end” (109).
is Ahab; all are Ahab; and this round gold is but the image of the rounder globe, which,
like a magician’s glass, to each and every man in turn but mirrors back his own mys‐
terious self. (332; ch. 99)
At this point in the novel, Ahab construes the entire world as merely a reflection
of himself – which of course renders true recognition of another impossible. It
is in the very next chapter, however, that Ahab meets Captain Boomer, and this
meeting with a fellow sufferer is the first moment a chink appears in Ahab’s
armor of solipsism. Ahab’s empathy for Pip is the next step in this process, and,
crucially, one of the first things Ahab notices when he looks at Pip is the latter’s
inability to serve as his mirror: “I see not my reflection in the vacant pupils of
thy eyes” (392; ch. 125). Whereas the pictures on the doubloon reflected only
Ahab’s image of himself, the eyes of the symbolical slave seem to mirror nothing
at all. Thus recognizing Pip as a fellow homeless soul, Ahab immediately decides
that his own cabin “shall be Pip’s home henceforth” (392; ch. 125). In this way,
the community of suffering between Ahab and Pip literally becomes the basis
for a new and common home: a home made out of homelessness (as in Ishmael’s
rhetorical attempts to universalize his sense of unbelonging).26
At the same time, Ahab realizes that he can only continue his (self-)destruc‐
tive quest to kill Moby Dick if he does not truly allow himself to accept others
as equal human beings who, as such, are constitutive of his own, supposedly
sovereign self. When Ahab finds that Pip’s condition is “too curing” for his
malady because “[l]ike cures like,” he decides that they ought no longer to spend
time together, and he hastily retreats when Pip tells him that he would prefer
to “remain a part” of Ahab (399; ch. 129). Ahab is quite explicit about why he
can no longer face Pip’s presence: “If thou speakest thus to me much more,
Ahab’s purpose keels up in him” (399; ch. 129). He cannot, in other words, carry
on with his single-minded quest if he acknowledges Pip the slave as constitutive
of his own masterly self. Indeed, the very language Ahab uses expresses his inner
conflict, for he distinguishes between the “me” that Pip addresses (“thou
speakest thus to me”), and “Ahab,” another self, to which he refers in the third
person only (“Ahab’s purpose keels up in him”).
Though Pip ultimately obeys Ahab’s command to leave him alone, the Pe‐
quod’s captain never quite regains his earlier ability easily to deny other humans
the recognition they demand. For instance, not much after his final exchange
with Pip, Ahab looks into Starbuck’s eyes and discovers the image of “the far
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27 The German original runs: “Die […] empfindlichste Kränkung aber soll die menschliche
Grössensucht durch die heutige psychologische Forschung erfahren, welche dem Ich
nachweisen will, dass es nicht einmal Herr im eigenen Hause, sondern auf kärgliche
Nachrichten angewiesen bleibt von dem, was unbewusst in seinem Seelenleben vor‐
geht” (Vorlesungen zur Einführung 295).
away home” there: the memory of his wife and child (406; ch. 132). Starbuck
reacts by emphasizing that he, too, is a husband and father, before urging Ahab
to abandon his quest for Moby Dick and, instead, to return to his loved ones.
However, Ahab evades the presence of this too familiar Other – we learn that
now his “glance was averted” – and instead muses upon the mysterious force
that drives him onward:
What is it, what nameless, inscrutable, unearthly thing is it; what cozzening, hidden
lord and master, and cruel, remorseless emperor commands me; that against all natural
lovings and longings, I so keep pushing, and crowding, and jamming myself on all the
time […]? Is Ahab, Ahab? Is it I, God, or who, that lifts this arm? But if the great sun
move not of himself; but is as an errand-boy in heaven; nor one single star can revolve,
but by some invisible power; how then can this one small heart beat; this one small
brain think thoughts; unless God does that beating, does that thinking, does that living,
and not I. (406 – 407; ch. 132)
Freud would, presumably, point out here that no ego is ever “master in its own
house” because of the all-pervasive influence of the unconscious (Introductory
Lectures 285).27 Ahab, by contrast, insists that an external force – a malevolent,
“hidden lord and master” – must be the cause of his self-alienation. And yet, the
crucial point is that Ahab has doubts about his own mastery at all. Far from
“defyingly” worshipping the hidden master, as he did not so long ago (382 – 383;
ch. 119), Ahab now seems weary and on the verge of resignation. As readers, we
may thus speculate that, had Ahab been given more time to converse with others
and truly to reflect on his own situation, he might eventually have overcome
his narcissistic isolation and decided to turn homewards instead.
What supports this interpretation is that, in Moby-Dick, isolation from others
is not only portrayed as a symptom, but also a cause of mental alienation. For
instance, in the case of Pip, it is quite clear that the boy’s madness relates to his
experience of absolute isolation after he had jumped overboard a second time,
for “the awful lonesomeness” of the open ocean is intolerable to humans: “The
intense concentration of self in the middle of such a heartless immensity, my
God! who can tell it?” (321; ch. 93). In properly Hegelian fashion, Pip’s self cannot
survive without the presence of another; bereft of the presence of fellow human
beings, the abandoned boy eventually becomes mad. I therefore agree with Sa‐
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28 “Bei aller Art von Verletzung und Verlust ist die niedere und gröbere Seele besser daran
als die vornehmere: die Gefahren der letzteren müssen grösser sein, ihre Wahrschein‐
lichkeit, dass sie verunglückt und zu Grunde geht, ist sogar, bei der Vielfachheit ihrer
Lebensbedingungen, ungeheuer” (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 261 – 262; § 276).
muel Kimball that, in Moby-Dick, “selfhood is defined relationally in terms of
homelessness,” in the sense that the self is haunted by the specter of abandon‐
ment and non-relation (546). Ahab, too, feels the intensity of this pressure, as
he confesses to Starbuck after his last farewell to Pip:
When I think of this life I have led; the desolation of solitude it has been; the masoned,
walled-town of a Captain’s exclusiveness, which admits but small entrance to any
sympathy from the green country without – oh, weariness! heaviness! Guinea-coast
slavery of solitary command! – when I think of all this; only half-suspected, not so
keenly known to me before – and how for forty years I have fed upon dry salted fare –
fit emblem of the dry nourishment of my soul! […] – away, whole oceans away, from
that young girl-wife I wedded past fifty, and sailed for Cape Horn the next day, leaving
but one dent in my marriage pillow – wife? wife? – rather a widow with her husband
alive! (405; ch. 132)
Ahab believes that he suffers from more than the common sailor’s homesick‐
ness, though his absence from the loved ones at home is a burden, too. What
makes his lot particularly difficult to endure is the “Captain’s exclusiveness” –
that “Guinea-coast slavery of solitary command” that has for so long isolated
him from his crew, the only home available during the years he spent far from
his native Nantucket. Once again mastery involves a kind of “slavery” – an
insight that for many years Ahab had “only half-suspected.”
The case of Ahab thus supports Terry Eagleton’s claim that power is “natu‐
rally solipsistic”: that it “tends to breed fantasy, reducing the self to a state of
querulous narcissism” (After Theory 132). While the poor and disempowered
cannot, according to Eagleton, afford to believe in a world that will simply bend
to their every whim and desire, those in power regularly witness the apparent
triumph of their own will over matter. Eagleton’s position is thus not entirely
unlike Nietzsche’s, who posits a fundamental difference between “noble” and
lower souls:
In all kinds of injury and loss the lower and coarser soul is better off than the nobler
soul: the dangers of the latter must be greater, the probability that it will come to grief
and perish is in fact immense, considering the multiplicity of the conditions of its
existence (Beyond Good and Evil 221; § 276)28
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29 In his Jungian reading of Melville’s novel, Edwin F. Edinger describes a notably similar
dynamic: “[I]nflation is also an alienation insofar as being at a height separates one
both from others and from the earthly realities of one's own being. A fall is necessary,
but if it is too abrupt, or if the dissociation is too great, the descent can be a dis‐
aster” (52).
30 “[D]ie Notwendigkeit solcher Führer, die erschreckliche Gefahr, dass sie ausbleiben oder
missrathen oder entarten könnten – das sind unsere eigentlichen Sorgen und Verdüs‐
terungen, ihr wisst es, ihr freien Geister?” (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 138; § 203).
Eagleton and Nietzsche thus share a sense that the elevated are also more vul‐
nerable, for if their self is more sophisticated (or more inflated, depending on
one’s point of view), it is also more likely to collapse entirely when confronted
with an insurmountable obstacle.29 What is so poignant in Ahab’s case, however,
is that his progress towards a less inflated sense of self is brutally cut short in
Moby-Dick. When Ahab examines the images on the Spanish doubloon, he is
still lost in the solipsism of his power. However, he increasingly opens up to
others due to his encounters with fellow sufferers: Captain Boomer and little
Pip. Ahab is a tragic figure because, when the Pequod meets Moby Dick and
thus its doom, he is so close to overcoming his thirst for vengeance, to aban‐
doning his monomaniac quest, and to re-establishing a sense of belonging with
the fellow human beings around him.
Moby-Dick is, then, not primarily an indictment of Ahab as a character, but a
critique of the very idea that self-reliant Übermenschen ought to shape the fate
of the world. Even Nietzsche himself in fact admits that this idea involves terrible
risks: “[T]he necessity for such leaders, the dreadful danger that they might be
lacking, or miscarry and degenerate: – these are our real anxieties and glooms,
ye know it well, ye free spirits!” (Beyond Good and Evil 117; § 203; original em‐
phasis).30 For Emerson, failure also constitutes a possible outcome, yet he tends
to portray it as an individual tragedy rather than as a threat to the fate of man‐
kind as such (“The Transcendentalist” 252 – 253). In Moby-Dick, however, Ahab’s
tragedy is not individual, as virtually all his followers meet their doom – even
Queequeg, who is arguably the most positive and heroic character in the novel
(e.g. Cohen, The Novel and the Sea 185; Edinger 35; Flory 96 – 97). Only Ishmael
survives to tell the tale, lost and abandoned: “another orphan” (427; “Epilogue”).
If a self-reliant individual as damaged as Ahab for one reason or another assumes
the position of supreme commander, this will likely lead to death and destruc‐
tion. Accordingly, we can read Moby-Dick as a political allegory against the evils
of power and the threat inherent in the idea of self-reliant mastery.
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31 Indeed, the similarity between the titles of the respective chapters – “The Town-Ho’s
Story” and “The Jeroboam’s Story” (ch. 54 and 71) – makes it difficult not to see them
as interrelated.
32 See C. L. R. James’s Mariners, Renegades and Castaways (1953) for a classic reading of
Ahab as the embodiment of totalitarian impulses.
The Duty of Civil Disobedience
The remedy that the novel implicitly proposes against the evils of, on the one
hand, Ahab’s unleashed ‘will to power,’ and, on the other, Ishmael’s (and others’)
political quietism is what Henry David Thoreau calls civil disobedience. In his
essay “Resistance to Civil Government” (published two years before
Moby-Dick, and later renamed “Civil Disobedience”), Thoreau points out that
law “never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it,
even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice” (387). In this view,
the problem with the crew of the Pequod is that even those who condemn Ahab’s
quest continue to obey their captain. This is particularly apparent in the case of
Starbuck, who voices his outrage at Ahab’s desire for vengeance from the very
outset of his commander’s quest (139; ch. 36), but who nevertheless continues
to carry out Ahab’s orders. Importantly, the point here is not to argue that Star‐
buck should have killed Ahab when he had the chance to do so (ch. 123, “The
Musket”) – and neither does Thoreau advocate violent resistance to govern‐
mental injustice. However, it is safe to assume that Thoreau would condemn
Starbuck’s insistence on a “lawful way” to wrest Ahab’s power from him (387;
ch. 123). Instead, Thoreau maintains that those “who, while they disapprove of
the character and measures of a government, yield to it their allegiance and
support, are undoubtedly its most conscientious supporters” (394). In other
words, those who see that the law is unjust yet nevertheless choose to adhere
to it are, according to Thoreau, the most morally objectionable of all. The le‐
gitimacy of command must, in Throeau’s view, derive from justice rather than
from legal authority. Indeed, in the course of Moby-Dick, we learn of no fewer
than two ships on which mutinies have taken place, which confirms that one of
the novel’s central interests is the potential legitimacy of insubordination.31
Moby-Dick can thus be read as an allegory of the universal dangers of power
and tyranny as well as of the potential remedies.32 At the same time, many critics
see Melville’s novel as a response to more specifically American ills: a suppos‐
edly democratic and egalitarian society that is in fact based on exploitation and
exclusion. The fact that the novel is set on a whaling ship to some extent supports
the idea that national concerns may be central to the novel, as the U. S. was
preeminent amongst the nations engaged in whaling at the time (Osterhammel
557) – a preeminence that registers in Moby-Dick in moments of national pride,
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33 The fact that the Pequots (or Pequods) were not actually extinct (see Parker and Hayford
69n4) is, I suggest, irrelevant here; what counts is that the allegorical ship of the state
is named after a Native American tribe that was utterly dispossessed.
as when the narrator boasts “that the Yankees in one day, collectively, kill more
whales than all the English, collectively, in ten years” (197; ch. 53). A whaling
ship can thus be seen, with some justice, as a particularly American type of
setting, and accordingly its allegorical significance might equally concern the
U. S. in particular.
Critics who focus on this aspect of the novel generally highlight the discrep‐
ancy between, on the one hand, American ideals of equality, and, on the other,
a highly exclusive political reality. Philip Armstrong nicely sums up this line of
argument:
As Melville was well aware, his nation’s much vaunted ideal of democracy depended
upon the exclusion of large sectors of the adult population. Many studies have shown
how Moby-Dick satirically recognizes America’s dependence upon the labor of Native
Americans, African American slaves, and conscripted Pacific islanders. (1050)
The Pequod’s three harpooneers – Queequeg, Tashtego, and Daggoo – are a
Pacific islander, a Native American, and an African, respectively, and though
their labor is essential, they are effectively barred from the higher levels of
command. Moreover, if the Pequod is a symbol of the American state, then the
fact that the ship is named after “a celebrated tribe of Massachusetts Indians,
now extinct as the ancient Medes” (69; ch. 16) becomes harrowingly appropriate,
for the United States themselves are founded on the basis of violent conquest.33
We need to bear in mind this underlying concern with ethnic Others when
reading Ishmael’s assertion that “it was the whiteness of the whale that above
all things appalled me” (159; ch. 42), and perhaps the significance of the white
whale is indeed, as Margaret Cohen suggests, to challenge the “schematic use
of whiteness in Western moralities” (“The Chronotopes of the Sea” 657). More‐
over, if race is one of the critical faultlines in the novel, then Philip Armstrong
points out that gender is another key problematic, since women are excluded
from the allegorical ship of the state altogether, and Ahab’s complaint about the
distance from his wife “involves the Captain’s recognition of the damage pro‐
duced by the economic separation between the genders” (1050).
That the benefits of such a racially and sexually divided societal order are
ultimately insubstantial except for those who are already in power is nicely
illustrated in Melville’s novel by the Spanish doubloon that Ahab has promised
as a reward to whoever first sights Moby Dick. We have seen that the force of
Ahab’s rhetoric may serve to sway others to his purpose, yet when it comes to
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34 Such a reading also ties in with Fredric Jameson’s reminder that the sea may seem to
promise adventure and escape from the mundane world of business, but is in fact itself
a work-place and trading highway, and as such essential to capitalist development (The
Political Unconscious 198).
35 For a similar argument see Jeremy Tambling, who suggests that in Moby-Dick allegorical
significance “has faded in the age of realism; and the text cannot prove the validity of
allegorical interpretation, save by asserting it” (Allegory 91).
persuading his crew to join him on his quest for revenge against Moby Dick,
the prospect of a financial reward is perhaps equally, if not more, effective (138;
ch. 36). At any rate, when the Pequod finally encounters Moby Dick, Ahab claims
that he himself “raised the White Whale first,” and that “Fate reserved the dou‐
bloon” for him (408; ch. 133). Ahab, the captain (and part owner) of the allegorical
ship of the state thus himself reaps the reward that he used earlier as a bait for
those amongst his crew who remained reluctant to join him. In short, the fi‐
nancial reward promised for collaboration in the commander’s morally dubious
endeavor ultimately proves illusory.34
The Signs of Madness and Transcendence: A “Hideous and Intolerable
Allegory”?
Moby-Dick thus invites at least two different kinds of allegorical readings: one
that regards the novel as a general critique of power and the dangers of cor‐
ruption, and another that focuses more particularly on the social ills of exclusion
in the polity of the United States. At the same time, however, the text also dis‐
courages allegorical readings entirely. Admittedly, an allegorical reading of
Ahab’s story is strongly suggested in some of the novel’s early chapters, in which
Ishmael visits “a Whaleman’s Chapel” in New Bedford. In these chapters, Ish‐
mael suggests that “the world’s a ship” and “the pulpit its brow” (47; ch. 8), with
the preacher acting as “pilot-prophet” (53; ch. 9). Accordingly, if Ahab the pilot
goes astray, then this involves grave allegorical dangers for the world. And yet,
at other times the narrator explicitly urges readers to refrain from seeing Moby
Dick as “a hideous and intolerable allegory” (172; ch. 45), emphasizing the re‐
alism of his tale instead (e.g. ch. 55, “Of the Monstrous Pictures of Whales”).
Indeed, the narrator’s attention to even the smallest details of whaling appears
superfluous if we read his tale allegorically. It would therefore be better to say
that Moby-Dick uneasily combines features both of a realist novel and of tradi‐
tional allegory, without being fully at home in either genre.35 The extent of the
book’s generic unbelonging is, in fact, reflected in the plethora of labels that
critics have used to describe Moby-Dick, from “fable of the Real” (Eagleton,
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Trouble with Strangers 216) to “monster anti-novel” (Hillis Miller, On Literature
73) and “modern epic” (Franco Moretti, Modern Epic).
Moby-Dick’s uneasy combination of allegorical imagery and novelistic re‐
alism is in many ways epitomized in Ahab, who constitutes a borderline figure
between a ‘realistic,’ embodied individual with psychological depth, and a ‘flat,’
allegorical character. In his study of nineteenth-century realism, Fredric
Jameson notes in passing that “allegory and the body […] repel one another and
fail to mix” (Antinomies of Realism 37), and it is indeed difficult to reconcile the
allegorical readings proposed above with the idea that Ahab suffers from
post-traumatic stress disorder. In other words, as soon as we focus on the real‐
istic depiction of Ahab as a traumatized individual with a wounded body, we
remain in the domain of literal meaning – which poses a problem for traditional
forms of allegorical reading because, as Jeremy Tambling notes, allegory privi‐
leges the ‘spirit’ over the ‘letter’ of the word: “A spiritual reading says that the
literal meaning is not as important as the allegorical message” (16). Accordingly,
close attention to the ‘literal,’ realistic details of a character’s embodied mind
distracts from the text’s allegorical message, which can only be revealed if the
literal character disappears, or at least recedes from view. Perhaps this explains
why, according to Angus Fletcher, an allegorical character’s way of acting typ‐
ically is “severely limited in variety” (38), for by reducing the character’s ‘real‐
istic’ complexity texts can foreground that character’s allegorical function.
Intriguingly, for Fletcher, this limited behavioral complexity of allegorical
characters is open to two entirely different interpretations, one religious and
the other secular. To tease out these two different interpretations, Fletcher
imagines how an allegorical character would appear to us if we were to meet
that character in real life:
[W]e would say of him that he was obsessed with only one idea, or that he had an
absolutely one-track mind, or that his life was patterned according to absolutely rigid
habits from which he never allowed himself to vary. It would seem that he was driven
by some hidden, private force; or, viewing him from another angle, it would appear
that he did not control his own destiny, but appeared to be controlled by some foreign
force, something outside the sphere of his own ego. (40 – 41)
In the context of a real-life situation, the allegorical character would “appear to
be controlled by some foreign force,” and Fletcher notes that in religious views
of the world such external forces are referred to as the demonic (39). By contrast,
from a secular perspective, the character’s “one-track mind” and “rigid habits”
appear as nothing other than psychological obsession. As Fletcher suggests,
Moby-Dick’s portrayal of Ahab oscillates precisely between these two poles (61),
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36 It is interesting that some of the early critical reactions to Moby-Dick echo Starbuck’s
link between madness and blasphemy, with one reviewer reading the novel’s “stylistic
and formal incoherence” as “certainly blasphemous, and most probably insane”
(Selby 18).
and even Ahab himself wavers between a religious and a secular interpretation
of his own condition: “I’m demoniac, I am madness maddened!” (143; ch. 37).
More generally, Moby-Dick as a novel oscillates between a realist under‐
standing of madness as a psychological problem, and a religious interpretation
of madness as demonic – i.e. a phenomenon with transcendental significance.
For instance, when Ahab discloses his desire to take revenge on Moby Dick, the
first mate Starbuck wavers between psychological and religious discourses, re‐
torting that such a plan is “[m]adness” as well as “blasphemous” (139; ch. 36).36
The notion that madness may in fact be linked to transcendence is stated most
explicitly, however, in Ishmael’s account of Pip’s tragic fate:
The sea had jeeringly kept his finite body up, but drowned the infinite of his soul. Not
drowned entirely, though. Rather carried down alive to wondrous depths, where
strange shapes of the unwarped primal world glided to and fro before his passive
eyes […]; and among the joyous, heartless, ever-juvenile eternities, Pip saw the mul‐
titudinous, God-omnipresent, coral insects, that out of the firmament of waters heaved
the colossal orbs. He saw God’s foot upon the treadle of the loom, and spoke it; and
therefore his shipmates called him mad. So man’s insanity is heaven’s sense; and
wandering from all mortal reason, man comes at last to that celestial thought, which,
to reason, is absurd and frantic; and weal or woe, feels then uncompromised, indif‐
ferent as his God. (321 – 322; ch. 93)
Pip may be mad, but he was also confronted with visions of the divine, and
accordingly for Ishmael the boy’s “insanity is heaven’s sense”: the madness of
the holy fool, which might hold the key to a kind of transcendental knowledge
that other mortals seek in vain.
Ahab, too, refers at one point to Pip’s “holiness” (391; ch. 125), which suggests
that he shares with Starbuck and Ishmael a view of madness that Michel Foucault
regards as typical of a much earlier historical period:
In the Middle Ages and until the Renaissance, man’s dispute with madness was a
dramatic debate in which he confronted the secret powers of the world; the experience
of madness was clouded by images of the Fall and the Will of God, of the Beast and
the Metamorphosis, and of all the marvelous secrets of Knowledge. (Madness and
Civilization xii)
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37 According to Johannes Völz, Emerson’s own thinking in fact “evolves from a theory of
the individual as an aspiring self-reliant genius in which the Other is never absent, but
generally pushed to the background from where it resurfaces as a problem, a theory of
the individual who still strives to become the great man or genius, but who can become
so only on the basis of what Emerson calls representativeness” (101). However, the aim
of this chapter is not to provide a systematic account of the relation between Melville’s
work and Emerson’s philosophy as it evolved over the years, but instead to use certain
Emersonian ideas as one of several tools that may help us to explore the notion of home
and belonging in Moby-Dick.
Foucault argues that, in the Middle Ages, the link between transcendence and
madness constituted a theological given, and in Moby-Dick Ahab’s very name
emphasizes this connection. “Ahab” is, as Ishmael points out early in the novel,
the name of an idolatrous and ill-fated King of Israel denounced by the prophet
Elijah, and we learn that it was given to Ahab by his “crazy, widowed mother”
(78; ch. 16; see 1 Kings 18: 16 – 19). In other words, Ahab’s mother was mad when
she chose his name – yet her choice also proves prophetic, for Ahab, too, is
denounced by a man who calls himself Elijah. Indeed, Elijah had warned Ishmael
and his friend Queequeg not to embark on the Pequod, and though Ishmael
believes that Elijah “must be a little damaged in the head,” he is also riveted with
the latter’s “insane earnestness” (87; ch. 19), confessing later that Elijah’s “dia‐
bolical incoherences” continue to haunt him (108; ch. 28). Moreover, by the end
of Melville’s novel, we know that Elijah’s prophecies of doom have all come
true, which in turn seems to confirm the earlier link between madness and “the
marvelous secrets of Knowledge.” We are thus now in a position to understand
what Georg Lukács means when, in his Theory of the Novel, he interprets mad‐
ness as an objectivation of “transcendental homelessness” (61). Extraordinary
mental states appear as demonic or prophetic in a world of faith, and it is only
when the link to the transcendental home is severed that a purely secular con‐
cept of madness can emerge.
Let us be clear about the implications of these conflicting interpretations of
madness for the larger theme of homelessness in Moby-Dick. What Emerson
defines in positive terms as self-reliance – a kind of ‘splendid isolation’ from the
mass of average beings – in Ahab appears as both mental and social alienation
(i.e. his madness is linked to his being cut-off from other human beings).37 The
captain’s madness thus constitutes a state of unbelonging – provided that we
subscribe to a secular interpretation of his condition. We have seen, however,
that Moby-Dick also offers a competing interpretation of madness as the sign of
transcendental connectedness (“insanity is heaven’s sense”), and perhaps this
explains why Ahab is so afraid of spending more time with Pip. If recognition
of the symbolical slave were indeed able to cure the master’s malady, then this
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process might also force Ahab to face the possibility that his obsession is ‘mere’
madness, and that his quest for the white whale lacks any transcendental sig‐
nificance. Put differently: were Ahab to relinquish his belief in the “demoniac”
nature of his quest, then this would force him to confront two kinds of trauma
at one and the same time: the historical trauma of physical mutilation and mental
illness (i.e. a recognition of his own madness, resulting from post-traumatic
stress disorder), and the structural or existential trauma of transcendental
homelessness. Faced with this double threat of unbelonging, Ahab holds fast to
the obsessive quest that has given meaning to his life – and turns away from
Pip forever.
We could say, then, that the ‘epic’ character Ahab shies away from the aes‐
thetic of the novel, for according to Lukács the genre of the novel is a formal
expression of transcendental homelessness (41). Lukács argues that the world
of the epic (and, arguably, allegory) “is like a home, for the fire that burns in the
soul is of the same essential nature as the stars” (29). The novel, by contrast, “is
the epic of an age in which the extensive totality of life is no longer directly
given, in which the immanence of meaning in life has become a problem” (56).
As both Michael McKeon (Theory of the Novel 179) and John Neubauer (533 – 534)
have noted, for Lukács this transcendental homelessness constitutes a funda‐
mental loss, and Robert T. Tally Jr. rightly notes that the feeling Lukács evokes
is akin to Martin Heidegger’s notion of existential angst (Spatiality 47). Lu‐
kács’s evaluation thus differs markedly from Mikhail Bakhtin’s, who finds in
the genre of the novel “a certain linguistic homelessness of literary conscious‐
ness” that he sees as profoundly liberating because he believes it to be incom‐
patible with oppressive, ‘monologic’ types of discourse (“Discourse in the Novel”
367; see McKeon, Theory of the Novel 318; Neubauer 541).
Despite such differences in evaluation between Lukács and Bakhtin, however,
we should note that linguistic and transcendental homelessness in fact remain
intimately related. The link between the two ideas is nicely expressed in Barry
Unsworth’s historical novel Morality Play, set in fourteenth-century England,
in which a former monk wonders whether it is morally acceptable for actors to
perform a play based on a real-life crime rather than stories taken from scripture:
God has not given us this story to use, He has not revealed to us the meaning of it. So
it has no meaning, it is only a death. Players are like other men, they must use God’s
meanings, they cannot make meanings of their own, that is heresy, it is the source of
all our woes, it is the reason our first parents were cast out. [… I]f we make our own
meanings, God will oblige us to answer our own questions, He will leave us in the
void without the comfort of His Word. (74)
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If meaning is not revealed (and thus transcendentally guaranteed), then ac‐
cording to Unsworth’s narrator it necessarily becomes the problematic task of
orphaned selves to create their own meaning in a comfortless void. In other
words, if we lose the transcendental anchor of God’s Word, meaning itself be‐
comes arbitrary and linguistically homeless.
Of course, it is possible to disagree with Lukács’s and Bakhtin’s view of
homelessness as an inherent characteristic of the novel as a genre, but the im‐
portant point in our context is that Moby-Dick’s concern with both transcen‐
dental and linguistic homelessness is in fact apparent from the novel’s very first
page. In Moby-Dick’s opening section (“Etymology”; 7), the narrator tries to un‐
ravel the meaning of the word whale by venturing beyond the boundaries of
English, his linguistic home:
ןח Hebrew.
khtoς, Greek.
CETUS, Latin.
WHÆL, Anglo-Saxon.
HVAL, Danish.
WAL, Dutch.
HWAL, Swedish.
HVALUR, Icelandic.
WHALE, English.
BALEINE, French.
BALLENA, Spanish.
PEKEE-NUEE-NUEE, Fegee.
PEHEE-NUEE-NUEE, Erromangoan.
In doing so, however, Melville’s narrator merely highlights the arbitrary nature
of linguistic signs (or, more precisely, the free-floating nature of the signifier,
the meaning of which is not, in fact, transcendentally given). Moreover, in the
novel’s second section (“Extracts”), the narrator provides us with quotations on
whales “from any book whatsoever, sacred or profane,” and his use of the phrase
“gospel cetology” beautifully encapsulates Moby-Dick’s characteristic oscilla‐
tion between empiricist realism (“cetology”) and allegorical or transcendental
significance (“gospel”; 8). In short, while initially these two sections are bound
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to have an alienating effect on the reader, in retrospect we find that they are
intimately related to the novel’s key philosophical conflicts.
Losing Control: Madness, Obsession, and Homeless Narration
The novel’s first two sections, moreover, highlight the extent to which the nar‐
rator’s quest for the meaning of his story parallels Ahab’s obsessive quest for
meaning through his quest for revenge against Moby Dick.38 The narrator’s
“systematized exhibition of the whale in his broad genera” (115; ch. 32); his
promise to paint “something like the true form of the whale as he actually ap‐
pears to the eye of the whaleman” (214 – 215; ch. 55); or his account of “the precise
origin of ambergris” (317; ch. 92): these and other painstakingly detailed de‐
scriptions betray a well-nigh pathological obsession with the subject matter of
whales. Put somewhat differently, we may say that readers who find themselves
exasperated by Moby-Dick’s frequent essayistic digressions on every conceiv‐
able aspect of whaling have sensed something of vital importance: that the novel
as a whole has an obsessive narrative structure that is, quite simply, apt to drive
one mad.
Intriguingly, just as Ahab fails to sustain his narcissistic fantasy of mastery,
Ishmael the narrator in many ways loses control over the story he tells – to the
extent that his very identity as a narrator threatens to dissolve.39 Ishmael’s status
as a realistically conceived narrator who simply relates his own experiences is
in fact precarious at best, for there are many chapters in Moby-Dick that read
like classically omniscient narration.40 In the chapter entitled “The Doubloon,”
for instance, the narrator never refers to himself in the first person; instead, he
uses impersonal phrases such as “it has been related” and “it has not been added,”
which could just as well be uttered by an extradiegetic, omniscient narrator
(331; ch. 99). Moreover, it is unlikely that Ishmael, as a character, could actually
have overheard what Ahab and Pip say to each other in the solitude of the
Captain’s cabin, and yet as a narrator he is able miraculously to provide us with
all the details of this exchange (399 – 400; ch. 129). In addition, the narrator refers
to himself in the first person in only one of the novel’s final fifteen chapters; the
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other fourteen chapters conform to the paradigm of third-person omniscience.41
More disturbingly still, at various points in the novel, the narrator’s voice dis‐
appears altogether, as in a chapter that presents us with Ishmael’s musings about
the loss of identity that can occur to someone who meditates in solitude on the
mast-head of a whaling ship (136; ch. 35). In the chapters that follow, the con‐
ventional form of narrative fiction slowly dissolves, transforming instead into
something that resembles a play script rather than novelistic prose:
HARPOONEERS AND SAILORS
(Foresail rises and discovers the watch standing, lounging, leaning, and lying in various
attitudes, all singing in chorus.)
Farewell and adieu to you, Spanish ladies!
Farewell and adieu to you, ladies of Spain!
Our Captain’s commanded–
1ST NANTUCKET SAILOR
Oh, boys, don’t be sentimental; it’s bad for the digestion! Take a tonic, follow me!
(Sings, and all follow.)
Our captain stood upon the deck,
  A spy glass in his hand,
A viewing of those gallant whales
  That blew at every strand. (145 – 146; ch. 40)
In these dramatized passages, the narrator virtually disappears – and as if in
panic-stricken response to this loss of narrative mastery, the next chapter opens
with an emphatic re-assertion of textual presence: “I, Ishmael, was one of that
crew” (152; ch. 41).
What is striking about Ishmael’s moments of narratorial dissolution is that
they are always associated with either Ahab or Pip, the two other characters
whose sense of self proves highly unstable in the course of Moby-Dick. A first
example is the sequence of increasingly dramatized narrative discussed just now,
which opens with Ahab announcing his quest for vengeance against Moby Dick
(138 – 139; ch. 36) and ends with Pip voicing his fear of death and dissolution in
a prayer to God (151; ch. 40). A second example occurs after the chapter in which
Pip jumps overboard for a second time and in consequence remains abandoned
for too long in the vast solitude of the ocean (“The Castaway”; ch. 93). This
chapter precedes Ishmael’s account of how, when squeezing the spermaceti ex‐
tracted from a slaughtered whale, he suddenly finds himself squeezing his co-la‐
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borer’s hands – an experience that leads Ishmael to indulge in a strongly ho‐
moerotic fantasy of bodily union with his fellow sailors (“let us squeeze
ourselves into each other”) which he immediately proceeds to sublimate into a
transcendental vision: “I saw long rows of angels in paradise, each with his hand
in a jar of spermaceti” (323; ch. 94). Though Pip’s traumatic isolation and Ish‐
mael’s erotic abandonment differ in many respects, they both involve a sense
that the bounded nature of their selves is being dissolved. Finally, the scene in
which Ahab mesmerizes his crew by catching the heavenly spark of St. Elmo’s
fire triggers another sequence of narratorial dissolution through an increasingly
dramatized style of storytelling (ch. 118 – 122). We ought therefore to regard with
skepticism Walter E. Bezanson’s claim that Ishmael’s voice “is there every mo‐
ment from the genesis of the fiction in ‘Call me Ishmael’ to the final revelation
of the ‘Epilogue’” (647), as well as John Bryant’s assertion that “it is always
Ishmael who contains and controls” (80). Rather, Ishmael is a remarkably pre‐
carious narrator who continually struggles against his own dissolution; increas‐
ingly absent from the novel’s plot as a character, he must even fear that his
narratorial voice will be drowned in the maelstrom of his story.
Moby-Dick thus constitutes a prime example of what Rick Altman calls a
multiple-focus narrative. In his Theory of Narrative, Altman suggests that there
are three basic types of narrative fiction. In the first type, which Altman calls
dual-focus narratives, the narrator shifts his attention back and forth between
two groups (or two individuals) whose conflict is defined by stable binary op‐
positions (55). Such narratives, according to Altman, presuppose a set of uni‐
versal values that are temporarily challenged by one or more characters, but
ultimately reaffirmed by either the destruction or re-integration of those char‐
acters who have strayed (86 – 87). As one example of a dual-focus narrative,
Altman cites Homer’s Iliad, in which the Trojans violate supposedly universal
values, and where the ultimate destruction of Troy reaffirms the Greek com‐
munity (79 – 81). In single-focus narratives, by contrast, we typically concentrate
on one main character who violates the symbolic laws of his or her community
on a quest “into previously unexplored territory, behavior, or thought”; the em‐
phasis, in other words, does not lie on reaffirming established values but instead
on discovering new ones (Altman 189). One of Altman’s examples for this second
type of narrative is Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter, which could easily
have been told as a dual-focus narrative (with Hester Prynne embodying values
opposed to the true Puritan faith of her community), but which instead con‐
centrates entirely on Hester’s quest for new and different values (Altman
99 – 118). While, in dual-focus narratives, the two opposing sets of values are
ordered hierarchically and portrayed as objective, in single-focus narratives all
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values “remain subject to interpretation” (189). Nevertheless, even in
single-focus stories there is a stable narrative center – i.e. the main character –
and this distinguishes them from multiple-focus narratives, which “thrive on
discontinuity” (243). In such stories, “we find ourselves transported by the nar‐
rator from one character to another” in an unpredictable, seemingly arbitrary
manner (263). Multiple-focus narratives thus function, according to Altman,
“like a mosaic,” where the individual parts of the text “may mean something
quite different” from the text as a whole (288).
Importantly, Moby-Dick initially looks very much like a single-focus narra‐
tive, and this creates expectations that the text subsequently proceeds to thwart.
After plowing their way through Moby-Dick’s enigmatic introductory sections
(“Etymology” and “Extracts”), readers are likely to react with considerable relief
when the narrator invites them to call him Ishmael and join him on his narrative
quest. We follow Ishmael to New Bedford, where he meets a new friend in
Queequeg, who decides to accompany him on his journey. As is typical of
single-focus narratives, the novel concentrates on its main character – until the
moment when the Pequod sets sail (ch. 22). At this point, the narrative suddenly
loses focus. Chapter 23, for instance, is devoted entirely to a character named
Bulkington, whom we previously encountered only very briefly (ch. 3), and who
will never again appear in the novel. Next comes the first of many essayistic
excursions (ch. 24), and from this point on the story of Ishmael and his friend
Queequeg recedes into the background, displaced by the tale of Ahab’s quest.
Even Ahab, however, sometimes disappears for long stretches of the text (e.g.
ch. 74 – 80, or 92 – 98), making it impossible to construe him as a new and stable
textual center. As readers, we thus experience a movement from fixity of nar‐
rative purpose to textual disorientation, and according to Altman this is typical
of multiple-focus narratives in general: “Many texts invite a single-focus or
dual-focus reading, only to undermine the reading in favor of a multiple-focus
alternative” (255).42
Intriguingly, Altman describes the reader’s condition in multiple-focus nar‐
ratives as an experience of homelessness, and it is plausible to argue that
Moby-Dick’s disjointed narrative structure effectively undermines any sense of
spiritual belonging that we may gain from the narrator’s assurances of deeper
religious significance. Walter E. Bezanson, for instance, notes that readers ex‐
pecting “classical form” will find Moby-Dick aesthetically unsatisfactory because
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“explorations of structure suggest elaborate interrelations of the parts but do
not lead to an overreaching formal pattern” (655).43 This statement matches
precisely Altman’s characterization of how multiple-focus narratives affect their
readers:
Reading dual-focus and single-focus narrative, I always feel at home – whether it is
the group-based home of the dual-focus texts or the single-focus identification with
an individual. Coming to multiple-focus narrative with expectations developed in an‐
other world, I sense the new form as a loss, a lack, a diversion from the expected path.
Trained to expect coherence […], I can’t feel at home in the multiple-focus
world […]. (285)
Altman compares this effect of disorientation to the paintings of Pieter Bruegel
the Elder, which confront us with images of a multiple-focus world marked by
the absence of a clear center: “We remain unable to image the drawing as a
whole, to constitute visually any unity or hierarchy, to restore a center in terms
of either interest or space” (200). In Moby-Dick, this absent center is, of course,
symbolized by the white whale itself: a void that structures the entire narrative
but that continues to elude both the novel’s characters, its narrator, and its
readers.
According to Altman, Bruegel’s technique of de-centering is complemented
in multiple-focus narratives by a clash of various styles, and Altman explicitly
associates this strategy with the Russian Formalist’s notion of defamiliarization
(as well as with Bakhtin’s concepts of dialogism and linguistic homelessness;
Altman 217 – 221). In Moby-Dick, too, we encounter various contrasting styles –
for instance in the novel’s juxtaposition of satirical legal history (ch. 89 – 90) with
picaresque episodes (ch. 91) and didactic treatises (ch. 92). In thus failing to
follow any predictable trajectory, multiple-focus narratives challenge their
readers to “stretch beyond the action-oriented and character-oriented questions
of single-focus and dual-focus narrative” (Altman 263). Instead, Altman con‐
tends, “the multiple-focus form seeks out the tertium quid of conception” (269) –
i.e. it encourages its disoriented, homeless readers to look for common thematic
denominators, formal patterns, and recurring tropes.
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Unraveling the “Weaver-God”
Let us examine how one such recurring trope – the image of the loom – can help
us to bring into sharper focus some of Moby-Dick’s central concerns. We first
encounter this recurring image in the title of the novel’s very first chapter
(“Loomings”), and already we are faced with significant ambiguities. The naut‐
ical meaning of the term looming is “land or ships beyond the horizon, dimly
seen by reflection in peculiar weather conditions” (Parker and Hayford 18n1) –
and indeed at this point in the narrative we do not yet ‘see’ the Pequod, but
perceive it only dimly in Ishmael’s reference to a “whaling voyage” on which
he is about to embark (22; ch. 1). This specialized meaning of looming is thus
relatively close to its more general – and often figurative – meaning as a “coming
indistinctly into view” (OED): a vaguely foreshadowed, possibly ominous pres‐
ence.44 However, looming can also denote the “action or process of ‘mounting’
the warp on the loom” (OED), which is precisely what the narrator does in the
novel’s first chapter: he sets out to weave the web of his story.45 The title “Loom‐
ings,” in other words, simultaneously constitutes an authentic use of nautical
jargon, an ominous expression of foreboding, and a playfully metafictional
comment. From the outset, Moby-Dick’s concern with a realistic depiction of life
at sea is thus counterpoised with a transcendental aura of prophecy as well as
with an interest in the workings of textuality as such.
Moreover, when an actual loom appears later on in the novel, we are con‐
fronted once again with Ishmael’s characteristic desire to imbue mundane facts
with a deeper, transcendental significance. As he and Queequeg are “mildly em‐
ployed weaving,” Ishmael begins to lose himself in thoughts about the symbolical
value of looms:
[I]t seemed as if this were the Loom of Time, and I myself were a shuttle mechanically
weaving and weaving away at the Fates. There lay the fixed threads of the warp subject
to but one single, ever returning, unchanging vibration, and that vibration merely
enough to admit of the crosswise interblending of other threads with its own. This
warp seemed necessity; and here, thought I, with my own hand I ply my own shuttle
and weave my own destiny into these unalterable threads. Meantime, Queequeg’s
impulsive, indifferent sword, sometimes hitting the woof slantingly, or crookedly, or
strongly, or weakly, as the case might be; and by this difference in the concluding blow
producing a corresponding contrast in the final aspect of the completed fabric; this
savage’s sword, thought I, which thus finally shapes and fashions both warp and woof;
this easy, indifferent sword must be chance – aye, chance, free will, and necessity –
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no wise incompatible – all interweavingly working together. The straight warp of
necessity, not to be swerved from its ultimate course – its every alternating vibration,
indeed, only tending to that; free will still free to ply her shuttle between given threads;
and chance, though restrained in its play within the right lines of necessity, and side‐
ways in its motions directed by free will, though thus prescribed to by both, chance
by turns rules either, and has the last featuring blow at events. (179; ch. 47)
What is so extraordinary about Ishmael’s reading of the loom as a model of how
necessity, free will, and chance interact as the three shaping forces of our lives
is that his initial interpretation is thoroughly agnostic, for “necessity” could
designate natural and historical laws just as it might refer to any mysterious,
providential design.
Characteristically, however, Ishmael later revises his original interpretation
in order to salvage a transcendental meaning. In the passage quoted above, God
is conspicuously absent from Ishmael’s image of the “Loom of Time,” but Ishmael
later sets out on project of rhetorical readjustment by claiming that Pip, while
abandoned during the chase of a whale, “saw God’s foot upon the treadle of the
loom” (322; ch. 94). Whereas God was at first merely an unnamed possibility, he
now suddenly emerges as the omnipotent weaver. This image of the
“weaver-god” returns a few chapters later, when Ishmael describes the lush
landscape of a Pacific island:
[T]he industrious earth beneath was as a weaver’s loom, with a gorgeous carpet on
it, whereof the ground-vine tendrils formed the warp and woof, and the living flowers
the figures. […] Through the lacings of the leaves, the great sun seemed a flying shuttle
weaving the unwearied verdure. Oh, busy weaver! unseen weaver! – pause! – one
word! – whither flows the fabric? what palace may it deck? wherefore all these cease‐
less toilings? Speak, weaver! – stay thy hand! – but one single word with thee! Nay –
the shuttle flies – the figures float from forth the loom; the freshet-rushing carpet for
ever slides away. The weaver-god, he weaves; and by that weaving is he deafened,
that he hears no mortal voice; and by that humming, we, too, who look on the loom
are deafened; and only when we escape it shall we hear the thousand voices that speak
through it. For even so it is in all material factories. The spoken words that are in‐
audible among the flying spindles; those same words are plainly heard without the
walls, bursting from the opened casements. Thereby have villainies been detected. Ah,
mortal! […] be heedful; for so, in all this din of the great world’s loom, thy subtlest
thinkings may be overheard afar. (345; ch. 102)
The whole world has now become, for Ishmael, a text woven by God, the great
master-weaver, who is supposedly deafened by the noise of his creative act. And
yet, the idea that our “subtlest thinkings may be overheard afar” seems to imply
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that there is some transcendent connection – possibly with the ones who have
escaped the loom (which may be Ishmael’s poetic way of referring to the souls
of the departed, as opposed to us mortals who “may be overheard afar”).
Just like his earlier rhetorical maneuvers, Ishmael’s remolded image of the
“Loom of Time” thus expresses his deep yearning for a transcendental sense of
belonging. At the same time, the idea that communication with God is entirely
impossible, and that the transcendent weaver will neither cease his work nor
ever react to human supplications must make us wonder how we could possibly
know anything about this absent being. Moreover, it is telling that Ishmael in‐
troduces the problem of social alienation (i.e. the textile workers who are iso‐
lated from each other by the noise of the “material factories”) only to shy away
from it, as if afraid of the “villainies” that we might detect if we remained un‐
distracted by transcendental re-imaginings.46
Visions of Home: Labor, Equality, and the Question of Gender
In Moby-Dick, the transcendental home remains out of reach, even as Ishmael
refuses to relinquish his desire for it; time and again, this sole survivor of the
Pequod’s disaster uses all the rhetorical means at his disposal in an attempt to
retrieve some grander meaning from the wreckage of his life at sea. Just like
Ahab, in other words, Ishmael is unable to let go of Moby Dick; the specter of
the whale continues to haunt him, and significantly he ends his tale, not on a
note of hope and belonging, or with a scene of joyful homecoming, but instead
as merely “another orphan.”
It is remarkable how fundamentally absent home is in Moby-Dick. Both Ahab
and Ishmael come from a ‘broken’ home (i.e. Ahab’s mother was mad, while
Ishmael’s stepmother treated him badly – and we know virtually nothing about
their fathers). Indeed, this lack of parental care may have something to do with
the two characters’ desperate attempts in later life to cling to the idea of a tran‐
scendent father (benevolent or malicious, as the case may be). In Ahab’s case,
things are made worse through the experience of trauma, and neither the power
nor the solitude and isolation that come with the captain’s office are likely to
improve his condition, for while the former tends to foster a narcissistic sense
of grandeur, the latter shuts Ahab off from human interaction (including ther‐
apeutic storytelling). In effect, Ahab as a character constitutes a study of the
pathologies inherent in Emersonian self-reliance, and it is only when Ahab, the
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ship’s master, encounters Pip the ‘slave,’ who suffers from a similar condition,
that the captain tentatively begins to re-establish a sense of belonging – a de‐
velopment that is tragically cut short when the Pequod finally meets Moby Dick.
Ishmael, meanwhile, is in some ways merely a good-humored conformist, but
if we pay close attention to his rhetorical shifts, we find that in fact his textual
contortions constitute discursive attempts at home-making in the face of a deep
sense of alienation. Crucially, though Ishmael’s alienation may be rooted in some
fundamental human condition (e.g. existential trauma or a human subjectivity
that is necessarily based on lack), it is the lack both of financial resources and
of any other kinds of interest that drive him away from a place that, given these
circumstances, simply does not feel like home. Perhaps it is Ishmael’s ardent
desire finally to belong – to have a well-defined place in the world – that stops
him from even contemplating civil disobedience as a means to prevent Ahab
from abusing his power. Tragically, the Pequod’s calamitous journey will leave
Ishmael with such a mutilated sense of self that even his own narrative spins
out of control, despite all his attempts to weave a discursive home out of the
manifold strands of his story.
And yet, there are two brief moments in Melville’s novel when Ishmael feels
at home in the world, and both of these are strongly homoerotic. One of these
two moments occurs, as we have seen, when Ishmael squeezes his co-workers’
hands, filled with such an “abounding, affectionate, friendly, loving feeling” that
he wishes to tell them: “let us squeeze ourselves universally into the very milk
and sperm of kindness” (323). For one thing, we may note that Ishmael here
alludes to a passage from Shakespeare’s tragedy Macbeth, in which Lady Mac‐
beth is afraid that her husband may be “too full o’ th’ milk of human kindness,”
and thus unable to seize the throne (1. 5. 16). From the reader’s point of view,
this reference to a canonical text conveys an intertextual sense of home at the
very moment when Ishmael, too, feels that he belongs. At the same time, while
the original metaphor thrives on associations of milk with motherhood and
nourishment, Ishmael’s use of the word “sperm” (ostensibly as a short form of
spermaceti) adds to the image a decidedly masculine and sexual twist, leaving
the familiar phrase strangely altered.47 Byron R. S. Fone has suggested that
“Melville constructs a fictional world in which the primary characters are out‐
casts from the land-locked world of (hetero-)sexual morality” (52), and perhaps
Ishmael’s alteration of the canonical text constitutes a stylistic correlative to the
novel’s revision of supposedly given moral codes.
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At any rate, the only similarly homely moment for Ishmael occurs much ear‐
lier in the novel, when he shares a bed with Queequeg at the Spouter-Inn in
Nantucket. At the end of their first night together, Ishmael wakes up to find
“Queequeg’s arm thrown over me in the most loving and affectionate manner,”
so that an observer could have “almost thought I had been his wife.” At this
point, Ishmael’s sensations are still “strange” rather than pleasant (36; ch. 4), but
his vague sense of discomfort has clearly faded by the second night:
How it is I know not; but there is no place like a bed for confidential disclosures
between friends. Man and wife, they say, there open the very bottom of their souls to
each other; and some old couples often lie and chat over old times till nearly morning.
Thus, then, in our hearts’ honeymoon, lay I and Queequeg – a cosy, loving pair. (57;
ch. 10)
Ishmael and Queequeg are like a “cosy, loving pair,” and every once in a while
Queequeg affectionately throws his legs over Ishmael’s because the two are now
“entirely sociable and free and easy”; indeed, Ishmael loves to have Queequeg
smoking by his side because the latter seems to be “full of such serene household
joy” (57 and 58; ch. 11). In the comfort of a bed he shares with another man,
Ishmael thus feels just as much at home as in the common labor of squeezing
sperm with his equals on board the Pequod.48
These, then, are the glimpses of a utopian vision in a novel otherwise suffused
with homelessness: equality and intimacy, shared work and bodily comfort – a
home in this world rather than the next. In Ishmael’s case, bodily comfort hap‐
pens to mean physical contact with other men, and it may well be that he fails
to feel at home in his native land because there is no real place there for same-sex
relationships:
Would that I could keep squeezing that sperm for ever! For now, […] by many pro‐
longed, repeated experiences, I have perceived that in all cases man must eventually
lower, or at least shift, his conceit of attainable felicity; not placing it anywhere in the
intellect or the fancy; but in the wife, the heart, the bed, the table, the saddle, the
fire-side, the country […]. (323; ch. 94)
Ishmael cannot imagine a real-life counterpart to his homoerotic “conceit” or
“fancy,” and instead believes that “man must eventually lower, or at least shift,
his conceit of attainable felicity” by settling for a conventional home shared with
“the wife.” In a world where women are considered to be the natural
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home-makers, Ishmael is evidently unable to imagine an everyday home with
another man at his side.49
It is therefore important to be clear about the limited nature of these visions
of belonging. On the one hand, Moby-Dick’s utopian vision of equality and in‐
timacy – of shared work and bodily comfort – transcends the divisions of gender
because in theory both men and women can engage in common labor, and both
men and women are able to heed the needs of other desiring human bodies. On
the other hand, the utopian moments that are actually depicted in Melville’s
novel are shared only between men, and Ishmael as a narrator is unable to un‐
derstand them as anything but fancies: pleasant, perhaps, but necessarily
fleeting and insubstantial. In other words, unlike Emerson’s self-reliant man,
Ishmael and his ideas ultimately remain within the boundaries dictated by
custom.
This latter point also explains why Moby-Dick ought properly to be under‐
stood not as a downright rejection of Emerson’s ideas, but as a complex and
searching critique. What Melville’s novel does reject, through its portrayal of
Ahab, is Emerson’s belief that self-reliance as such is synonymous with spiritual
isolation, and must always involve the will to dominate and sacrifice others. At
the same time, Moby-Dick suggests that Ishmael is far too willing to accommo‐
date to the status quo because he is afraid of standing apart, or appearing in any
way as different from others. The point of the novel’s critique, in short, is that
isolation from others is neither splendid nor an end in itself, but only, at times,
a tragic necessity when faced with widespread communal injustice – and it is
this that Ishmael fails to grasp. Moby-Dick thus confronts us with two very
different male figures, both of whom remain transcendentally homeless. Mel‐
ville’s women, meanwhile, stay behind on shore, as absent characters who
merely serve to symbolize the conventional home. To overcome this ideological
deadlock, we must now turn to George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss, where a
female character takes center stage.
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2 “Whom She Belongs To”: Gender, Genre, and
“Immovable Roots” in George Eliot’s The Mill on the
Floss
While Melville’s Moby-Dick explores oceans of transcendental homelessness,
George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss (1860) dutifully attends to the home and the
hearth.1 The novel is set in the English provinces of the late 1820s to 1830s and
focuses on the lives of the Tulliver family, owners of Dorlcote Mill on the banks
of the Ripple, a small tributary to the river Floss.2 The Tullivers have lived here
“for generations” (217; bk. 3, ch. 9), and on one level The Mill on the Floss is about
the family’s relation to the physical place that, for them, signifies home. At the
same time, the novel focuses on the Tullivers’ relationships to their relatives,
and to the larger community of St. Ogg’s. More specifically, the text examines
the interdependence between home as a physical place and home as a complex
network of social relations, as well as the factors that may enhance or diminish
one’s sense of home. These factors include class and gender stereotypes, and the
latter make it especially difficult for Maggie, the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Tul‐
liver, to maintain a sense of true belonging.
Importantly, the novel’s exploration of social prejudice is paralleled by a
searching critique of literary conventions, styles, and genres – including the
Bildungsroman (or novel of formation), the use of irony and nostalgia, and the
vicissitudes of tragic theory in its Aristotelian form. In relating such stylistic
and generic inquiries to the material problems of home and belonging, Eliot’s
novel suggests that literary culture ought not be imagined as a rarefied aesthetic
realm that can be understood in isolation from ideological and political struggles.
The novel thus rejects any clear-cut separation between social and discursive
modes of dispossession. Highlighting instead that discourse itself is a material
product of social relations, The Mill on the Floss intimates that the quest for a
just and inclusive society depends, at least in part, on a community’s repertoire
of fictions of home. In doing so, it focuses less on the problem of transcendental
homelessness, and more on the role of societal forces in determining the limits
of our freedom to belong.
Home and the Bildungsroman
Critics have long discussed The Mill on the Floss as a novel of formation or
Bildungsroman (e.g. Buckley 97 and Jost 106), and of all novelistic genres the
Bildungsroman is perhaps most inextricably intertwined with the question of
home. Home is, for instance, quite literally the genre’s starting point:
[T]he hero sets out from home in order to travel and see the world, and records his
right and wrong turns. He falls in love, and has his first sexual experiences before
finding, and eventually marrying, his ideal companion. He thus gains knowledge of
the world, and his experiences modify his Weltanschauung. (Gemmeke 32)
Leaving his childhood home, the (male) protagonist will have to learn the ways
of the world, and this experience will ultimately turn him into a mature and
useful individual richly deserving of domestic bliss. By the end of his quest, the
hero will, in other words, have learnt to reconcile his individual desires with the
demands of society: “[E]xperiencing both defeats and triumphs, [he] comes to
a better understanding of self and to a generally affirmative view of the world”
(Hardin xiii). Indeed, as Franco Moretti points out, in the process of true Bildung
the hero fuses external compulsion and internal impulses “into a new unity until
the former is no longer distinguishable from the latter” (Way of the World 16).
Desire and duty may jar at first, but any such discord will eventually be dis‐
solved.
The only reason why such a dialectical fusion of societal imperatives and
individual desire is conceivable is that the genre envisages Bildung itself as a
kind of homecoming:
[I]n Bildung one gives oneself over to something other than oneself, and by this
process of giving over, becomes more fully oneself. Giving oneself over to something
other is a going out to the other, so that Bildung involves the notion of leaving
home […] and going out into a new place that is strange and unfamiliar. As one comes
to understand this other place, as it becomes familiar, it comes to be a new home. […]
It seemed strange simply because we did not recognise ourselves in it. (Coyne and
Snodgrass 224; emphasis added)
Bildung allows the protagonist to recognize himself in what at first seemed an
alien world, and the prototypical Bildungsroman narrativizes the “dialectical
harmony” of such an experience of homecoming (Castle 8; see also Lukács 138;
Slaughter 111). As harmony is the key term in the ideal version of Bildung, the
1012 “Whom She Belongs To”: George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss
3 In fact, Dickens himself seems to have recognized this ambivalence, for from the 1862
Library Edition onward, the final sentence appeared in a slightly different, less ambiv‐
alent form: “I saw no shadow of another parting from her” (Rosenberg 500 – 501).
hero’s ultimate acceptance of society’s demands must never be motivated by
compulsion, fear, or disillusionment, but instead ought to result from his genuine
identification with society’s norms (Moretti, Way of the World 16).
Many critics recognize, however, that in practice the genre often falls short
of this haromonic ideal, as witnessed by the many classic Bildungsromane that
end neither in joyous affirmation nor with calm acceptance, but rather on a note
of reluctant, at times painful, compromise. Indeed, for some critics, the genre’s
historical development follows a downward trajectory from early optimism to
increasing gloom. Franco Moretti, for instance, posits that the truly optimistic
phase of the genre, with its “beautiful balance” between the benefits and con‐
straints of modern socialization, lasted only until the mid-nineteenth century,
when “the atmosphere darkens” (Way of the World vi – vii). The case of Great
Expectations (1860 – 1861) arguably constitutes a good example of this increas‐
ingly ambivalent atmosphere, as Dickens famously wrote two markedly dif‐
ferent endings for his novel: a first one, where the protagonist’s desire for his
beloved remains forever unfulfilled (481 – 482); and a second version, where Pip
can finally clasp Estella’s hand, seeing “the shadow of no parting from her” (480;
ch. 20). Dickens’s first instinct was, in other words, to end on a pessimistic note,
and it took a conscious effort of authorial revision to construct a somewhat more
hopeful conclusion. And yet, even this second ending remains curiously am‐
biguous, as there are two entirely different ways of reading the phrase “the
shadow of no parting”: either as affirming that Estella and Pip will live happily
ever after (i.e. ‘no future parting is foreshadowed’), or as intimating that their
common future will inevitably be cold and dreary (i.e. ‘the fact that there will
be no parting casts a shadow over their lives’). This is, to be sure, still far from
despair – but it is not “dialectical harmony,” either.3
There is good reason, then, for a more cautious assessment of the Bildungs‐
roman as a genre, and accordingly Marianne Hirsch speaks of the protagonist’s
eventual accommodation to, rather than his affirmation of, the society in which
he lives (“Novel of Formation” 298). Less optimistically still, Jeffrey L. Sam‐
mons’s definition of the genre incorporates the possibility of the protagonist’s
utter failure ever to find a sense of being at home in the world:
It does not much matter whether the process of Bildung succeeds or fails, whether the
protagonist achieves an accommodation with life and society or not. […] There must
be a sense of evolutionary change within the self, a teleology of individuality, even if
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the novel, as many do, comes to doubt or deny the possibility of achieving a gratifying
result. (41)
Sammons, in other words, is willing to consider as a Bildungsroman even a novel
in which individual gratification ultimately remains irreconcilable with life in
society – a novel, in short, that takes very much the same pessimistic stance as
Sigmund Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents.4 Accordingly, for Sammons,
the key requirement for a Bildungsroman is not a happy outcome, but merely
that Bildung – which he defines as “the early bourgeois, humanistic concept of
the shaping of the individual self from its innate potentialities through accul‐
turation and social experience to the threshold of maturity” – play a central part
in the hero’s quest (41). In this less sanguine view, the protagonist’s leaving
home still constitutes the genre’s starting point, yet a regained sense of be‐
longing may ultimately prove sadly elusive (Gemmeke 38).
Such an austere account of the genre fits well with Eliot’s The Mill on the
Floss, for the novel’s heroine, Maggie, undoubtedly fails to harmoniously fuse
her own desires with the demands and imperatives of her family and society at
large. Even when Maggie is still a child, her relatives express misgivings and
disapproval: Mr. Tulliver fears that his daughter is “[t]oo ’cute [i.e. acute, clever]”
for a woman, and his wife bemoans both Maggie’s unruly behavior and her
brown skin, which “makes her look like a mulatter” (12; bk. 1, ch. 2). Aunt Pullet
similarly frowns at her niece’s dark complexion, suspecting that looking “like a
gypsy” will stand in Maggie’s way later in her life (58; bk. 1, ch. 7). Deborah
Epstein Nord rightly notes that Maggie’s relatives thus conflate her “anomalous
femininity” with a sense of racial otherness (103), and to some extent this ex‐
plains why, after a particularly severe scolding, little Maggie decides to run away
and join a group of gypsies – an act that she sees as “the only way of escaping
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opprobrium, and being entirely in harmony with circumstances” (88; bk. 1,
ch. 11). The episode thus constitutes a variant of the Freudian family romance:
[This alternate version] involves the fantasy not of social aggrandizement and aspi‐
ration, but of lowly or stigmatized birth. The desire to rival and defeat the parent can
also express itself as the wish to escape from the bonds of obedience and conformity
through the discovery of a secret non-English, non-white (to the extent that English‐
ness is defined as white) self. (Nord 12)
Feeling constricted and unhappy at home, in short, little Maggie makes a des‐
perate attempt to venture out and find her place in the world.
Accordingly, Maggie’s flight to the gypsies is more than merely a semi-com‐
ical episode about childish fantasies and youthful sorrows. Rather, given the
symbolical status of Romani in 19th-century British culture, we must see Mag‐
gie’s attempt to associate with gypsies as decidedly ominous. Deborah Epstein
Nord has shown that, for many nineteenth-century writers (including George
Eliot), gypsies symbolized the absence of a clearly defined homeland and there‐
fore the lack of a “propitious future” (7). More generally, C. A. Bayly describes
the nineteenth century as a period that saw a worldwide onslaught on nomadic
forms of life – both in colonial territories and in long-established, independent
states (Bayly 436 – 440; see also Maier 30). The British government in India, for
example, idealized the settled (and tax-paying) peasant and, in 1871, introduced
the Criminal Tribes Act in order to increase its control over itinerant and no‐
madic groups (Kerr 100; Osterhammel 225). Maggie’s dark hair and her attempt
to find a new home amongst the ‘unsettled’ gypsies thus associate her with a
people that, for Eliot’s contemporaries, tended to symbolize backwardness, dis‐
possession, and ruin. The link between Maggie and gypsies can thus be seen as
having the same function as her mother’s repeatedly expressed fears that Mag‐
gie’s wild nature will one day lead her to drown (e.g. 12 and 87; bk. 1, ch. 2 and
ch. 10): foreshadowing that the novel must end in disaster, and that Maggie will
fail to find a true home in the world.
A Woman’s Place
To a large extent, the conflict that leads to Maggie’s failure revolves around her
relationship with her brother Tom. As a little girl, Maggie once says that she
loves Tom “better than anybody in the world” (27; bk. 1, ch. 4), and she later tries
to explain the well-nigh incestuous intensity of her attachment by the fact that
her earliest memory is the image of Tom and herself standing hand in hand by
the river Floss (249; bk. 1, ch. 1). At the same time, it is evident early on in the
novel that Tom’s clear-cut, rigid view of what is right and what is wrong con‐
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flicts sharply with Maggie’s impulsiveness and intellectual curiosity. Neverthe‐
less, as long as they are children they manage to avoid estrangement even when
Tom’s righteousness erupts into anger, for “Maggie and Tom were still very
much like young animals, and so she could rub her cheek against his, and kiss
his ear in a random, sobbing way, and there were tender fibres in the lad that
had been used to answer to Maggie’s fondling” (34; bk. 1, ch. 6). If childhood is
at one point compared to Eden in Eliot’s novel (155 and 159; bk. 2, ch. 7), then
this is not because it is entirely free of conflict, but because it still holds the
promise of forgiveness for Maggie.
However, it is precisely the abrupt and brutal nature in which childhood ends
for Maggie and Tom that also destroys this bond of forgiveness. When their
father loses a lawsuit over property rights (concerning irrigation works and the
legitimate share of water power: 129; bk. 2, ch. 2), the proud man and his family
suddenly find themselves bankrupt. Soon, many of the Tullivers’ most cherished
belongings are to be put up at auction, and it is this traumatic experience of
dispossession that propels Maggie and Tom into the adult world of “remembered
cares” (159; bk. 2, ch. 7). John Wakem, the lawyer who defeated Mr. Tulliver in
court and whom the miller regards as evil incarnate, eventually buys the Tulli‐
vers’ old mill. Wakem, relishing the opportunity to humiliate the old owner
under the guise of a “benevolent action” (208; bk. 3, ch. 7), offers Mr. Tulliver the
opportunity to stay on as manager of the mill – and thus as a dependent of the
very man he loathes: “one o’ them fine gentlemen as get money by doing busi‐
ness for poorer folks, and when he’s made beggars of ’em he’ll give ’em charity”
(220; bk. 3, ch. 9). Formerly a version of the independent, land-owning English
yeoman, Mr. Tulliver is now reduced to being a mere employee, and he never
fully recovers from the blow.5 In consequence, the responsibility to earn enough
money to restore the lost home to the family falls almost entirely to Tom, who
is at the time only sixteen years old. Mr. Tulliver, however, also urges Tom to
write in the family bible that he will never forgive Wakem for what he has done
to his father. It is a command that Tom executes “with gloomy submission” (220;
bk. 3, ch. 9), and which expels him forever from the realm of forgiveness that he
had shared with his sister before the sudden end of their childhood.
Maggie herself, meanwhile, is not only dismayed by her father’s hatred of
Wakem, but also suffers from the new “dreariness of a home where the morning
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brings no promise with it” (163; bk. 3, ch. 1). The family’s material dispossession
exacerbates Maggie’s sense of spiritual unbelonging – a link that the novel
symbolically highlights through the forced sale of her ‘spiritual capital’: her
beloved books (197; bk. 3, ch. 6). At the same time, we saw in the discussion of
Captain Ahab and Pip in chapter one that recognition of shared suffering may
foster a feeling of mutual belonging. And indeed, Maggie finds a precarious sense
of being at home in the presence of a fellow sufferer. Philip, lawyer Wakem’s
sensitive son – whom Maggie first met when he was Tom’s schoolfellow in
happier days – has a hump because of “an accident in infancy” (134; bk. 2, ch. 3).
As a consequence Philip feels that he is an outcast with no one to “tell every‐
thing – no one who cares enough” (246; bk. 5, ch. 1). Earlier in the novel, Eliot’s
narrator suggests that “the gift of sorrow” is that it may serve to strengthen the
“bond of human fellowship” (159; bk. 2, ch. 7), and when Maggie meets Philip
again she finds herself responding to his pain. Admittedly, at first she is hesitant
to accept Philip’s offer of friendship, knowing that she would have to keep it a
secret because both her father and Tom would forbid any association with the
Wakem family. However, deciding that there is “such a thing as futile sacrifice
for one to the injury of another” (247; bk. 5; ch. 1), Maggie ultimately agrees to
meet Philip again. With each new meeting their friendship deepens, and in time
Maggie even accepts Philip’s professions of love, despite the fact that she re‐
mains uncertain as to the true nature of her feelings towards him (271 – 274; bk.
5, ch. 5).
Importantly, it is Tom who breaks up Maggie and Philip’s relationship because
of his inflexible notions of familial duty and, in particular, female respecta‐
bility. When Tom finds out about Maggie and Philip’s secret meetings, he angrily
confronts his sister, threatening to tell Mr. Tulliver that Maggie is “a disobedient,
deceitful daughter, who throws away her own respectability by clandestine
meetings with the son of a man that has helped to ruin her father” (278; bk. 5,
ch. 5). Tom then forces Maggie to lead him to Philip, and his reproaches to the
latter, too, are explicitly patriarchal: “Do you pretend you had any right to make
professions of love to her, even if you had been a fit husband for her, when
neither her father nor your father would ever consent to a marriage between
you?” (280). Maggie, disgusted at Tom’s contemptuous treatment of both Philip
and herself, vehemently reproaches her brother for his self-righteous attitude:
“[Y]ou have always enjoyed punishing me – you have always been hard and
cruel to me” (282). Tom, however, proves inexorable, and instead asks Maggie
why she chooses to show her love through selfishness and deceit rather than by
trying to improve their family’s situation. Maggie’s answer once again focuses
on gender as the decisive factor: “Because you are a man, Tom, and have power,
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and can do something in the world” (282; bk. 5, ch. 6). Maggie thus explicitly
frames her conflict with Tom in terms of the limitations she encounters as a
woman, which relates their personal conflict to broader questions of societal
prejudice.
In a similar vein, critics have long pointed out that a gender bias lies at the
heart of overly optimistic assessments of the Bildungsroman as a literary
genre. If we have so far used the masculine pronoun to refer to the prototypical
hero of a Bildungsroman, then this is because the conventional story of a sturdy
individual venturing out to explore the world constitutes – at least in a nine‐
teenth-century context – a decidedly masculine ideal. For Susan J. Rosowski,
such masculine quests find a feminine counterpart in what she calls the “novel
of awakening”:
The novel of awakening […] also recounts the attempts of a sensitive protagonist to
learn the nature of the world, discover its meaning and pattern, acquire a philosophy
of life, but she must learn these lessons in terms of herself as a woman. […] The
protagonist’s growth results typically not with “an art of living,” as for her male coun‐
terpart, but instead with a realization that for a woman such an art of living is difficult
or impossible: it is an awakening to limitations. (313)
Where the Bildungsroman emphasizes the male protagonist’s quest for inde‐
pendence, the novel of awakening focuses on the limits to freedom in the lives
of women. Precisely because the limitations imposed on women are greater,
Gregory Castle argues that novels of awakening “may be a better index of the
subversive potential of the genre” than the texts featuring a male protago‐
nist (21).6
According to Jane McDonnell, the subversive potential of novels of awak‐
ening arises, in particular, from the way in which they highlight the conflict
between, on the one hand, the ‘male’ values of personal development and
self-determination, and, on the other, “the ideals of renunciation and self-sacri‐
fice so often demanded of nineteenth-century women” (379).7 In the final two
books of The Mill on the Floss, for instance, Maggie falls in love with Stephen
Guest, heir to a local business and banking concern and fiancé of Maggie’s cousin
Lucy. At first, both Stephen and Maggie try to resist each other’s mutual attrac‐
tion, but they ultimately relinquish, with Stephen appearing to Maggie as a
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“stronger presence that seemed to bear her along without any act of her own
will” (376; bk. 6, ch. 13). Maggie elopes with Stephen and soon finds herself on
a boat, floating down the river Floss. After a spell of fitful sleep, punctured by
disturbing dreams, however, Maggie’s struggle with her own conscience re‐
sumes, and she forces herself to leave Stephen and return home:
I can’t believe in a good for you, that I feel – that we both feel is a wrong towards
others. We can’t choose happiness either for ourselves or for another: we can’t tell
where that will lie. We can only choose whether we will indulge ourselves in the
present moment, or whether we will renounce that, for the sake of obeying the divine
voice within us – for the sake of being true to all the motives that sanctify our lives.
(387; bk. 6, ch. 14)
It is important to note that Maggie’s fateful decision is simultaneously conven‐
tional and brave, for while such an act of female renunciation would have been
expected by Victorian readers, in Eliot’s novel it also constitutes a reassertion
of the protagonist’s agency against her passive submission to her male partner’s
desire for a sort of escapism: to elope and, as Stephen puts it, “never go home
again” (377; bk. 6, ch. 13).
And yet, Maggie is not rewarded for her painful act of renunciation by any
semblance of poetic justice. Instead, she is ostracized by her home community
in a way that, once again, highlights how gender difference impacts on one’s
chances to establish a sense of belonging. After Maggie’s return to St. Ogg’s, her
behavior is widely judged as shameful – particularly by the ‘respectable’ women
of the community, who could have forgiven her if Maggie had returned home
married to Stephen, as a ‘legitimate’ member of (patriarchal) society, but who
now ironically blame Maggie for her “unwomanly boldness and unbridled pas‐
sion” (397; bk. 7, ch. 2). By contrast, public opinion regards Stephen’s conduct
as admittedly blameworthy, but also as understandable, even natural, in a young
man. Eliot’s contemporaries were, in other words, confronted with a novel
whose heroine does precisely what, as a woman, she ought to do (i.e. resist the
temptations of sexual desire), but who is not, in the end, rewarded for her act of
renunciation. This outcome flies in the face of the Victorian expectations that
Oscar Wilde brilliantly satirizes in The Importance of Being Earnest, in which
Miss Prism sums up the moral of a three-decker novel she once wrote: “The good
ended happily, and the bad unhappily. That is what fiction means” (273; 2.52 – 53).
Marianne Hirsch has suggested that the Bildungsroman is an essentially didactic
genre (“Novel of Formation” 298), and if it is true that the protagonist’s Bildung
in such texts is only a stand-in for the more important process of educating the
audience, then in the case of The Mill on the Floss the awakening that matters
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most may be the reader’s: a growing awareness of the gendered nature of social
injustice, as well as of the limits of poetic justice as a reliable doctrine for moral
guidance.
Tom’s Education: Generational Conflict and Masculine Bildung
The picture is even more complex than this, however, for as Susan Fraiman
suggests, The Mill on the Floss in fact juxtaposes a male and a female Bildungs‐
roman: the story of Maggie’s awakening, and the narrative of her brother’s
self-advancement (140 – 141).8 Working his way up the social ladder, Tom be‐
comes a respected partner in the local business and banking concern Guest &
Co., and ultimately manages to restore to the family the lost mill and its position
in society. At the same time, Fraiman rightly emphasizes that Tom remains un‐
married and eventually drowns locked in an embrace with his younger sister,
which constitutes a narrative refusal truly to validate his individual develop‐
ment (140). Indeed, far from becoming a well-rounded individual, Tom develops
into a tragically one-dimensional man. Mr. Tulliver’s dying wish was for Tom
to “get the old mill back” (291; bk. 5, ch. 7), and accordingly Tom feels bound at
all costs to return to the place that symbolizes home and respectability. To do
so, however, Tom will have to suppress his “strong appetite for pleasure,” for
only by living a life of “abstinence and self-denial” can he ever hope to save the
amount of money that is needed to pay the family debt and buy back the old
mill (252; bk. 5, ch. 2). Tom’s long-term cultivation of self-denial in turn explains
why, towards the end of the novel, he assures his uncle Deane that he always
wants to have plenty of work because there is nothing else he cares about much –
a statement that even his “business-loving” relative considers “rather sad” (323;
bk. 6, ch. 6). Moreover, when Tom finally ‘succeeds’ and moves back to Dorlcote
Mill, we never see him derive any pleasure from owning the old home; though
the mill eventually belongs to Tom, for some unfathomable reason he finds that
he himself no longer feels that he truly belongs there.9
In part, this is because Tom follows his father’s explicit commands to the letter
while failing to grasp the spirit of his words (and, indeed, the father’s actions,
which frequently run counter to his own precepts). Mr. Tulliver’s views may be
as rigid as Tom’s, but he is far less dogmatic when it comes to acting on his
beliefs. This is evident, for instance, in how Mr. Tulliver treats his sister. After a
quarrel with his wife’s elder sister, the proud miller decides to settle all his debts
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with Aunt Glegg and her husband. To do so, however, he must reclaim the money
he has lent to his own sister Gritty, “who had married as poorly as could be” (52;
bk. 1, ch. 7). Though initially he seems determined to reclaim what is his due,
Mr. Tulliver ultimately cannot bring himself to take the money from his sister,
for he suddenly realizes that Maggie, too, might one day depend on her brother
for help (71; ch. I.8). On his deathbed, Mr. Tulliver accordingly urges Tom to take
care of both Mrs. Tulliver and Maggie (291; bk. 5, ch. 7). For Tom, however, taking
care of someone seems to comprise material security only, as becomes clear
towards the end of the novel, when he assures his sister that he will always give
her money if she is in need, while at the same time making it clear that, as a
‘fallen’ woman, she will no longer be welcome in his home (392 – 393; bk. 7,
ch. 1). In thus neglecting Maggie’s emotional needs, Tom violates the spirit of
his father’s dying wishes even as he attempts most scrupulously to obey them.
At the same time, it would be unfair to suggest that Mr. Tulliver’s actions are
always guided by lofty ideals, and indeed in at least one crucial respect he acts
very selfishly towards his own son. When, early on in Eliot’s novel, Mr. Tulliver
explains why he wants to send Tom to a tutor, he admits that one of his motives
is to keep the boy from becoming his rival:
Why, if I made him a miller an’ farmer, he’d be expectin’ to take to the mill an’ the
land, an’ a-hinting at me as it was time for me to lay by an’ think o’ my latter end.
Nay, nay, I’ve seen enough o’ that wi’ sons. […] I shall give Tom an eddication an’ put
him to a business, as he may make a nest for himself, an’ not want to push me out o’
mine. (15; bk. 1, ch. 3)
In this passage, Mr. Tulliver does not envision the family home as a “refuge from
the competitive, insecure, amoral world of the market” (Howarth 169). Instead,
he portrays it as a contested piece of property that the patriarch must protect
even from his own son. Tom’s education is thus not intended by his father to
further the son’s spiritual growth, but instead can be seen as Mr. Tulliver’s con‐
scious attempt to curb Tom’s ambition to become a miller by thwarting or
‘re-directing’ his talents.
There is, then, an important element of generational conflict to The Mill on
the Floss, as suggested among other things by the narrator’s differential use of
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10 The ideas presented in this and the following paragraph derive from class discussions
in the Bachelor-level seminar “Bildungsroman vs. Coming of Age: Victorian and Con‐
temporary Versions of a Genre,” which I taught at the University of Zurich in the spring
semester 2013. The discussion itself was based on input by one of the seminar partici‐
pants, Simay Altan, who first brought the narrator’s differential use of proper names
to my attention.
11 The same is true, incidentally, of Tom’s childhood friend Bob Jakin (e.g. 255; bk. 5, ch. 2).
names in the novel.10 Generally speaking, Eliot’s narrator refers to the older
characters by their family names: ‘Mr. and Mrs. Tulliver,’ ‘Aunt and Uncle Glegg,’
or ‘lawyer Wakem.’ Indeed, even attentive readers may be forgiven for failing
to remember, say, that Mr. Tulliver’s first name is Jeremy, as it is mentioned only
once and in passing (17; bk. 1, ch. 3). Moreover, while Mrs. Tulliver’s first name –
Elizabeth, or Bessy – occurs much more frequently (three and seventy-nine
times, respectively), in all cases except one this happens in one of three particular
contexts: (a) other characters use the name Bessy in passages of direct speech;
(b) the name Bessy appears in indirect speech; and (c) the narrator calls
Mrs. Tulliver Bessy in passages that are focalized through Mrs. Tulliver’s hus‐
band or relatives (examples for each of these cases: 46 – 47; bk. 1, ch. 7). This
stands in marked contrast with the narrator’s virtually exclusive use of first
names for Maggie, Tom, and Philip even when they are not seen through the
eyes of other characters.11 At first sight, the effect of this subtle, but nevertheless
clear distinction seems relatively obvious, for by putting us, as it were, on a
first-name basis with the younger characters while at the same time retaining
a polite distance from their elders, the narrator arguably prompts us to identify
more closely with the former rather than with the latter.
This, however, is only part of the picture, for, in addition to age or generation,
another factor determining the narrator’s use of first as opposed to family names
is a character’s social status and degree of economic independence. This is most
readily apparent in the case of two characters who belong to an older generation
than Maggie and Tom, but who both have long formed part of the Tulliver
household as faithful servants to the family. Reflecting the fact that these serv‐
ants are dependents, the narrator does not hesitate to refer to them by their first
names, Kezia and Luke, even when they are not seen through the eyes of other
characters (e.g. 211 and 213; bk. 3, ch. 8). The underlying logic at work here is
that of the nineteenth-century household, which Fredric Jameson describes as
“an ambiguous category”:
[The household] does not preserve the blood jealousies of the older clans but yet is
not technically purely familial either, in the sense of some later extended family.
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Rather, these households very much include servants […]. (The Antinomies of Re‐
alism 102)
In this particular social context, identity and honor are determined by an indi‐
vidual’s position within a master’s household. We can therefore say that, just as
the common designation of slaves as ‘boys’ or ‘girls’ expresses their perma‐
nently subordinate position (Blackburn 11), so the narrator’s use of first names
for Kezia and Luke signals their ‘lower’ and dependent status, irrespective of
these characters’ age. However, while in one sense this aligns the two servants
with the younger characters in Eliot’s novel, the key difference is that, in theory,
someone like Tom ought at one point to gain honor and independence by as‐
suming his father’s position as master of the household – and it is precisely this
‘natural,’ patriarchal succession that Mr. Tulliver proves himself desperate to
prevent by sending Tom to school in order to learn a trade other than milling.
And yet, it is one of the many bitter ironies in The Mill on the Floss that Tom’s
schooling turns out to be doubly inadequate even from Mr. Tulliver’s problem‐
atic point of view. For one thing, Mr. Tulliver originally wanted Tom to learn
more about the practical world of business and less about things that lie “mostly
out o’ sight” (20; bk. 1, ch. 3). However, following the ill-founded advice of a
friend, Mr. Tulliver sends Tom to Reverend Stelling, who provides the boy with
the kind of classical education cherished by humanist proponents of Bildung,
but largely irrelevant to a future Victorian tradesman. Tom’s business-loving
uncle Deane is later quick to point this out to the frustrated nephew:
Your Latin and rigmarole may soon dry off you, but you’ll be but a bare stick after
that. Besides, it’s whitened your hands and taken the rough work out of you. And
what do you know? Why, you know nothing about book-keeping, to begin with, and
not so much of reckoning as a common shopman. (190; bk. 3, ch. 5)
Contrary to his intention, Mr. Tulliver has thus failed to provide Tom with an
education that would enable his son to “make a nest for himself.” Moreover,
Mr. Tulliver will eventually lose his beloved mill to lawyer Wakem and must
then depend on Tom to restore it to the family. In a painfully ironic twist of fate,
the son whom he regarded as a rival and threat to his property thus eventually
becomes the miller’s only hope to regain the lost home.
Importantly, however, despite these inauspicious circumstances, there are
hints in Eliot’s novel that Tom’s education at Reverend Stelling’s could have
initiated a genuine process of Bildung. For instance, when Tom realizes that he
is unable to master his academic subjects, the boy experiences for the first time
that awakening to limitations that Susan J. Rosowski sees as typical of female
protagonists. Tom had hitherto taken for granted that “all girls were silly” (35;
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bk. 1, ch. 5), whereas he would, “when he was a man, be master of everything”
(111; bk. 2, ch. 1). Now, Tom suddenly suspects that he may be “all wrong
somehow” (113), and these doubts nullify “his boyish self-satisfaction,” ren‐
dering him “more like a girl than he had ever been in his life” (118; bk. 2, ch. 1).
However, if it is possible for a boy to become “more like a girl” simply because
his education is ill-suited to his talents, then this also suggests that women’s
supposedly inferior nature is in fact the product of a societal structure that
thwarts rather than fosters their development. Tom’s experience of self-doubt
could, we may therefore speculate, have led him to a deeper understanding not
only of himself, but also of the constructed nature of gender difference.
Sadly, however, the seeds of this insight fall on thorny ground, for as Philip
Fisher rightly contends, far from making Tom a better human being, his educa‐
tion ultimately “crushes and obscures his best traits” (540). When Maggie visits
Tom at Reverend Stelling’s and enthusiastically proclaims that she could master
both Latin and Geometry, Tom finds his own prejudices confirmed rather than
challenged by the male teacher:
“Girls can’t do Euclid; can they, sir?”
“They can pick up a little of everything, I dare say,” said Mr. Stelling. “They’ve a
great deal of superficial cleverness; but they couldn’t go far into anything. They’re
quick and shallow.” (126; bk. 2, ch. 2)
While Tom delights in having his sense of superiority restored, Maggie is un‐
derstandably dismayed at the thought that her readiness of mind should be the
very sign of female inferiority – not least because it seems to confirm her father’s
fears that female intelligence can only lead to trouble (16; bk. 1, ch. 3). Indeed,
Mr. Tulliver believes that Maggie’s sharp wits compromise her value as a mar‐
riageable commodity, for he is certain that she will “fetch none the bigger price”
for being clever (12; bk. 1, ch. 2). In this regard, Mr. Tulliver notably agrees with
his arch-enemy, lawyer Wakem, who defines the social role of woman with
brutally aphoristic precision: “We don’t ask what a woman does – we ask whom
she belongs to” (345; bk. 6, ch. 8) – an undoubtedly accurate statement, given
that under the doctrine of coverture married women of the period had no legal
identity independent of their husbands (e.g. Griffin 9). Teachers, fathers, and
lawyers: where the status of women is concerned, the Victorian patriarchs in
The Mill on the Floss are evidently in perfect agreement. In such an environment,
it is little wonder that Tom’s ‘girlish’ self-doubts fail in the long run to challenge
his belief in male supremacy, for as Eliot’s narrator suggests in a different con‐
text, “we are all apt to believe what the world believes about us” (65; bk. 65,
ch. 8).
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12 Given that Eliot’s German was excellent, the name Firniss may be intended as a refer‐
ence to the German word Firnis, which can be translated as ‘varnish’ or ‘lacquer.’ This
in turn would strengthen the suggestion that the type of education reserved for girls
focused mainly on surface accomplishments.
“Immovable Roots”: Bildung and the Limits of Self-Determination
Both Tom and Maggie’s stories thus focus on the problem of inadequate educa‐
tion. While Tom only reluctantly reconciles “himself to the idea that his
school-time was to be prolonged and that he was not to be brought up to his
father’s business” (111; bk. 2, ch. 1), Maggie would be thrilled at the opportunity
to stay at Reverend Stelling’s. However, the boy Tom has to stay where he is,
while Maggie, because she is a girl, is sent to “Miss Firniss’s boarding school in
the ancient town of Laceham on the Floss” (154; bk. 2, ch. 7). The place name
“Laceham” provides us with some clues as to the kind of schooling Maggie can
expect there: not geometry or Latin, but weaving decorative cloth (‘lace’ and
‘hem’). Significantly, the narrator tells us virtually nothing about Maggie’s time
at Miss Firniss’s boarding school – a gap in the story that highlights how irrel‐
evant this type of schooling is for Maggie in terms of Bildung (i.e. the develop‐
ment of one’s innate potential).12 Jane McDonnell notes that unsatisfactory ed‐
ucation is in fact a common theme in the Bildungsroman, and we could therefore
conclude that The Mill on the Floss simply forms part of a larger movement for
educational reform, leading to a system of schooling that would allow each in‐
dividual, irrespective of gender, fully to develop his or her potential for true
Bildung.
The story of Philip Wakem intimates, however, that changes in educational
policy alone are not sufficient. We have seen that The Mill on the Floss incorpo‐
rates two related but different Bildungsromane: the ‘female’ story of Maggie, and
the ‘male’ story of her increasingly one-dimensional brother Tom. To these two
plots, which explore the social inadequacies of institutionalized education, the
story of Philip’s development adds a third narrative, one that is crucial for the
novel’s critique of the inherent problems of the ideal of Bildung. Importantly,
Maggie herself adheres to such a classical ideal of wide-ranging and
‘well-rounded’ intellectual formation, insisting that it is “a sort of clever stu‐
pidity only to have one sort of talent.” Philip, however, believes himself “cursed
with susceptibility in every direction,” implying that the sheer breadth of his
interests merely serves to dilute and disperse his intellectual faculties (266; bk.
5, ch. 3). Moreover, though Philip may be the intellectually most well-rounded
individual in Eliot’s novel, his physical “deformity” marks him as an outsider
and makes it impossible for him to feel at home in the community of St. Ogg’s
(277; bk. 5, ch. 5). In other words, in the case of lawyer Wakem’s son at least,
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wide-ranging Bildung does not automatically lead either to personal fulfillment
or to social success.
It is significant in this context that Philip does not suffer from a congenital
‘deformity.’ The fact that Philip’s hump is due to an accident (134; bk. 2, ch. 3)
rules out any suspicion, on the part of the readership, that Eliot might have
intended Philip as an example of the fearful consequences of hereditary degen‐
eration. Such racialist fears, though not yet widespread in 1860, were neverthe‐
less growing amongst Eliot’s contemporaries (Pick 178 – 179). If Philip had been
born a ‘deformed creature,’ then it would be possible to interpret his failure to
succeed in life as a kind of biological or eugenic inevitability. The purely con‐
tingent nature of Philip’s ‘deformity,’ in contrast, highlights the inherent limits
of the notion of self-determination that lies at the core of ideals of Bildung, for
if one’s ability to reach an ideal depends just as much on accident as on one’s
innate potential, then perhaps the ideal itself is in need of qualification. Put
bluntly, we can say that through the story of Philip, Eliot’s novel explores to
what extent ‘deformity’ can render Bildung (in the sense of successful formation)
difficult if not impossible. The Mill on the Floss thus complements the twin-nar‐
rative of Maggie and Tom’s inadequate Bildung with what we may call Philip’s
‘novel of deformation.’ In each of these three cases, the mental or spiritual ideal
of Bildung is qualified by the problem of embodied existence: sexual difference
with Maggie and Tom, and physical disability in the case of Philip. In short,
Eliot’s novel critiques, or at least questions, Bildung’s lofty idealism with a sober
reminder of bodily limitations.
In addition, the notion of self-determination is circumscribed in The Mill on
the Floss by the lasting impact of one’s past and, more specifically, one’s expe‐
riences as a child. We have already seen that the prejudices of relatives and
teachers affect, and in many ways stunt, the development of both Maggie and
Tom. Similarly, Philip’s accident took place when he was still an infant, which
means that he grew up with the experience of seeing people shrink from him
“only because he was deformed” (247; bk. 5, ch. 1). Moreover, in a passage worth
quoting at length, Eliot’s narrator argues explicitly that one’s childhood sets the
boundaries of self-determination:
[Tom experienced] the happiness of seeing the bright light in the parlor at home […];
the happiness of passing from the cold air to the warmth and the kisses and the smiles
of that familiar hearth, where the pattern of the rug and the grate and the fire-irons
were “first ideas” that it was no more possible to criticise than the solidity and exten‐
sion of matter. There is no sense of ease like the ease we felt in those scenes where
we were born, where objects became dear to us before we had known the labor of
choice, and where the outer world seemed only an extension of our own personality;
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13 Note that Eliot’s argument is strikingly similar to Margaret Morse’s claim that “[f]ee‐
lings and memories linked to home are highly charged, if not with meaning, then with
sense memories that began before the mastery of language” (63) – i.e. in early child‐
hood.
14 “Die Menschen machen ihre eigene Geschichte, aber sie machen sie nicht aus freien
Stücken, nicht unter selbstgewählten, sondern unter unmittelbar vorgefundenen, ge‐
gebenen, überlieferten Umständen. Die Tradition aller toten Geschlechter lastet wie ein
Alp auf dem Gehirne der Lebenden” (Marx, Der achtzehnte Brumaire 115).
we accepted and loved it as we accepted our own sense of existence and our own
limbs. Very commonplace, even ugly, that furniture of our early home might look if
it were put up to auction; an improved taste in upholstery scorns it; and is not the
striving after something better and better in our surroundings the grand characteristic
that distinguishes man from the brute, or, to satisfy a scrupulous accuracy of defini‐
tion, that distinguishes the British man from the foreign brute? But heaven knows
where that striving might lead us, if our affections had not a trick of twining round
those old inferior things; if the loves and sanctities of our life had no deep immovable
roots in memory. (127; bk. 2, ch. 1)
The narrator here suggests that, as children, we are not required to lead a
self-determined existence – we do not yet know “the labor of choice” – and
therefore we feel perfectly at ease in the “early home.” To strive after “something
better and better” may be in one sense what makes us human, but there is also
an undercurrent of violence to this ideal of implacable progress, which for the
narrator tends to hinge on a racist distinction between the supposedly progres‐
sive “British man” and the backward, primitive, “foreign brute.” Countering such
destructive fantasies of boundless (self-)invention and improvement, the nar‐
rator emphasizes that we can never entirely determine ourselves because our
affections and convictions have “deep immovable roots” – roots not in blood or
soil, but “in memory.” 13
Both Marx and Freud would, of course, agree that complete self-determina‐
tion is in fact an illusion, and that the explanation for this lies in one’s past. Marx
stated his case most famously in “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,”
published in 1852 (only a few years earlier than Eliot’s novel):
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please in circum‐
stances they choose for themselves; rather they make it in present circumstances,
given and inherited. Tradition from all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare
on the brain of the living. (32)14
While it is possible at any point in time for men – and women – to choose their
course of action, Marx emphasizes that they can never select freely the context
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15 See also Fredric Jameson, who argues that the “ambiguity of postmodernism as a phi‐
losophy” lies in the fact that “its progressive endorsement of anti-essentialist multi‐
plicity and perspectivism also replicates the very rhetoric of the late-capitalist market‐
place as such” (Archaeologies of the Future, 163) – a replication that Jameson finds
“exceedingly suspicious” (ibid., 165).
of that particular choice. And, importantly, one of these contexts that lies en‐
tirely beyond our range of choice is the early childhood home: the place and the
community where we grow up, and which can never be ‘self-selected.’ In a
dialectical view of history, the ‘starting point’ called home necessarily remains
part of everything that follows, albeit in what Hegel would call a ‘sublated’ form
(in German, aufgehoben: the point of origin is at the same time canceled, kept
in store, and lifted to a higher level; see J. Hillis Miller 28). Likewise, Sigmund
Freud argues that the past establishes the limits of self-determination. Beyond
these limits, Freud suggests, lies the realm of the unconscious, which is shaped
crucially by our childhood experiences, and which makes it impossible for us
ever to attain complete mastery over ourselves.
Like Freud and Marx, The Mill on the Floss is hostile to postmodern dreams of
infinitely malleable, fluid identities – but not necessarily in a conservative or
reactionary sense. Postmodern dreams of boundless self-fashioning appear
problematic, for instance, in the light of recent findings regarding the long-term
effects of malnutrition in the fetal stage and during childhood, which not only
impair individuals’ health, cognitive abilities, and labor productivity over the
course of their lives, but which also heighten the chance that such individuals
will lack the necessary resources to take sufficient care of their children: “It is
therefore in no way fanciful to see the influence of the health and welfare of
grandparents in the bodies of their grandchildren and the effect may be even
longer lasting” (Floud et al. 37). Our own life is thus shaped by the lives of our
ancestors – and not in the sense of ancestral spirits or fateful heredity, but in
terms of the contingent yet long-lasting effects of detrimental living standards.
Moreover, as Terry Eagleton maintains, change and flexibility are not inherently
progressive or oppositional qualities:
A faith in plurality, plasticity, dismantling, destabilizing, the power of endless
self-invention – all this, while undoubtedly radical in some contexts, also smacks of
a distinctly Western culture and an advanced capitalist world. […] Capitalism may be
upbraided for many defects, but a lack of dynamism is hardly one of them. (Sweet
Violence xi)15
We may quite rightly insist that identity is neither simply given nor eternally
fixed. At the same time, however, there would also be something callous about
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telling someone like Mr. Tulliver that his “clinging affection for the old home
as […] part of himself” (217; bk. 3, ch. 9) is merely an instance of reactionary
nostalgia.
Indeed, as Terry Eagleton points out elsewhere, the idea that unstable iden‐
tities are always subversive and thus desirable is a claim “which it would be
interesting to test out among the socially dumped and disregarded” (After Theory
16). Philip Fisher’s remark that a “break in continuity is the death of what is
meant by the self in The Mill on the Floss” has to be seen precisely in this context
(522), for without a certain amount of material stability, it becomes extremely
difficult to sustain a reasonably stable sense of self. Mr. Tulliver’s attachment to
the past may thus have much to do with an underlying sense of economic in‐
security – at least according to Eliot’s narrator, who contrasts the old miller’s
fear “that the country could never again be what it used to be” with the optimism
of Mr. Deane, who is “attached to a firm of which the returns were on the in‐
crease,” and who “naturally took a more lively view of the present” (64; bk. 1,
ch. 7). If, in short, The Mill on the Floss insists perhaps too much on the impor‐
tance of “immovable roots,” we should not forget that it does so against a back‐
drop (or at least the fear) of material dispossession that, in turn, highlights the
fragility of the place we call home.
Nostalgia, Mourning, and Ironic Distance: Novelistic Immaturity
Accordingly, we should read the novel’s generally nostalgic mood not exclu‐
sively as a form of sentimental indulgence, but also as an implicit critique of
social injustice and thus as a potential basis for resistance. The nostalgic mood
of The Mill on the Floss is established in the very first chapter, through the nar‐
rator’s dreamy remembrances of how Dorlcote Mill and its surroundings
“looked one February morning many years ago” (8; bk. 1, ch. 1; see Boumelha 20):
Just by the red-roofed town the tributary Ripple flows with a lively current into the
Floss. How lovely the little river is, with its dark changing wavelets! It seems to me
like a living companion while I wander along the bank, and listen to its low, placid
voice, as to the voice of one who is deaf and loving. I remember those large dipping
willows. I remember the stone bridge. (7; bk. 1, ch. 1)
This is not the detached, analytic tone one would expect from a “Study of Pro‐
vincial Life” – the subtitle of Eliot’s later novel Middlemarch – but the nostalgic
voice of a narrator who longs for a time “when joys were vivid” (127; bk. 2,
ch. 1). Instead of dismissing such nostalgic longings as sentimental, Kimberley K.
Smith emphasizes their potential “as a mode of resistance” (523). Smith shows
that the term nostalgia, which was coined in 1688 by the Swiss physician Johan
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16 Alison Blunt likewise argues that the widespread antipathy towards nostalgia may blind
us to its “liberatory potential” (14). See also John Kirk, who emphasizes that there are
“forms of nostalgic memory […] which can be enabling” (606; original emphasis).
Hofer to denote a potentially fatal condition of homesickness, underwent a
process of radical redefinition (509 – 510):
[N]ostalgia evolved from a disease into an emotion […]. The concept broadened and
complicated: Once defined simply as a desire to return home, to a specific place,
nostalgia was gradually being conceptualized as a longing to return to a former
time – and usually a time that was only imagined to be better. (512; original emphasis)
Eventually, Smith continues, nostalgia was reduced to a sometimes painful, oc‐
casionally pleasant, but in either case unreliable, private emotion that is inevi‐
tably unrelated to any real political harm (519). For Smith, such a view of nos‐
talgia mirrors a progressivist distrust towards any form of resistance to
change, and is therefore “integral to the emotional regime of industrial capi‐
talism” (522) – for if those who resist change are always and everywhere ‘merely
being nostalgic,’ then their political objections can be conveniently disre‐
garded.16
Accordingly, when reading the conclusion of The Mill on the Floss, we must
not simply dismiss the novel’s tone as nostalgic, but instead examine how such
nostalgia contributes to the text’s critique of Bildung and the genre of the Bil‐
dungsroman. The key for doing this lies in the problem of mourning, which
according to Franco Moretti can have no more than episodic significance in the
classical Bildungsroman because it “does not contribute to Bildung” (“The Com‐
fort of Civilization” 132). Indicating a refusal to let go of the past, mourning
constitutes an obstacle to the protagonist’s smooth, evolutionary development –
and, implicitly, to his or her ‘progress.’ Accordingly, while in the final chapter
of The Mill on the Floss Eliot’s narrator at first seems to argue that time has the
power to heal all wounds, it soon becomes clear that this is not in fact the case:
Nature repairs her ravages – repairs them with her sunshine, and with human labor.
The desolation wrought by that flood had left little visible trace on the face of the
earth, five years after. […]
Nature repairs her ravages, but not all. The uptorn trees are not rooted again; the
parted hills are left scarred; if there is a new growth, the trees are not the same as the
old, and the hills underneath their green vesture bear the marks of the past rending.
To the eyes that have dwelt on the past, there is no thorough repair. (422; “Conclusion”)
The Mill on the Floss does not, then, end on a confident note of progress, but with
the image of two men – Philip and Stephen – who continue to visit Maggie’s
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17 Svetlana Boym distinguishes between two types of nostalgia: restorative nostalgia,
which “attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home,” and reflective nos‐
talgia, which, at best, “can present an ethical and creative challenge” (xviii): “Reflective
nostalgia does not pretend to rebuild the mythical place called home […]. This type of
nostalgic narrative is ironic, inconclusive and fragmentary. […] The past is not made in
the image of the present or seen as foreboding of some present disaster; rather, the past
opens up a multitude of potentialities, nonteleological possibilities of historical devel‐
opment” (50). See also Kevis Goodman on Romantic nostalgia, which she regards as an
attempt “to register the growing pains of historical existence” (196).
grave, feeling “that their keenest joy and keenest sorrow were for ever buried
there” (422; “Conclusion”). As Susan Meyer points out, the novel’s nostalgia
“exerts a more memorable and stronger force than the energy of its forward
movement” (131); the smooth river of progress finds itself checked by an indel‐
ible longing for the past. Only by forgetting the past can we hope to avoid
mourning and nostalgia. However, since our identities must, for Eliot’s narrator,
have immovable roots in memory, to forget or deny the past would be tanta‐
mount to surrendering one’s self – the very self so cherished by advocates of
Bildung.
This is not to suggest that nostalgia ought to become a privileged discourse
in our relation to the past. We should, however, be aware that to dismiss nos‐
talgia out of hand means to surrender a potent resource for social critique. Nos‐
talgia is, first and foremost, an experience of homelessness, and as such an in‐
dication of discontent with the present:
[W]e should recognize that remembering positive aspects of the past does not neces‐
sarily indicate a desire to return there. Remembering the past should instead be seen
as a way to express valid desires and concerns about the present – in particular, about
its relationship (or lack of relationship) to the past. (Smith 523; original emphasis)
Nostalgia expresses desires and values that, in themselves, are neither necessa‐
rily sentimental nor illegitimate; after all, one reason for shying away from ex‐
amining the past is, as Eliot’s narrator puts it, that “mankind is not disposed to
look narrowly into the conduct of great victors when their victory is on the right
side” (207; bk. 3, ch. 7) – i.e. one’s own. To dismiss any kind of longing for the
past as ‘mere nostalgia’ may thus encourage, in both others and ourselves, an
unwarranted sense of “ironic detachment” from both past injustice and present
harm (Smith 515).17
In The Mill on the Floss, ironic detachment is in fact quite explicitly portrayed
as a privilege that the dispossessed cannot afford. In a lengthy passage that is
itself supremely ironic (Raymond Williams 172), Eliot’s narrator satirizes the
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18 The historian E. P. Thompson makes a similar observation on the relationship between
religious enthusiasm and social standing in his The Making of the English Working
Class: “The rational Christianity of the Unitarians, with its preference for ‘candour’ and
its distrust of ‘enthusiasm’, appealed to some of the tradesmen and shopkeepers of
London, and to similar groups in large cities. But it seemed too cold, too distant, too
polite, and too much associated with the comfortable values of a prospering class to
appeal to the city or village poor. Its very language and tone served as a barrier” (31).
For a particularly entertaining account of the relationship between class and irony, see
Terry Eagleton’s remarks on “a certain kind of English patrician” (Across the Pond 39).
belief that using irony implies a lofty transcendence of one’s limited, subjective
point of view:
In writing the history of unfashionable families, one is apt to fall into a tone of em‐
phasis which is very far from being the tone of good society, where principles and
beliefs are not only of an extremely moderate kind, but are always presupposed, no
subjects being eligible but such as can be touched with a light and graceful irony. But
then good society has its claret and its velvet carpets, its dinner-engagements six
weeks deep, its opera and its faëry ball-rooms; rides off its ennui on thoroughbred
horses; […] gets its science done by Faraday, and its religion by the superior clergy
who are to be met in the best houses – how should it have time or need for belief and
emphasis? But good society, floated on gossamer wings of light irony, is of very ex‐
pensive production; requiring nothing less than a wide and arduous national life con‐
densed in unfragrant deafening factories, cramping itself in mines, sweating at fur‐
naces, […] or else, spread over sheepwalks, and scattered in lonely houses and huts
on the clayey or chalky corn-lands […]. This wide national life is based entirely on
emphasis – the emphasis of want, which urges it into all the activities necessary for
the maintenance of good society and light irony; it spends its heavy years often in a
chill, uncarpeted fashion, amidst family discord unsoftened by long corridors. (238;
bk. 4, ch. 3)
Irony, the narrator insists, is not an ideologically neutral device, but suffused
with implicit value-judgments; an “unsoftened” hut is far less hospitable to “light
irony” than a comfortable, wealthy home furnished with “velvet carpets.” Indeed,
given the depth of social injustice (“deafening factories,” “the emphasis of want”),
good society’s well-tempered beliefs appear curiously exorbitant (or “extremely
moderate,” in the narrator’s elegantly oxymoronic phrase). Accordingly, it
would be a profound mistake to think that holding strong beliefs necessarily
indicates blind fanaticism, whereas a properly ironic distance goes hand in hand
with intellectual subtlety and independence.18
In addition, the narrator’s argument also challenges the idea that irony is
necessarily subversive, for it is difficult to imagine that the tone of “good society”
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constitutes a counter-hegemonic discourse. The narrator’s point is thus not far
from an observation Franco Moretti makes when noting irony’s centrality in the
history of the modern novel. How, Moretti wonders, could a stylistic device that
has enjoyed almost unrivalled dominance in novelistic aesthetics simultane‐
ously constitute a grave threat to the social order (Way of the World 97)? Rather
than seeing the device as subversive, we should regard irony as a stylistic cor‐
relative to what Moretti posits as the great theme and political disposition of
the Bildungsroman: compromise (Way of the World 10). This becomes more
readily apparent if we examine Moretti’s definition of compromise: “We can
speak of compromise when conflicting principles have indeed reached an ac‐
cord, but without having lost their diversity. They remain heterogeneous, and
the agreement intrinsically precarious” (Way of the World 69). In agreement, but
only precariously so – unified, yet remaining heterogeneous: it is a definition
of compromise, but also a perfectly good description of how irony manages
momentarily to unite fundamentally irreconcilable meanings: what Catherine
Gallagher calls a characteristically modern “spirit of ‘ironic’ assent” (347).
Admittedly, The Mill on the Floss’s critique of irony is complicated by the fact
that its narrator at the same time employs the device. There is irony, for instance,
in the narrator’s description of the “fashionably drest [sic] female in grief” as a
“striking example of the complexity introduced into the emotions by a high state
of civilization” (48; bk. 1, ch. 7). There is irony, too, in the narrator’s attitude
towards little Maggie, who, after running away from home to join the gypsies,
mistakenly believes that she was really “gaining great influence over them,” and
that the gypsies would want her to become their queen (92; bk. 1, ch. 11). And
there is irony, to give a third and final example, in the narrator’s comments on
the supposedly staggering backwardness of the past depicted in the novel:
All this, you remember, happened in those dark ages when there were no schools of
design; before schoolmasters were invariably men of scrupulous integrity, and before
the clergy were all men of enlarged minds and varied culture. In those less favored
days, it is no fable that there were other clergymen besides Mr. Stelling who had
narrow intellects and large wants, and whose income, by a logical confusion to which
Fortune, being a female as well as blindfold, is peculiarly liable, was proportioned not
to their wants but to their intellect, with which income has clearly no inherent relation.
(139 – 140; bk. 2, ch. 4)
The surface meaning of the passage is that the narrator’s present is superior to
the past, yet the idea that nowadays all schoolmasters are upright men, and all
members of the clergy persons of enlarged minds and varied culture, is trans‐
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parently excessive and, therefore, highly suspicious.19 Moreover, if taken at face
value, the link made in the passage between “female” and “logical confusion”
would sit uneasily with the novel’s general gender politics. In short, there is
good reason to believe that the narrator’s comments are not in fact intended to
praise the present, but instead to ridicule those who subscribe to an overly op‐
timistic progressivism.
And yet, it is important to recognize that ironic distance towards a particular
ideology is not in fact the same as repudiating it. We have already examined
some reasons why irony is not necessarily subversive, and Slavoy Žižek even
suggests that “ideological identification exerts a true hold on us precisely when
we maintain an awareness that we are not fully identical with it” (The Plague of
Fantasies 27). Accordingly, we might read The Mill on the Floss’s use of irony as
evidence of just how firmly the novel is committed to the liberal ideology of
progress from which it ostensibly distances itself. After all, the narrator states
quite clearly that suffering simply “belongs to every historical advance of man‐
kind” (223; bk. 4, ch. 1; emphasis added). Suffering is, in other words, regret‐
table – but also an inevitable aspect of progress, which itself remains eminently
desirable. Moreover, even according to the narrator’s own theory of irony, the
novel’s use of the device would in fact mark The Mill on the Floss as yet another
product of that ‘good society’ that depends on exploitation and widespread
want. From either perspective, the novel seems curiously at odds with itself:
satirizing the very ‘good society’ from which it has itself emerged, and em‐
bracing an idea of progress that, at the same time, it critiques through its per‐
vasive mood of nostalgia.
Crucially, however, there is one respect in which Eliot’s novel increasingly
abandons the respectable stance of ironic distance, namely in relation to its
protagonist, Maggie. We have already seen that, when still a child, Maggie at
times serves as the butt of the narrator’s irony. However, as the novel’s heroine
matures, the narrator identifies more and more uncompromisingly with her
spiritual and emotional plight. Indeed, for F. R. Leavis it is precisely this lack of
ironic distance towards Maggie’s soulful yearnings that constitute the one great
flaw of The Mill on the Floss:
There is nothing against George Eliot’s presenting this immaturity with tender sym‐
pathy; but we ask, and ought to ask, of a great novelist something more. ‘Sympathy
and understanding’ is the common formula of praise, but understanding, in any strict
sense, is just what she doesn’t show. To understand immaturity would be to ‘place’ it,
with however subtle an implication, by relating it to mature experience. (485)
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For Leavis, Eliot’s novel of education remains scandalously immature because
it does not moderate its protagonist’s emotional intensity through properly
ironic distance. In a similar vein, Virginia Woolf complains that the narrator’s
humor “controls” Maggie only as long as she is still a child, whereas this superior
ironic poise is lost as the novel’s protagonist matures – and it is this that sepa‐
rates it from Middlemarch, which Woolf has famously called “one of the few
English novels written for grown-up people” (“George Eliot” 168 – 169). What
upsets both Leavis and Woolf, in short, is that the narrator of The Mill on the
Floss progressively – or, to their mind, regressively – abandons the mature tone
of ‘good society,’ opting instead for a very unfashionable, emphatic identification
with the adolescent heroine’s struggle.
However, before analyzing in more detail some vital components of Maggie’s
struggle, we should perhaps rephrase the argument up to this point in terms of
two different levels of critique: the mimetic or referential, and the literary or
intertextual. On the one hand, we have seen that The Mill on the Floss constitutes
a far-reaching critique of Victorian gender norms and their adverse effects on
women and, at least to some extent, on men as well. As this kind of critique is
linked to the state of affairs in the real world, we may – for lack of a better term –
call it mimetic or referential. Eliot’s novel highlights symbolically the extent to
which Victorian gender norms are sustained by central pillars of the bourgeois
order: fathers (Mr. Tulliver), preachers and educators (Reverend Stelling), as well
as lawyers (Wakem). Importantly, the novel does not depict these patriarchs as
a monolithic and unified front of oppression; rather, the text depicts them as
engaged in deep conflict but nevertheless agreeing on one key issue: the infe‐
riority of women as intellectually limited commodities that belong to the head
of the family. The novel thus also portrays the family home as an institution that
is deeply implicated in the reproduction of social injustice, even as it acknowl‐
edges the deep bonds of affection between father and daughter, or sister and
brother. Moreover, like so many a Bildungsroman, it exposes important flaws in
the educational system, and as such advocates social change.
Such referential critique is, however, complemented in the novel by what we
might term literary or intertextual critique. This includes, for instance, the way
in which The Mill on the Floss challenges some key tenets of the Bildungsroman
as a genre by refusing to focus on Stephen Guest and instead juxtaposing three
unsuccessful plots of formation: Maggie’s, Tom’s, and Philip’s, none of whom
will find a true home in this world. In combining these three plots, the text
highlights the limits to self-determination, and thus qualifies an overly opti‐
mistic conception of human agency inherent to classical ideals of Bildung.
Moreover, the novel questions the political innocence of irony as a stylistic de‐
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vice, and to some extent at least rejects what it portrays as a class-based stance.
The strongest expression of this incomplete but significant repudiation is the
narrator’s increasing rejection of ironic distance from Maggie, which has led
critics to accuse Eliot’s novel as a whole of unseemly immaturity. Similar accu‐
sations could be leveled against the narrator’s nostalgic tone, if one were to
analyze nostalgia as merely a regressive yearning for an idealized childhood
home. However, the novel cautions us against such a simplistic assessment of
the nostalgic impulse, and instead pits it against a narrative of implacable pro‐
gress in order to highlight the latter’s emotional as well as social costs. If this
last point threatens to collapse the distinction between referential and intertex‐
tual critique, then this is not a coincidence, but instead one of the novel’s key
arguments: that social critique ought not limit itself to what we might call the
world’s content, but must also pay attention to its style and its discursive ar‐
rangements of oppression. To put things somewhat differently: one’s loss of
home may derive from material deprivation or from one’s lack of a proper place
in the symbolic order – and, not infrequently, from a combination of the two.
Maggie’s Dreams: Awakening and Romance
It is with these considerations in mind that we must now analyze Maggie’s
struggle, as an emotional conflict that arises from her desire to honor past duties
and, at the same time, to strive towards future fulfillment; she wishes to develop
as a ‘free’ individual without relinquishing the ancestral home that stands in the
way of that very development. Maggie’s passionate response – as a young
woman who has lost the material security of home (and the social status asso‐
ciated with it) – to the writings of the late-medieval mystic Thomas à Kempis
needs to be seen in this context. In à Kempis’s ascetic philosophy, Maggie be‐
lieves to have found a way of resolving the dilemma between individual desire
and social limitations:
[H]ere was a sublime height to be reached without the help of outward things; here
was insight, and strength, and conquest, to be won by means entirely within her own
soul […]. It flashed through her like the suddenly apprehended solution of a problem,
that all the miseries of her young life had come from fixing her heart on her own
pleasure […]; and for the first time she saw the possibility of shifting the position from
which she looked at the gratification of her own desires – of taking her stand out of
herself, and looking at her own life as an insignificant part of a divinely guided whole.
(237; bk. 4, ch. 3)
Maggie finds herself doubly deprived: as a woman refused the benefits of edu‐
cation, and as a daughter suffering from the family’s very material downfall.
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20 “[Ich] empfinde die Empfindung […] als zu meinem Wesen gehörig, und, obwohl als
die Quelle aller Leiden, Schwächen und Schmerzen, doch als eine herrliche, göttliche
Macht und Vollkommenheit. Was wäre der Mensch ohne Empfindung? Sie ist die mu‐
sikalische Macht im Menschen” (Das Wesen des Christenthums 102 – 103).
This explains why the notion of “means entirely within her soul” must seem so
appealing, as it involves neither intellectual nor material resources; it is a matter
of the soul, not of the mind or the body. Maggie, in other words, hopes to solve
these conflicts by discursively reframing her needs as merely “the gratification
of her own desires,” and as insignificant in the larger scheme of things. It is
precisely the emphasis of want that leads Maggie to embrace an emphatic be‐
lief, in the hope that this will help her recover the “sense of home” that she has
been unable to find in the “world outside the books” (194; bk. 3, ch. 5).
Significantly, it is Philip who ends Maggie’s mystic dream of cheerful resig‐
nation by challenging its underlying assumptions about the nature of longing
and desire. Ascetics like Thomas à Kempis assume that desire binds us to a fallen
world to which we do not truly belong, and that therefore desire itself is the
main obstacle to our quest for a lasting, transcendent home. Philip, however,
questions Maggie’s belief that denying her longings is the path to true belonging:
It seems to me we can never give up longing and wishing while we are thoroughly
alive. There are certain things we feel to be beautiful and good, and we must hunger
after them. How can we ever be satisfied without them until our feelings are deadened?
I delight in fine pictures; I long to be able to paint such. I strive and strive, and can’t
produce what I want. That is pain to me, and always will be pain, until my faculties
lose their keenness […]. (246; bk. 5, ch. 1; original emphasis)
Longing may mean suffering, Philip admits, but it is also essential to a fulfilling
and truly human life. The German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, who claims
that God is nothing but an outward projection of humankind’s own essential
nature, and whose Das Wesen des Christenthums (The Essence of Christianity)
Eliot herself had translated into English in 1854, makes a case very similar to
Philip’s:
I feel feeling […] as belonging to my essential being, and, though the source of all
sufferings and sorrows, as a glorious, divine power and perfection. What would man
be without feeling? It is the musical power in man. (The Essence of Christianity 63;
ch. 5)20
The only way to avoid suffering, Feuerbach argues, would be entirely to quench
our feelings – that divine, “musical power in man” which defines what it means
to be truly human.
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21 See Levine for a more sustained discussion of the relationship between The Mill on the
Floss and Ludwig Feuerbach’s ideas.
What underlines this philosophical connection is that Feuerbach’s musical
metaphor repeatedly resurfaces in The Mill on the Floss. For instance, there are
echoes of Feuerbach’s metaphor in what Philip says to Maggie shortly after his
attack on ascetic self-denial:
I think there are stores laid up in our human nature that our understandings can make
no complete inventory of. Certain strains of music affect me so strangely; I can never
hear them without their changing my whole attitude of mind for a time, and if the
effect would last, I might be capable of heroisms. (248; bk. 5, ch. 1; emphasis added)
Like Feuerbach, Philip here associates music both with our deepest feelings and
our most heroic or divine powers.21 Moreover, listening to Philip’s pleas, Maggie
herself feels as if “music would swell out, […] persuading her that the wrong lay
all in the thoughts and weaknesses of others, and that there was such a thing as
futile sacrifice” (247; bk. 5, ch. 1). Similarly, toward the end of the novel, Philip
assures Maggie in a moving letter that she has been, to his affections, “what
light, what colour is to my eyes – what music is to the inward ear” (407; bk. 7,
ch. 3). The musical imagery here becomes linked to the appreciation of light and
colour, and hence with the “delight in fine pictures” that Philip had mentioned
earlier on. In this way, the novel associates desire and longing with a thirst for
the beautiful, the good, and the true – with, in short, the classical ideal of Bildung
as a culture of the self that is entirely incompatible with an ascetic philosophy
of self-denial (Boumelha 26 – 27).
Philip thus in one sense (re-)awakens Maggie’s desires for knowledge and
culture, and we may note in passing that his last name is, tellingly, Wakem
(‘wake ’em’). At the same time, however, The Mill on the Floss portrays desire
itself as related to that dissolution of the conscious self that is characteristic of
sleep and dreams. For instance, at one point we find little Maggie, who contin‐
ually thirsts for the knowledge that can be gained from reading, “dreaming over
her book” (15; bk. 1, ch. 3). Similarly, when she later runs off to join a group of
gypsies, the experience at first seems to her as if “rehearsed in a dream” (91; bk.
1, ch. 11) – and we have seen that the episode as a whole can be read as a version
of the Freudian family romance. Moreover, romantic love and sexual fulfillment,
too, are associated with dreams, for the idea that she could ever have a lover
seems to Maggie “like a dream – only one of the stories one imagines” (272; bk.
5, ch. 4). Significantly, towards the end of the novel, Maggie must literally wake
up from “vivid dreaming” before she can bring herself to decide against an
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22 In a similar vein, Tom, is “awakened” from his “boyish dreams” when he learns that
Mr. Tulliver has lost his lawsuit against lawyer Wakem (158; bk. 2, ch. 7).
elopement with Stephen Guest (381; bk. 6, ch. 14). Susan J. Rosowsksi’s descrip‐
tion of the ‘female Bildungsroman’ as typically revolving around a woman’s
awakening to limitations thus proves particularly accurate for The Mill on the
Floss, in which Maggie’s dreamlike desires clash, time and again, with the lim‐
itations imposed by reality.22
And yet, while this may suggest that the novel attempts to expose the insub‐
stantiality of dreams by portraying them as the binary opposite of a realistic
outlook on the world, the text in fact explores the complex interrelatedness of
the “triple world of Reality, Books, and Waking Dreams” (225; bk. 4, ch. 2). We
have seen, for instance, that books do inspire some of Maggie’s dreams and
desires. At the same time, however, Maggie is also very well aware of the un‐
realistic conventions of popular romances, where the “blond-haired young lady”
invariably triumphs over the “dark woman” (270; bk. 5, ch. 4). Northrop Frye’s
claim that “romance is nearest of all literary forms to wish-fulfillment and
dream” (186) is, therefore, not exactly true for Maggie, who is herself one of
those dark women whose desires continually end up thwarted in popular ro‐
mances. Accordingly, Maggie formulates her dreams in direct opposition to
conventional romances, voicing the hope that she herself might one day be able
to avenge all these “dark unhappy” heroines (270; bk. 5, ch. 4). Philip, who is
passionately in love with Maggie, teasingly assures her that she could easily win
a handsome young man away from a pretty, blond-haired woman such as her
cousin, Lucy – and this is, of course, precisely what will happen in Eliot’s novel.
Maggie eventually wins Stephen Guest’s love from pretty, blond-haired Lucy
and, in this way, fulfills her daydream fantasy of revenge. In The Mill on the Floss,
Maggie’s dreams and desires thus not only take shape in relation to both ev‐
eryday domestic reality and the imaginary worlds described in books; they also
have an uncanny way of coming true, and of shaping the course of her own life.
The Tragedy of Wish-Fulfillment
This realization may in turn help us understand the novel’s much-discussed,
dream-like ending, in which Maggie and her brother Tom drown in a flood, and
which is highly problematic when read in realist terms of narrative coherence
and probability. Henry James, for instance, is one of many critics who have been
uncomfortable with the novel’s dramatic conclusion, and highly suspicious of
its artistic merits: “As it stands, the dénouement shocks the reader most painfully.
Nothing has prepared him for it; the story does not move towards it; it casts no
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23 See the subtitle of U. C. Knoepflmacher’s 1968 study George Eliot’s Early Novels: The
Limits of Realism.
24 Terry Eagleton agrees that metafiction is an important aspect of Eliot’s fiction: “It is
with Eliot that realism in the English novel becomes theoretically self-conscious” (The
English Novel 168). Kristie M. Allen also puts forward a reading of the ending as pro‐
ductively disruptive: “The novel’s conclusion, thus, becomes a formal forging of new
channels of ideas about the taken-for-grantedness of culture, the mind’s processes of
repetition, the cumulative moral effects of habit, and the kinds of self-reflective con‐
sciousness required to manifest our best selves” (847). Similarly, Jordan Baker posits
that at the end of The Mill on the Floss “we find ourselves subject to a logic alien to the
typical protocols of the realist novel” (229)
shadow before it” (465). In a similar vein, F. R. Leavis suggests that the novel’s
ending belongs to “another kind of art” than the preceding sections; the flood
in which Tom and Maggie perish constitutes a “dreamed-of perfect accident,” but
has “no symbolic or metaphorical value” (488; my emphasis). Less judgmentally,
Jane McDonnell remarks that The Mill on the Floss moves from a realistic por‐
trayal of Maggie towards a more supernatural mode of representation typical
of such genres as the fairy tale or romance (400).
While Penny Boumelha agrees that the novel’s ending abandons the realist
mode, she is one of the few critics who also notes the crucial, metafictional effect
of such a “flagrantly fantasied and contrived” conclusion:
It acknowledges and makes unusually visible the formal-cum-ideological impasse that
the novel has reached by virtue of its concentration on the development of a woman
for whom no meaningful future […] can be imagined. It breaks out of this impasse
only by sweeping the novel out of its realist mode altogether. (29)
According to Boumelha, the ending of Eliot’s novel serves to expose “the re‐
stricted possibilities of the world as it could be imagined by realism,” and the
shift to a world of fantasy and wish-fulfillment thus constitutes a critique of
classic realism’s unacknowledged limitations (32 – 33).23 By flaunting the con‐
trived nature of its conclusion – the flood arrives at the very moment of Maggie’s
utmost despair, when she wonders “how long it will be before death comes”
(417; bk. 7, ch. 5) – The Mill on the Floss problematizes its status as fiction and
highlights the link between generic conventions, narrative closure, and
ideology.24
More specifially, Eliot’s novel dismantles a central convention of the English
Bildungsroman: its valorization of childhood, commonly expressed in endings
that depict the protagonist’s fairytale-like return to his or her original home. As
Franco Moretti has pointed out, the hero’s childhood is not only granted an
emblematic prominence in the English Bildungsroman; in contrast to continental
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25 In Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, for instance, young Wilhelm is not at all un‐
happy to leave his childhood home: “Seines Vaters Haus, die Seinigen zu verlassen,
schien ihm ein Leichtes” (37); the English translation runs: “It seemed to him the easiest
thing in the world to leave his family and his father’s house” (Wilhelm Meister’s Ap‐
prenticeship 16). Similarly, the protagonist of a Bildungsroman by Stendahl is more than
eager to venture forth into the world: “Pour Julien, faire fortune, c’était d’abord sortir
de Verrières; il abhorrait sa patrie” (Le rouge et le noir 45; ch. 5); the English translation
runs: “For Julien, making his fortune meant first and foremost getting out of Verrières;
he loathed his native town” (The Red and the Black 26; ch. 5). Compare this to, say,
Dickens’s David Copperfield, the fifth chapter of which is entitled “I am sent away from
Home” (73).
examples of the genre, the protagonist’s most significant experiences also tend
to be “those which confirm the choices made by childhood ‘innocence’” (Way of
the World 182; emphasis added):
Can you picture a child reading Wilhelm Meister, The Red and the Black, Lost Illu‐
sions? Impossible. But Waverley and Jane Eyre, David Copperfield and Great Expecta‐
tions: here we have the ‘great tradition’ of children’s literature (and our era, less in‐
timidated by sex, can easily add Tom Jones). […] Could it in fact be that, deep down,
these novels are fairy tales? (Way of the World 185)
In the fairytale world of the English Bildungsroman, Moretti points out, siblings
often “magnetically attract the negative values of the narrative universe,” as part
of a broader tendency towards moral polarization into clear-cut rights and
wrongs (Way of the World 186). If continental heroes are happy to leave (and
even deliberately defy) their childhood homes, the youthful journeys of English
protagonists are portrayed as enforced exile: “a long and bewildering detour”
from the cherished stability of the original home (Way of the World 203).25 The
basic structure of the English Bildungsroman is, in short, regressive, and the
often unlikely or even blatantly unrealistic plot twists needed to manufacture a
happy ending – the rediscovery of long-lost relatives, or Rochester’s voice su‐
pernaturally calling out to Jane Eyre over the distance of several miles – reveal
the extent to which the endings of such novels are concerned, not with reality,
but with poetic justice and wish-fulfillment. And of course, almost all of this is
true for The Mill on the Floss, too: the sibling who attracts the negative values of
the fictional universe (i.e. Tom); the protagonist’s aversion to the idea of having
to leave the childhood home; and the restoration of an ‘innocent’ childhood
perspective through the reconciliation of Tom and Maggie, brought about by
the flagrantly fantasized flood that concludes the novel. There is only one
problem with this argument in connection with The Mill on the Floss: its ending
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may be just as fantasized as all the others – but it is not truly a happy one. How
can we make sense of this fantasy of doom?
Using Slavoj Žižek’s Lacanian framework as an analytical tool, we can say
that Eliot’s novel ‘traverses the ideological fantasy’ that structures the English
Bildungsroman, and in doing so confronts the generic tradition’s traumatic
kernel. Here is how Žižek defines fantasy:
Fantasy conceals the fact that the Other, the symbolic order, is structured around some
traumatic impossibility, around something which cannot be symbolized […] – so what
happens with desire after we ‘traverse’ fantasy? Lacan’s answer, in the last pages of
his Seminar XI, is drive, ultimately the death drive: ‘beyond fantasy’ there is no
yearning or any kindred sublime phenomenon, ‘beyond fantasy’ we find only drive,
its pulsation around the sinthome. (Sublime Object of Ideology 138 – 139; original em‐
phasis)
For Lacan, fantasy serves to hide a traumatic kernel, and if we traverse it we
will be confronted with the pulsation of the death drive around the so-called
sinthome, which Žižek defines as “a knot, a point at which all the lines of the
predominant ideological argumentation […] meet” (The Ticklish Subject 206).
This is a potentially liberating encounter, for Žižek suggests that if we untie the
sinthome, then the efficiency of the corresponding ideological edifice is sus‐
pended (ibid.). Given that, for Žižek, ironic distance is one of the key ways in
which we can “blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy”
(Sublime Object of Ideology 30), we may therefore speculate that abandoning
irony may be one way to confront the traumatic kernel of ideological fantasies.
If we now apply this theoretical framework to Eliot’s novel, then we can say
that The Mill on the Floss manages to traverse the regressive fantasy of childhood
that lies at the core of the English Bildungsroman precisely through its progres‐
sive abandoning of ironic distance, which is why the – expected and conven‐
tional – fairytale happy ending turns into a sublime depiction of a pulsating,
semi-incestuous death drive:
Tom, looking before him, saw death rushing on them. Huge fragments, clinging to‐
gether in fatal fellowship, made one wide mass across the stream.
“It is coming, Maggie!” Tom said, in a deep, hoarse voice, loosing the oars, and
clasping her.
The next instant the boat was no longer seen upon the water [… B]rother and sister
had gone down in an embrace never to be parted […]. (422; bk. 7, ch. 5)
Maggie is reunited with Tom, who in the course of the narrative has come to
embody the Law of the Father, and both are obliterated in what one could call
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26 See, for instance, how Elisabeth Bronfen summarizes Freud’s account of the psycho‐
logical dynamics of fantasy: “[F]antasies try to jettison their origin but only find them‐
selves drawn back to the repressed other scene from which they emerged” (209).
27 For a similar argument, see Meyer 129. Note that the narrator of Eliot’s Middlemarch
constructs a “home epic” for Dorothea Brooke, the heroine of that novel (Middlemarch
511; “Finale”; emphasis added – see Marotta 416).
a literal ‘stream of unconsciousness’: a fantasized Liebestod in the flood un‐
leashed by Maggie’s death drive.26 Once we foreground this submerged psycho‐
logical drama, it seems almost too fitting that, in the course of the novel, Eliot’s
narrator incorporates references to two of psychoanalysis’s favorite tragic nar‐
ratives: Sophocles’s Oedipus and Shakespeare’s Hamlet (110 and 325; bk. 1, ch. 13
and bk. 6, ch. 6).
More than merely referring to these tragedies in passing, however, the nar‐
rator of The Mill on the Floss in fact launches a systematic analysis of the genre
of tragedy and its relation to the story of Maggie and her family. Early on in the
novel, Maggie already suspects that Tom’s character and actions might make
the “future in some way tragic” (15; bk. 1, ch. 3). Later, the narrator compares
Maggie to the tragic hero of Sophocles’s play Ajax (56; bk. 1, ch. 7) and even
points explicitly to Aristotle’s discussion of tragedy in his Poetics (85; bk. 1,
ch. 10). At another point, the narrator challenges received ideas about the genre,
relating this critique to more general problems of novelistic representation:
Mr. Tulliver, you perceive, though nothing more than a superior miller and maltster,
was as proud and obstinate as if he had been a very lofty personage, in whom such
dispositions might be a source of that conspicuous, far-echoing tragedy, which sweeps
the stage in regal robes, and makes the dullest chronicler sublime. The pride and
obstinacy of millers and other insignificant people, whom you pass unnoticingly on
the road every day, have their tragedy too; but it is of that unwept, hidden sort that
goes on from generation to generation, and leaves no record – such tragedy, perhaps,
as lies in the conflicts of young souls, hungry for joy, under a lot made suddenly hard
to them, under the dreariness of a home where the morning brings no promise with
it, and where the unexpectant discontent of worn and disappointed parents weighs
on the children like a damp, thick air, in which all the functions of life are depressed;
or such tragedy as lies in the slow or sudden death that follows on a bruised passion,
though it may be a death that finds only a parish funeral. (163; bk. 3, ch. 1)
Against the classic Aristotelian dogma, the narrator maintains that tragedy is
not confined to those whom one could call “lofty”; it may also afflict “insignif‐
icant people,” who suffer from everyday conflicts and “the dreariness of a home
where the morning brings no promise.”27 The Mill on the Floss is thus best un‐
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28 Domestic tragedy had already appeared on the English stage in the early eighteenth
century in plays such as George Lillo’s The London Merchant, which was first performed
in 1731 (Sanders 302 and Johann N. Schmidt 215; see Helgerson 13 – 76 for an account
of its prehistory). Perhaps the most celebrated eighteenth-century example of tragedy
in the English novel is Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa: or, The History of a Young Lady,
published in 1748 (Eagleton, Sweet Violence 201 – 202).
derstood as an attempt not only to stage, but explicitly to conceptualize a nov‐
elistic version of domestic tragedy.28
In the course of this exploration of the genre of tragedy, the narrator takes
particular issue with the idea of the tragic flaw (hamartia), understood as a defect
of character. Various critics have recently rejected the traditional understanding
of hamartia as an inherent flaw in the hero’s character. Jennifer Wallace, for
instance, argues that the Aristotelian notion of hamartia is “less about a char‐
acter defect than about an error in judgment which led to a wrong decision or
a wrong course of action” (118 – 119). It is this very idea – that hamartia refers
to an error of judgment – which explains why John Drakakis and Naomi Conn
Liebler maintain that hamartia is related to the notion of dilemma, defined as
“the positioning of protagonist, represented community and audience alike be‐
tween two choices of equal value both politically and morally” (9). If a character
is faced with two choices of more or less equal value, then an “error in judgment”
is of course far more likely to occur. Accordingly, Drakakis and Liebler insist
that what may appear to be an innate character flaw in fact often has its roots,
“not in the inner psychological life of the protagonist, but in the larger domain
of culture” (8). Intriguingly, much the same stance is taken by the narrator in
The Mill on the Floss:
[Y]ou have known Maggie a long while, and need to be told, not her characteristics,
but her history, which is a thing hardly to be predicted even from the completest
knowledge of characteristics. For the tragedy of our lives is not created entirely from
within. “Character,” says Novalis, in one of his questionable aphorisms–“character is
destiny.” But not the whole of our destiny. Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, was speculative
and irresolute, and we have a great tragedy in consequence. But if his father had lived
to a good old age, and his uncle had died an early death, we can conceive Hamlet’s
having married Ophelia, and got through life with a reputation of sanity, notwith‐
standing many soliloquies, and some moody sarcasms toward the fair daughter of
Polonius, to say nothing of the frankest incivility to his father-in-law.
Maggie’s destiny, then, is at present hidden, and we must wait for it to reveal itself
like the course of an unmapped river; we only know that the river is full and rapid,
and that for all rivers there is the same final home. (325; bk. 6, ch. 6)
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For Eliot’s narrator, tragedy is not usually the direct consequence of a protag‐
onist’s inherent, tragic flaw, but the result of a fatal misfit between character
and circumstances. If, that is to say, the classical Bildungsroman assumes that
we can recognize ourselves in, and identify with, the wider world as our natural
home (i.e. as a place in harmony with our selves), then tragedy focuses on dis‐
sonance and the possibility of breakdown. We can therefore read the ending of
The Mill on the Floss, which constitutes such a blatant break with the novel’s
realist mode, not only as a critique of the doctrine that tragedy arises “entirely
from within,” but also as highlighting tragedy’s impulse towards a violent dis‐
ruption of what is conceived as the ‘proper’ order.
A tragic novel, then – yet at the same time a novel ending in wish-fulfill‐
ment? Can a narrative really be called a tragedy if the outcome fulfills the pro‐
tagonist’s deepest, death-driven, incestuous desires? Perhaps we must not only
accept that it can, but even posit that such knowledge in fact deepens the tragic
experience because it highlights the overwhelming pressures on the protago‐
nist’s self. In the course of Eliot’s novel, we have come to see that Maggie may
well be overly impulsive – but she is also intelligent, sensitive, and generous.
Surely it deepens rather than dilutes the tragedy that such a person should find
herself in a situation where her only remaining wishes are to be reunited with,
and at the same time to take revenge against, her own brother, who has so often
treated her with the harshest contempt. Maggie is “so young, so healthy” (415;
bk. 7, ch. 5), yet by the end of the novel this only means to her that death is still
a long time to come: she is doomed to live, and thus to experience further pain.
So yes, Maggie’s death in the flood at the end of the novel, locked in an erotically
charged embrace with her brother, is a fantasy scenario that allows her to fulfill
her conflicting desires. But it is deeply tragic that things should have come to
such a pass: that this is indeed the only thing left for Maggie to desire. In The
Mill on the Floss, Maggie’s desire for “homecoming and reconciliation” can only
be fulfilled by death and destruction (Fisher 522) because her society provides
“no home, no help for the erring” (417; bk. 7, ch. 5). Nicholas Howe is therefore
right when he suggests that thinking about home and homelessness has every‐
thing to do with how one defines “a just and decent society” (11). The tragic
wish-fulfilment of Eliot’s novel surely constitutes a plea for social change, even
if it does not – is perhaps unable to – envision the precise nature of this
change.
Capitalism and the Specter of Nomadic Existence
Indeed, despite a commitment to social reform, Eliot’s novel seems afraid of any
real historical change. More precisely, The Mill on the Floss is pervaded by a fear
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29 Or, to be more precise, from the point of view of the 1860s, it was easier to imagine that
the notion of immovable roots had seemed less problematic in earlier times. In other
words, the point is not that early-nineteenth-century society was truly more stable;
rather, the point is that Eliot and her contemporaries could plausibly imagine the past
as simpler and less disrupted.
of the epochal changes that, in the course of the nineteenth century, were trans‐
forming the nature of family and home:
By 1860, when George Eliot’s novel first appeared, industrialization had transformed
the nation [… T]he construction of railroads and other kinds of infrastructure had
caused the razing of entire neighborhoods and a concentration of population in a small
number of districts. The contrast between overcrowded, unhealthy urban centers and
the open country, which represented the ideal of England, fostered sentimental long‐
ings for older, traditional ways of life. The competitive spirit fostered by the industrial
system was viewed as infiltrating private lives, corrupting common feelings by aspi‐
rations to advance one’s own status, even at the risk of abandoning domestic respon‐
sibilities. […] In a work force that was moving from villages to cities, following em‐
ployment opportunities as they developed, kinship ties had become tenuous, even to
the point of giving way to more advantageous commercial connections. (Kilroy 119)
By the mid-Victorian period, which “marks the beginning of the greatest mi‐
gration of peoples in history” (Hobsbawm, Age of Capital 193; see also Manning
149), the ties to the place where one had grown up – the childhood home so
central to The Mill on the Floss – had lost much of their former meaning. There
may therefore be something escapist about the fact that the novel is set in the
early decades of the nineteenth century, when the notion of immovable roots
perhaps seemed less problematic than it did in 1860, when Eliot’s novel was
published.29 Moreover, Deirdre David points out that Maggie possesses qualities
that align her with the “pre-industrial era” (603), and this lends symbolical
significance to the fact that she and her brother Tom are killed by a piece of
“machinery” carried towards them by the novel’s apocalyptic flood (421; see also
Fisher 521, Kreisel 99 – 100). Just when it seems that the old values of kinship and
belonging have been reaffirmed, just when brother and sister are finally re‐
united, a machine – that most widely recognized symbol of the industrial age –
kills off the two characters who, in their different and conflicting ways, refused
to relinquish the ancestral home.
The novel’s nostalgic longing for stable roots is thus only one of the ways in
which The Mill on the Floss expresses deep misgivings about the extent to which
the changes of the nineteenth century can be seen as progress rather than as
destructive forces. Similar worries about a newly emerging, rootless society
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were to remain a concern in English fiction well into the early twentieth century,
as we can see in E. M. Forster’s Howards End (1910). In Forster’s novel, the nar‐
rator fears that the course of modern societal development will eventually re‐
duce humanity “again to a nomadic horde” (154; ch. 17):
London was but a foretaste of this nomadic civilization which is altering human nature
so profoundly, and throws upon personal relations a stress greater than they have
ever borne before. Under cosmopolitanism, if it comes, we shall receive no help from
the earth. Trees and meadows and mountains will only be a spectacle, and the binding
force that they once exercised on character must be entrusted to Love alone. May Love
be equal to the task! (256 – 257; ch. 31)
The age of urbanization and mass-migration, in this view, constitutes not pro‐
gress, but a kind of regression to a more primitive, nomadic past. In such a
‘nomadic age,’ where the home is no longer rooted in a specific place, “Love” –
or, as Maggie would put it, “the wayward choice of […] passion” (381; bk. 6,
ch. 14) – may remain the only binding force in people’s lives.
This fear of an uprooted, nomadic civilization in fact also pervades little
Maggie’s escape to the gypsies, which soon turns into an experience of almost
gothic terror:
Her ideas about the gypsies had undergone a rapid modification in the last five mi‐
nutes. From having considered them very respectful companions, amenable to in‐
struction, she had begun to think that they meant perhaps to kill her as soon as it was
dark, and cut up her body for gradual cooking; the suspicion crossed her that the
fierce-eyed old man was in fact the Devil, who might drop that transparent disguise
at any moment, and turn either into the grinning blacksmith, or else a fiery-eyed
monster with dragon’s wings. (95; bk. 1, ch. 11)
On the one hand, Deborah Epstein Nord is surely right in insisting that Maggie’s
excessive hopes and fears in this episode must be read as ironically exposing
her childish “myopia and delusions” (16). On the other hand, it would be difficult
to argue that Eliot’s novel secretly propagates the gypsies’ nomadic way of life
as a desirable alternative to the Tullivers’ respectable, settled existence. Rather,
the narrative emphasizes the gypsies’ comparative poverty (“We’ve got no tea
nor butter”; 93; bk. 1, ch. 9), suggesting that one ought, perhaps, to pity, but
certainly not emulate such a ‘rootless’ existence.
Similarly, The Mill on the Floss foregrounds the threats of rootlessness and
nomadism in Maggie’s relationship to Stephen Guest. For Maggie, abandoning
her family and her home community to elope with Stephen would mean “for
ever [to] sink and wander vaguely, driven by uncertain impulse” (382; bk. 6,
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30 Importantly, to say that the new, industrial-capitalist order threatens the older social
order is not to idealize the latter. See, for instance, Raymond Williams, who describes
English history as “a story of growth and achievement, but for the majority of men it
was the substitution of one form of domination for another: the mystified feudal order
replaced by a mystified agrarian capitalist order, with just enough continuity, in titles
and in symbols of authority, in successive compositions of a ‘natural order’, to confuse
and control” (39).
31 On the notions of negative and positive liberty see, for instance, Isaiah Berlin’s “Two
Concepts of Liberty.”
ch. 14). Even Stephen’s last name in fact emphasizes that Maggie cannot expect
to find a stable home with him, for a ‘guest’ is, by definition, a person who is
not staying in his or her own home, but only ever in someone else’s. Moreover,
Stephen is the prospective heir of Guest & Co., “a great mill-owning,
ship-owning business […], with a banking concern attached” (54; bk. 1, ch. 7),
and thus a proponent of the very industrial-capitalist order that threatens to
erode the ideal of home that Maggie (and, arguably, Eliot’s novel) desperately
tries to uphold.30 Put more abstractly, the novel confronts Maggie with the choice
between, on the one hand, a negative, personal kind of freedom from interfer‐
ence by the home community (i.e. asserting her right to be with Stephen, over
and against the wishes of relatives, friends, etc.), and, on the other, the positive
freedom of belonging to a community and participating in its daily life (i.e. re‐
maining accepted and included).31
The Politics of Genre and Style Brought Home
Maggie’s conflict cannot be solved within the realist parameters of the English
Bildungsroman, and accordingly The Mill on the Floss ultimately abandons the
world of realism for the realm of tragic wish-fulfillment and dreamlike disso‐
lution. The prototypical Bildungsroman tells the story of someone who, after
leaving home, manages to reconcile his or her own desires with the demands of
society – someone who finds a place in the world, albeit at the cost of compro‐
mise. Whenever such a (more or less harmonious) homecoming becomes en‐
tirely impossible, we approach the tragic realm of ‘unbelonging’ that is charac‐
terized by a breakdown of both the social and the transcendental order. As Terry
Eagleton points out, this tragic realm tends to be associated with “virile warriors
and immolated virgins”; it confronts us with scapegoat figures who incarnate
“the inner contradictions of the social order” and thus symbolize an entire so‐
ciety’s failure in their own defeat (Sweet Violence ix and 280).
This idea that inner, hidden contradictions are exposed in tragedy also ex‐
plains why Andrew Bennet and Nicholas Royle associate the tragic as such with
psychoanalytic theory: both make the unconscious public (109). Freud himself
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32 “Die Traumdeutung ist in Wirklichkeit die Via Regia zur Kenntnis des Unbewußten,
die sicherste Grundlage der Psychoanalyse und jenes Gebiet, auf welchem jeder Ar‐
beiter seine Überzeugung zu gewinnen und seine Ausbildung anzustreben hat” (Freud,
Über Psychoanalyse 32).
famously argued that the interpretation of dreams is “the royal road to a knowl‐
edge of the unconscious” (Five Lectures 33), and the fact that the tragic catas‐
trophe in Eliot’s novel constitutes a departure from realism into a land of
semi-incestuous, death-driven wish-fulfillment is thus merely a more than usu‐
ally striking example of the secret affinity between tragedy, dreams, and the
unconscious.32
Importantly, in The Mill on the Floss the critical exploration of tragedy and
other literary concepts is linked explicitly to the novel’s thematic focus on home
and dispossession. For instance, in a chapter entitled “What Had Happened at
Home,” the narrator describes Mr. Tulliver’s loss of Dorlcote Mill, his beloved
home, as a “tragedy” both for himself and for the family (as well as the serv‐
ants) who depend on him (162 – 163 and 212; bk. 3, ch. 1 and 8). Similarly, as we
have seen, the narrator believes that fashionable irony thrives only in the com‐
fortable homes of the privileged who depend, for their comfort, on those who
suffer from want and dispossession. Even the novel’s concern with popular
romances, where the dark-haired heroine must always end unhappily, is in fact
directly related to the events in Maggie’s own home, for both her parents and
other relatives echo these prejudices in their misgivings about Maggie’s
‘gypsy-like’ dark hair. Literary conventions and stereotypes thus reinforce, and
perhaps also create, social prejudices that, in turn, have real repercussions in
domestic life. In short, we can say that The Mill on the Floss relates all its three
major literary critical concerns – the critique of tragedy, of irony, and of popular
romances – to problems of domesticity, home, and belonging, and thus to key
themes of the Bildungsroman.
In doing so, Eliot’s novel presents a vision of home – that supposedly safe
and private space – as permeated and shaped by fundamentally public forces. It
also presents home as a gendered space owned by patriarchs who see the world
mainly in terms of property relations. Reverend Stelling’s decision to teach, for
instance, is not based on any desire on his part to contribute to the progress of
civilization; he simply needs the money to finance his and his wife’s rather
expensive lifestyle (113; bk. 2, ch. 1). Moreover, we have seen that Mr. Tulliver
only decides to send Tom to a tutor because he wants to prevent the son from
becoming his rival by one day claiming the mill as his own. Similarly, Mr. Tulliver
fears that Maggie’s intelligence lowers her value as a marriageable commodity.
Like Lawyer Wakem, Mr. Tulliver thus (at least occasionally) regards women as
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a piece of property, which suggests that belonging, for women, all to often means
being owned by the male head of the household, rather than feeling at home in
the family or the wider community.
Even Stephen Guest, who in many ways is the proponent of a younger, more
‘advanced’ generation of men, has no doubts that a woman’s role in life is defined
through and by her relation to men. For instance, in the scene where we first
meet Stephen, he asks Maggie’s cousin Lucy to “sing the whole duty of woman”
from Handel’s The Creation (297; bk. 6, ch. 1), and is thus immediately associated
with a view of women in terms of their duty to men – a view sanctioned by
official religious discourse. In a later scene, Stephen angrily “bursts forth” that
a bazaar organized by the women of St. Ogg’s takes “young ladies from the duties
of the domestic hearth”:
I should like to know what is the proper function of women, if it is not to make reasons
for husbands to stay at home, and still stronger reasons for bachelors to go out. If this
goes on much longer, the bonds of society will be dissolved. (327; bk. 6, ch. 6)
The Father, the Teacher, the Lawyer, the Preacher, and even the young Capitalist
thus all agree that belonging, for women, has little to do with a sense of ease,
emotional attachment to people and places, or a modicum of control over their
own lives. Consequently, it is not difficult to understand why Maggie urgently
wishes for an occupation that would allow her to “get my own bread and be
independent” (e.g. 402; bk. 7, ch. 2) – that would, in Virginia Woolf’s terms, allow
her to have a room of her own.
What makes matters even more difficult for Maggie is that, despite the in‐
justices of a patriarchal society, there is much about her home to love and
cherish: her father can be affectionate (as in the treatment of his sister,
Mrs. Moss; 64 – 72; bk. 1, ch. 7) and often takes Maggie’s side when others berate
her; her mother may not really understand her, but always tries to protect her
from harm; and Maggie is treated with genuine kindness not only by Philip, but
also by Tom’s boyhood friend Bob, who helps the Tullivers after they lose their
mill (bk. 3, ch. 6), and who even takes Maggie into his home when most people
in St. Ogg’s treat her as an outcast because of her ‘failed’ elopement with Stephen
Guest (bk. 7, ch. 1). In spite of patriarchal injustice, home thus means more to
Maggie than merely pain and restriction; it also holds the promise of fulfillment,
intimacy, and kindness – the positive freedom that comes from belonging to
others, as opposed to a negative liberty that is defined through the absence of
interference. It is true, of course, that the image of a carefree childhood, a time
when Maggie and her brother “clasped their little hands in love, and roamed the
daisied fields together” (422; bk. 7, ch. 5), is a nostalgic idealization. But it is also
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33 See Dirk Hoerder, who notes that migrants “made and make decisions ‘free’ under the
constraints of economic conditions that leave no room for life-projects or even survival.
Their ‘home’ may be a society that is unfair and unsupportable, that does not permit
sustainable lives” (474; original emphasis).
true that such moments of harmony do, at times, occur in The Mill on the Floss
(as when Tom, at one point, tries to console little Maggie by kissing her and
offering her a piece of cake – 34; bk. 1, ch. 5) – at least before Mr. Tulliver’s
embittered command of revenge thwarts the impulse toward forgiveness that
characterized Tom in his younger years. At the end of Eliot’s novel, Maggie must
choose between this imperfect, but familiar home, and the vague promise of a
‘nomadic’ future with Stephen. It is very well possible that returning home is
the wrong choice for Maggie (Eagleton, The English Novel 178), but this is in
some ways beside the point, for the real tragedy is that she is forced by circum‐
stances to make the choice at all.
One may, then, justifiably criticize The Mill on the Floss for its failure to see
that one can, in fact, feel perfectly at home in a nomadic existence – whether it
is a way of life inherited from one’s forebears (as in the case of the gypsies), or
whether it is freely chosen (as in the case of contemporary upper-class nomads
who enjoy shuttling back and forth between the world’s metropolitan centers).
Yet Eliot’s novel rightly emphasizes that nomadism is not a matter of positive,
free choice for everyone. It is, as we have seen, not that for Maggie, who refuses
the seductively modern choice of a ‘rootless’ existence and opts instead for a
‘pre-modern’ adherence to the familiar home. It is not necessarily so for the
children of today’s transnational elite, some of whom, according to recent
studies, feel that they do not really belong anywhere (e.g. Blunt and Dowling
218 – 219). And nomadic existence is certainly not a free choice for those who
suffer what J. Douglas Porteous and Sandra E. Smith refer to as domicide: “the
deliberate destruction of home by human agency” (12). In nineteenth-century
Britain, it was still possible to imagine that those who abandoned their homes
did so freely, although for the poor this ‘freedom’ in fact often consisted in a
desperate attempt to avoid economic hardship or even famine, as was the case
in Ireland during the 1840s (Daunton 47; Harvie 506).33 The first half of the
twentieth century, however, would come to be dominated by the more directly
enforced mass migrations precipitated by genocidal, total war (Manning 164).
From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, in short, the threat of homelessness
and exile became an increasingly real prospect for Europeans (as it had long
been for the colonized and the enslaved). It is against this backdrop that we
should read both the great Victorian domestic tragedy of The Mill on the Floss
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as well as the masterpieces of Modernist fiction – including Virginia Woolf’s
Mrs. Dalloway.
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1 I would like to thank Simone Heller-Andrist, Laura Marcus, and Christa Schönfelder
for their comments on draft versions of this chapter, as well as Sarah Chevalier and
Anja Neukom-Hermann for their feedback on the final version. For a detailed exami‐
nation of the impact of World War I on modernist fiction, see Stevenson, Literature and
the Great War (114 – 120, in particular).
2 See Bryony Randall (595 – 599) for more general comments on Mrs. Dalloway as a novel
of the everyday.
3 “The Majesty of England”: The Ethics of Home and
the Imperial City in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway
For European modernists after 1914, writing about home meant coming to terms
with the impact of global war.1 Consider, for instance, the novel that many be‐
lieve to be the period’s greatest achievement: James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922),
written abroad and named after a hero who, after a protracted and devastating
war, can no longer seem to find his way home. At the same time, though the
long nineteenth century had arguably come to a close with the armistice on
November 11, 1918 (e.g. Osterhammel 88), to political commentators in the early
1920s the meaning of the historical moment was far less clear than it seems in
hindsight. The United Kingdom, for instance, mourned the deaths of hundreds
of thousands in the bloodiest conflict in human history, but the country had also
emerged victorious from the war, and the British Empire in many respects ap‐
peared more unified and powerful a world system than ever (Jeffrey 13; see also
North 54). Given this strange commixture of triumph and trauma, the profound
sense of ambivalence that pervades English postwar novels like Mrs. Dalloway
(1925) is hardly surprising.
In Woolf’s novel, this sense of ambivalence revolves, specifically, around the
nature of everyday life in London, the Empire’s proud metropolitan center.2
However, the novel’s key question is not, as some critics suggest, whether or
not it is possible to feel at home in the modern metropolis (Ellis 76; see also
Hawthorn 78; Whitworth 153). Rather, Mrs. Dalloway explores whether, given
the state of British society in the 1920s, to feel at home in the capital is morally
justifiable. In the previous chapters, we mainly examined the factors that make
it more difficult to feel at home for some characters than for others; accordingly,
the focus was on the potential obstacles to an individual’s sense of belonging.
We have thus not yet asked whether there may be circumstances under which
one should not truly want to feel at home because the ethical price for belonging
is simply too high. It is this question that we will address in the present chapter.
Part of the discussion will revolve around the way in which Woolf’s novel
constructs both geographical and discursive space. We will begin by examining
how Mrs. Dalloway reflects and renegotiates English debates about the relative
merits of the city and the country as sites of home. In particular, the novel dis‐
sects the familiar idyll of the English country house, laying bare some of its
ideological limitations and pitting it against the pulsating and spectacular space
of the modern city. At the same time, however, the space of the city also appears
as very precisely delimited in Woolf’s novel, at least for those associated with
Clarissa Dalloway and her social circle. In part, the novel uses shifting narrative
perspectives to open up this delimited social space, but even the scope of these
narrative shifts has very precise boundaries, depending on the characters with
whom they are associated. Ultimately, Mrs. Dalloway confronts us with charac‐
ters whose discursive space of belonging is every much as confined and con‐
tested as their geographical room for maneuver in the city.
In order better to understand the conflicts between these characters, we will
therefore have to shift the emphasis from the spatial dimensions of home to
what we might call the temporality of belonging. In effect, the novel contrasts
characters who – for various reasons – gravitate toward a timeless, mythical
view of life with those who are more firmly rooted in historical time. The novel’s
postwar context is vital here, as the repression of history has much to do with
a desire on the part of Clarissa, in particular, to evade questions of responsibility
and social injustice. In consequence, Clarissa and others from her circle not only
misread the novel’s most tragic figures, Septimus and Lucrezia Warren Smith;
they also fail to reflect on the extent to which their own sense of belonging
depends on their social position within a political elite that is at least partly
responsible for the disasters of the Great War. Importantly, Mrs. Dalloway does
not fault these characters for their desire to belong. Rather, the novel emphasizes
that their sense of belonging comes at a price, and it encourages us continually
to judge whether this ethical price is worth paying. In its wanderings through
the imperial city, Mrs. Dalloway thus constitutes nothing short of a narrative
quest for an ethics of home.
The Country and the City
If debates about the modern metropolis as a problematic kind of home shed light
on Woolf’s novel, then this is in part because London has been a central reference
point in such discussions since at least the period of the Enlightenment. Ray‐
mond Williams, for instance, points out that Enlightenment thinkers like Vol‐
1433 “The Majesty of England”: Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway
taire and Adam Smith disagreed fundamentally with regard to both the nature
and the ethical value of the city as a site of home:
Voltaire saw the pursuit of industry and urbane pleasure as the marks of the city and
thence of civilisation itself. The golden age and the Garden of Eden, lacking industry
and pleasure, were not virtuous but ignorant; the city, and especially London, was the
symbol of progress and enlightenment, its social mobility the school of civilisation
and liberty […]. Adam Smith, rather differently, saw the city as securing the industry
of the country: a centre of freedom and order but in its very dependence as a market
and manufacturing centre liable to breed a volatile and insecure people. (144)
At a time when the modern industrial cities were only beginning to emerge,
London was thus already envisaged as both an ideal home and a potentially
dangerous space: the cradle of freedom and civilized order, but also a breeding
ground for “volatile” urban masses.
In the late nineteenth century, similar arguments were waged in the field of
sociology, though by now the metaphoric terms of the debate had shifted from
the Enlightenment contrast between unruliness and order to an opposition –
better suited to industrialized society – between organic and mechanical ways
of life. In his Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (Community and Society, 1887), Fer‐
dinand Tönnies suggested that the supposedly organic rural communities of the
past were increasingly being replaced by a rationalized urban society dominated
by merely mechanical relations of exchange (Delanty 32 – 33). Only sixteen years
later, however, Émile Durkheim provocatively reversed Tönnies’s thesis in De
la division du travail social (The Division of Labor in Society, 1893) – an argument
that Phil Hubbard has summarized succinctly:
For Durkheim […], traditional, rural life offered a form of mechanical solidarity with
social bonds based on common beliefs, custom, ritual, routines, and symbols. Social
cohesion was thus based upon the likeness and similarities among individuals in a
society. Durkheim argued that the emergence of city-state [sic] signalled a shift from
mechanical to organic solidarity, with social bonds becoming based on specialisation
and interdependence. […I]n contrast to feudal and rural social orders, urban society
was one which allowed for the coexistence of social differences, with a complex di‐
vision of labour (where many different people specialise in many different occupa‐
tions) creating greater freedom and choice for individuals. (15 – 16; original emphasis)
Whereas in Tönnies’s view rural society was organic because it was based on
‘natural’ kinship relations, Durkheim, by contrast, regarded such kinship rela‐
tions as automatic or ‘mechanical’ because they lacked any element of freedom
and individual choice (Delanty 38). In short, while Tönnies idealized life in the
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country, Durkheim – much like Voltaire a century before him – viewed rural
existence as narrow-minded and stifling when compared with the exhilarating
freedom of the city.
Such debates over the relative value of rural and urban homes arguably had
a particularly strong resonance in Britain due to the very common cultural as‐
sociation of rural life with ‘true Englishness.’3 As David Gervais has shown, it
was in the course of the nineteenth century, when the new, industrial cities
emerged, that writers increasingly located true Englishness in the rural exis‐
tence of a rapidly disappearing yeoman class (4). An example for this trend is
the influential Garden City movement, which attempted to reintroduce some of
the supposedly redemptive qualities of rural life into the city (Gifford 37; Hub‐
bard 61). Even for city-dwellers, the English domestic ideal thus became asso‐
ciated with images of country mansions and rural cottages:
London’s residential neighborhoods exhibited a paradoxical symbiosis of the rural and
the urban: paradoxical because, despite their identification as rural and even anti‐
urban, those suburban villas were also specifically and indelibly metropolitan, just as
the song “Home, Sweet Home” (1823) invoked a prelapsarian village abode but was
written for a melodrama set and performed in London. (Sharon Marcus 98 – 99)
A literary example of the privileged cultural position of the English countryside
are the novels of Jane Austen, where narrative complications tend to occur in
more urban areas, such as seaside towns or London itself, while the happy res‐
olution takes the heroine to a (stately) home in the countryside (Moretti, Atlas
of the European Novel 17 – 19).
Such ruralist ideals of Englishness continued to gain in importance during
the Edwardian period, and by the 1920s constituted one of the most prominent
features in national self-definitions (Howkins 63). The overwhelming majority
of writers between 1910 and 1940 thus regarded as the most representative part
of the nation a “favoured enclave of the English countryside, usually presented
in pastoral terms as a tranquil idyll” (Baldick 305). In these pastoral visions of
Englishness, the city tended to be construed as stimulating yet chaotic, filled
with dirt, criminals, and other ‘alien’ elements; indeed, “the discourses of urban
investigation that developed in the 1840s argued that especially in London, the
city had overtaken and destroyed the home” (Sharon Marcus 101). The metrop‐
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many English ‘modernists’ seems tame and insular when compared to avant-garde
writing from the United States, Ireland, or the Continent (Esty 33 – 35).
olis, in short, was seen as undermining domestic ideals, while the country prom‐
ised the timeless stability of a truly English home.4
Mrs. Dalloway, however, questions such ruralist prejudices from the outset
by challenging the idea that rural life is stable and idyllic. Woolf’s novel famously
opens with Clarissa Dalloway stepping out of her London home in Bond Street
to go and buy flowers for a party that she intends to give in the evening. The
scene she encounters immediately reminds Clarissa of a more rural past at
Bourton, the stately country home of her youth:
What a lark! What a plunge! For so it had always seemed to her, when, with a little
squeak of the hinges, which she could hear now, she had burst open the French win‐
dows and plunged at Bourton into the open air. How fresh, how calm, stiller than this
of course, the air was in the early morning; like the flap of a wave; the kiss of a wave;
chill and sharp and yet (for a girl of eighteen as she then was) solemn, feeling as she
did, standing there at the open window, that something awful was about to
happen […]. (3)
On the one hand, Clarissa immediately associates the freshness of the morning
air in the city with life in the country, though the air there had been “stiller than
this of course.” However, the rural stillness at Bourton is not an unequivocally
positive feature for Clarissa; it seems like the “kiss of a wave” and yet somehow
solemn, as if “something awful was about to happen.” Moreover, later in the
novel, we learn that Clarissa’s rural past is indeed associated with a very per‐
sonal tragedy, as her only sister was killed in the woods near Bourton by a falling
tree (85). In contrast to common celebrations of rural England, there is thus,
from the beginning, little sense in Mrs. Dalloway that homes in the country are
necessarily more idyllic or carefree than city abodes.
Revisiting the Country House
Importantly, to say that Mrs. Dalloway constitutes a critique of countryside
ideals is not to deny any idyllic dimension to Clarissa’s more rural home at
Bourton, as some pastoral scenes in Woolf’s novel constitute a self-conscious
reworking of the literary topos that Terry Gifford has called “country-house
Arcadias” (66). This is particularly evident in those scenes that focus on Claris‐
sa’s intimate friendship with Sally Seton, whom Clarissa continues to remember
with glowing affection: “Had not that, after all, been love?” (35). The loving
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5 It is, admittedly, possible to place Sylvia’s death in the long-standing tradition of pas‐
toral that highlights the presence of death even in Arcadia (‘Et in Arcadia ego’; see
Gifford 154; Heusser 183). However, naming someone who is killed by a tree ‘Sylvia’
nevertheless constitutes a peculiarly cruel variation on the motif.
relationship between the two women culminates, on the terrace at Bourton one
star-lit night, in a glorious, passionate kiss:
Then came the most exquisite moment of her whole life passing a stone urn with
flowers in it. Sally stopped; picked a flower; kissed her on the lips. The whole world
might have turned upside down! The others disappeared; there she was alone with
Sally. (38)
Such celebrations of same-sex affection have long been characteristic of pastoral
literature; homoerotic desire was, for instance, already a central concern in the
Idylls of Theocritus (Holmes M. Morgan), and by the seventeenth century one
of pastoral’s primary interests was its “participation in fields of sexual deviation”
(Bredbeck 200). It is thus possible to read the love scene between Sally and Cla‐
rissa not primarily as a moment of rural authenticity, but instead as a self-con‐
sciously literary evocation of pastoral conventions.
However, whereas pastoral texts generally allow the same-sex lovers more
than merely a brief moment of bliss, in Mrs. Dalloway Sally and Clarissa are
immediately interrupted by their friend Peter Walsh, who asks whether they
have been star-gazing: “It was shocking; it was horrible! [… Clarissa] felt his
hostility; his jealousy; his determination to break into their companionship” (39).
The pastoral idyll of homoerotic desire is evoked only to be immediately shat‐
tered. It is thus fitting that shepherds – those staple ingredients of classical
pastoral (Gifford 15) – are only hinted at in the vaguest of terms in Mrs. Dal‐
loway, when we learn that Clarissa, in her youth at Bourton, owned a “great
shaggy dog which ran after sheep” (65). Similarly, though the name of Clarissa’s
sister, Sylvia (Latin for ‘forest’ or ‘woods’), carries strong pastoral associations
(Abel 111), her death – being killed by a falling tree – gives this generic link a
decidedly non-idyllic, black-humored twist.5 The homely rural idyll of Clarissa’s
youth at Bourton is, in short, suffused with conflict, self-consciously artificial,
and fragile at best.
If the general literary tradition of country-house Arcadias is reworked in
Mrs. Dalloway to challenge common preconceptions about rural innocence and
stability, the novel also more specifically refers to a novel by Jane Austen to
broaden the scope of the domestic novel beyond the confines of the heterosexual
courtship plot. As Raymond Williams notes, Jane Austen’s novels are centrally
concerned with estates, incomes, and social position as indispensable elements
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native to heterosexual marriage in Mrs. Dalloway, it is central in The Hours (1998), Mi‐
chael Cunningham’s appropriation of Woolf’s novel.
of all the relationships that are formed (113). In order, Williams continues, to
solve the ensuing conflict between economic interest and moral value, Jane
Austen “guides her heroines, steadily, to the right marriages” (115); the trans‐
mission of wealth is secured through a match between those characters whom
the narrative has revealed as being most worthy of it. At the beginning of the
heroine’s journey, her family home tends to be under threat; at the end, she is
rewarded with an equally deserving husband and a new, far more exquisite home
somewhere in rural England (Moretti, Atlas of the European Novel 18).
Elizabeth Abel astutely observes that this fictional universe is evoked in
Mrs. Dalloway when Clarissa at first mishears her future husband’s family name
as “Wickham,” thus linking him to arguably the most disreputable character in
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice (1813). According to Abel, this explicit intertextual
reference draws attention to how Woolf’s novel modifies the standard courtship
plot of Austen’s fiction:
Woolf condenses the […] moment that constitutes Austen’s novel and locates it in a
remembered scene thirty years prior to the present of her narrative […]. Marriage in
Mrs. Dalloway provides impetus rather than closure to the courtship plot, dissolved
into a retrospective oscillation between two alluring possibilities as Clarissa continues
to replay the choice she made thirty years before. (107)
The home of Clarissa’s youth, Abel reminds us, was also the scene of her mar‐
riage choice, with Peter Walsh and Richard Dalloway as the two competing male
suitors.6 However, while Austen’s novels conclude with the heroine reaching
the goal of the ‘right’ marriage, the suggestion in Mrs. Dalloway that Richard is
similar to Austen’s deceitful George Wickham intimates that Clarissa may in
fact have made the wrong choice. This suspicion is, if not explicitly confirmed,
then at least kept alive by the fact that much of Woolf’s novel focuses on Cla‐
rissa’s lingering doubts, with the heroine sometimes thanking heaven that she
refused to marry Peter, yet at other times wishing she had agreed to his proposal
rather than to Richard’s (50 – 51; see Bowlby 147). Whereas in Jane Austen’s
novels marriage at least superficially signifies happiness, maturity, and narra‐
tive closure, in Mrs. Dalloway the country-house world of romantic fulfillment
becomes, instead, the past as prelude to the heroine’s conflicts in later life, as
well as a subtly playful intertextual reference point.
At the same time, we need to bear in mind that, by the 1920s, life in the actually
existing English country houses had itself become a mode of playful perform‐
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the agricultural and industrial revolutions of the eighteenth century, if not earlier
(McKeon, The Secret History of Domesticity 689; Raymond Williams 98).
ance for the nations’ upper class. Since at least the late nineteenth century, the
average stately home in the country had few (if any) remaining ties with rural
life in the sense of agricultural work; such country houses were, rather, the
setting for “ritual enactments” of country life, maintained “on the profits of
industrial and imperial development” (Raymond Williams 282). In Mrs. Dal‐
loway, we only have to listen to the rural daydreams of Clarissa’s daughter,
Elizabeth, to hear echoes of such upper-class performances as disconnected from
the social reality of English farmers:
She might be a farmer. […] She might own a thousand acres and have people under
her. She would go and see them in their cottages. […] One might be a very good
farmer – and that, strangely enough, […] was almost entirely due to Somerset House.
It looked so splendid, so serious, that great grey building. And she liked the feeling of
people working. (149)
Hierarchy and privilege are central to this fantasy of rural England (“She
might […] have people under her”), and even Elizabeth acknowledges that Som‐
erset House – situated in the heart of the city and, at the time, home to the
government’s principal tax and public record offices (Showalter 224n58) – is the
main reason why someone like her might one day be able to style herself as a
good ‘farmer,’ for it is the supposedly urban political and financial system that
enables a small group of country-house owners to enjoy “the feeling of people
working” (emphasis added). Importantly, to highlight the links between the
country and the city is not to contradict Elizabeth Abel’s observation that Clar‐
issa herself sees Bourton as a pastoral world that is spatially and temporally
disjunct from London, the sociopolitical world of her husband Richard (108). It
does mean, however, that Woolf’s novel as a whole portrays ‘rural’
country-house Arcadias as only superficially isolated from the city, whereas in
fact they are part of the same overarching social system.7 Accordingly, we must
now leave the countryside and devote our attention to the urban spaces of
Mrs. Dalloway.
Street Haunting: Flânerie, Gender, and Class
Just as Mrs. Dalloway’s engagement with ‘country-house England’ constitutes a
meticulous reworking of ruralist and pastoral traditions, its depiction of life in
the city draws on an already existing image: the urban wanderer or flâneur. As
Raymond Williams points out, the experience and perception of the modern city
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has been “associated, from the beginning, with a man walking, as if alone, in its
streets” (233). Long before Williams, Walter Benjamin had devoted sustained
theoretical attention to this key figure of modernity, and Sharon Marcus notes
how in Benjamin’s writings the city street sometimes appears curiously cozy –
almost more homelike than city homes themselves (13 – 14). Indeed, what is ul‐
timately at stake in Benjamin’s as well as later discussions of flânerie is whether
the urban wanderer’s experience of the modern city can be described as a new
way of belonging – a genuinely modern sense of home – or whether such urban
experiences need to be understood in terms of increasing anomie and aliena‐
tion.
The figure of the flâneur – around whom these problems coalesced – was, for
most critics writing after Benjamin, predominantly male: the relatively privi‐
leged man of means who appears in the poems of Charles Baudelaire, or in such
stories as Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Man of the Crowd” (Parsons 4).8 We also find
such a privileged male flâneur in Mrs. Dalloway, in Clarissa’s old friend Peter
Walsh, whose life Woolf’s heroine considers to have been a failure (8), but who
nevertheless clearly belongs to imperial Britain’s wealthy elite. In one of the
many scenes from Woolf’s novel in which Peter is wandering through the streets
of London, he encounters an attractive young woman and decides secretly to
follow her:
[S]he’s not married; she’s young; quite young, thought Peter, the red carnation he had
seen her wear as she came across Trafalgar Square burning again in his eyes and
making her lips red. […] There was a dignity about her. She was not worldly, like
Clarissa; not rich, like Clarissa. Was she, he wondered as she moved, respect‐
able? [… H]e was an adventurer, reckless, he thought, swift, daring […] He was a
buccaneer. (58)
Peter, the bourgeois man of means, turns the young woman who is “not rich,
like Clarissa,” into a spectacle for his own consumption: an erotic fantasy that
he admits is “half made up” (59). And in this, too, he resembles the flâneurs in
Baudelaire, where according to Deborah L. Parsons women are objectified by
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fugitive and infinite. To be away from home and yet to feel oneself everywhere at home;
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family, just like the lover of the fair sex who builds up his family from all the beautiful
women that he has ever found, and that are – or are not – to be found” (9). For a concise
summary of Baudelaire’s and Benjamin’s ideas about the flâneur see Tally (Spatiality
95 – 99).
the leisured male spectator while they themselves rarely appear in a position
that would allow them to become the observers of others (25).9
At the same time, as Parsons rightly points out, there is an element of con‐
scious parody about the way in which Peter observes the city, in “an attitude of
rebellion yet ultimate conventionality” (73); Peter styles himself a “buccaneer,”
but he is in fact a much more common and decidedly less daring figure: a
middle-aged man silently fantasizing about a much younger woman in an at‐
tempt to escape “(only of course for an hour or so) from being precisely what
he was” (57). Indeed, we can see how far Peter is from being a true rebel in the
scene that immediately precedes this fantasied ‘adventure.’ After a visit in Bond
Street, Peter feels dissatisfied with Clarissa’s conventionality (53), and he begins
to reflect on his own position within the Dalloway’s social circle:
He was not old, or set, or dried in the least. As for caring what they said of him – the
Dalloways, the Whitbreads, and their set, he cared not a straw – not a straw (though
it was true he would have, some time or other, to see whether Richard couldn’t help
him to some job). (55)
Peter once again styles himself as a non-conformist, yet at the same time he
hopes to profit from his association with the Dalloways. Even so, Peter would
like to believe that his own private enthusiasms will, one day, stand revealed as
prefiguring nothing less than the future of society as a whole:
He had been sent down from Oxford – true. He had been a Socialist, in some sense a
failure – true. Still the future of civilisation lies, he thought, in the hands of young
men like that; of young men such as he was, thirty years ago; with their love of abstract
principles; getting books sent out to them all the way from London to a peak in the
Himalayas; reading science; reading philosophy. The future lies in the hands of young
men like that, he thought. (55)
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spheres (without, however, denying the concept’s heuristic value): “Feminist scholar‐
ship showed how a host of nineteenth-century discourses and practices defined the
home as a private, cloistered space, advocated women’s restriction to that space, and
correspondingly excluded women from the easy commerce with the city’s public spaces
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those divisions too securely and fixed their extent too widely” (6 – 7).
Tellingly, however, immediately after this imperial vision of a future created by
intellectual ‘renegades’ like him, Peter witnesses a troop of boys parading “in
uniform, carrying guns, […] on their faces an expression like the letters of a
legend written round the base of a statue praising duty, gratitude, fidelity, love
of England” (55). This juxtaposition suggests, for one thing, that the real future
may lie, not with bookish young men in love with abstract principles, but with
uniformed boys carrying guns, “drugged into a stiff yet staring corpse by disci‐
pline” (56).10 Moreover, it is important to note that this band of boys are on their
way to the Cenotaph, a monument commemorating the dead of the Great War
and, as such, one of the most “arresting emblems of the modern culture of na‐
tionalism” (Anderson 9). Typically Peter, though not entirely uncritical, ulti‐
mately remains convinced that, even if one laughed at such a display, “one had
to respect it” (56). We are, significantly, not given a reason why, precisely, “one”
ought to respect a militarization of everyday life; Peter merely asserts the fact
as self-evidently the appropriate thing for an Englishman to do – which shows
just how far Peter is from being a truly reckless “adventurer” or “buccaneer.” As
an urban wanderer in London, Peter corresponds to the literary figure of the
flâneur, but as was the case with pastoral idylls and the romance of Austen’s
stately homes, Mrs. Dalloway evokes this figure in part to lay bare its conven‐
tional ideological bias.
This is not to suggest that wandering through the city is seen as an inherently
reprehensible pursuit in Woolf’s novel. On the contrary, Mrs. Dalloway to some
extent celebrates the liberating potential that ‘street haunting’ can offer for
women, in particular. Clarissa, for example, loves to wander through the streets
of London, insisting that it is “better than walking in the country” (6). As Laura
Marcus points out, through their entry into the public spaces of the city upper-
and middle-class women in early twentieth-century literature frequently found
“liberation from enclosure in the private, domestic sphere” of the home (61; see
also Parsons 27).11 Virginia Woolf’s own essay on “Street Haunting” (1927) con‐
stitutes a particularly important document from this corpus of female literature
about the city, for it explicitly suggests that one may feel a sense of liberation
when leaving one’s home – a home in which one sits “surrounded by objects
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which perpetually express the oddity of our own temperaments and enforce the
memories of our own experience” (177):
[W]hen the door shuts on us, all that vanishes. The shell-like covering which our souls
have excreted to house themselves, to make for themselves a shape distinct from
others, is broken, and there is left of all these wrinkles and roughnesses a central oyster
of perceptiveness, an enormous eye. (178)
Leaving the home is thus similar to breaking out of a constricting shell, and as
we wander through the city, “everything seems miraculously sprinkled with
beauty” (181); we can finally “leave the straight lines of personality” and explore
more fully both our own potential and, imaginatively, the lives of others (187).
Clarissa, in Mrs. Dalloway, clearly feels some of the euphoric delight described
in Woolf’s essay: after her “plunge” into the London streets, she encounters
“what she loved: life; London; this moment of June” (4). For women like Clarissa,
then, the streets of London may appear, not as the urban nightmare so frequently
envisioned by mournful pastoralists, but as a counter-homely source of vitality
and regeneration (Whitworth 153).
Nevertheless, if we compare Mrs. Dalloway and Woolf’s essay on “Street
Haunting” more closely, we find that there are limits to these texts’ celebration
of female flânerie. On the one hand, the two texts have much in common, for
both open with a figure leaving the home and subsequently becoming enthralled
by the sights and sounds of the city. On the other hand, according to Woolf’s
essay the ideal times for such wanderings are evenings in winter (177), while in
Mrs. Dalloway Clarissa leaves her home around ten in the morning, on a day in
mid-June (3 – 4). Consequently, if we take the essay’s celebration of street
haunting on winter evenings at face value, then this might imply a subtle critique
of Clarissa Dalloway’s wanderings, which take place at a different time of the
day and year.12 In addition, though it is true that Woolf’s essay celebrates the
liberating sense of dissolution that comes when one imaginatively merges with
the darkening crowd, it also posits that there are both temporal and social limits
to such delights:
[T]o escape is the greatest of pleasures; street haunting in winter the greatest of ad‐
ventures. Still as we approach our own doorstep again, it is comforting to feel the old
possessions, the old prejudices, fold us round, and shelter and enclose the self, which
has been blown about at so many street corners, which has battered like a moth at the
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didn’t want to help them – he did – but because of his belief that giving did them no
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material homelessness.
flame of so many inaccessible lanterns, sheltered and enclosed. Here again is the usual
door; here the chair turned as we left it and the china bowl and the brown ring on the
carpet. (187)
Escaping to the city, this passage suggests, is a pleasure for those who know
they can return, after a relatively brief period of time, to the “old possessions”
and the comfort of their homes. The idea of flux and instability is thus, as we
have already seen in the discussion of The Mill on the Floss, much more attractive
for those with stable homes than for those who live, precariously, on the edge
of a socio-economic abyss.13 It is not purely coincidental, then, that in both
Mrs. Dalloway and “Street Haunting” the forays into the city streets are, at least
ostensibly, motivated by the protagonists’ intention of buying non-essential
commodities: a pencil in the essay (177), and flowers in the novel. In short,
whether male or female, flânerie remains an unequivocally class-based aes‐
thetics: a leisured way of consuming the sights and sounds of the city, and thus
a kind of pleasure that is not equally available to all.
The importance of class to Mrs. Dalloway’s depictions of female flânerie is
confirmed in a scene in which Elizabeth, Clarissa’s daughter, boards an omnibus
to travel through London’s legal and commercial district, for here we discover
just how small the world of the novel’s flâneurs really is. We learn, early on in
Woolf’s novel, that for Clarissa the omnibus is a typically middle-class mode of
transport (18), which in turn may explain why the narrator places so much
emphasis on the unusual nature of Elizabeth’s excursion: “Suddenly Elizabeth
stepped forward and most competently boarded the omnibus, in front of every‐
body” (148). There is a palpable note of ridicule here, in the text’s emphasis on
Elizabeth’s competence and daring, and it seems fitting that Elizabeth indulges
in her classist daydreams about visiting farmers in their cottages precisely at
this moment, for her trip on the omnibus is daring or “reckless” (148) only ac‐
cording to very narrow standards of upper-class respectability. Moreover, like
Peter, Elizabeth does not indulge in her little act of rebellion for very long: “She
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must go home. She must dress for dinner” (150; see Bowlby 146). On her way
back to Bond Street, Elizabeth in fact herself defines the perspective from which
her excursion seems adventurous: “[N]o Dalloways came down the Strand daily,”
and her mother surely “would not like her to be wandering off alone like this”
(151 – 152). The Strand, incidentally, leads away from Westminster, the center of
government, to the civil and commercial center of the city, and even in the early
nineteenth century, Beau Brummell, a well-known arbiter of fashion, reportedly
expressed great mortification at being discovered as far east as that (Roy Porter
99). The area is clearly beyond (as well as below) the socio-geographical circle
within which the Dalloways and their likes are wont to move. To style Eliza‐
beth’s trip as a great, non-conformist act of resistance would thus mean to judge
it from a very limited upper-class perspective – and, conversely, to expand the
term resistance to a point where it no longer retains any real political meaning
(Loomba 203).
We can say more generally, then, that Mrs. Dalloway maps the social limita‐
tions of its characters’ homes onto the urban geography of London. David
Dowling has meticulously traced the itineraries of five central characters in
Woolf’s novel – Clarissa, Richard, and Elizabeth, as well as Peter Walsh and
Septimus Warren Smith – and his maps show that virtually all the action of the
novel’s present takes place in Westminster. Dowling’s itineraries, in fact, cover
more or less the same part of London as Franco Moretti’s maps of the so-called
silver-fork novels, a largely forgotten genre that thrived between 1810 and 1840
and which, according to Moretti, depicted not a city but a particular class: the
fashionable part of English society that would never stray as far as London’s
East End (Atlas of the European Novel 79). Moreover, we find that none of the
Dalloways even venture as far as Oxford Street, which according to one of
Woolf’s own essays “is not London’s most distinguished thoroughfare,” and was
rather looked-down upon by the more fashionable people who shop in “secret
crannies off Hanover Square, round about Bond Street” (“Oxford Street Tide”
199). And Bond Street is, of course, precisely where the Dalloways live: far from
the working-class squalor of the East End tenements, and sheltered from the
‘vulgar’ middle-class display of Oxford Street, in one of the most affluent areas
in the city of London. The physical location of the Dalloways’ house, together
with their everyday urban itineraries, thus allows us to define with great pre‐
cision their ‘home space’ within the city of London – a space that may seem
fluid and mobile, but which in fact is rigidly circumscribed by the boundaries of
social class.
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14 While Woolf’s novel is not divided into separate chapters, in the edition used here a
total of eleven sections are indicated by spaces between paragraphs: section 1 (3 – 14),
section 2 (14 – 31), section 3 (31 – 52), section 4 (52 – 62), section 5 (62 – 64), section 6
(64 – 70), section 7 (71 – 103), section 8 (103 – 165), section 9 (165 – 180), section 10
(181 – 204), and section 11 (204 – 213). The characters who are, at least briefly, focalized
from within are: Clarissa Dalloway (3), Scrope Purvis (4), Miss Pym (13), Septimus
Warren Smith (15), Lucrezia Warren Smith (16), Sir John Buckhurst (18), several men
standing in the bow window of White’s, a gentlemen’s club (19), Moll Pratt (20), an
anonymous policeman (20), Emily Coates (21), Mr. Bowley (21), Maisie Johnson (28),
Carrie Dempster (29), Mr. Bentley (30), a seedy-looking man (30), Lucy, a servant in the
Dalloway household (41), Peter Walsh (44), Lady Bradshaw (103), Sir William Bradshaw
(104), Hugh Whitbread (104), Lady Bruton (114), Milly Brush (115), Richard Dalloway
(115), Elizabeth Dalloway (134), Doris Kilman (135), Mr. Fletcher (146), Mrs. Gorham
(146), Mrs. Filmer (165), Charles Morris and his family (175), Mrs. Walker (181), Ellie
Henderson (184), Jim Hutton (193), Aunt Helena (196), Sally Seton (198), and Willie
Titcomb (206). The page numbers indicate where focalization from within occurs for
the first time for that particular character. While for the most part the characters listed
above are clearly focalized from within, the cases of Sir John Buckhurst and the anon‐
ymous policeman are at least debatable. For more on the notion of ‘focalization from
within’ see Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (Narrative Fiction 75 – 76).
Modernist Spectacles and Pathologies of Narration
If Mrs. Dalloway nevertheless overcomes some of the social limitations of its
urban geography, then this is because it incorporates a wide variety of distinct
points of views and class perspectives. As Pam Morris points out, in Woolf’s
novel “figures from the lowest strata of social life appear fleetingly but recur‐
rently at the margins of the narrative, representing an encroaching material
otherness at the perimeter of the enclosed nation of the well-to-do” (“Woolf and
Realism” 45). Indeed, in Mrs. Dalloway’s eleven sections, the narrator grants us
temporary access to the thoughts, emotions, and perceptions of almost forty
characters.14 Some of these characters are closely associated with Clarissa: her
husband Richard and her daughter Elizabeth, for instance, or old friends of the
family like Peter Walsh. Other focalizers, however – such as the shell-shocked
war veteran Septimus Warren Smith and his wife Lucrezia – have no direct
connection with Clarissa, and some are clearly lower-class (e.g. the Irishwoman
Moll Pratt, who sells flowers in the street). To understand the social scope of
Woolf’s novel we must therefore decide how best to interpret this wide range
of perspectives: the relations between the various focalizers, as well as the way
in which they are distributed throughout the text.
The first thing we need to note is that, much as is the case with Moby-Dick
(see chapter one), Woolf’s novel initially misleads the reader to expect a story
organized around a dominant central character; it looks, in Rick Altman’s terms,
very much like a single-focus narrative (189). Even before we open the book,
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the novel’s title, Mrs. Dalloway, cues us to see Clarissa as the central figure, and
this expectation seems confirmed by the text’s famous opening sentence: “Mrs.
Dalloway said she would buy the flowers herself” (3). The novel opens with the
eponymous character, whom we then follow on her mundane, but clearly de‐
fined narrative quest to buy flowers. The point of view in the opening para‐
graphs is organized firmly around Clarissa, and she remains the dominant fo‐
calizer throughout the novel’s first section. It may therefore be due to the –
relatively – traditional nature of the novel’s opening section that Avrom
Fleishman sees Mrs. Dalloway as “the fictional autobiography of a single char‐
acter,” with the other figures merely juxtaposed to and surrounding Clarissa (80;
see also Baldick 202; Rachman 5).15
Indeed, there is a good case to be made that the opening section of
Mrs. Dalloway constitutes a modification of, but not yet a radical departure from
the standard techniques of Victorian narration. Admittedly, the narrative per‐
spective in the text’s first section is more markedly subjective than what we are
used to from Victorian novels (Pam Morris, Realism 14):
[H]aving lived in Westminster – how many years now? over twenty, – one feels even
in the midst of the traffic, or waking at night, Clarissa was positive, a particular hush,
or solemnity; an indescribable pause; a suspense (but that might be her heart, affected,
they said, by influenza) before Big Ben strikes. There! Out it boomed. First a warning,
musical; then the hour, irrevocable. The leaden circles dissolved in the air. Such fools
we are, she thought, crossing Victoria Street. For Heaven only knows why one loves
it so, how one sees it so, making it up, building it round one, tumbling it, creating it
every moment afresh […]. (4)
In this passage, the ‘omniscient’ narrator is still the one who speaks, but the
narrator’s voice threatens to disappear behind the densely poetic texture of
Clarissa Dalloway’s focalizing consciousness. Nevertheless, the first section of
Woolf’s novel retains a relatively stable narrative perspective, with flashbacks
that grant us insight into Clarissa’s past (e.g. 3 and 7 – 8); with other characters’
perspectives occasionally complementing her point of view (Scrope Purvis and
Miss Pym; 4 and 13); and with the heroine eventually reaching “Mulberry’s the
florists,” the goal of her quest (13). Though later parts of the novel are more
experimental, we should thus not forget that the first section of Mrs. Dalloway
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17 On the frequent link between modernist techniques of narration and crisis, madness,
illness, and suicide see Franco Moretti, Modern Epic 169 – 176. (On page 171, Moretti
explicitly cites Septimus as an example.)
constitutes a modification (or perhaps better: intensification) of, but not yet a
break with, the conventions of realist fiction.16
Intriguingly, to the extent that the first section does modify these conven‐
tions, this is linked subliminally to an illness from which Clarissa has only re‐
cently recovered. In an essay entitled “On Being Ill” (1926), Woolf contends that
illness can have a remarkable effect on a patient’s attitude towards the world:
Directly the bed is called for, or, sunk deep among the pillows in one chair, we raise
our feet even an inch above the ground on another, we cease to be soldiers in the army
of the upright; we become deserters. They march to battle. We float with the sticks
on the stream; helter-skelter with the dead leaves on the lawn, irresponsible and dis‐
interested and able, perhaps for the first time in years, to look round, to look up – to
look, for example, at the sky. (104)
In mock-militaristic language (“soldiers in the army of the upright,” “deserters,”
“march to battle”), Woolf describes how, in illness, we are no longer required to
put on a brave face, and instead may allow ourselves simply to “float” on the
stream of existence – which is not a bad description of the mood in Mrs. Dal‐
loway’s first section. There, we learn that Clarissa’s heart is likely to have been
affected by a recent bout of influenza (4), and in the two moments in the first
section when Clarissa is not the focalizing agent, the temporary bearers of nar‐
rative perspective note that Woolf’s heroine looks old and somewhat frail (4 and
13 – 14). There is thus a sense that the stream-like narrative flow in the novel’s
first section, as well as the slight disruptions in point of view, are semi-patho‐
logical deviations from the narrative norm; they appear as the lingering symp‐
toms of a feverish state of mind that, as Woolf insists in her essay, has the power
to make us see familiar phenomena in a startlingly different light (105). Illness,
in short, while in itself undesirable, also leads to defamiliarization, and may thus
reveal aspects of the home that seemed intimately known as suddenly strange
and little understood.17
At the same time, the modifications of narrative technique described so far
are mild compared to the sudden fragmentation of perspective that characterizes
the novel’s second section, which is fittingly introduced in the text by the “vi‐
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olent explosion” of a car that backfires at the end of Mrs. Dalloway’s opening
section, startling both Clarissa and Miss Pym the florist (14). Whereas in the
first section Clarissa is clearly the dominant focalizer and organizing center, the
second section confronts us with over ten focalizing agents, and Clarissa’s point
of view now constitutes only one among many. As in Moby-Dicky, after having
essentially been led to expect a single-focus narrative, we are now thrust into
that “state of homelessness” that Rick Altman sees as typical of multiple-focus
narration (285), and the relative stability of the novel’s opening section is in‐
creasingly lost in multiple points of view and a seemingly aimless, meandering
storyline.
Indeed, in contrast to section one, which remains at least partially plot-driven
(i.e. it tells the story of Clarissa Dalloway leaving her home in order to buy
flowers for her party), the second section is organized by a logic of symbolic
co-occurrence. The “violent explosion” that startles Clarissa also causes wide‐
spread commotion outside the flower shop, among the crowd in Oxford Street,
because “a face of the very greatest importance” is briefly seen through one of
the windows of the car that backfired: “Was it the Prince of Wales’s, the Queen’s,
the Prime Minister’s? Whose face was it? Nobody knew” (15). This entire scene
adds little in terms of plot development; it is, at best, a convenient ploy to in‐
troduce Septimus Warren Smith, one of the novel’s central characters, who just
happens to be present (Lee R. Edwards 103). At the same time, however, the
scene is charged with symbolic meaning – a meaning that a passage from Ray‐
mond Williams’s The Country and the City can help us unravel:
It is impossible to read the early descriptions of crowded metropolitan streets – the
people as isolated atoms, flowing this way and that; a common stream of separated
identities and directions – without seeing, past them, this mode of relationship em‐
bodied in the modern car: private, enclosed, an individual vehicle in a pressing and
merely aggregated common flow […]. (296)
The car around which, in Mrs. Dalloway, the “common stream of separated
identities” is organized is also the symbolic embodiment of a typically urban
kind of relationship: co-presence rather than community – a society organized
around common spectacles rather than collaborative action.
Four decades after the publication of Mrs. Dalloway, Guy Debord suggested,
in thesis six of The Society of the Spectacle (La société du spectacle, 1967), that the
spectacles permeating our daily lives are not to be understood as mere orna‐
ments added to the normal course of events; rather, in “all of its particular man‐
ifestations – news, propaganda, advertising, entertainment – the spectacle rep‐
resents the dominant model of life” (8). For Debord, then, the spectacles of
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modernity are never innocent, but rather point to the power structures at work
in society. More particularly, the fact that Debord mentions propaganda and
advertising in his analysis is surely significant for an interpretation of
Mrs. Dalloway; after all, while the car in the second section of Woolf’s novel
carries a half-recognized passenger who prompts the onlookers to think of “the
majesty of England” (i.e. it serves as a means of imperial propaganda; 17), the
airplane that suddenly attracts the crowd’s attention towards the end of the
same section turns out to be part of an elaborate advertising stunt (30 – 31). Both
the car and the airplane in Woolf’s novel thus provide the crowd with spectacles
that are not mere ornament, but that instead represent the period’s dominant
political and economic interests: the monarchy as a symbol of government, and
the promotion of consumerism in advanced capitalist societies. We can say,
therefore, that the slightly feverish, but nevertheless stable narrative perspective
that we find in the first section of Mrs. Dalloway is shattered, in the second, by
the twin spectacles of advertising and propaganda, both of which appear in
quintessentially modern symbolic shapes: a motor car and an airplane (22).
Urban space thus not only appears as socially stratified in Woolf’s novel, but
also as commodified and pervaded by governmental strategies of power.
National Virtues and the Memory of War
If the “violent explosion” that marks the transition between sections one and
two of Mrs. Dalloway is associated on one level with the urban spectacles of
imperial and capitalist modernity, we must also consider a further layer of
meaning that arises from the text’s historical position as a postwar novel. More
specifically, we can interpret the differences in narrative perspective between
the novel’s first two sections as a stylistic expression of the unequal impact of
the Great War on two of the novel’s main characters: Clarissa Dalloway and
Septimus Warren Smith. In the first section of the novel, whenever Clarissa looks
back on the war, she emphasizes the fact that the conflict is past:
The War was over, except for some one like Mrs. Foxcroft at the Embassy last night
eating her heart out because that nice boy was killed and now the old Manor House
must go to a cousin; or Lady Bexborough who opened a bazaar, they said, with the
telegram in her hand, John, her favourite, killed; but it was over; thank Heaven – over.
(4 – 5)
Two aspects about this passage are important. First, there is something rather
disturbing about the first half of the sentence, which sounds as if the real tragedy
consisted, not in the actual fact of a young man’s death, but in how his death
affects the Foxcroft family estate; the Foxcrofts no longer have a direct heir, and
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in consequence their home will have to “go to a cousin.” Second, though Clarissa
acknowledges, dutifully, that the war is not really over for everyone, she is
clearly not keen on giving the matter much thought: “it was over; thank
Heaven – over.” Revealingly, she later thinks of Lady Bexborough with her “per‐
fectly upright and stoical bearing” as the “woman she admired most” (10). In
fact, Clarissa wishes to be “like Lady Bexborough, slow and stately; rather large;
interested in politics like a man; with a country house” (11). We may note in
passing that once again, in this passage, country-house England serves as the
idealized home of the English upper classes. More importantly, it seems that, for
Clarissa, the most admirable thing one can do is to maintain, at all times, a stiff
upper lip, and to try and carry on much as one did before the War – which is,
as we have seen, precisely what happens in the novel’s first section, in terms of
both narrative structure and point of view: a modification of, but not yet a true
break with Victorian realism.
However, whereas the first section shows us Clarissa managing to maintain
her composure despite the impact of the War and her recent illness, the sudden
bout of fragmentation in Mrs. Dalloway’s second section reveals the seriousness
of Septimus Warren Smith’s post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Anne
Whitehead has shown that a “fragmented narrative voice” is a typical feature of
trauma fiction in general (84), and we know from Woolf’s novel that Septimus
suffers from the “deferred effects of shell shock” (201), the term used by con‐
temporaries for PTSD.18 The suspicion that the second section’s fragmented
perspective can be related to Septimus’s condition is confirmed by the fact that
he and his wife Lucrezia are, taken together, by far the section’s most dominant
focalizing agents. In the edition of the novel used for this chapter, the perspective
is organized around either Septimus’s or Lucrezia’s point of view on seven of
section two’s seventeen pages (i.e. roughly 40 %). Clarissa, by comparison, who
of all the other characters occupies most space in this section, is the focalizer on
slightly less than two pages (i.e. not quite 12 %). Moreover, while the section’s
other characters – including Clarissa – act as focalizers only once, the narrative
perspective returns to Septimus and Lucrezia after a substantial interruption
(15 – 18 and 23 – 28). Both in terms of perspective structure and the fragmented
narrative logic of trauma, in other words, there is good reason for us to regard
the Warren Smiths as the key figures in the novel’s second section.
And yet, this is not to say that the other focalizers in section two are unim‐
portant. Rather, we can read their presence as indicative of a broader social
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vision associated with the Warren Smiths, as opposed to the narrowly enclosed,
upper-class Dalloways. We have seen that the Dalloways’ world is very precisely
delimited, and it is fitting that, in the novel’s opening section, the only focalizers
apart from Clarissa are a neighbor “who lives next door” (4), and an employee
in an expensive flower shop (14). This contrasts sharply with section two, which
is associated primarily with Septimus and Lucrezia, and which includes focal‐
izers as diverse as, on the one hand, Sir John Buckhurst and the wealthy group
of men standing in the bow window of White’s, a gentlemen’s club (18 and 19),
and, on the other, Moll Pratt, an Irishwoman who sells flowers in the street (20);
Maisie Johnson, recently arrived from Edinburgh “to take up a post at her un‐
cle’s” (28); and Carrie Dempster, an elderly woman whose husband drinks too
much (29). If Mrs. Dalloway can at all be said to represent the whole complexity
of London society, then this is to a large part due to the novel’s second section,
for in no other section is the cast of focalizers equally diverse in terms of social
class. In fact, the only other section with a comparably inclusive perspective is
section eight – a section that is, once again, framed by the Warren Smiths: it
opens in their home near the Strand, and it ends with Septimus committing
suicide by throwing himself out of the window of their living room (103 and
164 – 165).
If there is an upper-class bias in Mrs. Dalloway, then it is for the most part
linked to specific characters and should therefore not be regarded as a structural
limitation of the novel or its author. At the same time, we cannot simply dismiss
out of hand Jeremy Hawthorn’s point that Woolf’s novel renders the idiom of
its upper-class characters much more successfully than the speech of their
lower-class counterparts. For instance, Hawthorn quite rightly insists that a
character like Mrs. Dempster, who speaks Cockney, would not normally use a
phrase like “it seemed to her better to be […] a little moderate in one’s expect‐
ations” (29); the use of “one,” in particular, strikes a false note in a passage that
is otherwise at pains to mimic Mrs. Dempster’s working-class idiom (e.g. “She
had had a hard time of it”; see Hawthorn 103). Like all of Woolf’s novels, then,
Mrs. Dalloway is notably more at home in the genteel idiom of the English upper
classes than in any ‘lowlier’ style of speech (Eagleton, The English Novel 308
and 320).
Even if one concedes, however, that there is a certain linguistic class-bias in
Mrs. Dalloway, Hawthorn’s concomitant suggestion that the novel as a whole
tends to depict members of the lower classes as lacking in individuality, associ‐
ating them with animality instead, is hardly convincing. Hawthorn’s argument
hinges on the idea that, in Mrs. Dalloway, any statement that appears within
parentheses constitutes “some implied narrator-interruption of a character’s
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stream of thoughts” (101). This explains why Hawhthorn interprets a phrase
like “The mothers of Pimlico gave suck to their young,” which appears within
parentheses in Mrs. Dalloway (7), as a narratorial interjection that denies the
humanity of lower-class mothers by using the expression to give suck, which is
usually reserved for animals. However, while Hawthorn is right in claiming that
there is a disparaging quality to the statement, we may take issue with his more
general claim that all statements in parentheses should be read as narratorial
commentary in Woolf’s novel. In the following passage, for instance, in which
Clarissa examines the expensive items displayed in a shop window, the state‐
ment made in parentheses most likely constitutes an afterthought on Clarissa’s
part: “[T]he shopkeepers were fidgeting in their windows with their paste and
diamonds, their lovely old sea-green brooches in eighteenth-century settings to
tempt Americans (but one must economise, not buy things rashly for Eliza‐
beth) […]” (5). If, however, this as well as other statements in parentheses cannot
automatically be ascribed to the narrator, then Hawthorn’s argument con‐
cerning the text’s general association of the lower classes with animality no
longer holds true. The passage that refers to mothers ‘giving suck’ to their
young, for instance, is not a narratorial interjection but instead associated with
marginal presences impinging on Clarissa’s consciousness:
[A]s for saying, as Peter did, that he [i.e. Hugh Whitbread] had no heart, no brain,
nothing but the manners and breeding of an English gentleman, that was only her
dear Peter at his worst; and he could be intolerable; […] but adorable to walk with on
a morning like this.
(June had drawn out every leaf on the trees. The mothers of Pimlico gave suck to
their young. Messages were passing from the Fleet to the Admiralty. Arlington Street
and Piccadilly seemed to chafe the very air in the Park and lift its leaves hotly, bril‐
liantly, on waves of that divine vitality which Clarissa loved. To dance, to ride, she
had adored all that.) (7)
It is, at the very least, not absolutely clear whether the class bias of the expression
“gave suck” is the narrator’s or Clarissa’s; the narrator’s voice and the focalizing
consciousness are notoriously difficult to distinguish in Mrs. Dalloway, and in‐
terpretative caution is therefore in order (Garvey 60; Snaith 63 – 64). Quite tell‐
ingly, Hawthorn’s only other example for an association of the lower classes
with animal-like behavior occurs in a part of the novel where the focalizer is
Richard Dalloway (124 – 128; see Hawthorn 102). Accordingly, while it is difficult
to deny the subtle linguistic class bias of Mrs. Dalloway’s genteel idiom, we
should ascribe the novel’s more blatantly prejudiced statements, not to the nar‐
rator or to the text as a whole, but to Richard and Clarissa Dalloway, the text’s
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focalizers at the two points in question. This, in turn, confirms the observation
made earlier that the novel’s social vision is far less inclusive in the sections that
focus on the Dalloways than in the parts of the novel that revolve around Sep‐
timus and his wife.
The fact that the segments centering on Septimus and Lucrezia are also the
most socially inclusive is particularly noteworthy because this renders it deeply
ironic that several characters in Woolf’s novel construe Septimus’s behavior as
un-English.19 Even Septimus’s wife in fact worries that Septimus’s condition is
too conspicuous and therefore unseemly:
[H]er husband, for they had been married four, five years now, jumped, started, and
said, “All right!” angrily, as if she [i.e. Lucrezia] had interrupted him.
People must notice; people must see. […] Suppose they had heard him? She looked
at the crowd. Help, help! she wanted to cry out to butchers’ boys and women. […] But
failure one conceals. She must take him away into some park. (17)
Lucrezia – herself an outsider because she is an Italian expatriate – tries to hide
Septimus’s condition from others because she has understood an important
characteristic of ‘good’ English society: “failure one conceals.” Later, we learn
that Dr. Holmes, the physician whom the Warren Smiths consult, believes that
there is “nothing whatever seriously the matter” with Septimus (23); in fact,
Dr. Holmes – whose name blends ‘Dr. Watson’ with ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and thus
evokes an unsavory combination of medical care and criminal judgment (Brad‐
shaw xxxii) – explicitly reminds Septimus of his “duty” as an English husband
to pull himself together and “do something instead of lying in bed” (101). Much
like Clarissa, Dr. Holmes thus regards stoical composure in the face of adversity
as one of life’s highest virtues – and a decidedly English one at that. As Alex
Zwerdling observes, such “unruffled self-control has everything to do with the
ability to retain power,” and those who fail to maintain a stiff upper lip quickly
become “outsiders in a society dedicated to covering up the stains” (72). Private
misery must, at all cost, be concealed, and those who fail to do so are regarded
as un-English even if they are in many ways more representative than those
who succeed.
It is therefore particularly poignant that Septimus himself at first also sub‐
scribes to the view that one must conceal one’s emotions, realizing too late that
his real problem is precisely an inability to feel. Before the war, Septimus’s em‐
ployer, Mr. Brewer, thought very highly of Septimus’s professional abilities, but
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was worried by the fact that the young man “looked weakly” (94). Serving as a
soldier in the trenches in France, however, Septimus supposedly “developed
manliness,” and when his friend Evans was killed in combat, Septimus “con‐
gratulated himself upon feeling very little and very reasonably” (94 – 95). As
Lee R. Edwards observes, the lesson that Septimus has learnt is that, in this
society, becoming a ‘real man’ means that one must not feel (105).20 For this
reason, Septimus is at first not alarmed by the “emotional numbing” that is, in
fact, a characteristic symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder (Manguno-Mire
and Franklin 356). Soon after the armistice, however, Septimus begins to worry
about a lasting absence of feeling:
He looked at people outside; happy they seemed, collecting in the middle of the street,
shouting, laughing, squabbling over nothing. But he could not taste, he could not
feel. […] He could reason; he could read, Dante for example, quite easily […], he could
add up his bill; his brain was perfect; it must be the fault of the world then – that he
could not feel. (96)
Septimus explicitly suspects here that it is “the fault of the world” that he can
no longer feel, and he is evidently not merely deluded in his belief because so‐
ciety does in fact hold the truth to be self-evident that the only proper way for
an Englishman to behave is to endure, stoically, the horrors even of total war.
As Karen DeMeester contends, this silencing of emotions also impairs Sep‐
timus’s ability to engage in therapeutic storytelling, which in turn renders it less
likely that he will manage to recover from the effects of shell-shock (662).
Bearing this in mind helps us to see that Septimus’s disturbing hallucinatory fits
are best read as a psychological safety valve for pent-up emotions:
[H]e, Septimus, was alone, called forth in advance of the mass of men to hear the truth,
to learn the meaning, which now at last, after all the toils of civilisation – Greeks,
Romans, Shakespeare, Darwin, and now himself – was to be given whole to … “To
whom?” he asked aloud. “To the Prime Minister,” the voices which rustled above his
head replied. The supreme secret must be told to the Cabinet; first that trees are alive;
next there is no crime; next love, universal love, he muttered, gasping, trembling,
painfully drawing out these profound truths which needed, so deep were they, so
difficult, an immense effort to speak out, but the world was entirely changed by them
for ever. (74)
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To a society that values emotional restraint above everything else, Septimus, in
his severely traumatized state, responds with rapturous visions of “universal
love.” Dr. Holmes, however, remains unsympathetic and interprets even Septi‐
mus’s suicide as an un-English, unmanly sign of weakness: “The coward!” (164).
What Mrs. Dalloway shows is that a society’s demand for emotional control or
moderation can itself become excessive: that an unconditional requirement for
self-restraint is in fact a form of moral extremism.21
History as the Return of the Repressed
Just as it is instructive to examine Septimus’s ‘failure’ to comply with upper-class
ideals of stoic composure, it is worth asking why Clarissa herself is unable to
maintain her equanimity when confronted with Doris Kilman, the tutor and
close friend of her daughter Elizabeth. The intensity of Clarissa’s dislike for Miss
Kilman is in fact quite startling:
Miss Kilman would do anything for the Russians, starved herself for the Austrians,
but in private inflicted positive torture, so insensitive was she, dressed in a green
mackintosh coat. Year in year out she wore that coat; she perspired; she was never in
the room five minutes without making you feel her superiority, your inferiority; how
poor she was; how rich you were how she lived in a slum without a cushion or a bed
or a rug or whatever it might be […].
It rasped [Clarissa …], to have stirring about in her this brutal monster! […] this
hatred, which, especially since her illness, had power to make her feel scraped, hurt
in her spine […], and made all pleasure in beauty, in friendship, in being well, in being
loved and making her home delightful rock, quiver, and bend as if indeed there were
a monster grubbing at the roots, as if the whole panoply of content were nothing but
self love! this hatred! (12 – 13)
The “hatred” Clarissa feels for Doris Kilman endangers, we learn, even her
pleasure in “making her home delightful” – and it certainly departs from an ideal
of emotional equipoise. The text makes clear, moreover, that Clarissa does not
hate Miss Kilman because she objects to the idea of her daughter falling in love
with someone of her own sex; rather, Elizabeth’s blunder is that she has fallen
for a “[h]eavy, ugly, commonplace” woman (137), quite unlike Clarissa herself,
who had had the good sense of pining after the fascinating and more socially
acceptable Sally Seton. Moreover, when we learn that Clarissa disdains Miss
Kilman’s piety because of her conviction that “religious ecstasy made people
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callous” (12), we should remember the discussion of George Eliot’s The Mill on
the Floss in chapter two, where the narrator points out that fervent beliefs tend
to be deemed unfashionable by those who live in wealthy, comfortable homes
(238; bk. 4, ch. 3) and who can therefore afford to retain a properly ironic dis‐
tance.
The unseemly intensity of Doris Kilman’s beliefs is, however, only one reason
why Clarissa reacts with such disgust to her daughter’s friend. Another, equally
important reason is that Doris Kilman is of German descent and a teacher of
history, for as such she reminds Clarissa of the very thing she would like to
forget: the horrors of the Great War, for which the class to which Clarissa be‐
longs was ultimately responsible. Miss Kilman, we learn early on in the novel,
was treated badly during the war, “all her soul rusted with that grievance
sticking in it, her dismissal from school during the War” (12). We have already
seen that Clarissa is all too keen on emphasizing that the war is a thing of the
past, which explains why the presence, or even the mere thought, of Doris
Kilman is so unbearable for Clarissa. Moreover, if Maria DiBattista is right in
arguing that Clarissa seeks “unhistorical happiness in plunging spontaneously
into the present” (40), then Doris Kilman’s “really historical mind” (Mrs. Dal‐
loway 12) points us toward a fundamental conflict: the clash between, on the
one hand, someone who did not suffer directly during the war and who displays
an intense love for the present, and, on the other hand, a person who was treated
unfairly and whose very presence serves as a reminder of historical injustice.22
This is of course not to say that we should see Doris Kilman as a flawless
character, for she may indeed, as Alice van Buren Kelley insists (91 – 92), occa‐
sionally use religion merely as a shield, or be too possessive in her love for
Elizabeth (see Mrs. Dalloway 144: “If she could grasp her, if she could clasp her,
if she could make her hers absolutely and forever and then die; that was all she
wanted”). The very name Kilman (‘kill man’), moreover, hardly helps to paint
Elizabeth’s friend in a positive light. At the same time, however, we should be
wary of situating Doris Kilman “at the negative pole” of the novel’s value system
(Kelley 92), as this would mean simply to accept Clarissa’s problematic judg‐
ment. Instead, we need to recognize that the extent of Clarissa’s disgust is en‐
tirely disproportionate to any real offence on Miss Kilman’s part – a circum‐
stance to which Clarissa readily admits: “[I]t was not her one hated but the idea
of her, which undoubtedly had gathered into itself a great deal that was not Miss
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Kilman” (12 – 13).23 Characteristically, however, Clarissa does not accept any
responsibility on her part; it is simply that “one” – not she herself – hates Miss
Kilman, because of an “idea” that has, almost magically, “gathered into itself a
great deal” that, in fact, has little to do with the real Miss Kilman. The text’s very
language – the impersonal pronoun, the passive voice – thus testifies to the
extent to which Clarissa desires to repress her own agency and responsibility
for injustice.
This evasion of responsibility is most clearly in evidence when Clarissa thinks
of her husband’s work in a government committee concerned with the Arme‐
nians, a people Clarissa cannot even distinguish from the Albanians:
[Richard] was already halfway to the House of Commons, to his Armenians, his Al‐
banians, having settled her on the sofa, looking at his roses. And people would say,
“Clarissa Dalloway is spoilt.” She cared much more for her roses than for the Arme‐
nians. Hunted out of existence, maimed, frozen, the victims of cruelty and injustice
(she had heard Richard say so over and over again) – no, she could feel nothing for
the Albanians, or was it the Armenians? but she loved her roses (didn’t that help the
Armenians?) – the only flowers she could bear to see cut. (131 – 132)
Clarissa’s admission that she cares more about flowers and her parties than
about the Armenians is problematic irrespective of historical context. However,
if we bear in mind the extent of genocidal violence committed against the Ar‐
menians by the Ottoman military forces during World War I, then Clarissa’s
indifference surely is nothing short of appalling:
We don’t know the exact number of Armenians killed in the years following 1915 –
or even the number living in Turkey. 1.2 – 1.4 million killed might be a reasonable guess
for 1915 – 16. [… O]nly about 10 percent of the Armenians living in Turkey in 1914
remained in the country in 1922 – the most successful murderous cleansing achieved
in the 20th century. (Mann 140)
Clarissa even muddles “Armenians and Turks” (134), and David Bradshaw
rightly points out that doing so in the early 1920s “is only a little less bizarre
than muddling Jews and Nazis would be in the latter half of the following
decade” (xx).
Nevertheless, Lee R. Edwards attempts to defend Clarissa’s ‘apolitical’ stance,
readily conceding that Clarissa’s roses may not help the Armenians much, but
also wondering whether the usual schemes of politics – petitions, committees,
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charitable donations – had done much good, either (110 – 111). And indeed it is
true that British policies during and after the war remained largely ineffective,
despite initial promises to hold those who committed the massacres responsible:
Power politics intruded […] and Britain found itself forced – by circumstances and by
preference – to back away from its stated commitments to the Armenians. This found
its clearest expression in the half-hearted attempts by the British authorities to bring
arrested Young Turk leaders before a military or criminal tribunal after the war; most
of those in British custody were ultimately released, with only a few trials of minor
figures having taken place (resulting in few convictions). (Totten and Bartrop 20)
Given the British government’s failure to keep its promises to the Armenian
people, one could hardly blame Clarissa for being angered, perhaps even disil‐
lusioned. However, for her to opt for indifference – to care more about her roses
and do nothing at all – is hardly the appropriate response, especially for someone
so closely associated to the very governing class that has failed to keep its
promises to the Armenians in the first place. This, however, is precisely what
Clarissa prefers to do: to forget the war, and in particular to repress the fact that
she is guilty by association. Accordingly, while we began the discussion of
Woolf’s novel with an emphasis on the spatial dimensions home (e.g.
country-house Arcadias, or the social geography of imperial London), we must
now turn to the problem of history, and thus the temporality of belonging.
Time on the Clock vs. Time in the Mind
At first sight, it seems plausible to relate a recurring hostility against clocks in
Mrs. Dalloway to Clarissa’s desire to repress historical responsibility. However,
as Randall Stevenson has shown, such hostility against mechanical timepieces
occurs frequently in modernist fiction in general, and was to some extent shared
by contemporary philosophers like Henri Bergson, who believed that time exists
as duration within the self: a seamless continuum of conscious states, rather
than a sequence of mechanically divisible and measurable items (Stevenson,
Modernist Fiction 105). There is, in the words of the narrator in Woolf’s Or‐
lando, a “discrepancy between time on the clock and time in the mind” (95), and
precisely this discrepancy is highlighted in Mrs. Dalloway through one of its
leitmotifs: the sound of a bell tolling the hour, penetrating even into the private
space of the home and interrupting a character’s introspective mood (e.g. 103,
139 – 140 and 204).24
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According to Stevenson, there are historically specific reasons why Woolf
and her contemporaries were so concerned with mechanical time and its impact
on people’s everyday lives. For one thing, Stevenson argues, the spread of the
railways in the mid-nineteenth century had made it necessary to standardize
time throughout Britain, and thus contributed to an increasingly strict regime
of time-keeping. Moreover, the newly regulated working environment of the
industrial factories ensured that standardized time became an everyday reality
for millions of laborers (e.g. through the ritual of ‘clocking in’ and ‘clocking out’;
Modernist Fiction 113 – 114). The complexity of military action during the Great
War, finally, depended on exact synchronization and thus contributed to the
spread of wristwatches (116). For all these reasons, Stevenson suggests, me‐
chanical timepieces not only became an increasingly prominent feature in peo‐
ple’s lives; they also came to symbolize a growing mechanization of human
existence, with individuals reduced to wheels and cogs in a soulless mili‐
tary-industrial machine.
And yet, while Stevenson’s argument explains the general preoccupation
with clocks in modernist fiction, it is important to note that in Mrs. Dalloway,
characters’ attitudes towards timepieces vary depending on their particular sit‐
uation and social status. We can see this in a passage from Woolf’s novel that
Stevenson discusses in the course of his argument:
Shredding and slicing, dividing and subdividing, the clocks of Harley Street nibbled
at the June day, counselled submission, upheld authority, and pointed out in chorus
the supreme advantages of a sense of proportion, until the mound of time was so far
diminished that a commercial clock, suspended above a shop in Oxford Street, an‐
nounced, genially and fraternally, as if it were a pleasure to Messrs. Rigby and Lowndes
to give the information gratis, that it was half-past one. (Mrs. Dalloway 112; see Ste‐
venson, Modernist Fiction 134)
Stevenson is surely right in claiming that the hostility directed in this passage
at the clocks of Harley Street is related to a critique of the status quo (“counseled
submission, upheld authority”). However, what Stevenson does not discuss is
that the value judgments at this point in Woolf’s novel are, in all likelihood, the
narrator’s and Lucrezia Warren Smith’s, whereas other characters exhibit en‐
170 3 “The Majesty of England”: Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway
25 In the paragraph that precedes the excerpt quoted above, Lucrezia Warren Smith is the
focalizing agent, and it is at least plausible that she continues to be the focalizing agent
(as there is no explicit indication of a change in perspective). Moreover, the language
used in the excerpt echoes a passage that occurs a few pages earlier in Woolf’s novel,
where the point of view at first seems to be associated exclusively with the omniscient
narrator. The phrase “Rezia Warren Smith devined it,” however, which occurs in that
passage, suggests that the narratorial perspective (including the narrator’s value judg‐
ments) is, if not identical with, then at least similar to Lucrezia’s; the point of view is
both the narrator’s and Lucrezia’s. Given the parallels between that earlier passage and
the excerpt quoted above, I would argue for a similar combination of narratorial and
character focalization in the second passage.
26 See Paul K. Saint-Amour, who notes that “[s]ometimes clock time tyrannizes in
Mrs. Dalloway,” but who also suggests that “oftener the striking of a clock is the occasion
for linking or shuttling among characters” (89).
tirely different attitudes towards mechanical timepieces.25 For instance, in the
paragraph that immediately follows the passage quoted above, Hugh Whit‐
bread – a pinnacle of respectability, and viewed by both Peter Walsh and Sally
Seton as the embodiment of mindless conformism (7 and 79 – 80) – feels “grati‐
tude” rather than hostility towards the clocks in Harley Street (112). Or, to give
a second example, immediately after her husband’s suicide, even Lucrezia,
hearing a clock striking the hour, thinks “how sensible the sound was; compared
with all this thumping and whispering” (164). In moments of great emotional
turmoil, an otherwise oppressive order may suddenly seem “sensible” and re‐
assuring. Without denying the general validity of Stevenson’s observations, we
nevertheless need to examine more closely when and why, precisely, Woolf’s
characters react to timepieces in the way they do.26
If we pay attention to the details of Woolf’s text, we find that, for Clarissa,
clocks are problematic not as symbols of an oppressive social order, but for two
rather different reasons: on the one hand they remind her of human mortality,
and on the other they threaten to thwart her efforts to repress the reality of
historical change. The former idea is made explicit early on:
[Clarissa] feared time itself, and read on Lady Bruton’s face, as if it had been a dial cut
in impassive stone, the dwindling of life; how year by year her share was sliced; how
little the margin that remained was capable any longer of stretching, of absorbing, as
in the youthful years, the colours, salts, tones of existence, so that she filled the room
she entered […]. (32 – 33)
Lady Bruton’s face here becomes the dial of a clock that measures the (life-)time
Clarissa has left. Of course, the idea that clocks are mementoes of human mor‐
tality is far from new and has long been central to the carpe diem theme (Ste‐
venson 113). Yet for Clarissa, mechanical timepieces also symbolize more than
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the general principle of mortality, as we discover when the sound of a bell tolling
the hour immediately makes her think of Doris Kilman:
The sound of Big Ben flooded Clarissa’s drawing-room, where she sat, ever so an‐
noyed, at her writing-table; worried; annoyed. It was perfectly true that she had not
asked Ellie Henderson to her party; but she had done it on purpose. [… W]hy should
she invite all the dull women in London to her parties? Why should Mrs. Marsham
interfere? And there was Elizabeth closeted all this time with Doris Kilman. Anything
more nauseating she could not conceive. Prayer at this hour with that woman. And
the sound of the bell flooded the room with its melancholy wave […]. (128 – 129)
Here, the intrusion of time into the (supposedly inviolate) privacy of the home
initially leads Clarissa to think of a dull acquaintance who would spoil her up‐
coming party – but her thoughts are then mysteriously propelled forward to her
daughter’s “nauseating” friendship with Miss Kilman, the history teacher with
German roots. The two passages thus illustrate Clarissa’s concerns with time: a
‘universal’ fear of mortality, and a very personal dislike of Doris Kilman. Both
these impulses express a desire on Clarissa’s part to stop time and halt the
progress of history. Therefore, if at first sight Clarissa’s dislike of clocks may
seem similar to Lucrezia’s, on closer inspection we find that the reasons for their
hostility are fundamentally different. Whereas Clarissa fears the idea of history
and mutability itself, Lucrezia dislikes clocks as symbols of a particular
socio-historical order and thus desires change (except in moments of existential
crisis – e.g. after her husband’s suicide – when even Lucrezia appreciates the
sense of order and predictability that clocks convey).
Everyday Myths
It is in the same context that we have to see the use of mythical elements in
Mrs. Dalloway, for myth should not only be conceived as a departure from the
“everyday time” that Mikhail Bakhtin sees as characteristic of the novel (“Forms
of Time and the Chronotope in the Novel” 128; see Walder 9); it also constitutes
an attempt to empty the past of its historical dimension. According to Franco
Moretti, rewriting an event in mythical form means “freeing it from the profane
world of causes and effects, and projecting into it the symbolic richness of the
archetype” (Modern Epic 248). And perhaps the most effective way of aban‐
doning the logic of cause and effect is to adapt myth’s non-linear conception of
time, which breaks down the distinction between past and present (Tobin 266).
Because of this different conception of time, Roland Barthes suggests, mythical
objects seem to “come from eternity”; they no longer appear in a linear, causal
sequence – as produced or chosen – and in consequence “history evaporates,”
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together with any notion of human responsibility, since no one can be respon‐
sible for a state of affairs that is eternal and unchangeable (151). In short, then,
myth is a kind of discourse that purports to discover, underneath the mundane
historical surface of everyday life, a deeper, unchanging, eternal reality.
In Woolf’s novel, a concern with this shift from surface to depth is intimated
continuously through the frequent use of water imagery.27 Such imagery is om‐
nipresent, for instance, in the opening paragraphs of Mrs. Dalloway, in which
Clarissa plunges into a London morning in June 1923 just as she had “plunged
at Bourton into the open air,” which for her felt “like the flap of a wave” (3); we
learn that she loves the city’s “waves of divine vitality” (7), and the beauty of
flowers is to Clarissa like “a wave which she let flow over her and surmount”
the hatred she feels for Miss Kilman, that stern woman with her unduly historical
mind (14). Similarly Septimus, looking out of the window of the Warren Smith’s
living room, notices how the “trees dragged their leaves like nets through the
depths of the air; the sound of water was in the room” (153). In both cases, the
narrator’s language associates everyday occurrences with images of watery
depths and blissful submergence, and perhaps the pervasive presence of aquatic
metaphors in Mrs. Dalloway has contributed to critics’ tendency to attribute a
stream-like quality to Woolf’s prose style (e.g. Love 71; Nalbantian 84; Naremore
91; Judith Ryan 191). At any rate, the recurrence of water imagery in the novel
suggests a continual tension between mythical depths and the flow of everyday
reality.28
The novel’s most celebrated attempt to explore the mythical substratum of
everyday life occurs in a scene in which an old beggar-woman sings a song in
Regent’s Park. The focalizer at this point in the text is Peter (Booker, Techniques
of Subversion 174), whose train of thought is interrupted by the sound of the old
woman’s song, which “bubbled up” and “streamed away in rivulets over the
pavement” – note, once again, the use of aquatic metaphors. Peter imagines the
woman to have been singing “through all ages”: “Still remembering how once
in some primeval May she had walked with her lover, this rusty pump, this
battered old woman with one hand exposed for coppers, the other clutching her
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side, would still be there in ten million years” (89 – 90). There are two reasons
why the phrase “rusty pump” is important here. For one thing, it shows again
that, when a lower-class character is implicitly dehumanized in Woolf’s novel
(i.e. the woman is not regarded as human, but merely as a rusty, mechanical
thing), the perspective is invariably that of a member of the Dalloway circle. For
another, a pump is an instrument designed to tap sources that lie buried deep
beneath the ground, just like the life-giving, mythical meaning that supposedly
lurks somewhere beneath the surface of everyday reality.
For Peter, a poor beggar-woman singing a song thus becomes an awe-in‐
spiring mythical presence related to the archetypes of the eternal feminine and
the earth-mother (e.g. Fleishman 84; Viola 244; Wyatt 443) – a timeless being
who already existed “in some primeval May,” and who “would still be there in
ten million years”:
But the passage of ages had blurred the clarity of that ancient May day; […] and she
no longer saw, when she implored him (as she did now quite clearly) […] black
whiskers or sunburnt face but only a looming shape, a shadow shape, to which, with
the bird-like freshness of the very aged she still twittered “give me your hand and let
me press it gently” (Peter Walsh couldn’t help giving the poor creature a coin as he
stepped into his taxi) […]; and her fist clutched at her side, and she smiled, pocketing
her shilling, and all peering inquisitive eyes seemed blotted out, and the passing gen‐
erations – the pavement was crowded with bustling middle-class people – van‐
ished […]. (90)
History – “the passing generations,” the “bustling middle-class people” – disap‐
pears in this mythopoetic vision, and there remains only an ancient female lover
with her eternal song. Crucially, the rhapsodic language of myth threatens to
distract us from the ‘superficial’ sequence of events: Peter, when stepping into
a taxi, is importuned by an old beggar-woman to whom he gives a shilling
(though, it seems, rather unwillingly: he “couldn’t help giving”). At the same
time, if there is an evasion of reality in this scene, then it is either Peter’s or the
narrator’s, but not, as Michael Whitworth rightly insists, the novel’s as a whole
(156), for the mythicizing sequence is immediately followed by Lucrezia Warren
Smith’s correctively prosaic perception of the same beggar-woman: “Oh poor
old wretch!” (90). Whereas, in short, the mythopoetic vision of the privileged
flâneur threatens to dazzle us with symbolic richness, the perspective of a be‐
leaguered middle-class wife with a foreign background returns us to the sparse,
historical prose of everyday life.
It is thus no coincidence that, in Mrs. Dalloway, the ‘visionary’ characters who
sense a mythical unity underlying everyday existence – Clarissa, Peter, and
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Septimus – are also, albeit in different ways, cut off from ordinary personal
relationships. James Naremore, for instance, points to Peter’s dream vision of
himself as a “solitary traveler” as evidence of his sense of isolation (99; see
Mrs. Dalloway 62 – 64).29 Naremore also highlights Clarissa’s tendency to retreat
from people into her upper room and, most emphatically, to Septimus’s
post-traumatic estrangement from his wife and the world (110). Each of these
three characters experiences moments of intense and isolated subjectivity
during which they believe they have discovered a mysterious, transcendent
cosmic unity. As Raymond Williams notes:
This is the ‘collective consciousness’ of the myth, the archetype: the ‘collective un‐
conscious’ of Jung. In and through the intense subjectivities a metaphysical or psy‐
chological ‘community’ is assumed, and characteristically, if only in abstract struc‐
tures, it is universal; the middle terms of actual societies are excluded as ephemeral,
superficial, or at best contingent and secondary. Thus a loss of social recognition is in
a way made into a virtue: as a condition of understanding and insight. (246)
These characters’ union with a “metaphysical or psychological ‘community’”
flows, as Margaret Blanchard astutely observes, from vision rather than from
action; it consists in a solitary way of seeing the world, not in a collective attempt
to interact with and change it – and thus, like flânerie, ultimately constitutes a
luxury that depends on the socio-historical circumstances of the individual in
question: “One can afford to conjure up a better world without trying to actualize
it only if the world one lives in is tolerable as it is” (Blanchard 305). In the light
of these observations, it becomes crucial to note that, of the novel’s three ‘vi‐
sionary’ characters, only Peter and Clarissa survive, whereas the more beleag‐
uered and less privileged Septimus is unable to re-establish a sense of home in
the world and therefore eventually takes his own life.
Misreading the Other
More generally, a key feature of Woolf’s novel is that it continually emphasizes
the parallels between, on the one hand, the Warren Smiths, and, on the other,
the Dalloways and their circle – but only simultaneously to highlight the crucial
differences between them. To neglect these differences would mean to misread
the story of Septimus and Lucrezia much as it is misread by Peter Walsh early
on in Woolf’s novel. In a scene set in Regent’s Park, Peter passes Septimus and
Lucrezia, and while he acknowledges that he does not know enough about the
two to interpret their behavior adequately, he nevertheless supposes that they
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are merely “lovers squabbling” (77) – an assessment that gravely underestimates
the depth of the Warren Smiths’ personal crisis. The sense that Peter misreads
events connected to the Warren Smiths is confirmed later, after Septimus has
killed himself. Lucrezia’s reaction to her husband’s suicide is, understandably,
a mixture between shock and resignation, and looking back on their married life
she movingly concludes: “Of her memories, most were happy” (165). This mood
of loving sadness at the end of the novel’s eighth section is disrupted brutally
by the opening sentences of section nine, in which Peter hears the sound of an
ambulance – in all likelihood the very ambulance that is on its way to the Warren
Smiths – and thinks: “One of the triumphs of civilization” (165). A moment of
deep sadness for Lucrezia is thus, for Peter, comforting, even uplifting.
We must therefore keep the possibility of misinterpretation in mind when we
proceed to Clarissa’s interpretation of Septimus’s suicide towards the end of
Woolf’s novel. When the psychiatrist Sir William Bradshaw mentions Septi‐
mus’s suicide at her party, Clarissa’s first reaction is one of anger and frustration:
“What business had the Bradshaws to talk of death at her party?” (201). Irritated
perhaps because the intrusion of death into her home reminds her of her general
fear of mortality, Clarissa briefly retires to her room. There, Clarissa’s mood
soon changes, and initially she interprets Septimus’s suicide as an indirect com‐
ment on her own ethical failures:
They (all day she had been thinking of Bourton, of Peter, of Sally), they would grow
old. A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about with chatter, defaced,
obscured in her own life, let drop every day in corruption, lies, chatter. This he [i.e.
Septimus] had preserved. Death was defiance. (202)
Clarissa admits, here, not only to a sort of emptiness in her life – her self appears
“wreathed about with chatter” – but even to a fundamental sense of dishonesty
(“corruption, lies”). By contrast, she believes, Septimus’s suicide has allowed him
to save his innermost self from the corruption that comes from living in society:
Somehow it was her disaster – her disgrace. It was her punishment to see sink and
disappear here a man, there a woman, in this profound darkness, and she forced to
stand here in her evening dress. She had schemed; she had pilfered. She was never
wholly admirable. She had wanted success. (203)
Given Clarissa’s unflinching criticism of herself, it would be tempting to think
that being confronted with Septimus’s suicide constitutes a truly life-changing
epiphany for her: a moment of recognition concerning the extent to which the
suicide of a shell-shocked war veteran reflects on her own life (including her
desire for “success,” and the ethical price she has been willing to pay for it).
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30 This argument would be one piece of evidence in support of Dominic Head’s impres‐
sively broad thesis that “most of the accepted modernist ‘epiphanies’ are problem‐
atic” (21).
31 Margaret Blanchard suggests that Septimus’s suicide cannot be seen as a political ges‐
ture (302), and she is of course right in the sense that Septimus is unlikely to have
intended it as such. This does not mean, however, that there is no political significance
to his action, for – as is generally the case when it comes to interpretation – intentions
do not determine entirely the meaning of the interpreted object.
However, Clarissa ultimately shies away from her insight and characteristi‐
cally reinterprets Septimus’s death in entirely apolitical terms.30 The same,
moreover, is true for at least one literary critic, who argues that Septimus’s case
should not be regarded in its own right at all, but instead as merely enhancing
that of Clarissa in order “to bring to the surface something buried deep in her
own life” (Rachman 5). In this view, the story of the shell-shocked war veteran
Septimus Warren Smith is not to be read in political terms, but merely as a means
of individual self-discovery for Clarissa.31 However, as John G. Hessler points
out, the society that Clarissa has assembled at her party is “the same society that
sent Septimus Warren Smith (and many others like him) to the trenches” (135),
and we must bear this in mind when we read Clarissa’s final assessment of
Septimus’s suicide:
The young man had killed himself; but she did not pity him; with the clock striking
the hour, one, two, three, she did not pity him, with all this going on. […] She must
go back to them. But what an extraordinary night! She felt somehow very like him –
the young man who had killed himself. She felt glad that he had done it; thrown it
away. The clock was striking. The leaden circles dissolved in the air. He made her feel
the beauty; made her feel the fun. But she must go back. She must assemble. She must
find Sally and Peter. (204)
While at first Clarissa had read Septimus’s suicide as highlighting her own fail‐
ures, she ultimately sees his death as little more than an appeal for her to seize
the day (he “made her feel the fun”); she does “not pity him,” and even feels “glad
that he had done it.” In sharp contrast, Septimus himself had felt little joy when
he killed himself, as Deborah Gut reminds us: “Instead, there is the terror of the
hunted beast” (“Self-Evasion” 19). Septimus has not preserved his innermost
self, as Clarissa would like to believe; rather, he has obliterated his entire self
because he could not find a way to restore it from its fragmented, shell-shocked
condition. Clarissa’s attempt to interpret a shell-shocked young man’s suicide
as an uplifting spiritual triumph is chillingly inappropriate, as well as conven‐
iently compatible with her political complacency.
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The argument that Clarissa misreads Septimus’s death is supported by an‐
other of Mrs. Dalloway’s leitmotifs: a quotation from Shakespeare’s Cymbeline
that highlights the differences, rather than the similarities, between Clarissa and
Septimus. Early in the novel, Clarissa sees an open book in a shop window and
there discovers the following lines: “Fear no more the heat o’ the sun / Nor the
furious winter’s rages” (10). These are the opening lines of a funeral dirge from
Cymbeline, sung by two male characters:
Guiderius.   Fear no more the heat o’th’sun
  Nor the furious winter’s rages;
Thou thy worldly task hast done,
  Home art gone and ta’en thy wages.
Golden lads and girls all must,
As chimney-sweepers, come to dust.
Arviragus.   Fear no more the frown o’th’great;
  Thou art past the tyrant’s stroke;
Care no more to clothe and eat;
  To thee the reed is as the oak.
The sceptre, learning, physic, must
All follow this and come to dust. (84; IV.ii.258 – 269)
One may note in passing that this dirge evokes the age-old Judeo-Christian topos
of death as a return to God as man’s original, true home, and that it also refers
to the threat posed by “the tyrant’s stroke” (a theme which, arguably, resonates
more strongly with Septimus’s rather than with Clarissa’s story). More impor‐
tantly, we need to bear in mind that the dirge in Shakespeare’s play is sung for
two sharply distinct characters: for Imogen, King Cymbeline’s daughter who,
much like Clarissa, remains virgin-like even after her marriage (Mrs. Dalloway
34: “she [i.e. Clarissa] could not dispel a virginity preserved through childbirth”;
see King 103); and for Cloten, son of the king’s second wife, a rather self-im‐
portant and obtuse villain who was in fact killed by Guiderius, one of the two
characters who sing the dirge. Hermione Lee thus overestimates the extent to
which the Shakespearean intertext suggests a fundamental similarity between
Septimus and Clarissa (31). What ought to be emphasized instead is that, for the
audience of Shakespeare’s play, the scene is ripe with irony, since the dirge
aligns the fate of a lowly villain, killed by one of the singers, with that of a regal
woman who – unbeknownst to the singers, but not the audience – is not even
dead (i.e. Imogen has drunk a potion that induces a sleep which merely resembles
death). The Shakespearean text thus presents us with two widely differing char‐
acters: a male figure who dies a violent death, and a female figure who may
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appear lifeless, but who in fact remains entirely unharmed and will be miracu‐
lously resurrected.
Given these differences, it is worth examining more closely at which points
in Mrs. Dalloway Clarissa recalls the lines from Cymbeline that she finds in a
book early on in the novel. If we do so, it becomes apparent that they serve
mainly to provide her with a sense of consolation in moments of comparatively
mild distress. For instance, the reference to Cymbeline is repeated for the first
time when Clarissa learns that Lady Bruton has failed to invite her to a lunch
party – an event that constitutes a “shock” in the eyes of Clarissa (32). Clarissa
remembers the opening lines of the dirge again later, when she is mending a
dress in the quiet of her room, “calm, content,” and secluded from the world’s
troubles in her comfortable home: “Fear no more, says the heart, committing its
burden to some sea, which sighs collectively for all sorrows, and renews, begins,
collects, lets fall” (43). Here too, thinking of Shakespeare leads to reconciliation,
and typically this sense of reconciliation is expressed in aquatic metaphors that
create a mythical mood of rebirth and renewal. The third and last time Clarissa
remembers the lines is, as we have seen, when she abandons her thoughts about
Septimus’s suicide and decides to go back to her party (204). In each of these
scenes, then, the Shakespearean text has a consolatory function for Clarissa,
though at the same time it is clear that she is not in fact suffering a great deal;
her ‘wounds’ are, if not entirely illusory, then clearly not life-threatening.
This contrasts sharply with the case of Septimus, whose psychic wounds
prove too deep for literary consolation to be effective. Before the war, Septimus
used to admire Shakespeare and what he stood for; indeed, according to the
narrator, Septimus “went to France to save an England which consisted almost
entirely of Shakespeare’s plays and Miss Isabel Pole,” whose public lectures on
Shakespeare Septimus had admired greatly (94). After the war, however, Sep‐
timus remains, for a long time, unable to derive any joy from Shakespeare:
That boy’s business of the intoxication of language […] had shrivelled utterly. How
Shakespeare loathed humanity – the putting on of clothes, the getting of children, the
sordidity of the mouth and the belly! This was now revealed to Septimus; the message
hidden in the beauty of words. The secret signal which one generation passes, under
disguise, to the next is loathing, hatred, despair. Dante the same. Aeschylus (translated)
the same. (97)
The very cultural artifacts that, for Septimus, used to express the highest human
values now speak to him only of the deepest despair, and Julia Briggs rightly
points out that, in part, Shakespeare has become tainted for Septimus because
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32 For a general overview of the importance of anti-imperialism in Woolf’s novels, see
Helen Carr’s article on “Virginia Woolf, Empire and Race,” as well as the chapters on
Woolf in Rebecca Walcowitz’s Cosmopolitan Style: Modernism beyond the Nation (2006)
and Paul Stasi’s Modernism, Imperialism, and the Historical Sense (2012).
33 Woolf’s novel also refers to Shakespeare’s sonnets, which Richard Dalloway dislikes
because reading the sonnets “was like listening at keyholes” (82). In contrast to the
plays, then, which relate to the novel’s concern with ethnicity and empire, the sonnets
are related to the text’s examination of gender and ‘deviant’ sexuality.
of the way he was used as a national icon in war-time propaganda (14; see also
Gordon Williams 243).
Nevertheless, when Septimus later thinks of the lines from Cymbeline – “Fear
no more the heat o’ th’ sun” – he seems to regain a sense of joy in the beauty of
the bard’s words; he is lying on his sofa, resting and watching the play of light
on the wall-paper in the sitting-room, and for a brief moment “not afraid” (153);
despite everything, Septimus suddenly believes in recovery: “He would not go
mad” (155). For once, Septimus proceeds from vision to action: He joins Lucrezia,
who sits at the table and is working on a hat, and while they are employed in
common labor Septimus even makes a few jokes, leading Lucrezia to exclaim
that they “were perfectly happy now” (160; see Hawthorn 95). However, re‐
covery lasts only for the briefest of moments, for when Dr. Holmes suddenly
interrupts the scene, Septimus panics and throws himself out of the living-room
window (163 – 164). While, in short, a few lines from Shakespeare may help
Clarissa to reestablish a sense of home, beautiful words alone are not enough
for Septimus to recover – which, incidentally, is a sobering reminder that the
power of literature to make us feel at home in the world may not be as great as
literary critics, in particular, would perhaps like to believe.
The Home of Civilization: Shakespeare, Britain, and the Empire
In addition to putting in relief the many contrasts between Clarissa and Sep‐
timus, the Shakespearean intertext of Woolf’s novel allows us to address one
final issue that is crucial to Mrs. Dalloway’s exploration of home: imperial con‐
quest and colonial domination.32 Cymbeline is, among other things, a play about
a war between a subject people – the Britons – and the Roman Empire, written
at a time when the English were actively colonizing Scotland and Ireland, and
beginning to venture further abroad (Innes 16; Floyd-Wilson 102). This, in turn,
renders it significant that the other two Shakespearean texts referred to in
Mrs. Dalloway are Othello (37 – 38 and 202) and Antony and Cleopatra (93 and
100): two other plays that are clearly related to questions of ethnic difference,
imperial power, and colonization.33
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34 This is not to deny the complexity of Peter’s character, whom, as Elizabeth Clea Lamont
rightly insists, one should not reduce to a “colonialist power-monger” (174). It is merely
to highlight his thematic function as the first palpably colonial(ist) presence in Woolf’s
novel.
In addition to noting the imperial implications of Shakespearean texts in
Mrs. Dalloway, we need to consider Peter Walsh’s position as an agent of colo‐
nialism. Focusing on Peter’s role in the opening paragraphs of Mrs. Dalloway,
for instance, we find that these passages not only revolve around an uneasy
opposition between a ‘rural’ past and an urban present; rather, the novel’s
opening also suggests that colonialism is omnipresent even at home. We have
already seen that Clarissa is immediately reminded of her youth at Bourton
when, at the beginning of the novel, she steps out on Bond Street to buy flowers
for her party in the evening. Significantly, her reminiscences end with the image
of her old friend Peter, a man “from a respectable Anglo-Indian family which
for at least three generations had administered the affairs of a continent” (60),
and whom Clarissa expects to “be back from India” one of these days (3). Clar‐
issa’s thoughts thus return to present-day London from recollections of a
country-house past via a colonialist ‘detour’: a man returning from India, that
‘jewel in the imperial crown’ which was so central to Britain’s geopolitical
strategy of domination (e.g. Hobsbawm, Age of Empire 68 – 69).34
The opening of Woolf’s novel thus implicitly confirms Edward Said’s claim
that, partly because of colonialism and its effects, the national home always
already includes the foreign, colonial Other (Culture and Imperialism xxv). In an
analysis of Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park, Said focuses specifically on the English
country house as a site that may appear isolated from the wider world, but which
in fact depends for its existence on “overseas sustenance” (89). Franco Moretti
has questioned Said’s idea that the colonies were, in actual fact, economically
indispensable for the English ruling classes (Atlas of the European Novel 24 – 27).
However, as Ian Baucom points out, Said focuses not only on the notion of
economic interdependence between empire and ‘motherland,’ but also “relates
the ordered moral economy which the country house represents to the apt ad‐
ministration of colonial property” (166). Similarly, Susan Strehle insists that
idealizations of Empire use a particular kind of home for their symbolic repre‐
sentation of national values (21), with the ideology of ‘true Englishness’ de‐
pending on the image of the very country-house Arcadias we have already dis‐
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35 See Raymond Williams (281) and, in particular, Peter Borsay on the enlightenment cul‐
ture of improvement: “[T]he improvers [believed in] a struggle between the forces of
civilization and enlightenment, and those of barbarity and heathenism. It cannot be
denied that some of this spirit was to infuse the class conflict that gained increasing
strength in the early years of the nineteenth century and the spread of empire later in
the century” (210).
cussed, and whose ordered stability is envisioned not only as a remedy for the
city’s social ills, but also as a cure for the ‘barbarism’ of the colonies.35
Later, Mrs. Dalloway in fact makes explicit this link between a supposedly
rational order at home – what the narrator calls “Proportion” – and Britain’s
ongoing imperial project. In section eight of Woolf’s novel, the narrator intro‐
duces Sir William Bradshaw, a renowned London psychiatrist, as the most fer‐
vent believer in the idea of Proportion:
Worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered himself but made England
prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalised despair, made it impos‐
sible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense of propor‐
tion – his, if they were men, Lady Bradshaw’s if they were women (she embroidered,
knitted, spent four nights out of seven at home with her son) […].
But Proportion has a sister, less smiling, more formidable, a Goddess even now
engaged – in the heat and sands of India, the mud and swamp of Africa, the purlieus
of London, wherever in short the climate or the devil tempts men to fall from the true
belief which is her own – is even now engaged in dashing down shrines, smashing
idols, and setting up in their place her own stern countenance. Conversion is her name
and she feasts on the wills of the weakly, loving to impress, to impose, adoring her
own features stamped on the face of the populace. (109)
Not only do Sir and Lady Bradshaw adhere strictly to a high-bourgeois model
of separate spheres that, for women, revolves mainly around household duties
(“she embroidered, knitted, spent four nights out of seven at home with her
son”); the establishment of a supposedly disinterested and rational order turns
out to be intimately related to a ‘will to power’ and domination – a fact that is,
perhaps, hinted at even by Sir William Bradshaw’s first name, which is not only
quintessentially English (William the Conqueror, William Shakespeare), but
which can also be parsed as ‘will-I-am.’ Less speculatively, we may note that,
according to the narrator, assuming the ‘white man’s burden’ (i.e. converting
one’s colonial subjects to English Proportion) generally leads to acts of vio‐
lence: “dashing down shrines” and “smashing idols.”
Some critics have commented on the fact that, precisely at this point in the
novel, the narrator of Mrs. Dalloway seems to lose all sense of equanimity and
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36 See also A Room of One’s Own, where Woolf suggests that, in the case of Jane Eyre, “it
is clear that anger was tempering with the integrity of Charlotte Brontë the nov‐
elist” (66).
moral proportion (e.g. Blanchard 299), seemingly contradicting Woolf’s own
belief, stated in her essay “Women and Fiction,” that authors should never let
bitterness or anger seep into their work (135).36 Avrom Fleishman even suggests
that the moral outrage expressed in this passage constitutes a stylistic ‘lapse’
that can be explained by Woolf’s own experience of mental illness and her con‐
sequent dislike of psychiatrists (69; see also Jouve 251). Importantly, however,
in her essay Woolf is careful to distinguish between, on the one hand, the “dis‐
tortion” that partisanship may introduce into a literary text and, on the other,
artistic weakness; for Woolf, distortion only “frequently” – and thus not neces‐
sarily – results in artistic weakness (135). Moreover, even if we were to assume
that Woolf was indeed fundamentally opposed to authors expressing any strong
convictions in works of fiction, we would still be faced with a paradox that
haunts all forms of ‘dogmatic relativism.’ As Christopher Herbert puts it: “In a
world where all nonrelativistic truth has been abolished, the relativity principle
itself is proclaimed as a universal verity” (118). The assumption that everything
is relative, and that art should therefore refrain from expressing strong parti‐
sanship, is itself an absolutist creed – and thus inherently contradictory. Ac‐
cordingly, the narrator’s ‘lapse’ from equanimity when faced with the ‘ideal’ of
English Proportion is best understood as a novelistic counterpoint to an abso‐
lutist moral relativism that would render political critique entirely impossible.
It is therefore fitting that the very language the narrator uses to describe the
twin-sisters of Proportion and Conversion is suffused with a sense of ‘unpro‐
portional,’ excessive enjoyment (“feasts on the will of the weakly”; emphasis
added). If domination can be associated with such boundless pleasure, then this
belies any idea that Empire is truly based on order and proportion. Rather, the
narrator envisages the imperial project as a profoundly narcissistic endeavor,
concerned not with higher ideals but with admiring its “own features stamped
on the face of the populace” (i.e. with remaking the world in its own image).
Reversing the colonialist stereotype that ‘natives’ are child-like and in need of
guidance (Loomba 181), in this passage the imperialists themselves appear as
overly powerful and unpredictable children who throw tantrums whenever
‘their’ colonial subjects dare to frustrate the self-serving needs of the imperial
masters.
We have already seen, in the case of Ahab in Moby-Dick, that power is apt to
re-enforce such narcissistic delusions of grandeur (see chapter one), and we
encounter the same phenomenon in Mrs. Dalloway in the figure of Lady Bruton
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and her colonialist “project for emigrating young people of both sexes born of
respectable parents and setting them up with a fair prospect of doing well in
Canada” (119). In the scene in question, Lady Bruton has just asked Hugh Whit‐
bread, a government official, to help her write a letter to The Times in support
of her project – and it is precisely at this point that Mrs. Dalloway highlights the
extent to which the work of domestic servants turns Lady Bruton’s home into
a cocoon that shields her from the vicissitudes of everyday life:
(The coffee was very slow in coming.)
“The address?” murmured Hugh Whitbread; and there was at once a ripple in the
grey tide of service which washed round Lady Bruton day in, day out, collecting,
intercepting, enveloping her in a fine tissue which broke concussions, mitigated in‐
terruptions, and spread round the house in Brook Street a fine net where things lodged
and were picked out accurately, instantly, by grey-haired Perkins, who had been with
Lady Bruton these thirty years and now wrote down the address; handed it to
Mr. Whitbread, who took out his pocket-book, raised his eyebrows, and slipping it in
among documents of the highest importance, said that he would get Evelyn to ask
him to lunch.
(They were waiting to bring the coffee until Mr. Whitbread had finished.)
Hugh was very slow, Lady Bruton thought. He was getting fat, she noticed. […]
She was getting impatient […]. (118 – 119)
An army of domestics is employed in order to spare Lady Bruton any undesired
interruptions, and the phrase “tide of service” – another instance of water im‐
agery – dehumanizes the servants by turning them into a natural phenomenon,
underlining the extent to which their efforts seem natural to Lady Bruton and
her class. If Lady Bruton wants the food to be served, there will immediately be
“a soundless and exquisite passing to and fro” (114); she has “only to nod” for
her servants to be “instructed to quicken the coffee” (117). In such an environ‐
ment, the object of desire – Lady Bruton’s project of emigrating young people
to Canada – “becomes inevitably prismatic, lustrous, half looking-glass, half
precious stone”; it is a narcissistic mirror that reflects back only her own sense
of self: “Emigration had become, in short, largely Lady Bruton” (119).
Once we recognize the profound significance of colonialism in Woolf’s novel,
the virtual absence of characters that could be described as colonial subjects
must appear striking. Peter Walsh, though admittedly a kind of outsider due to
his Anglo-Indian background (Lamont 174), is also the scion of a family of
colonial administrators and thus hardly qualifies as a colonial subject, if by that
term we mean someone who is subjected to colonial rule. Indeed, even though
he sees himself as “disliking India, and empire, and army,” he also experiences
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“moments of pride in England” and ultimately approves of “London; the season;
civilisation,” which he regards as a “splendid achievement” (60). What is striking
here is that Peter thinks of London as “civilisation,” in implicit contrast to the
uncivilized disorder of ‘the East.’ Moreover, this particular moment of pride oc‐
curs only a few pages after the nationalistic display, discussed earlier, of a group
of boys “in uniform, carrying guns,” marching through the streets of London
towards a “statue praising duty, gratitude, fidelity, love of England” (55). For all
his sense of isolation and psychological complexity, then, Peter is a marginal
figure only when seen from within the very narrow upper-class circle of the
Dalloways, not from a broader social perspective.
Only two characters thus remain in Mrs. Dalloway whom we might plausibly
describe as colonial subjects: the Irishwoman Moll Pratt, who sells flowers on
the street (20), and a nameless “Colonial” who appears a little earlier in Woolf’s
novel (19). Of these two, only Moll briefly becomes a focalizing agent, as if in
reward for the “loyalty” she feels towards the Prince of Wales, who – suppos‐
edly – passes by in a car (“she wished the dear boy well”). Moll, we learn, would
even have liked to express her loyalty more clearly by tossing a bunch of roses
into St. James’s Street; however, she refrains from doing so because she finds a
“discouraging constable’s eye upon her” (20). Despite the fact that Moll is a loyal
subject, in other words, her freedom is very precisely delimited in Woolf’s text
(as, incidentally, was that of the recently established Irish Free State; see Robbins
82 – 83).
It is instructive to compare the way in which the novel treats Moll with the
fate of the nameless “Colonial,” who reacts to the (assumed) presence of the
Prince of Wales, not with expressions of loyalty, but by insulting the royal
family – “which led to words, broken beer glasses, and a general shindy” (19).
Colonial dissent is thus immediately silenced within the fictional world of
Mrs. Dalloway (Bradshaw xxix; Snaith 73). Moreover, the “Colonial” never be‐
comes the focalizer or bearer of narrative perspective. In fact, we do not even
learn what, precisely, the “Colonial” said, and are therefore unable to judge
whether he was purposely insulting the royal family in order to pick a fight, or
whether he was merely trying to make a valid political point. In either case, it
is clear that neither he nor Moll Pratt can express themselves freely in
Mrs. Dalloway because they are at all times monitored closely by the – official
as well as unofficial – guardians of the imperial nation, who are prepared vio‐
lently to suppress any oppositional point of view.
1853 “The Majesty of England”: Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway
37 As Jo-Ann Wallace so aptly puts it, Mrs. Dalloway suggests “the complex relationship
between various components of ‘the social system’: education, medicine, religion,
class, politics, imperialism, and the military” (26). See also Jane Goldman, who suggests
that Clarissa and Septimus inhabit a social world that is profoundly distorted by “pat‐
riarchal imperialism” (57).
Mrs. Dalloway and the Ethics of Home
The imperial nation is thus not a true homeland for its colonial subjects. More‐
over, we have seen that the urban space of the imperial capital is not only very
precisely delimited, but also not fundamentally different from those ‘rural’
country houses that are among the key symbolical markers of ‘true’ English‐
ness. Throughout, it has become clear that ideas about what it means to be truly
English – such as the glorification of stoical composure – are not in the end
separable from questions of gender (e.g. manliness vs. cowardice) or the vagaries
of social class (e.g. Doris Kilman’s unfashionably emphatic religious beliefs).37
Accordingly, it is difficult for outsiders like Doris Kilman or Lucrezia Warren
Smith to feel at home in the city of London. Likewise, in the wake of the Great
War, “home” for Septimus ultimately comes to mean, not security or belonging,
but the threat of being sent, against his will, to one of Sir William Bradshaw’s
or “[Dr.] Holmes’s homes” (106 – 107). It is telling, moreover, how differently
Clarissa reacts to Septimus and to Miss Kilman. Doris Kilman is a woman whom
Clarissa actually meets, and whom she considers her “enemy”:
That was satisfying; that was real. Ah, how she hated her – hot, hypocritical, corrupt;
with all that power; Elizabeth’s seducer; the woman who had crept in to steal and
defile (Richard would say, What nonsense!). She hated her: she loved her. It was en‐
emies one wanted, not friends […]. (191 – 192)
Clearly, Clarissa loves to hate Doris Kilman, and this contrasts sharply with her
reaction to Septimus, who remains an anonymous and mostly imaginary pres‐
ence in Clarissa’s life. This, in turn, makes it easy for her to reinterpret Septi‐
mus’s suicide as a metaphysical triumph that reconciles her with life – or, more
precisely, with the current state of society, as well as her position in it.
We must, in other words, always bear in mind Septimus Warren Smith, Doris
Kilman, and the general (mis-)treatment of the ‘lower orders’ – working-class
people and colonial subjects – when we examine Clarissa’s attempts at “making
her home delightful” (13), and particularly when we discuss the hospitality she
displays at her parties. Clarissa herself believes that giving parties is inherently
positive and, quite simply, “her gift”:
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38 The six principles of heterotopias that Foucault indicates are: (a) there is no society that
refrains from constructing heterotopic spaces (24); (b) the same heterotopic space can
have different meanings in different historical periods (25); (c) heterotopias can juxta‐
pose in a single real space “several sites that are in themselves incompatible” (ibid.); (d)
most heterotopias are linked to particular “slices of time” (such as museums, which are
associated with “indefinitely accumulating time”; 26); (e) heterotopias “presuppose a
system of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable”
(ibid.); (f) with regard to all the spaces that remain, heterotopias either function as
spaces of illusion or as spaces of compensation (27).
Here was So-and-so in South Kensington; some one up in Bayswater; and somebody
else, say, in Mayfair. And she [i.e. Clarissa] felt quite continuously a sense of their
existence; and she felt what a waste; and she felt what a pity; and she felt if only they
could be brought together; so she did it. And it was an offering; to combine, to create;
but to whom? (133 – 134)
There is genuine generosity here, in Clarissa’s vision of spontaneous intercon‐
nection, and it resonates powerfully with Jacques Derrida’s idea that hospitality
is not just one virtue among many, but rather the key to “culture itself”:
Insofar as it has to do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one’s home, the familiar
place of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we
relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, ethics is
hospitality […]. (“On Cosmopolitanism” 16 – 17; original emphasis)
Opening one’s home to others and making them feel at ease is, for Derrida, the
quintessentially ethical behavior, and Clarissa’s hospitality surely is not without
merit. Yet even if her “offering” is virtuous in principle, we must ask not only
why Clarissa can afford such conspicuous displays of generosity, but also – as
the text of Mrs. Dalloway itself suggests – to whom, precisely, her hospitality is
offered (“but to whom?”).
Michel Foucault’s concept of heterotopic spaces can help us shed some light
on the extent to which Clarissa’s parties are anything but the disinterested
works of art that she herself imagines them to be (“an offering for the sake of
offering”; 134). In “Of Other Spaces,” Foucault defines heterotopias as spaces that
project an ideal vision of a particular society, but which in contrast to utopian
spaces actually exist as real places within that society (e.g. theaters and mu‐
seums; 24 – 26). Among the six principles of heterotopic spaces that Foucault
outlines in his essay, the one that is crucial in our context is that they are, in
general, “not freely accessible like a public place” (26).38 This is, of course, also
true for Clarissa’s parties, which do not just bring together any sort of people,
but only members of the London establishment, including the Prime Minister,
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39 Julia Carlson has rightly emphasized the importance of Peter as a critic of Clarissa’s
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“this symbol of what they all stood for, English society” (189). Clarissa’s hospi‐
tality may, in other words, be perfectly sincere and gesture toward a genuinely
admirable ideal. However, her parties also conveniently help the Dalloways ful‐
fill societal expectations and thus to uphold their privileged position.
This is, importantly, not to say that Woolf’s novel constitutes a relentless
indictment of its eponymous heroine. In fact, many critics would agree with
Alex Zwerdling’s suggestion that Mrs. Dalloway is “finally a sympathetic picture
of someone who has surrendered to the force of conventional life and permitted
her emotions to go underground” (78). And it is indeed understandable that
Clarissa wants to plunge into the present in order to forget, not only her recent
illness or human mortality in general, but also the horrors of the Great War. It
is understandable, too, that she looks to literary works like Cymbeline for con‐
solation, in order to maintain a sense of belonging. Moreover, even if we believe
that the society portrayed in Mrs. Dalloway is profoundly unjust, it does not
follow that Clarissa has a moral obligation to be unhappy, for the oppressed of
the world gain nothing by the misery of others – even the unhappiness of the
privileged.
What is problematic about Clarissa is thus not her desire to feel at home, nor
even the fact that she actually manages to find a place in the world. The problem
is, rather, that she is willing to do so in ways that not only fail to combat injustice
(her refusal to engage with key political issues, such as the British govern‐
ment’s role during and after the Armenian genocide), but that even help main‐
tain the status quo (e.g. fulfilling her role as “perfect hostess”; see Mrs. Dalloway
8 and 67), and which occasionally add insult to injury (e.g. her treatment of Doris
Kilman, who poses a threat to Clarissa’s sense of home because she reminds her
of things she would prefer to forget). Clarissa herself acknowledges a peculiar
“hollowness” at the heart of her social triumphs – triumphs which, perhaps
because she was “growing old, satisfied her no longer as they used” (191) – and
even in the eyes of her old friend Sally, Clarissa appears as “at heart a snob”
(208).
This leads us to what is perhaps the least acknowledged fact about Mrs. Dal‐
loway, and one that is crucial to the novel’s attempt to establish an ethics of
home, namely that judgments of all kinds are passed continually in the novel
by various characters and, occasionally, by the narrator.39 If we look, for instance,
at the first ten paragraphs of Mrs. Dalloway, we not only find Clarissa judging
Peter Walsh and Hugh Whitbread, as well as reporting Peter and Richard’s
188 3 “The Majesty of England”: Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway
judgments of “the admirable Hugh” (5); we also learn that Scrope Purvis, who –
like the Dalloways – lives in Westminster, finds Clarissa a “charming woman”
(4). Later in the novel, we have Dr. Holmes, whose name, as we have seen, sug‐
gests both medical care and criminal judgment, and who indeed does not hesitate
to call Septimus a coward. Moreover, there is the narrator’s judgment of Sir
William Bradshaw and his love of Proportion, and even Doris Kilman’s view of
Clarissa is given some space: “She despised Mrs. Dalloway from the bottom of
her heart” (141). Crucially, we also have Clarissa’s reactions to the judgments
of others:
[S]omething that Peter had said, combined with some depression of her own, in her
bedroom, taking off her hat; and what Richard had said had added to it […]. That was
it! Her parties! Both of them criticised her very unfairly, laughed at her very unjustly,
for her parties. […]
Well, how was she going to defend herself? Now that she knew what it was, she
felt perfectly happy. They thought, or Peter at any rate thought, that she enjoyed
imposing herself; liked to have famous people about her; great names; was simply a
snob in short. Well, Peter might think so. Richard merely thought it foolish of her to
like excitement when she knew it was bad for her heart. It was childish, he thought.
And both were quite wrong. What she liked was simply life. (132 – 133)
We learn here that both Peter and Richard are critical of Clarissa’s enthusiasm
for parties (though both, of course, nevertheless dutifully attend), and Clarissa’s
only defense is that she “simply” likes life. If Woolf’s novel shows us anything,
however, it is precisely that simply liking life is not enough – neither in the
imperial city, nor in the seemingly pastoral environment at Bourton.
To love life “simply” thus ultimately proves inadequate in a novel that con‐
fronts us with multiple points of view in two related, but distinct senses: a
‘technical’ sense relating to vantage points from which the fictional world is
perceived; and a ‘political’ sense pertaining to conflicting judgments and di‐
verging opinions. Woolf’s novel provides us with a broad, albeit far from all-in‐
clusive or politically neutral range of focalizers, and thus immerses us in a sea
of ethical judgments. And this continual and contradictory passing of judgment
can hardly fail to have an effect on the reader. Put somewhat bluntly: Can anyone
read, say, Clarissa’s idea that Richard and Peter criticize her “very unfairly”
without beginning to judge her, too? When doing so, we may disagree with
Karen DeMeester’s idea that Clarissa, like other members of her social class,
merely domesticates the social evils that are “evident in England’s perpetuation
of its empire and its sacrifice of a generation to war” (665). But it is difficult to
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read Mrs. Dalloway without at least considering the ethical implications of Clar‐
issa’s home-making practices.
By choosing the title Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf – consciously or not – emphasized
Clarissa’s social position as successful wife to the government official Richard
Dalloway (in contrast to, say, Samuel Richardson, who did not include the pat‐
ronymic “Harlowe” in the title of his novel Clarissa, thus foregrounding the
heroine’s first name), and Clarissa Dalloway’s social success in what is arguably
an unjust system may well be considered an ethical failure (Hawthorn 43). At
the very least, Woolf’s novel examines how, precisely, its eponymous character
tries to make a home in a world that is not of her own making and over which
she – like all of us – has only limited control. At the same time, Mrs. Dalloway
encourages us to consider the ethical price Clarissa is willing to pay for such
belonging, and it makes these abstract costs concrete by counterpointing her
successful quest for belonging with the story of Doris Kilman and, in particular,
with the tragedy of Septimus, who quite literally embodies the traumatic kernel
of Clarissa’s ideological fantasy. Something awful may lurk at the center of even
the most delightful home: a repressed but familiar, uncanny presence that
haunts Mrs. Dalloway in the figure of Septimus. It is this kind of political uncanny
that takes center stage in William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!, which precip‐
itates us into a veritable nightmare of belonging.
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4 “Everybody Seemed to Have to Have a Home”:
History, Innocence, and the Nightmare of Belonging
in William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!
FIGURE 8: Storm’s regionalism assumes a global dimension if one takes into account pro‐
jected spaces.
Regionalism: the word evokes local color, boundedness, perhaps provin‐
ciality.1 And yet, though there is a tendency in regionalist novels to depict their
settings as pristine, authentic spaces outside of history (Kaplan 251 – 252), Philip
Joseph rejects the notion that such novels are necessarily isolationist. Instead,
Joseph argues that there have always been regional novels in which the local
community remains “in dialogue with the outside world” (7). Likewise, Harilaos
Stecopoulos argues that some novelists “counterintuitively found in regionalism
2 I would like to thank Barbara Piatti for allowing me to use the map in FIGURE 8.
3 Among the novels set in Yoknapatawpha county are Sartoris (1929), The Sound and the
Fury (1929), As I Lay Dying (1930), Light in August (1932), The Hamlet (1940), Go Down,
Moses (1942), The Town (1957), The Mansion (1959), and The Reivers (1962).
the inspiration for transnational fiction” (24). The works of the German author
Theodor Storm are a good example for this, for while virtually all of Storm’s
texts are set in the author’s home region, Northern Frisia, this regional setting
is opened up to the wider world through what Barbara Piatti has called projected
spaces: locations that are remembered, dreamed of, or envisioned as future des‐
tinations (Piatti 362). As soon as one adds projected spaces to Storm’s fictional
universe, his regionalism in fact assumes truly global proportions (FIGURE 8).2
In the discussion that follows we will find that the regionalism of William
Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! (1936) is likewise transnational in its scope. Ab‐
salom, Absalom! is set in Yoknapatawpha, a fictional county located in the state
of Mississippi and home to many of William Faulkner’s novels.3 In their osten‐
sible focus on the particular histories and institutions of the Deep South, the
Yoknapatawpha stories belong to a tradition of regionalism that had emerged
as an important current in American fiction in the post-Civil-War period (Ruland
and Bradbury 193). And yet, in Absalom, Absalom! the outside world quite lit‐
erally intrudes on the town of Jefferson, Mississippi, in the figure of Thomas
Sutpen, who appears there in 1833, seemingly out of nowhere. On one hundred
square miles “of tranquil and astonished earth,” he builds Sutpen’s Hundred, a
grand plantation home, dragging “house and formal gardens violently out of the
soundless Nothing” (4). Sutpen then marries Ellen Coldfield, a woman from a
respected local family, and has two children with her, Henry and Judith. How‐
ever, just when it seems that Sutpen will succeed in his “design” to become the
founding father of a great Southern dynasty (194), the repressed past returns in
the shape of Charles Bon, his son from a previous marriage with a woman whom
Sutpen left when he found out that she was “part negro” (283). On the eve of the
American Civil War, Sutpen’s design thus begins to falter, ultimately destroying
his new family.
It is, however, only through the prism of several retellings that we come to
know of Sutpen’s relentless pursuit of a particular fiction of home, and the fact
that his story is continually retold emphasizes the extent to which his cata‐
strophic history continues, decades after the events in question, to haunt
Quentin Compson and other members of Jefferson, his home community. We
will see, moreover, that these regional hauntings are in fact intimately related
not only to U. S. national history, but also to the country’s geopolitical role in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By allegorically encoding the his‐
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tory of slavery and racism, as well as the continuing U. S. involvement in the
Republic of Haiti, the novel draws attention to the illusionary nature of fantasies
of a new beginning, or dreams of splendid isolation. Instead, it evokes Karl
Marx’s famous dictum that “[t]radition from all the dead generations weighs
like a nightmare on the brain of the living” (“The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte” 32; see also chapter two), and gives literary form to this idea through
equally Gothic tropes.4 Moreover, Absalom, Absalom! uses a technique that we
may call uncanny narration in order to make readers undergo a similarly night‐
marish experience as one of the novel’s protagonists, Quentin Compson.
In the preceding chapters, we have focused on the obstacles to belonging –
social alienation, for instance, or injustices related to gender. In addition, we
have examined the question of whether, at times, we ought to resist our urge to
make ourselves at home because the ethical price to pay would simply be too
high. In the discussion that follows, we will now have to examine what happens
when someone would in fact prefer to leave the home behind, but finds to their
horror that he or she simply cannot let go. In short, in assessing the potentially
debilitating long-term impact of the family home and the wider community,
Absalom, Absalom! constitutes an attempt to confront the nightmare of be‐
longing, in order to unearth its potential as a basis for political action.
Postmemory: Excessive Past(s) and the Weight of History
The potentially overwhelming weight of history is made palpable in Faulkner’s
novel through the sheer multiplicity of interlocking and sometimes competing
narratives that, collectively, reconstruct the story of Thomas Sutpen.5 The novel
opens in September 1909, with Quentin paying a visit to Miss Rosa Coldfield,
an elderly lady who knew Sutpen personally (5). While the circumstances of
Quentin’s visit are related by an extra-diegetic, third-person narrator, the em‐
bedded story of Thomas Sutpen is told in the “grim haggard amazed voice” of
Rosa Coldfield (3). In fact, of the first chapter’s twenty pages, the final twelve
consist almost exclusively of Miss Rosa’s embedded tale, making her a
second-level narrator who virtually takes over the telling of the story. Similarly,
of the second chapter’s twenty-three pages, only ten are told by the extra-die‐
getic third-person narrator, while the other thirteen consist of a monologue by
Quentin’s father. Not unlike Ishmael in Moby-Dick, then (see chapter one), the
third-person narrator in Absalom, Absalom! repeatedly loses control over the
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narrative, speaking, for instance, only eight words in the twenty-four pages of
chapter three. Later, in chapter five, the novel seems to dispose of the extra-die‐
getic perspective altogether, presenting us with another thirty-two pages of Miss
Rosa’s voice before, on the second-but-last page, the third-person narrator
stages a surprise return. Instead of controlling and orchestrating the novel’s
many retellings, the ‘omniscient’ third-person narrator thus appears in a curi‐
ously precarious position and threatens to be drowned out by embedded nar‐
rative voices.6
Moreover, if the various retellings are well-nigh unmanageable in their to‐
tality, the embedded narrators appear similarly overwhelmed by their stories,
which they recount in seemingly boundless sentences, as if compelled stylisti‐
cally to recreate the enormity of the past. Consider, for instance, the following
gargantuan sentence, spoken by Quentin’s father:
[Y]our grandfather never knew if it was Clytie who watched, kept in touch by some
means, waited for the day, the moment, to come, the hour when the little boy would
be an orphan, and so went herself to fetch him; or if it was Judith who did the waiting
and the watching and sent Clytie for him that winter, that December of 1871;–Clytie
who had never been further from Sutpen’s Hundred than Jefferson in her life, yet who
made that Journey alone to New Orleans and returned with the child, the boy of twelve
now and looking ten, in one of the outgrown Fauntleroy suits but with a new oversize
overall jumper coat which Clytie had bought for him (and made him wear, whether
against the cold or whether not your grandfather could not say either) over it and
what else he owned tied up in a bandana handkerchief – this child who could speak
no English as the woman could speak no French who had found him, hunted him
down in a French city and brought him away, this child with a face not old but without
age, as if he had had no childhood, not in the sense that Miss Rosa says she had no
childhood, but as if he had not been human born but instead created without agency
of man or agony of woman and orphaned by no human being […]. (159)
This lengthy quotation in fact constitutes only the first third of the sentence,
and though the example may seem extreme, it is not at all uncharacteristic of
the novel’s overwhelming style. Too much, it seems, must be told:
I will tell you what he [i.e. Sutpen] did and let you be the judge. (Or try to tell you,
because there are some things for which three words are three too many, and three
thousand words that many words too less, and this is one of them. It can be told; I
could take that many sentences, repeat the bold blank naked and outrageous words
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just as he spoke them, and bequeath you only that same aghast and outraged unbelief
I knew when I comprehended what he meant; or take three thousand sentences and
leave you only that Why? Why? and Why? that I have asked and listened to for almost
fifty years.) But I will let you be the judge and let you tell me if I was not right.
(134 – 135)
Words, that is to say, cannot do justice to Sutpen’s story (“three words are three
too many, and three thousand words that many words too less”), and the enor‐
mity of the narrative task affects the very language in which Rosa – who is the
narrator at this point – tells her tale: definite statements that she immediately
qualifies (“I will tell you […]. Or try to tell you”); adjectives crammed on top of
each other (“bold bland naked and outrageous”); repetitions (“and let you be the
judge,” “will let you be the judge”), speculations (“could take”), and unresolved
questions (“that Why? Why? and Why? that I have asked and listened to for
almost fifty years”). If John Brannigan is right in suggesting that an “excess of
memory and history is […] the prototypical temporal condition of the twentieth
century” (117), then perhaps Absalom, Absalom! is the century’s paradigmatic
novel, enacting this excessive temporality in the very texture of its convoluted
style.
Nevertheless, much like Rosa Coldfield, Quentin is aware that even the most
excessive of narrations cannot encompass the full reality of the past, but must
instead select, rearrange, and condense its components. In order to tell Sutpen’s
story, the characters must thus distort the reality to which their tales purport to
refer, thus adding to their material a dream-like quality:
It (the talking, the telling) seemed (to him, to Quentin) to partake of that logic- and
reason-flouting quality of a dream which the sleeper knows must have occurred, still‐
born and complete, in a second, yet the very quality upon which it must depend to
move the dreamer (verisimilitude) to credulity – horror or pleasure or amazement –
depends as completely upon a formal recognition of and acceptance of elapsed and
yet elapsing time as music or a printed tale. (15)
The “logic- and reason-flouting quality” of dreams finds its counterpart in the
storyteller’s need to manipulate time – to compress, for instance, the thirty-three
years between Sutpen’s arrival in Jefferson and his death in 1869 into a novel
that one can read in only a few days. Such passages that discuss the precarious
relationship between the reality of the past and its recreation as a text represent
an explicit metafictional discourse in Faulkner’s novel, and this explicit dis‐
course in turn complements the novel’s implicitly metafictional style (i.e. the
extraordinarily long and complex sentences that flaunt the text’s artificiality
and constructedness). Absalom, Absalom! thus constitutes what Linda Hutcheon
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that Sutpen rides off to war on a “black stallion named out of Scott” (63).
8 For the distinction between existential and historical trauma see Dominick LaCapra,
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has termed a historiographic metafiction: a novel that “problematizes the very
possibility of historical knowledge” (106).7
It is, in part, this problematic nature of attempts to reconstruct the past that
Shreve, Quentin’s roommate at Harvard College, finds stimulating and even
exciting. “Let me play a while now,” Shreve asks Quentin when the latter tries
to interrupt his friend in the course of a free-flowing narrative improvisation
on the story of Thomas Sutpen, and Norman W. Jones has rightly pointed out
that there is a markedly homoerotic charge to the roommates’ “back-and-forth
storytelling” (334). We learn, for instance, that Shreve is “naked to the waist”
(Absalom 176), and that the two roommates sometimes glare at one another “not
at all as two young men might look at each other but almost as a youth and a
very young girl might out of virginity itself” (240). Thus seduced by each others’
imaginative prowess, Shreve and Quentin move further and further away from
a version of the past based on verifiable fact, creating, “out of the rag-tag and
bob-ends of old tales and talking, people who perhaps had never existed at all”
(243): a dream-like historical fantasy driven by their mutual narrative desire.
However, while Shreve, a Canadian, is for the most part able to enjoy this
game of narrative seduction, the Southerner Quentin finds himself unable to
gain unadulterated pleasure from their flights of fancy because he is weighed
down by the effects of collective historical trauma.8 At one point in Faulkner’s
novel, Shreve and Quentin explicitly address this crucial difference in their re‐
lation to the past:
[Shreve: I]t’s something my people haven’t got. […] What is it? something you live
and breathe like air? a kind of vacuum filled with wraithlike and indomitable anger
and pride and glory at and in happenings that occurred and ceased fifty years ago? a
kind of entailed birthright father and son and father and son of never forgiving General
Sherman, so that forever more as long as your children’s children produce children
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you wont be anything but a descendant of a long line of colonels killed in Pickett’s
charge at Manassas?”
“Gettysburg,” Quentin said. “You cant understand it. You would have to be born
there.”
“Would I then?” (289)9
A particular way of relating to history is, Quentin and Shreve suggest here,
passed on like a “birthright” from father to son, and can only be understood –
if at all (“Would I then?”) – by those for whom the South has always been
home.10
Though Quentin has no personal recollections of the Civil War, he is thus
unable to escape the impact of what Marianne Hirsch has called postmemory:
memories handed down from one generation to the next, and therefore char‐
acterized by a deeply personal sense of emotional investment despite the tem‐
poral distance that separates the younger generation from the events concerned
(Family Frames 22).11 In Absalom, Absalom!, the story of Thomas Sutpen is part
of this postmemory that Quentin ‘inherits’:
[T]his first part of it, Quentin already knew. It was a part of his twenty years’ heritage
of breathing the same air and hearing his father talk about the man; a part of the
town’s – Jefferson’s – eighty years’ heritage of the same air which the man himself
had breathed […]. Quentin had grown up with that; the mere names were inter‐
changeable and almost myriad. His childhood was full of them; his very body was an
empty hall echoing with sonorous defeated names; he was not a being, an entity, he
was a commonwealth. (7)
In the collective memory of Jefferson, Mississippi, Thomas Sutpen is such an
overwhelming presence that Quentin is familiar with his story from childhood;
Quentin’s memories are “myriad,” and his very self is not truly individual but
instead “a commonwealth.” Indeed, so heavily does postmemory weigh on
Quentin that his sense of self threatens to collapse:
[H]e would seem to listen to two separate Quentins now – the Quentin Compson
preparing for Harvard in the South, the deep South dead since 1865 and peopled with
1974 “Everybody Seemed to Have to Have a Home”: Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!
garrulous outraged baffled ghosts, listening, having to listen, to one of the ghosts who
had refused to lie still even longer than most had [i.e. Miss Rosa], telling him about
old ghost-times; and the Quentin Compson who was still too young to deserve yet to
be a ghost but nevertheless having to be one for all that, since he was born in the deep
South the same as she was […]. (4)
Faced with the history of Sutpen and the Civil War, Quentin experiences himself
as both disjointed (“two separate Quentins”) and insubstantial (“a ghost”), and
consequently cannot bring himself to share Shreve’s sense of narrative exhila‐
ration.
Thomas Sutpen and the Destruction of Home
If Quentin is unable truly to enjoy the game of historical reconstruction, the
same is true of Rosa Coldfield, who in contrast to Quentin personally witnessed
the destructive effects of Sutpen’s design on Jefferson and, more particularly, on
her own family. For one thing, Sutpen played a key role in the breakdown of the
relationship between Rosa’s father and his home community by proposing to
him a dubious financial scheme – “one of those things that when they work you
were smart and when they dont you change your name and move to Texas”
(208). Though morally outraged by Sutpen’s proposal, Mr. Coldfield realizes that
he “couldn’t quit thinking about it,” and in order to “get it out of his mind” he
decides to accept, fully expecting and even hoping that the scheme will fail (209).
Consequently, Mr. Coldfield is appalled when Sutpen’s unethical gamble even‐
tually pays off:
Mr Coldfield never did believe it would work, so when he saw that it was going to
work, had worked, the least thing he could do was to refuse to take his share of the
profits; […] when he saw that it had worked it was his conscience he hated, not
Sutpen; – his conscience and the land, the country which had created his conscience
and then offered the opportunity to have made all that money to the conscience which
it had created, which could do nothing but decline; hated that country so much that
he was even glad when he saw it drifting closer and closer to a doomed and fatal
war; […] he would have joined the Yankee army […], only he was not a soldier and
knew that he would either be killed or die of hardship and so not be present on that
day when the South would realise that it was now paying the price for having erected
its economic edifice not on the rock of stern morality but on the shifting sands of
opportunism and moral brigandage. (209)
In this episode, Rosa casts Sutpen in the role of the great tempter who seduces
a morally upright man and leaves him fundamentally alienated from a home
community that Rosa’s father now views as irredeemably corrupt. Indeed,
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Mr. Coldfield henceforth hates the South “so much that he was even glad when
he saw it drifting closer to a doomed and fatal war.” After the outbreak of war,
Mr. Coldfield closes his store to Confederate troops and also refuses to sell any
goods to supporters of the Southern cause (64). Eventually, he locks up the store
for good, and when it is looted by troops who were “doubtless abetted, if only
vocally, by his own fellow citizens,” Mr. Coldfield withdraws to the attic of his
home, shutting himself in and nailing the door behind him (65).
The reason why Rosa cannot forget this story is that it led directly to the
irreversible destruction of everything she had previously thought of as home.
From the point when her father shuts himself up in the attic, Miss Rosa secretly
provides him with food, hauling up baskets of provision to him “at night by
means of a well pulley and rope attached to the attic window” (65). Rosa does
this even though she herself supports the Confederate cause – among other
things by writing “odes to Southern soldiers” since the first day of her father’s
self-incarceration. When, after three years of living in the attic, Mr. Coldfield
finally refuses to eat and starves himself to death, the family’s financial assets
are entirely depleted, and Rosa finds herself “not only an orphan, but a pauper
too” (65 – 66). In a very real way, then, both the material and emotional security
of Rosa’s family home was shattered by Thomas Sutpen, who proposed the du‐
bious scheme that led to Mr. Coldfield’s alienation from the home community,
as well as, indirectly, to his suicide.
In addition, we learn that Rosa’s is not the only home that Sutpen destroys
in the relentless pursuit of his design to found a Southern planter dynasty. Before
he came to Jefferson, Sutpen had worked as an “overseer or foreman or some‐
thing to a French sugar planter” in Haiti (199). After saving the planter’s family
during an uprising, Sutpen becomes engaged to marry his employer’s daughter,
who soon gives birth to Sutpen’s first son, Charles (204, 212). However, when
Sutpen finds out that his wife is not, as he had been led to believe, part Spanish,
but “part negro” instead (283), he provides for her “and put[s] her aside” because,
as a ‘mixed-race’ woman, she cannot be “adjunctive or incremental to the de‐
sign” that Sutpen has in mind (194). Sutpen thus ruthlessly breaks apart the
family home he has just established because it fails to correspond to the partic‐
ular fiction of home that he obsessively pursues: a grand plantation manor
owned by a ‘pure,’ white family clan.
However, while Sutpen believes that he can simply leave the past behind, the
abandoned first plantation home ultimately brings about the destruction of his
second home in Jefferson. As a young man, Charles, Sutpen’s first-born son,
enrolls as a student at the same college as Henry, the son from Sutpen’s second
marriage with Ellen Coldfield. Unaware that they are half-brothers, Charles and
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Henry become close friends, and at one point Henry decides to take Charles
home with him to Supten’s Hundred. There, Charles meets Judith, Henry’s sister,
and he soon begins to court the young woman who is in fact his half-sister.
When Sutpen finds his suspicion confirmed that Charles Bon is his first-bon son,
he tries to convince Henry to put a stop to Charles and Judith’s incestuous
courtship. Henry, however, refuses to act against Charles, loving his friend so
much that he prefers to repudiate “father and blood and home” instead (79).
Seeing that even the threat of incest does not move Henry decisively to inter‐
vene, Sutpen, after a long period of waiting, ultimately reveals the secret of
Charles’s ‘tainted’ racial origin to Henry. Despite Henry’s intense affection for
Charles – Norman W. Jones even speaks of a “romance” between the two friends
(348) – Henry cannot bear the thought of racial ‘impurity,’ as Charles himself
observes toward the end of the novel: “So it’s the miscegenation, not the incest,
which you cant bear” (285). In a climactic scene, Henry shoots Charles at the
gates of Sutpen’s Hundred, his family home, and then disappears, leaving Sutpen
bereft of a male heir and therefore, once again, foiled in his design to establish
a great plantation dynasty.
And yet, if it is in some ways true that Sutpen’s second home was destroyed
by the return of a son from the first home, we must at the same time bear in
mind that Sutpen’s Hundred had never truly been a homely home. For instance,
just as Sutpen’s first marriage had “certainly not [been] about love” (200), we
know that Sutpen never had any romantic interest in his second wife, Ellen
Coldfield, but instead merely married her to gain respectability through “the
shield of a virtuous woman” (9). When Ellen, on hear deathbed, asks Rosa to
“save” her two children, or “Judith at least,” from their father (10), it becomes
quite clear that Sutpen’s Hundred is a home only in the most impoverished sense
of the term: a place of residence and physical shelter, but not, as Cleanth Brooks
has pointed out, an emotional or psychological abode. The reason for this lack
of interpersonal affection is that Sutpen’s design, though ostensibly valuing the
family, in fact views it as merely “incidental” (Brooks, Towards Yoknapatawpha
292). Perhaps ‘instrumental’ would be an even better term, for we can say that,
for Supten, the family constitutes only a means to fulfilling his design, rather
than an end in itself (Bollinger 214). Sutpen thus violates one of Kant’s ethical
imperatives, according to which rational beings must never be used as a means
only:
[T]he human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not
merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion; instead he must in
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12 The German original runs: “[D]er Mensch und überhaupt jedes vernünftige Wesen,
existiert als Zweck an sich selbst, nicht bloss als Mittel zum beliebigen Gebrauche für
diesen oder jenen Willen, sondern muss in allen seinen, sowohl auf sich selbst, als auch
auf andere vernünftige Wesen gerichteten Handlungen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck
betrachtet werden” (Kant, Grundlegung 43; § 48).
all his actions, whether directed to himself or also to other rational beings, always be
regarded at the same time as an end […]. (“Groundwork” 79, original emphasis).12
In Marxist terms, Sutpen disregards the use-value of the members of his two
families – their unique qualities and individual needs – reducing them to their
exchange-value instead (i.e. to how much the wife and children can contribute
toward his grand design).
The home at Sutpen’s Hundred is thus built on the same logic as the system
of plantation slavery, in which the unique qualities and needs of the slaves are
seen as entirely irrelevant, and where the only question of importance is their
exchange-value: how much can be got out of them. It is in part because slaves
are reduced in this way to mere means of production, without rights of kinship,
that Orlando Patterson has described them as the “quintessentially homeless”
persons (162), and though Henry and Judith’s situation at Sutpen’s Hundred is
incomparably better in terms of legal recognition and material comfort, the
‘home’ that Sutpen has built for them is founded on the same dehumanizing
logic. It is understandable, then, that the only reason why Henry calls Sutpen’s
Hundred his home is that “everybody seemed to have to have a home” (263).
Home, which for the fortunate is a place both of shelter and of kindness, for
Sutpen’s son constitutes nothing but an inescapable, oppressive obligation.
Knowledge and the Homes of Our Youth
If Sutpen’s design thus has an enormously destructive effect on three different
homes – the Coldfields’ as well as his two plantation homes – the roots of his
design reach back to his own precarious childhood home. Growing up in the
mountains of Virginia, Sutpen only knew people “who lived in log cabins boiling
with children like the one he was born in,” in a society where “the land belonged
to anybody” (179). While this description may initially tempt readers to imagine
the Virginia home as a poor, but otherwise idyllic mountain community, Cleanth
Brooks rightly observes that Sutpen in fact describes a “dog-eat-dog society”
(The Yoknapatawpha Country 426). According to Absalom, Absalom!, everybody
in this society “had just what he was strong enough or energetic enough to take
and keep,” and “the only colored people were Indians and you only looked down
at them over your rifle sights” (179). In other words, the settler society that
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13 In this emphasis on the formative effect of the childhood home, Absalom, Absalom! is
not unlike George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss. There, however, as we have seen in
chapter 2, the enabling qualities of the home are foregrounded, whereas Faulkner’s
novel pays at least as much attention to the potentially debilitating effects of homes
that are fundamentally flawed.
14 From a psychoanalytic and feminist perspective, the fact that the death of Sutpen’s
mother is mentioned only once and very briefly would support the idea that a repression
of the motherly body is the driving force behind Faulkner’s story.
Sutpen describes is characterized by endemic violence and only the most pre‐
carious sense of equality among whites, with the main principle of cohesion
being the settlers’ virulent fear of Native Americans. At the same time, even as
a boy Sutpen sometimes overhears tales of a different society further south: a
society governed by the rule of law and glowing with the splendor of plantation
wealth. And yet, the boy never really pays much attention to such stories “be‐
cause there was nothing in sight to compare and gauge the tales by and so give
the words life and meaning” (180). What is emphasized here are the cognitive
dimensions of the childhood home: they way in which familiar experiences
function as yardsticks against which we measure the unfamiliar, and how some
things may remain inconceivable because they are too different from anything
we have encountered at home.13
It is, accordingly, the family’s move away from the Virginia mountain home
that brings about a first important change in young Sutpen’s intellectual deve‐
lopment. Interestingly, Sutpen’s father decides to move south with his family
shortly after the mother dies, and even though Sutpen does not “remember the
reason if he ever knew it” (181), the sequence of events suggests a link between
the domestic tragedy and the family’s abandoning the old home. Moreover, the
trauma of the loss of his mother may in part explain Sutpen’s fixation on be‐
coming a patriarch.14 At any rate, when the Sutpens finally settle down again,
they find themselves in a society that works very differently from the Virginia
mountain community:
[Supten] learned the difference not only between white men and black ones, but he
was learning that there was a difference between white men and white men not to be
measured by lifting anvils or gouging eyes or how much whiskey you could drink
then get up and walk out of the room. That is, he had begun to discern that without
being aware of it yet. He still thought that that was just a matter of where you were
spawned and how; lucky or not lucky […]. (183)
Society in the Deep South is based on entirely different laws and conventions,
and sharply divided not only in terms of race (which, after all, had been the case
in Virginia, too), but also in terms of class (“a difference between white men and
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white men”). It is a place where “regiments of niggers with white men watching
them planted and raised things,” and where a select group of white men living
in big houses “owned all the land and the niggers and apparently the white men
who superintended the work” (184). In this new society, young Sutpen also ob‐
serves that many slaves wear “better clothes than he or his father and sisters
had ever owned and ever expected to,” and that some of these slaves also live in
better-kept quarters than poor white laborers like the Sutpens. At the same time,
the dwellings of poor whites still seem to the boy mysteriously “nimbused with
freedom’s bright aura, which the slave quarters were not for all their sound roofs
and white wash” (184 – 185). Even though the family’s geographical change of
home confronts Sutpen with a new and different type of community, the boy is
thus not yet prepared to abandon his belief that all white men are, if not eco‐
nomically, then at least legally and politically equal.
In Faulkner’s novel, the family’s physical removal from home is therefore a
necessary first step, but not a sufficient condition for radically new knowledge
and deeper insight on Sutpen’s part. Instead, a ‘cognitive restructuring’ can only
occur once additional factors come into play, and for Thomas Sutpen the decisive
factor is an insult that undermines his previous trust in white equality and his
own self-worth. When Sutpen is “thirteen or fourteen,” his father sends him to
his employer’s plantation home to deliver a message, and the young boy looks
forward to finally seeing the inside of the white master’s mansion (185). How‐
ever, a black servant not only stops Sutpen from entering the house, but even
tells him “never to come to that front door again but to go around the
back” (188). In consequence of this insult, everything Sutpen thought he knew
and understood is suddenly cast in a different light:
[H]e seemed to kind of dissolve and a part of him turn and rush back through the two
years they had lived there like when you pass through a room fast and look at all the
objects in it and you turn and go back through the room again from the other side and
you find out you had never seen them before […]. (186)
An experience of defamiliarization thus follows the black servant’s insult, un‐
dermining not only Sutpen’s self-image, but also his previously unquestioned
belief that a rich man could never think himself superior to a poor white boy
like Sutpen (185). Baffled rather than outraged, Sutpen turns away from the
plantation manor and runs, “not toward home,” but off into cave in the woods,
“where he could be quiet and think” (188).
By having Sutpen run off into the woods and not toward home, the novel
makes explicit that Sutpen’s reconceptualization of society and his own place
in it does not – perhaps cannot – happen in the most familiar surrounding of
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15 A similar moment in which a character suddenly recognizes the abject poverty of his
own, previously so familiar home occurs in Indra Sinha’s novel Animal’s People
(2007). The novel’s main character and narrator lives in a slum called Nutcracker in the
fictional city of Khaufpur (modeled on Bhopal, the capital of the Indian state of Madhya
Pradesh). When the protagonist hears someone observe that “this whole district looks
like it was flung up by an earthquake,” his home appears suddenly in an entirely new
light: “On hearing Elli speak this one word, earthquake, something weird and painful
happens in my head. Up to that moment this was Paradise Alley, the heart of the Nut‐
cracker, a place I’d known all my life. When Elli says earthquake suddenly I’m seeing
it as she does. Paradise Alley is a wreckage of baked earth mounds and piles of planks
on which hang gunny sacks, plastic sheets, dried palm leaves. Like drunks with arms
round each other’s necks, the houses of the Nutcracker lurch along this lane which,
now that I look, isn’t really even a road, just a long gap left by chance between the
dwellings. Everywhere’s covered in shit and plastic. Truly I see how poor and disgusting
are our lives” (106).
the home. Moreover, we soon learn just how profoundly the boy’s perception
of the family home changes through his dramatic experience of humiliation:
[H]e began to think of Home. Home and […] he thought at first he was trying to laugh
and […] he kept on telling himself it was laughing even after he knew better; home,
as he came out of the woods and approached it, still hidden yet, and looked at it – the
rough partly rotten log walls, the sagging roof […], the leanto room which they used
for kitchen […], and his sister pumping rhythmic up and down above a washtub in
the yard, her back toward him, shapeless in a calico dress and a pair of the old man’s
shoes unlaced and flapping about her bare ankles and broad in the beam as a cow, the
very labor she was doing brutish and stupidly out of all proportion to its reward: the
very primary essence of labor, toil, reduced to its crude absolute which only a beast
could and would endure […]. (190 – 191)
The family home, previously “nimbused with freedom’s bright aura,” is now not
even something to laugh at, but instead a place to be ashamed of for its poverty
and squalor.15 Whereas once Sutpen believed that all white men were created
equal, he now recognizes that the dehumanizing poverty of white families (i.e.
labor that is “stupidly out of all proportion to its reward,” and “which only a
beast could and would endure”) is constitutive to the hierarchically divided so‐
cial system he had thought he knew intimately and understood.
However, though Sutpen now recognizes the extent to which the ‘private’ life
at home is shaped by ‘public’ social circumstances, the conclusions he draws
from this insight fall short of their radical potential. In part, this is because
Sutpen’s upbringing has not provided him with the mental resources necessary
to conceive of an appropriate response to his new insights. As Greg Forter
observes, Sutpen for a time debates with himself the various ways in which he
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might respond to the black servant’s insult, which emphasizes that “more than
one response is conceivable” (Forter 276). Recognizing, for instance, that “they
(the niggers) were not it, not what you wanted to hit” (Absalom 186), Sutpen
could have developed a revolutionary yearning to level both class and racial
hierarchies. However, the odds are stacked against such a response on Sutpen’s
part, as nothing in the boy’s experience has prepared him to think beyond the
color line: “[H]e was seeking among what little he had to call experience for
something to measure it by, and he couldn’t find anything” (188). Rather than
conceiving of a kind of solidarity that transcends the boundaries of race, the first
idea that comes to Sutpen’s mind is simply to shoot the owner of the plantation
(189) – an idea that arguably reflects the endemic violence of his Virginia moun‐
tain upbringing. At the same time, Sutpen senses that this “wouldn’t do no
good” (190; original emphasis), and still debating with himself, the insulted youth
tries to find a more appropriate solution by drawing analogies between the cur‐
rent problem and his past experience:
‘If you were fixing to combat them that had the fine rifles, the first thing you would
do would be to get yourself the nearest thing to a fine rifle you could borrow or steal
or make, wouldn’t it?’ and he said Yes. ‘But this aint a question of rifles. So to combat
them you have got to have what they have that made them do what he did. You got
to have land and niggers and a fine house to combat them with. You see?’ and he said
Yes again. (192)
Building on the Virginia home’s logic of gun-toting violence, Sutpen decides
that he can only fight rich white men successfully if he rises to their social level,
with “land and niggers and a fine house to combat them with.” As is, perhaps,
to be expected of a boy filled with the “self reliance of mountains and solitude”
(195), Sutpen thus imaginatively models his “combat” against the white upper
class on the individualist image of a gunfight, rather than envisaging a collective
struggle of poor laborers – white and black – against the exploitative plantation
owners.
It is, moreover, not only Sutpen’s domestic background that severely limits
his chances for dealing appropriately with his crisis of self-worth, for we also
learn that he was sent to school only for “about three months one winter” (194).
Sutpen’s formal education thus proves woefully inadequate, too. One of the few
things Sutpen remembers from his brief time at school is that the teacher once
read to the class from a book about the West Indies, a place “to which poor men
went in ships and became rich, it didn’t matter how, so long as that man was
clever and courageous” (195; emphasis added). The teacher’s account of how
colonial fortunes are made thus matches closely the way in which, according to
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16 In fact, Faulkner’s novel also emphasizes that the father “probably” sent his son to
school, “not to better himself,” but out of “mere vindictive envy toward one or two men,
planters, whom he had to see every now and then” (194). The two novels thus share the
themes of patriarchal trouble, problematic father-son relationships, and inadequate
schooling thus continues.
Franco Moretti, the colonies tend to be represented in nineteenth-century
British novels: it is “the mythic geography – pecunia ex machina – of a wealth
that is not really produced […] but magically ‘found’ overseas” (Atlas of the
European Novel 27). Combining the resources of his limited home experience
with the teacher’s misleading accounts of the West Indies, young Sutpen patches
together his grand design of becoming a wealthy plantation owner.16 He is aware
that the accomplishment of the design will require “first of all and above all
things money in considerable quantities and in the quite immediate future,” and
taking his teacher’s ideologically distorted account of rags-to-riches careers in
the West Indies at face value, Sutpen decides to leave the U. S. for Haiti (196). At
this point in the novel, we know already that Sutpen will destroy several homes
later in his life, but by emphasizing the highly inauspicious circumstances of his
upbringing – inured to violence, and exposed to misleading information during
his brief and unenlightening time at school – Faulkner’s novel makes it possible
for us to understand (though not condone) Sutpen’s subsequent course of action.
Fantasies of Innocence: The American Adam
It is, in fact, precisely because Sutpen suffers from such an inauspicious up‐
bringing that a seemingly outrageous claim made several times by Quentin’s
grandfather – namely that Sutpen’s tragic flaw was “innocence” – gains at least
some plausibility. Despite the fact that Sutpen ends up destroying one home
after another, Quentin’s grandfather insists that Sutpen at heart remained an
innocent. Indeed, Grandfather Compson claims that Sutpen’s innocence was
already apparent in the latter’s reaction to the black servant’s insult:
His trouble was innocence. All of a sudden he discovered, not what he wanted to do
but what he just had to do, had to do it whether he wanted to or not, because if he did
not do it he knew that he could never live with himself […], never live with what all
the dead men and women that had died to make him had left inside of him for him to
pass on […]. And that at the very moment when he discovered what it was, he found
out that this was the last thing in the world he was equipped to do because he not
only had not known that he would have to do this, he did not even know that it existed
to be wanted, to need to be done, until he was almost fourteen years old. Because he
was born in West Virginia, in the mountains […]. (178)
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17 Of course, as Martin Gretchen notes, Sutpen initially wants to combat the Southern
upper class but ultimately ends up joining and even defending it in the Civil War: “His
personal fight becomes absorbed into the Southern conflict” (409).
Explicitly related to his Virginia mountain background, Sutpen’s innocence is
also associated here with a lack of knowledge (“had not known that he would
have to do this, he did not even know that it existed to be wanted, to need to be
done”). Moreover, while it would seem that Sutpen must inevitably lose his in‐
nocence in the very moment of recognition, Quentin’s grandfather maintains
that this is not so. On the contrary, Supten kept his innocence “because after it
[i.e. his innocence] finally told him what to do that night he forgot about it and
didn’t know he still had it” (194). Later, Quentin’s grandfather defines Sutpen’s
supposed innocence in an almost biblical sense as a lack of knowledge of good
and evil, for the man had “that innocence which believed that the ingredients
of morality were like the ingredients of pie or cake and once you had measured
them and balanced them and mixed them and put them into the oven it was all
finished and nothing but pie or cake could come out” (212). It is possible, in short,
to portray Sutpen as a victim of deleterious social circumstances: a young boy
from a motherless home who was both intellectually and morally ill-equipped
to deal with either the psychological or the societal pressures of an impoverished
existence in the Deep South.17
If we therefore accept, for the time being, that the term ‘innocence’ may with
some justice be applied to Thomas Sutpen, then it becomes easy to see that in
many ways he corresponds to the type of figure that R. W. Lewis calls the Amer‐
ican Adam. Michael Gellert argues that U. S. self-definitions have long involved
the idea of a break with the past, and that this belief harks back to the Puritan
notion “that America was the place for a new beginning in the history of man‐
kind” (153). Gellert also notes that Thomas Jefferson – whose name the fictional
town in Absalom, Absalom! carries – was among those who regarded the United
States as a place where “the evils of the old European order […] would no longer
interfere with the people’s ability to access their natural, God-given moral sense”
(Gellert 149). For R. W. Lewis, it is from this particular view of history that the
figure of the American Adam arises:
America, it was said insistently from the 1820’s onward, was not the end-product of
a long historical process […]; it was something entirely new. […]
The new habits to be engendered on the new American scene were suggested by
the image of a radically new personality, the hero of the new adventure: an individual
emancipated from history, happily bereft of ancestry, untouched and undefiled by the
usual inheritances of family and race; an individual standing alone, self-reliant and
2074 “Everybody Seemed to Have to Have a Home”: Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!
18 We know from Faulkner’s novel that Sutpen is thirteen or fourteen when the insult
occurs (185), and as Sutpen was born in 1807 (Absalom 380), we can date the event to
around 1820.
self-propelling, ready to confront whatever awaited him with the aid of his own unique
and inherent resources. (5)
In this description, we can recognize a number of parallels to the figure of
Thomas Sutpen: the emphasis on self-reliance, for instance, or the idea that it is
possible to emancipate oneself from one’s history and make a completely new
beginning (as Sutpen tries to do twice, first in Haiti and then in Jefferson).
Moreover, in terms of chronology, it is suggestive that Sutpen’s life-changing
experience of being insulted by a black servant, which lies at the origin of his
design, occurs around 1820, and thus precisely when, according to Lewis, it
became increasingly common in the American republic to emphasize a sense of
historical rupture (“something entirely new”).18 There are, then, several reasons
why it is possible for Quentin’s grandfather to style Sutpen as a tragic version
of the American Adam: a self-reliant and self-propelling figure of “heroic inno‐
cence” (Lewis 1) who embodies the New World’s supposed potential for new
beginnings, and who fails in his quest precisely because of his innocence.
At the same time, however, Absalom, Absalom! provides us with at least three
different reasons why we should be wary of Grandfather Compson’s portrayal
of Sutpen as an Adamic innocent. The first of these reasons is that Sutpen’s ‘new
beginning’ in fact constitutes anything but a true break with his past. As we
have seen, for instance, Sutpen’s belief in self-reliant action and individual au‐
tonomy is itself part of his upbringing and cultural inheritance. Accordingly,
Laurel Bollinger is right in suggesting that the figure of Sutpen exposes the myth
of the autonomous individual who can simply leave his or her history behind
(231). In addition, Faulkner’s text is quite clear about the fact that Sutpen’s re‐
action to the black servant’s insult in part arises from his sense of duty to the
past, for the boy believes that he could never again “live with what all the dead
men and women that had died to make him had left inside of him for him to
pass on” if he decided not to act (178). Paradoxically, then, Sutpen’s attempt to
break with the past is motivated by his sense of being bound and responsible to
it. Finally, though Supten seems like a figure “of no discernible past” when he
first appears in Jefferson (7), we know that the past later does come back to
haunt him in the figure of Charles, the abandoned son from his first marriage.
If, then, Faulkner’s novel evokes the figure of the American Adam through the
account of Sutpen given by Quentin’s grandfather, it does so to critique the
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19 See also Ulrike Hanna Meinhof (7): “As much as we might think that our self-construc‐
tions are our own, we always draw upon socially available resources with which we
construct our experience of ourselves and the reality surrounding us.”
ideological dream that the figure embodies: the fantasy of a new beginning un‐
burdened from the weight of history.
A second challenge to the narrative of innocence propagated by Quentin’s
grandfather is Miss Rosa’s rendering of Sutpen as a demoniac Gothic villain.
According to Quentin, his grandfather was Sutpen’s “only friend” (220), and it
is hardly surprising that a friend would want to depict Sutpen as innocent. By
contrast, Rosa Coldfield has many reasons to detest Thomas Sutpen, since in her
view he destroyed the home both of her father and of her sister Ellen, Sutpen’s
second wife. After Ellen’s death, moreover, Sutpen adds insult to injury by telling
Rosa that he might marry her if she were willing first to bear his child, in order
to allow him to see whether it will be a boy or a girl: “if it was a boy and lived,
they would be married” (228). Though Rosa at one point in the novel claims to
have forgiven Sutpen, and even that she “had nothing to forgive” (138), much
of what she says about the man in fact sounds rather like an indictment:
[H]e was not articulated in this world. He was a walking shadow. He was the
light-blinded bat-like image of his own torment cast by a fierce demoniac lantern up
from beneath the earth’s crust and hence in retrograde, reverse; from abysmal and
chaotic dark to eternal and abysmal dark completing his descending […], clinging,
trying to cling with vain unsubstantial hands to what he hoped would hold him, save
him, arrest him – Ellen […], myself, then last of all that fatherless daughter of Wash
Jones’s only child who, so I heard once, died in a Memphis brothel – to find severance
(even if not rest and peace) at last in the stroke of a rusty scythe. (139)
In this heavily Gothic denouncement, Rosa associates Sutpen with nether‐
worldly forces (“demoniac,” “from beneath the earth’s crust”) and also invokes
two other women on whose lives he wrought havoc: her sister Ellen and the
fifteen-year-old Milly Jones, who, after Ellen’s death and Rosa’s refusal of Sut‐
pen’s ‘proposal,’ bears Sutpen’s child but is then cast aside by him when he finds
that she has given birth not to a male heir, but to a girl (an action that leads
Milly’s father to kill Sutpen with a scythe; 234). Drawing a sharp contrast be‐
tween Rosa’s and Grandfather Compson’s account, Absalom, Absalom! thus
lends support to Harald Welzer’s thesis that memories are shaped by the desire
for meaning of the person who remembers, and that socio-cultural story tem‐
plates are used to establish the desired meaning (160, 186).19 While, on the one
hand, there is Quentin’s grandfather, who uses the template of the American
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Adam in his attempt retrospectively to absolve his friend, Rosa aims to exact
narrative revenge by framing Sutpen as a Gothic villain.
A House Divided: From Biblical Intertext to National Allegory
If Rosa’s Gothic counter-discourse and Sutpen’s inability to make a new begin‐
ning challenge the image of Sutpen as an American Adam, a third challenge
arises from the biblical title of Faulkner’s novel, which aligns Sutpen, not with
Adam, but instead with King David, and thus with a morally much more am‐
bivalent figure. Even as a boy, Sutpen appears a bit like the young shepherd
David in his belief that he might single-handedly defeat a seemingly invincible
enemy: Goliath in the case of David, and the racist system of exploitation in the
U. S. South in Sutpen’s case. More importantly, however, the story of Sutpen’s
children in several ways parallels the story of the children of King David. Ac‐
cording to the biblical tale, Absalom is one of King David’s sons, and he kills his
half-brother Amnon because the latter raped Tamar, Absalom’s younger sister,
just as Henry Sutpen will eventually kill his half brother Charles. Moreover, like
Henry, Absalom ends up opposing his father (in Absalom’s case leading a re‐
bellion against the king). What connects the two stories, more broadly speaking,
is a focus on domestic turmoil and its familial as well as dynastic consequences.
In addition, the precise context from which the novel’s title is taken sheds
some light on one of its key themes: on how history tends to come back to haunt
us. In the biblical narrative, Absalom’s rebellion against his father proves un‐
successful, and when King David learns that the son was killed after the battle,
he utters a heart-rending cry of mourning that provides the source for
Faulkner’s title: “O my son Absalom, O Absalom, my son, my son!” (2 Samuel
19:4; KJV). As Peter von Matt rightly points out, the intensity of the king’s grief
is likely to appear puzzling to most readers, since Absalom wanted to kill David
and was, from this perspective, justly punished for rising up against his father
(28). For von Matt, the key to this interpretive puzzle lies in David’s past, for the
king, having fallen in love with Bathsheba, a married woman, conspired with
one of his generals to ensure that Bathsheba’s husband, Uriah, would be killed
in battle (2 Samuel 11; see von Matt 28 – 29). The prophet Nathan subsequently
foretold what the punishment for David’s actions would be: “Thus saith the Lord,
Behold, I will raise up evil against thee out of thine own house” (2 Samuel 12:11,
KJV). Crucially, von Matt notes (28), it is in the very next episode that Absalom’s
name is first mentioned (2 Samuel 13:1). This suggests that it is Absalom who
will be the instrument of divine retribution: the “evil” arising out of the king’s
own house. The sins of the father are, in this view, visited upon the son – which
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is, as we have seen, precisely what happens in Faulkner’s novel, where both
Henry and Charles become victims of their father’s ruthless design.
As noted in the introductory chapter, it is tempting to see such allusions to
biblical and other well known texts as home-making devices: a web of familiar
intertextual references that makes a novel’s readers feel more at home. However,
in the case of Absalom, Absalom! there are a number of problems with this view.
For one thing, it is only for readers who know the bible well that the title of
Faulkner’s novel could serve as guidance in the first place. For anyone who is
unfamiliar with the details of the biblical narrative – i.e. the majority of the
world population today, and arguably most Christians, too – the novel’s title is
enigmatic rather than helpful, especially since the reference is not explained or
elaborated in the text. In other words, as we have seen in the case of Steven
Spielberg’s E. T., religious intertexts can potentially serve as home-making de‐
vices, but their effect depends both on how, precisely, the references are de‐
ployed, and on readers’ available intertextual repertoire.
Moreover, despite the parallels mentioned above, the plot of Absalom, Ab‐
salom! also differs in crucial respects from the biblical story. Unlike Thomas
Sutpen, for instance, King David never asks Absalom to act against his
half-brother (i.e. Absalom takes revenge for the rape entirely on his own initia‐
tive, whereas Sutpen himself urges his son Henry to take action). Similarly, un‐
like Absalom’s half-brother Amnon, Charles does not rape his half-sister Judith,
who would in fact be perfectly happy to marry Charles. Finally, while Absalom
tries to depose his father and prematurely assume his position as David’s suc‐
cessor, Henry rebels against his father by repudiating his home and thus refusing
to become his dynastic heir at all. In short, while the biblical narrative may seem
to provide Faulkner’s readers with some reassuring interpretive guidance and
thus make them feel more at home in the text, the manifold contrasts between
the two stories end up complicating matters further.
Less conspicuous than these biblical intertext, but equally important in terms
of the novels themes is its connection to Abraham Lincoln’s ‘House Divided’
speech. In this speech, which Lincoln gave after he had won the Republican
nomination for Senator from Illinois in 1858, the future President argued that a
“house divided against itself” could not stand, and that the U. S. government
would not “endure, permanently half slave and half free.” (qtd. in McPherson
179; original emphasis). Lincoln’s image of a “house divided against itself” draws
on two distinct intertextual sources: a parable told by Jesus, who was accused
of having driven out a demon with the help of Beelzebub, and who defended
himself by insisting that this was impossible because the powers of evil were
not a “house divided” (Mark 3:25), and a nineteenth-century American discourse
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that imagined the nation as reflected, and even embodied, in the domestic
sphere: “Antebellum American writers celebrated the home as the symbol of
‘America,’ the site of nurture and republican fraternity, the embodiment of
equality, affection, and toleration” (Egan 13). Given that the home was thus
imagined as a symbol of the American nation, Ken Egan Jr. argues that stories
about fallen houses (such as Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher”)
necessarily constituted a challenge to Antebellum (over-)confidence in enduring
national stability (170 – 173). Focusing more specifically on Absalom, Absalom!,
Eric Sundquist observes that both Lincoln and Supten try to save their ‘house’
from disintegrating, and in both cases it is the Civil War that forces a resolution
of the crisis: “It is not by any means an analogy in which they or their designs
are exactly duplicated but, rather, one in which they are mirror images in the
sense that a mirror image reverses the figure to which it corresponds” (105) Just
as is the case with the novel’s biblical intertext, the links to Lincoln and his
famous House Divided Speech are thus far from simple one-to-one correspond‐
ences; rather, they serve to increase the text’s resonance and complexity because
they create a dialectical tension between familiarity and alienation.
If we take the biblical intertext as a cue for allegorical decoding – allegory is,
after all a scriptural mode of interpretation – and combine this with the text’s
reference to Lincoln’s speech (which focused on the future of the American
nation), then there is ample ground for us to attempt a reading of Absalom,
Absalom! in terms of national allegory. In his introduction to the concept of
allegory, Jeremy Tambling argues that the genre is still often misrepresented in
modern literary studies as a rigid and abstract way of en- or decoding a text. At
the same time, critics following the lead of Walter Benjamin and Paul de Man
have challenged this view (Tambling, Allegory 1–2), and Fredric Jameson, too,
insists that an allegorical reading does not necessarily constitute a narrowing
or closing off of interpretive possibilities, but can instead lead to an “opening
up of the text to multiple meanings, to successive rewritings” (The Political
Unconscious 14). We have seen that both the biblical intertext and the thematic
reference to Lincoln’s speech add to the complexity of Absalom, Absalom!, and
by systematically reading the novel as a national allegory, we will be able to
perform precisely the kind of opening up that Jameson regards as the positive
potential of allegorical interpretation.
Jameson himself has in fact commented on the concept of national allegory,
making the controversial suggestion that it is “third-world texts,” in particular,
that “necessarily project a political dimension in the form of national allegory”
(“Third-World Literature” 69; emphasis added). Aijaz Ahmad has rightly critized
Jameson’s rigid link between national allegory and “third-world texts” for its
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unwarranted, binary opposition between a unified West and a supposedly mon‐
olithic third-world Other (95). Among other things, Ahmad points out that
Jameson overstates the presence of national allegory in ‘third-world’ literature
while at the same time underestimating “the presence of analogous impulses in
US cultural ensembles” (110). In the light of Ahmad’s critique, we may speculate
that there is a tendency toward national allegory in fiction from peripheral re‐
gions in general, irrespective of whether that periphery be located in the United
States (e.g. the South), or in India, or elsewhere in the world. We may also ask
whether a reader’s distance from a particular location makes it easier for him
or her to allegorize the literal level of a narrative because regional details seem
to serve no real function except to add ‘local color.’ This would imply, conversely,
that the greater the extent to which readers feel at home in a particular culture,
the less likely (or willing) they are to ‘devalue’ the thick descriptions of everyday
local life by recasting them as merely allegorical ciphers for broader, national
concerns. Finally, the ways of reading allegorically may themselves differ vastly
among different interpretive communities, to use a concept proposed by Stanley
Fish. Fish argues that it is from the interpretive community to which they belong
that readers learn how to construct the meaning of a text, and that such com‐
munities therefore “determine the shape of what is read rather than, as is usually
assumed, the other way around” (14). If this is so, then it may be communally
shaped interpretive desires, rather than any particular textual features, that
would explain the decision to recast a novel – Absalom, Absalom!, for instance –
in terms of a national allegory. Put differently: there are different ways of making
oneself at home in a text, and these techniques of interpretive home-making
may have much to do with our own communal and cultural belonging(s).
Plantation Domesticity: Slavery at Home
Though the concept of national allegory is far from problematic, a reading of
Absalom, Absalom! in these terms quickly proves productive because the story
of the origins of Sutpen’s Hundred – Thomas Sutpen’s plantation home – dis‐
plays several links to the colonial conquest of the New World and the history of
the United States, in particular. Early in the novel, for instance, we learn that
Sutpen takes the land for his plantation “from a tribe of ignorant Indians” (10).
Later, at a time when he had only one “gold Spanish coin” left, Sutpen engages
a French architect to design the plantation manor subsequently built by black
slaves (26; see also 31). These elements from the novel allegorically encode im‐
portant aspects of the history of the New World, which the Spanish ‘discovered’
and then plundered because, among other things, of its rich supply of gold, and
which involved the dispossession of Native Americans as well as the enslave‐
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20 Elizabeth Maddock Dillon and Michael J Drexler note that, to this day, popular accounts
of American history highlight its supposedly non-violent nature, ignoring “the bloody
backdrop of the Haitian Revolution out of which” it emerged (8).
21 Thomas Jefferson – a Virginian like Sutpen and ‘patron saint’ of Quentin’s fictional
hometown – in many ways epitomized this paradox, for not only was he the author of
the declaration of independence and a slave owner, but he also vocally advocated the
view that the British were pursuing a “deliberate and systematical plan of reducing us
to slavery” (8).
ment of black people. Moreover, the presence of the French architect can be read
as an allegorical reference to the so-called Louisiana Purchase of 1803, in which
the United States bought a huge territory – including the future state of Mis‐
sissippi – from the French (Gordon S. Wood 368 – 370).20 Sutpen’s Hundred, the
home of the family, is thus allegorically connected in Absalom, Absalom! to a
broader continental and national history. In addition, we have already seen that
Sutpen is a critical reworking of R. W. Lewis’s figure of the American Adam,
whose national and allegorical dimensions we need hardly emphasize further.
What we do need to re-examine, however, is the notion of innocence that
forms such a crucial component of the idea of the American Adam, for we can
rewrite allegorically the notion of innocence if we relate it to the cultural role
of slavery in the United States. If Absalom, Absalom! critiques the figure of the
American Adam by putting Sutpen’s innocence in question in various ways –
through Sutpen’s inability truly to begin anew, by Rosa’s Gothic version of Sut‐
pen’s story, and through that story’s complicated intertextual relation to the
story of King David and his son Absalom – then the fact that Sutpen is a slave‐
holder adds a crucial political twist to this critique. Carolyn Porter, for instance,
has observed that the image of a slave-holding yet heroic innocent – this “wed‐
ding of the upwardly mobile American hero’s dream of success to the Southern
planter-aristocrat’s paternalism” – is a particularly disturbing feature of
Faulkner’s novel (173). Indeed, what this combination in the allegorical figure
of Thomas Sutpen highlights is that the United States’ favored myth of national
innocence is similarly troubled by the historical fact of slavery. The first sizeable
shipment of Africans arrived in English-speaking North America as early as in
1619, and by the final decades of the seventeenth century slavery was starting
to be systematically developed (e.g. Painter 22; Betty Wood 73 – 78). The ‘peculiar
institution’ was thus well established when the American revolutionaries began
to fight for independence, and numerous critics have commented on the paradox
that the very men who feared ‘enslavement’ by the British, and who therefore
declared their independence on the principle that all men were created equal,
were themselves slaveholders (e.g. Middlekauff 119 – 126; Swaminathan 93).21
Moreover, if we accept the view that the American Revolution was compromised
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22 See Gerald Horne’s The Counter-Revolution of 1776 (2014) for a particularly critical ac‐
count of the link between the American Revolution and the institution of slavery.
23 In a deeply ironic reference to this paternalistic discourse of plantation domesticity, a
Kentucky slave plantation in Toni Morrison’s 1987 novel Beloved is called Sweet Home –
a name about which one of the former slaves says early in the novel: “It wasn’t sweet
and it sure wasn’t home” (14).
by the unresolved problem of slavery, and that these conflicts made a later na‐
tional crisis like the Civil War virtually inevitable (Blackburn 141, 229 and
397 – 409; Osterhammel 768), then we can say that for the young nation, just as
for Sutpen, a willful fantasy of innocence concerning the past returned violently
to haunt the present. As Eric Sundquist puts it concisely, “Sutpen’s crisis of
innocence, as well as the flaw that engenders it [i.e. his first son’s ‘black blood’]
is the nation’s” (102). From the very beginning of U. S. history, the existence of
slavery compromised the nation’s revolutionary ideals expressed in the opening
sentences of the Declaration of Independence – a challenge that the ‘innocent’
figure of Sutpen embodies.22
This challenge becomes all the more forceful if we consider that it was pre‐
cisely around the time of Sutpen’s childhood (i.e. in the early years of the nine‐
teenth century) that there was a crucial shift of emphasis from domination to‐
ward ‘innocence’ in slaveholder ideology. This shift of emphasis was expressed
through what Jeffrey Robert Young has called “plantation domesticity.” Young
argues that, to most eighteenth-century planters, the idea that there should be
bonds of affection between slaves and their owners would have been entirely
foreign; rather, the masters “despised and feared their bondservants” (124). By
1815, however, there was a growing assumption among planters that African
Americans were human beings, albeit perpetually child-like ones (Young 131).
As Richard Godden points out, the “peculiar institution peculiarly demanded
that its managers view their slaves as a threat but also, and simultaneously, as
children of limited will, as Sambos to be loved through subordination” (254). By
thus figuring the enslaved as part of the extended family belonging to the plan‐
tation home, slave owners could both diffuse their own fears of a black insur‐
rection and imagine themselves as stern but ultimately benevolent fathers (Gu‐
demstad 82). The notion of plantation domesticity thus allowed slaveholders
imaginatively to transfigure the daily violence of racist oppression into loving
gestures of parental care.23
The link between Sutpen’s ‘innocence’ and the “plantation domesticity” of
slaveholder ideology initially seems at odds with the fact, observed by Richard
Godden, that Sutpen differs from the more established Southern planters pre‐
cisely in that he does not style himself as a benign fatherly figure in his dealings
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with the slaves (254 – 255). Instead, “naked and panting and bloody to the waist,”
he engages in fierce wrestling matches with ‘his’ negroes, “perhaps as a matter
of sheer deadly forethought toward the retention of supremacy, domination”
(Absalom 21). There is little sense, in other words, that Sutpen is merely benev‐
olently watching over his black children; rather, he fights them so fiercely that
his son Henry – whom Sutpen at one point brings with him to watch the father
wrestling the slaves – ends up “screaming and vomiting” (21). Given Sutpen’s
disregard for even a show of plantation domesticity, it is tempting to conclude,
with Cleanth Brooks, that Sutpen is ultimately not a representative or typical
Southern planter (Towards Yoknapatawpha 292 – 294).
However, the idea that Sutpen is not representative jars with Brooks’s si‐
multaneous claim that Sutpen “outdoes in his vehement orthodoxy” the estab‐
lished planters (Towards Yoknapatawpha 293). How, we must ask, can Sutpen be
untypical yet somehow more orthodox than slaveholders from the older,
long-established families? One way of reconciling Brooks’s seemingly contra‐
dictory claims is to read Sutpen as a literal return of the repressed for the other
planters, who would prefer to mask and forget the necessarily violent nature of
slavery. For the old-stock planters, the foundational violence of the system of
plantation slavery lies buried deep in the past; their forefathers may have had
to break the will of men and women who had been born free, but they themselves
preferred to see themselves as benevolent fathers to their inherited, child-like,
‘domesticated’ slaves. Raymond Williams has commented on this very common
illusion that long-established property is somehow more innocent than recently
accumulated wealth:
Very few titles to property could bear humane investigation, in the long process of
conquest, theft, political intrigue […], extortion and the power of money. It is a deep
and persistent illusion to suppose that time confers on these familiar processes of
acquisition an innocence which can be contrasted with the ruthlessness of subsequent
stages of the same essential drives. (50)
To be confronted with “the ruthlessness of subsequent stages of the same es‐
sential drives”: this is what happens to the planters when Sutpen arrives in
Jefferson to drag his plantation “violently” from the earth (Absalom 4). Sutpen
truly is both unlike all the established planters and at the same time more rep‐
resentative than they are of the reality of a slave economy, for his ruthlessness
renders visible the foundational violence that the ideology of plantation do‐
mesticity attempts to conceal.
If so far our allegorical ‘opening up’ of Absalom, Absalom! has been limited,
for the most part, to the evil of slavery in the U. S. South, then Sutpen’s Virginia
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24 As Barbara J. Fields rightly notes, the term race relations is highly problematic: “Race
relations as an analysis of society takes for granted that race is a valid empirical datum
and thereby shifts attention from the actions that constitute racism-enslavement, dis‐
franchisement, segregation, lynching, massacres, and pogroms-to the traits that con‐
stitute race” (151).
origin is the key element that allows us to recast his story in more broadly
national, American terms. Edmund Sears Morgan has shown that the single most
important good with which the revolutionary U. S. government bought the sup‐
port of other nations in its struggle for independence was tobacco, produced on
the Southern slave plantations, and particularly in Virginia:
Virginia was the largest of the new United States, in territory, in population, in influ‐
ence – and in slaveholding. Virginians owned more than 40 percent of all slaves in
the new nation. It was Virginia slaves who grew most of the tobacco that helped buy
American independence. […] Virginians drafted not only the Declaration of Inde‐
pendence but also the United States Constitution of 1787 and the first ten amendments
to it. And Americans elected Virginians to the presidency of the United States under
that constitution for thirty-two out of the first thirty-six years of its existence. They
were all slaveholders. (5 – 6)
We can therefore say, with Morgan, that to a large extent “Americans bought
their independence by slave labor” (5), and that Virginia constitutes the key link
between the slave economy and national politics. Sutpen’s Virginia origin is thus
crucial for the allegorical significance of Absalom, Absalom!, pointing as it does
to the unsavory paradox that enslavement lies at the very heart of the United
States’ freedom as a nation.
The Specter of Race and Slavery Abroad
The reason why a re-examination of this genuinely American paradox was par‐
ticularly urgent at the time when Faulkner wrote Absalom, Absalom! is that ‘race
relations’ in the U. S. were in a deep state of crisis in the first decades of the
twentieth century.24 While the so-called Reconstruction of the post-Civil-War
years initially prioritized black freedom and emancipation, the desire for na‐
tional reconciliation between white Northerners and Southerners eventually
“trumped race” (Blight 2). A new phase in race relations thus began in 1877,
when federal troops were withdrawn from the Southern states and the North
implicitly acquiesced in the South’s demand that the region’s dominant whites
were to deal with the ‛problem of race’ on their own terms (Blackburn 429 – 432).
As C. Vann Woodward notes, while it was not immediately apparent what pre‐
cisely the “new status of the Negro” would be, it became clear by the early years
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25 See Norman (4) on the complex history of the term Jim Crow.
of the twentieth century that African Americans “would be effectively disfran‐
chised throughout the South” through the system generally known as Jim Crow
(6).25 The fact that the various retellings of Sutpen’s story take place between
September 1909 and January 1910 in Absalom, Absalom! is thus significant, as it
situates the novel’s present at a time when race relations in the post-Civil-War
South had arguably reached their nadir (e.g. Osterhammel 1210). In addition, we
learn that Henry, Sutpen’s son, secretly moves back to Sutpen’s Hundred in 1905
(Absalom 140), and it is perhaps no coincident that this allegorical, racist specter
from the Civil-War past returns home in the same year that W. E. B. Du Bois
founded the Niagara Movement (Grossman 101), which called for racial equality
and is generally considered a forerunner of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The latter was founded in the early
months of 1909, and the title of the NAACP’s monthly magazine, The Crisis,
established in November 1910, bears eloquent witness to the social climate of
the time (Ovington 16 – 17; Rampersad 472). The years 1909 and 1910 are thus
not merely the temporal setting for the novel’s various retellings (as well as for
Quentin’s eventual confrontation with Henry Sutpen; see Absalom 298), but also
the period when the deepening crisis in race relations in the U. S. led to decisive
developments in black self-emancipation. Henry, the long-lost son who killed
his half-brother because of the latter’s racial ‘impurity,’ returns – and dies – in
Faulkner’s novel precisely when the black emancipation movement began more
directly to confront the social and legal consequences of Jim Crow.
Moreover, the fact that the most extended retelling of Thomas Sutpen’s
story – Quentin and Shreve’s collaborative narrative – takes place not in the
South, but at Harvard in Cambridge, Massachusetts, highlights the extent to
which the North was involved in this crisis in race relations. According to Tha‐
dious M. Davis, segregationist practices had hardened not only in the South of
Jim Crow, but throughout the nation, and they continued to do so after World
War I, with the tacit approval of Woodrow Wilson’s presidential administration
(411). The Northern setting of the novel’s retellings allegorically acknowledges
the North’s involvement in the country’s racial crisis, and the fact that Shreve
is Canadian extends the reach of Absalom, Absalom! even beyond the nation’s
boundaries.
If Shreve allegorically internationalizes the novel, then Sutpen’s period of
residence in Haiti from the early 1820s to about 1833 serves more concretely to
highlight both historical and present dimensions of U. S. imperial policies. Haiti
is described in Absalom, Absalom! as “halfway between the dark inscrutable
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26 The military struggle in Haiti for independence from France ended in 1804 (Popkin
140), and the constitution established in 1805 proclaimed: “slavery is abolished forever”
(qtd. in Popkin 2).
continent from which the black blood […] was ravished by violence, and the
cold known land” from which Sutpen came (202). We never find out how exactly
young Sutpen reaches Haiti, but we do learn that he ultimately worked as an
“overseer or foreman or something to a French sugar planter,” and that as such
he helped quell a violent uprising (199). Commenting on this episode, Richard
Godden insists that Sutpen’s account of a slave revolt on Haiti in 1827 is anach‐
ronistic because “there were neither slavers nor French plantations” in the
post-revolutionary ‘black republic’ (251).26 By contrast, Leigh Anne Duck con‐
tends that, though formal slavery no longer existed in Haiti, the working con‐
ditions on the plantations were in fact virtually indistinguishable from those on
the slave plantations of the U. S. South (34 – 35). John T. Matthews concurs with
Duck’s account:
The Haitian Constitution of 1804 had abolished slavery, outlawed white landowner‐
ship, and confiscated the property of French colonists […]. Almost immediately mu‐
latto offspring of former white landowners began to reclaim their land, violating the
spirit of the measures and angering Emperor Dessalines. When Dessalines attempted
to reinforce policies favoring Negroes, the mulatto class rebelled and Dessalines was
assassinated. Meanwhile, agricultural failures stemming from the breakup of large
plantations and the creation of small black-owned farms, especially in Haiti’s southern
region, led to reforms designed by President Jean Pierre Boyer to return peasants to
laborer status on large farms. These measures constituted the notorious Rural
Code […]. (253)
Under the Rural Code, the rights of black laborers were so severely restricted
that the historian Eric Williams describes the effects of the bill as “the restoration
of slavery, minus the whip” (334). And indeed, if we look at the text of Absalom,
Absalom!, we find that the black Haitian laborers – de iure freedmen – are de‐
picted in such equivocal terms that their de facto status as quasi-slaves becomes
apparent. Accordingly, as Matthews points out, even Sutpen himself “may not
register that the black plantation workers he oversees are not technically
slaves; he cares only that they may be treated that way” (253). Moreover, even
if the novel’s depiction of conditions in Haiti were incorrect (Blackburn 218), it
would nevertheless have resonated strongly in the segregated United States of
the early twentieth century, where African Americans were de iure equal but
de facto increasingly discriminated against: “In sum, Thomas Supten travels to
a locale shaped by economic and legal structures that prefigured post-Civil War
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27 According to Ineke Bockting, it was in early 1934 that Faulkner began to combine four
short stories which he had written between the late 1920s and the early 1930s into “a
manuscript that he initially entitled Dark House”; by August 1934, Faulkner had decided
on the title Absalom, Absalom! (1). When Faulkner began work on the novel, the U. S.
troops were thus only just about to withdraw from Haiti.
sharecropping in the U. S. South – the form of labor still experienced in
Faulkner’s era, by up to 80 percent of farmworkers in some regions” (Duck 35).
The ‘exotic’ space of nineteenth-century Haiti thus suddenly appears as very
close to home.
Moreover, Faulkner wrote Absalom, Absalom! at a time when the recent mili‐
tary occupation of Haiti by the U. S. was still frequently, and controversially,
discussed in the national media.27 The occupation of Haiti in 1915, which ended
in 1934, had been justified by the island republic’s economic instability, the
causes of which reached back to the 1820s (i.e. precisely the time when Sutpen
resided there):
As part of the negotiations to achieve international recognition, in 1825 Haiti agreed
to pay reparations to France to the tune of 150 million francs in gold. France had
demanded these costs to compensate it for the costs of the war and also to pay the
former plantation and slave-owners for losses. This move by France was supported
by the United States […]. (Street 4; see also Bryan 43)
The 1825 arrangement, which constitutes the root cause of Haiti’s long-term
financial instability, was thus supported by the slave-holding United States,
whose government also withheld diplomatic recognition of the new black re‐
public until 1862 (i.e. after the outbreak of the Civil War; see Herring 239;
Gordon S. Wood 537). So crippling was Haiti’s historical burden of reparation
that it remained one of the island’s major policy concerns even in the early
decades of the twentieth century, despite the fact that Haitian governments had
shown exemplary diligence in meeting debt payments (Hans R. Schmidt 32,
113, and 168; see also Popkin 152). In the meantime, and especially since work
on the Panama Canal had begun in 1904, the U. S. showed itself more aggres‐
sively determined to maintain political stability in the Caribbean “as a means of
preventing foreign encroachment that might threaten the developing American
military, political, and economic hegemony in the area” (Hans R. Schmidt 43). If
the Haitian republic’s economic instability ultimately provided a rationale for
U. S. intervention, this instability can in turn be traced back to the reparation
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28 See also Jeremy D. Popkin, who cites internal factors – “above all, the failure to integrate
the poorer classes of the population into society at a time when other countries were
moving toward greater democracy” – but also emphasizes the “role of foreign economic
interests and the intervention of foreign governments, particularly the United States”
as explanations for Haiti’s continuing problems (158; cf. Coupeau 53).
payments the imposition of which the U. S. government had supported.28 Put
differently: At the time when Faulkner’s novel was published, Haiti – much like
the United States in general, and the South in particular – was still quite mate‐
rially haunted by the unresolved conflicts between its revolutionary heritage
and the historical burdens of racism and slavery. The allegory of Absalom, Ab‐
salom! is thus not, strictly speaking, national; rather, Faulkner’s regionalist novel
simultaneously constitutes a truly transnational allegory of the United States
and its long-term entanglement in hemispheric policies of racialized injustice.
Gothic Revisited: Material Haunting and Uncanny Narration
This notion of material haunting makes it necessary for us to return to the genre
of the Gothic and its larger role in Faulkner’s novel, for it is precisely such
historical remnants (or revenants) from the past that lie at the heart of this
generic tradition. In admirably succinct fashion, Terry Eagleton has outlined
how Gothic fiction, “this most subjectivist and supernatural of literary forms,”
is also a grossly materialist genre:
[A]t its centre lie disputed wills and struggles over inheritance, secret legacies and
financial double-dealing. […] Gothic is a form in which the dead take command of the
living – in which the clammy hand of the past stretches out and manipulates the
present, reducing it to a hollow repetition of itself. The present is awash with spectres
and revenants, with transmitted curses and rumours of primordial crimes; but it re‐
quires no great labour of decipherment to see in all this how the deadweight of prop‐
erty and inheritance moulds an upper-class world, and the novels are not shy of laying
bare these connections themselves. (Heathcliff and the Great Hunger 194)
We have already seen how the “deadweight of property and inheritance” affects
Thomas Sutpen and his design, as well as, more generally, the Southern States
and U. S. American involvement in Haiti. In addition, one of the figures who
most haunts Sutpen and his acknowledged son Henry is Charles Bon, the child
who returns to reclaim his dynastic inheritance. Further, “secret legacies and
financial double-dealing” pervade Absalom, Absalom!: in the dubious scheme
Sutpen proposes to Rosa’s father (who, in consequence, ends his life as a ‘mad‐
man’ in the attic), or in the figure of a lawyer hired by Charles’s mother, Sutpen’s
first wife (a man whom Charles knows to be scheming for money; see Absalom
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250). It is, once again, the Canadian outsider Shreve who comments on the im‐
portance of such material haunting – on the “defeated grandfathers and freed
slaves (or have I got it backward and was it your folks that are free and the
niggers that lost?) and bullets in the dining room table and such,” which con‐
stantly remind white Southerners “to never forget” (289). In addition, Shreve’s
sly parenthetical question whether it might not be “the niggers that lost” re‐
minds us that the white trauma of defeat in the Civil War, though real, is clearly
not the full story. Tellingly, however, not a single black character assumes the
role of embedded narrator in Absalom, Absalom!, which in some sense repro‐
duces the practice of segregation on the level of the novel’s narration (much as
in Mrs. Dalloway colonial characters tend not to be focalized from within; see
chapter 3).
Gothic fiction’s concern with “guilty secrets from communal and family
pasts” (Botting 115) is thus a key preoccupation in Faulkner’s novel. As Fred
Botting suggests, in the course of the nineteenth century Gothic styles became
“domesticated” (123), leading to a kind of “homely Gothic”: no longer set in
gloomy castles or sublime Romantic landscapes, these texts focus on “horrors
that are much closer to home” (113). One example of such ‘homely horrors’
would be the secret of Sutpen’s abandoned first family. In addition, Rosa at one
point evokes the trope of the haunted Gothic home when she tells Quentin about
a mysterious presence in Sutpen’s Hundred: “There’s something in that
house. […] Something living in it. Hidden in it. It has been out there for four
years, living hidden in that house” (140). Only later do we learn that this “some‐
thing” is Henry Sutpen, who has returned in his old age to the house of his father,
and who will eventually perish there when it burns to the ground.
Sutpen’s Hundred, which had always been an ‘unhomely’ home, thus also
becomes decidedly uncanny. As we saw in the introductory chapter, Freud ar‐
gues that the uncanny arises from a return, in alienated form, of something
repressed but long familiar (“The Uncanny” 148). In Absalom, Absalom!, the fig‐
ures of Charles Bon and Henry are among the instances of this return of the
repressed, as is the way in which Sutpen functions as a reminder of the inherent
violence of slavery for the older and more established planters. More broadly,
themes such as homoeroticism (Charles and Henry, as well as Quentin and
Shreve) or incest and miscegenation (Charles and Judith) constitute a return of
what has been repressed culturally in “Western history’s long tradition of
sexism, heterosexism, and racism” (Norman W. Jones 343). In staging these re‐
turns, Faulkner’s novel plays on the “terrors and horrors of transgression” that
Jeremy Tambling associates with the Gothic as a genre (7).
222 4 “Everybody Seemed to Have to Have a Home”: Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!
29 While Samuel Kimball uses the term uncanny narration in an article on Moby-Dick (see
chapter one), he defines it in a much more general sense, noting that “‘narration’ and
‘canny’ share the same Indo-European root, gno-, meaning to know. Thus narration is
in some sense a trope of the canny, a knowing how to tell, a telling knowledge; and to
narrate includes the other side of the uncanny, the homeness of homelessness”
(544 – 545).
Crucially, beyond such uncanny returns on the level of content or theme,
Absalom, Absalom! is also told in a style that can best be described as uncanny
narration.29 What this means is that the text uses particular stylistic techniques
to create, within readers’ minds, a rough equivalent to a repressed but long
familiar knowledge, thus heightening the novel’s emotional impact. The way in
which this is done is, in part, through a combination of two techniques that we
may call ‘perceptual overload’ and ‘fragmentary exposition.’ Consider, for in‐
stance, the following sentence, which appears toward the very beginning of the
novel and which focuses on Quentin’s familiarity with the story of Thomas
Sutpen:
It was a part of his twenty years’ heritage of breathing the same air and hearing his
father talk about the man; a part of the town’s – Jefferson’s – eighty years’ heritage
of the same air which the man himself had breathed between this September afternoon
in 1909 and that Sunday morning in June in 1833 when he first rode into town out of
no discernible past and acquired his land no one knew how and built his house, his
mansion, apparently out of nothing and married Ellen Coldfield and begot his two
children – the son who widowed the daughter who had not yet been a bride – and so
accomplished his allotted course to its violent (Miss Coldfield at least would have said,
just) end. (7)
In hindsight, we recognize that the passage already hints at the fact that Henry
will kill the suitor of his sister, Judith, for the text mentions “the son [i.e. Henry]
who widowed [i.e. killed the husband-to-be of] the daughter [i.e. Judith].” More‐
over, a few pages later, Henry is described as a “murderer and almost a fratri‐
cide” (10), so that one could even guess that the prospective husband is Henry’s
half-brother. However, because these bits of expository information are dis‐
persed throughout the text and often cryptically expressed (e.g. without the use
of proper names, and formulated in an extremely circumlocutory manner), most
readers are unlikely to be able consciously to process or remember the infor‐
mation.
This problem is exacerbated, moreover, by the incredibly long sentences
characteristic of Faulkner’s novel, which are so complex that, as readers, we
struggle to understand the main point of the narrative and therefore miss a great
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30 Another example of the technique is the scene in which Sutpen is killed by Wash Jones,
one of his tenants. Parts of this scene are told on page 139, 145, and 151 (among others),
but the fact that Wash Jones killed Sutpen because the latter had disowned his child
with Wash’s daughter, Milly, is only stated explicitly on page 234.
31 The ten passages occur on the following pages of my edition of Absalom, Absalom!: 194,
199, 200, 205, 211 – 212, 218, 219, 220, 238, and 261.
deal of incidental information. At the same time, this ‘superfluous’ or excess
information is arguably not simply lost altogether, but perceived and processed
subliminally; it by-passes the conscious mind and is stored unconsciously,
waiting to be (re)activated later on. The technique of uncanny narration thus
first presents us with story fragments that are related to each other but dispersed
throughout the text, subliminally familiarizing us with all the important infor‐
mation even as we fail to connect the dots consciously. The text then confronts
us with the full story at some later stage, leading to the uncanny realization on
our part that this ‘unknown’ story is in fact already familiar.
Perhaps the best example of this technique of uncanny narration is the way
in which we learn that Charles’s mother was “part negro” (283).30 Before this
crucial truth is revealed, fragments of information appear in no fewer than ten
different passages dispersed throughout the novel.31 To understand more clearly
how the technique of uncanny narration works, we need to examine some of
these lengthy passages in detail, as it is their cumulative effect that makes un‐
canny narration possible:
(a) [Sutpen] told Grandfather how he had put his first wife aside, like eleventh and
twelfth century kings did: ‘I found that she was not and could never be, through no
fault of her own, adjunctive or incremental to the design which I had in mind, so I
provided for her and put her aside.’ (194)
(b) [Grandfather Compson described how Sutpen] granted that by certain lights there
was injustice in what he did but that he had obviated that as much as lay in his power
by being above-board in the matter; that he could have simply deserted her, could
have taken his hat and walked out, but he did not: and that he had what Grandfather
would have to admit was a good and valid claim, if not to the whole place which he
alone had saved, as well as the lives of all the white people on it, at least that portion
of it which had been specifically described and deeded to him in the marriage settle‐
ment which he had entered in good faith, with no reservations as to his obscure origin
and material equipment, while there had been not only reservation but actual mis‐
representation on their part and misrepresentation of such a crass nature as to have
not only voided and frustrated without his knowing it the central motivation of his
entire design, but would have made an ironic conclusion of all that he had suffered
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and endured in the past and all that he could ever accomplish in the future toward
that design – which claim he had voluntarily relinquished, taking only twenty niggers
out of all he might have claimed and which many another man in his place would
have insisted upon keeping and (in which contention) would have been supported by
both legal and moral sanction if not the delicate one of conscience […]. (199)
In passage (a), we are told for the first time that there was something about
Charles’s mother that made her unsuitable for Sutpen’s design, though what
exactly the problem was remains unstated. In passage (b), we learn more about
the situation: that there was “misrepresentation” on the part of the relatives,
and that it is a kind of misrepresentation that would have been condemned by
the dominant legal and moral order (i.e. Sutpen’s reaction to this mysterious
misrepresentation had “both legal and moral sanction if not the delicate one of
conscience”). The key truth has not yet been revealed (‘fragmentary exposition’),
and this remains the case for some time to come:
(c) [Sutpen] also told Grandfather, dropped this into the telling as you might flick the
joker out of a pack of fresh cards without being able to remember later whether you
had removed the joker or not, that the old man’s wife had been a Spaniard […]. (203)
(d) [Sutpen: “The marriage was] an arrangement which I had entered in good faith,
concealing nothing, while the other party or parties to it concealed from me the one
very factor which would destroy the entire plan and design which I had been working
toward, concealed it so well that it was not until after the child was born that I dis‐
covered that this factor existed […].” (220)
(e) [They] sat in that drawing room of baroque and fusty magnificence which Shreve
had invented and which was probably true enough, while the Haiti-born daughter of
the French sugar planter and the woman who Sutpen’s first father-in-law had told
him was a Spaniard (the slight dowdy woman with untidy gray-streaked raven hair
coarse as a horse’s tail, with parchment-colored skin and implacable pouched black
eyes which alone showed no age because they showed no forgetting, whom Shreve
and Quentin had likewise invented and which was likewise probably true enough)
told them nothing because she did not need to because she had already told it […].
(268)
Passage (c) both adds the information that the French planter’s wife “had been
a Spaniard” and serves as an implicit comment on Faulkner’s own narrative
technique, in which important information is “dropped into the telling as you
might flick the joker out of a pack of fresh cards without being able to remember
later.” Next, in passage (d), there is a suggestion that the ‘flaw’ in Charles’s
mother was of the kind that can be detected after the birth of a child (though
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32 In other words, a temporal relation (first A, then B) is processed as a causal relation, a
cognitive mechanism which Rimmon-Kenan calls post hoc, ergo propter hoc, providing
the following example: “Milton wrote Paradise Lost, then his wife died, and then he
wrote Paradise Regained” (Narrative Fiction 17).
the causal relation is not in fact stated explicitly: “after the child was born […]
I discovered that this factor existed”).32 Finally, in passage (e), we get a descrip‐
tion of Sutpen’s first mother-in-law, who had “raven hair” and “parchment-col‐
ored skin,” and who Sutpen had been told was of Spanish descent.
Against the backdrop of slavery, the U. S. South, and the history of Haiti, and
taking all of this information together, it would, in theory, be possible to realize
that the ‘flaw’ in Charles’s mother must be racial in nature: a ‘taint in her blood’
that makes the marriage unsuitable in the eyes of the dominant white culture,
with the claim that her mother is “a Spaniard” constituting the crucial act of
misrepresentation on the part of her family. And yet, the fact that the five pas‐
sages cited above are dispersed over seventy-four pages (‘fragmentary exposi‐
tion’), combined with the perceptual overload of Faulkner’s style – particularly
evident in passages (b) and (e) – renders it difficult for any reader even to process
the information, let alone to put the various pieces together. Once the ‘unknown’
truth about Charles’s mother is revealed in a straight-forward manner, however,
the material that was subliminally perceived is (re)activated, generating on the
part of the reader an uncanny sense of familiarity and belated recognition: it is
strange but already long familiar.
Importantly, the technique of uncanny narration is not merely a way of
sending shivers down readers’ spines. Rather, it constitutes a stylistic correlative
to the novel’s concern with what we might call the nightmare of belonging.
Much as is the case in a nightmare scenario, the novel’s interminable sentences
propel us inexorably forward, as if we were running from some obscure threat.
At the same time, when reading Absalom, Absalom! there is a strong sense of
not getting anywhere, in part because of the novel’s frequent repetition of
half-told stories. We have seen, for instance, that Rosa tells Quentin about a
mysterious “something” hidden in Supten’s Hundred quite early on in the novel
(140), and four pages later the text states more precisely that “somebody” – i.e.
a human being – is hidden there. And yet, much later in the novel, we still do
not know “whatever it was that was up stairs, […] hidden up there for almost
four years” (280). At the same time, given that all the characters from the story
that so haunts Quentin are either dead (e.g. Ellen, Judith, Charles Bon) or clearly
not hiding at Sutpen’s Hundred (e.g. Rosa), we in a sense already know that it
can only be Henry who is hiding in his father’s house, even if we are not con‐
sciously aware of this knowledge. When Quentin finally stands face-to-face with
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33 Note that the quotation from Absalom, Absalom! contains a narrative palindrome – “To
die. Yes. / To die? / Yes. To die.” – embedded in a larger, ‘semi-palindromic’ passage.
Christina Ljungberg suggests that such palindromes “focus attention on the very act of
signification” (i.e. that they have an implicitly metafictional effect), and that “they bring
into play the figure of reversal and thereby challenge the unidirectional linearity of
human discourse, spoken or written” (248). Both observations fit Faulkner’s novel per‐
fectly. Moreover, Faulkner’s revisions show that he reworked the manuscript version
in a way that heightens the ‘palindromic effect’ of the published passage (Langford
358; I would like to thank Christina Ljungberg for bringing Faulkner’s revisions to my
attention).
Henry, the nightmare of belonging thus reaches its uncanny climax not only for
Quentin, but for the reader, too:
And you are–––?
Henry Sutpen.
And you have been here–––?
Four years.
And you came home–––?
To die. Yes.
To die?
Yes. To die.
And you have been here–––?
Four years.
And you are–––?
Henry Sutpen. (298; original emphasis)
Though this is the first time in the novel that the truth about Henry’s return
home is revealed, for the reader the revelation constitutes a “hollow repetition”
of the kind that Eagleton regards as characteristic of Gothic fiction in general
(Heathcliff and the Great Hunger 194).33 Even in terms of style, the dialogue is
crammed with repetitions, and Quentin realizes that “waking or sleeping it was
the same and would be the same forever as long as he lived” (298). Waking or
sleeping, Quentin thus finds that he cannot escape the power of postmemory,
which forever binds him to his haunted, conflicted home community. The aes‐
thetic purpose of uncanny narration in Absalom, Absalom! is that it simulates
or enacts this condition for the reader, who is similarly weighed down by the
sheer mass of the novel’s language, with its ceaseless stream of burdensome
sentences and endlessly accumulating repetitions.
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34 Roger Lundin tries to strengthen the case that Quentin is torn apart by his hatred by
pointing out that Quentin commits suicide five months later on (179) – at least according
to The Sound and the Fury, a novel which also features a character named Quentin
Compson. However, Lundin’s argument is not unproblematic, for as Fargnoli, Golay
and Hamblin (35) point out, Shreve has a different name in Absalom, Absalom! (ge‐
nealogy: Shrevlin McCannon) than in The Sound and the Fury (Shreve MacKenzie),
which suggests that despite the striking similarities between the characters in the two
novels they are not necessarily identical.
The Weight of History and Loving One’s Home
A region weighed down by a story from its past – a past that is as transnational
as the region’s present, ranging from France and Spain to Africa, Canada, and
Haiti. It is a contested story that some attempt to frame in terms of innocence,
while others tell it in the damning mode of the Gothic. It is a story of seemingly
biblical proportions – about incest, fratricide, and war – with family homes being
destroyed and a patriarch’s dynastic designs thwarted. Through all of this, the
region’s black inhabitants continue to be denied their fundamental right to rep‐
resent themselves: as narrators in the novel, but also as voters in Faulkner’s
present. It is difficult to think of any other novel in which the tradition of all
dead generations weighs so palpably on the brains of the living – like an endless
nightmare that we, as readers, are made to share through the technique of
uncanny narration.
It is Quentin, in particular, who can barely cope with this nightmare of be‐
longing to a region that is so deeply flawed. And yet, when at the end of Absalom,
Absalom! Shreve asks Quentin why he hates the South, the latter denies that this
is the case: “‘I dont hate it,’ Quentin said, quickly, at once, immediately; ‘I dont
hate it,’ he said. I dont hate it he thought, panting in the cold air, the iron New
England dark: I dont. I dont! I dont hate it! I dont hate it!” (303; original emphasis).
Norman W. Jones interprets Quentin’s surprising reaction as an unconscious
denial of his homoerotic desire for Shreve (340), while most other critics read it
rather straight-forwardly as Quentin’s desperate attempt to repress his hatred
for the South (e.g. Betina Entzminger 117; Fargnoli, Golay and Hamblin 25;
Jameson, “Third-World Literature” 86).34
However, while such interpretations are certainly plausible, there is also a
more intriguing possibility: that Quentin really does not hate the South. Quen‐
tin’s reaction would then constitute, not a case of repression and denial, but
rather a moment of horrified recognition of the fact that, despite everything he
knows, he nevertheless cannot bring himself to hate the region that remains his
only home. What leaves Quentin gasping in “the cold air” of New England, in
other words, is his inability to hate a place he knows to be fundamentally cor‐
rupt – that in many ways would deserve his hatred. In a final twist to the novel’s
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35 As Kurt Heinzelman points out, Ezra Pound is often erroneously credited with having
coined the phrase ‘make it new’ in 1914. Though Pound did use the phrase “in canto
53, written probably in the early 1930s,” it was Ford Madox Hueffer (a.k.a. Ford Madox
Ford) “who came closest in 1914 to saying the equivalent of ‘make it new,’ at least in
the sense that phrase has come to possess” (131).
emotional drama, it is not Quentin’s unconscious hatred, but his ineradicable
love for home that lies at the heart of his nightmare of belonging (that is to say,
he would prefer simply to hate it, if only he could).
What is left unstated in Absalom, Absalom!, but arguably implied by this final
twist, is that in order to deal successfully with the weight of history, it is not
enough for us merely to keep on retelling it. Admittedly, such a ‘working
through’ of one’s story may constitute a necessary first step; after all, Quentin
arrives at his recognition that he loves the South despite everything only
through the therapeutic act of collaborative narrative reconstruction; in this
sense, Shreve’s game of narrative seduction does have a positive effect after all.
At the same time, however, the realization that ‘supernatural’ or Gothic haunt‐
ings are, in fact, material also means that historical (re-)interpretation must be
followed by material changes if the ghosts of the past are ever to be laid to rest.
If the home is found undeserving of a love that nevertheless proves ineradicable,
then the only remaining course of action is to try and work towards changing
that home.
Absalom, Absalom! makes clear that this is far from easy, and that it certainly
cannot be achieved by indulging in fantasies of Adamic new beginnings. Rather,
while some American ideologists (and supposedly many modernists) believed
in the possibility of simply ‘making it new,’ Faulkner’s novel focuses on the
obstinacy of socio-political reality and on the circumstances under which Amer‐
icans in the 1930s had to try and make their own history: admirable ideals of
freedom and equality, but also a heavy burden of racist oppression and imperi‐
alistic interference in other regions of the hemisphere.35 This long history of
injustice cannot, the text suggests, be redressed by the heroic actions of
super-human individuals (as witnessed by the utter failure of Thomas Sutpen’s
design single-handedly to defeat the plantation system that had destroyed his
self-worth as well as his trust in the ideal of equality). We live, as Marx empha‐
sizes, under circumstances not of our own making (see chapter two and above),
and so heavy is the burden of our common history that only through a collective
effort can we hope to escape the seemingly endless nightmare of belonging. Such
unity, of course, never comes easily, especially in a society that is historically as
deeply divided as Faulkner’s South – but it is all the more important for precisely
that reason. However, to examine in more details the fissures within a particular
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community, as well as the factors that might help to overcome them, we must
now leave the rural South of Faulkner’s novel and turn, instead, to the Northern
English industrial town portrayed in Pat Barker’s Union Street.
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1 203 I would like to thank Simone Heller-Andrist and Rahel Rivera Godoy-Benesch for
their comments on the first draft, as well as Sarah Chevalier for her feedback on this
chapter.
5 “People Still Living in the Derelict Houses”: Realism,
Class, and the Fragile Body in Pat Barker’s Union
Street
According to Michal Peled Ginsberg and Lorri G. Nandrea, the realist novel fo‐
cuses on “the prosaic world of the everyday, of the common man, of the home
and its cares” (246) – which is not a bad description of Pat Barker’s Union
Street, except that the latter tells the story, not of the common man, but of seven
working-class women and their daily struggles during the economic crisis of the
early 1970s.1 The relation between realism, class, and gender will thus be central
to the discussion that follows, and the body as a common ground for human
vulnerability and finitude will help us connect these issues with the problem of
home as physical shelter. This is particularly important because the body has
been given relatively short shrift in the four preceding chapters; it features
briefly in chapter one, in the discussion of Ishmael’s few moments of bodily
comfort – for example, when he shares a bed with Queequeg – but on the whole
our embodied nature as human beings has not been an explicit theme. This will
be redressed in the analysis of Union Street, a realist text that pays close attention
to the materiality of working-class homes.
And yet, as a literary form, realism has frequently been associated, not with
men and women from the lower orders, but with the rise of the middle class and,
therefore, a decidedly bourgeois outlook (e.g. Jameson, The Political Unconscious
138; Watt 48). More specifically, Nancy Armstrong has shown that, whereas
initially bourgeois novelistic discourse was directed against the aristocracy,
from around the 1830s it turned instead to the industrial working class as the
“target of moral reform” (20). If we accept this assessment, then it no longer
comes as a surprise that, by the mid-nineteenth century, the British novel should
have been “deeply biased against reflecting a working-class perspective on so‐
ciety” (Haywood 3). It would also be consistent with Terry Eagleton’s claim that
realism is “the form par excellence of settlement and stability” (Heathcliff and the
Great Hunger 147), as well as with Franco Moretti’s assertion that the nine‐
teenth-century novel rested on the twin pillars of bourgeois existence and con‐
2 The French original runs: “Le négatif et le possible sont aussi ‘réels’ que le réel pos‐
itif” (31).
servative beliefs (The Bourgeois 94). Catherine Belsey sums up this view of re‐
alism as a form that cannot prove truly unsettling for us today because, “however
harrowing the events of the story, […] the world evoked in the fiction, its pat‐
terns of cause and effect, of social relationships and moral values, largely con‐
firm the patterns of the world we seem to know” (47). Stable, familiar, and re‐
assuring: it is a view of realism as the discourse of the status quo.
There are, however, critics who disagree with this assessment, both on his‐
torical and on more theoretical grounds. Perhaps the most important historical
objections come from scholars who have explored the cultural function of realist
fiction in colonial settings. Derek Hand, for example, suggests that realism in
pre-independence Irish fiction was not conformist, but in fact signified a revo‐
lutionary attempt to challenge centuries of colonialist misrepresentation (130).
More generally, Neil Ten Kortenaar maintains that realism has often served
“anti-colonial and subversive purposes” because it “located the truth of society
in the untouchable, the coolie, the slave, the criminal, and the colonized” (1303).
Turning to more theoretical objections to the idea that realism is necessarily
conservative, we may cite the dramatist Lorraine Hansberry, who insists that
an “artist creating a realistic work shows not only what is but what is possible –
which is part of reality, too” (qtd. in Carter 32; original emphasis). Hansberry,
in other words, maintains that realism is not limited to things as they are – as
does Henri Lefebvre: “the negative and the possible are just as ‘real’ as the posi‐
tive real” (319).2 Indeed, for Pam Morris, these two characteristics of realist
narratives – their ability to bridge global socio-cultural divides, and their power
to discern alternatives to the present as part of reality itself – together constitute
the “inherent utopianism” of the form (Realism 162). This leaves us with two
starkly opposed views of realist fiction: either as a conservative discourse, or as
emancipatory and even utopian.
Perhaps the best strategy is for us to assume that realism can serve both
conservative and progressive political ends, and that a realist text like Union
Street is inevitably marked by the genre’s contradictory history: its historical
association with bourgeois values, as well as its formal impulse ceaselessly to
widen the social range of artistic representation (Cobley 79; Pam Morris, Realism
3). We will begin the discussion of Union Street by examining closely how the
text establishes a parallel between dilapidated buildings and derelict, homeless
human bodies as the material signs of economic crisis. These physical signs of
dereliction also find an analogy in Union Street’s fragmented textual structure,
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though at the same time the text uses several discursive means to unify its nar‐
rative segments, thereby creating a dialectical tension between unity and frag‐
mentation that, in turn, correlates with the contradictory pulls of female solid‐
arity and intra-communal strife depicted in the story. We will see that one of
the strongest unifying features of Union Street is a complex array of symbols
that not only allow us to address the question of female identity, but also to
reflect on realism as a literary mode (e.g. with mirrors appearing as problematic
bearers of truth, or eyes linked to alienating as well as more beneficent kinds of
vision). Indeed, it is through its use of intricate symbolical clusters, as well as
by paying close attention to the fragile human body and its basic need for phys‐
ical shelter, that Union Street appropriates and critiques the form of literary
realism – in particular its long-standing equation of home with bourgeois do‐
mesticity. In so doing, Union Street works toward a truly progressive realism
which never loses sight of the material condition of the working class, while at
the same time exploring the symbolical forms of belonging that are specific to
laboring human bodies.
Things Fall Apart: Dereliction and Fragmentation
Set in an unnamed Northern English industrial town in the early 1970s, Union
Street evokes the well-established literary topos of the tightly-knit working-class
community – only immediately to subvert it. As John Brannigan notes, for in‐
stance, the title Union Street, “seems to promise the intimate neighbourliness,
shift-work routines, and cheerful endurance common to the popular, often nos‐
talgic, imagination of working-class life” (14). However, the cozy warmth radi‐
ating from such familiar images is immediately dispelled by Union Street’s
opening sentences: “There was a square of cardboard in the window where the
glass had been smashed. During the night one corner had worked loose and
scraped against the frame whenever the wind blew” (1). A makeshift cardboard
cover barely keeps the elements at bay here, and Brannigan rightly notes that
the smashed window of the opening scene is only “one of a number of images
of exposure, of the lack of the protective shell that ‘home’ should represent” (19).
This also explains the frequent use in Barker’s text of the word derelict to de‐
scribe the community’s built environment: the “whole place was derelict,” with
“derelict streets,” and rows of “derelict houses” (27, 64, 216; see Brannigan 18).
From the very beginning, Union Street thus focuses our attention on the dilapi‐
dated condition of physical structures that ought to provide shelter and a sense
of security, and in doing so the text highlights the concrete effects on people’s
homes of such seemingly abstract processes as economic downturns and reces‐
sions.
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The destructive effects of an economy in crisis are not, however, limited to
buildings and infrastructure in Barker’s text. Rather, the narrative continually
emphasizes the deleterious effects of deprivation on the human body. Indeed,
Union Street uses the same word, “derelict,” for both the neglect of the built
environment and bodily harm, as if to underline that ultimately they result from
the very same causes:
[By the river,] a whole community had been cleared away: the houses waited for the
bulldozers and the demolition men to move in, but they never came.
[… S]till the houses stood. Officially empty, but not in reality. […]
[…H]owever carefully you trod sooner or later glass crunched under your feet or
a sagging floorboard creaked and threatened to give way, and instantly […] hidden
life revealed itself, if only by a quickening of the silence. Tramps. Drunks. […] These
were not the drunks you meet wending a careful path home to the safety of hearth
and bed. These were the hopeless, the abandoned, the derelict. (60)
An entire community has been “cleared away,” we learn here, but the “derelict”
remain, without a home that would provide “the safety of hearth and bed,” and
“abandoned” like the crumbling houses in which they seek shelter. Naturally,
these “derelict” bodies will seek shelter anywhere, even in a public library (sup‐
posedly the home of cultured minds):
They were dirty. They picked their noses and rolled the results between thumb and
forefinger, making a pellet hard enough to be flicked away on to the floor. They made
noises. They made smells. They were afraid. For the assistants in the library, lads and
lasses in their late teens, had power over them and they knew it. They had the power
of banning people from the library, of withholding warmth. So sandwiches were con‐
sumed furtively, a bit at a time. And those who were compelled to talk to themselves,
thrashing out some unending internal feud, tried to do so quietly, though they did not
always succeed. (223)
Books are sheltered, in other words, while human beings live under the con‐
tinual threat of expulsion: this is one illustration of Walter Benjamin’s
well-known dictum that there is “no document of culture which is not at the
same time a document of barbarism” (“Eduard Fuchs” 124). The poorest members
of the society depicted in Union Street are shown to be out of place in both senses
of the term: they have no place of their own, and they are perceived as incon‐
gruous and improper wherever they go.
In fact, if the “derelict” appear as dirty in the description cited above, then
this is not exclusively a realistic rendering of their outward appearance (though
it is that, as well). Rather, they also appear as dirty because dirt, in Mary
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3 See Lucy Gallagher’s essay “‘He Had Always Believed That There Were Two Sorts of
Women’: The Female Body, Dirt, and Domesticity in Pat Barker’s Union Street” for a
highly illuminating discussion of how ideas about gender affect the cultural construc‐
tion of bodily fluids as dirty.
Douglas’s famous definition, is simply “matter out of place” (Purity and Danger
44). More specifically, Douglas maintains that the systematic classification and
ordering of matter always involves a “rejection of the inappropriate elements” –
and this is, precisely, why the “derelict” are described as dirty in Barker’s text.
The “derelict” are characterized both by their abject, unruly corporeality – they
pick noses, make noises, emanate smells – and by the frequent occurrence
among them of mental disorder (which, incidentally, is indeed more prevalent
amongst the poor because of the greater physical and social stresses to which
they are exposed; see Ritter and Lampkin 37); they are both material bodies and
the symbolical, ‘dirty’ excess that accumulates at the margin of the social
system.3
The very language used to describe these ‘dirty misfits’ in fact emphasizes
that people in a society who do not matter in some ways threaten to become
mere matter. If we look, for instance, at the verbs in the passage describing the
“derelict” in the public library, we find them shifting from the active voice
(“picked noses”) to a darkly humorous mock-active (“made smells”) and, ulti‐
mately, to the passive voice (“sandwiches were consumed,” “were compelled to
talk to themselves”). Admittedly, the pattern is not perfectly consistent, as the
final two verbs in the passage return to the active voice (“tried,” “succeed”). At
the same time, we need to bear in mind that the first of these two final verbs
refers to the attempts on the part of the “derelict” to effect their own effacement
by drawing as little attention to themselves as possible (“tried to do so quietly”),
while the second appears in conjunction with a negation (“did not always suc‐
ceed”). Much as is the case with the mock-active phrase “made smells,” in other
words, the agency that ultimately remains for the “derelict” is in fact a kind of
non-agency, forced upon them by their lack of power and material resources. In
Union Street, that is, people as well as houses end up “abandoned,” “derelict,”
and – literally as well as figuratively – falling apart (Brannigan 17).
To some extent, this disintegration of minds and matter in Barker’s text finds
a parallel in Union Street’s structural fragmentation. Critics frequently refer to
the book as a novel (e.g. Haywood 145; Hitchcock 55), and this label also appears
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4 Union Street is, for example, referred to as a novel on the back cover of the edition used
for the present study. In addition, the generic label appears prominently on the front
cover of: Pat Barker. Union Street & Blow Your House Down. New York: Picador, 1999.
The German equivalent of the label novel, Roman, appears on: Pat Barker. Union
Street. Berlin: Orlanda Frauenverlag, 2001.
5 The sections are explicitly labeled as chapters in: Pat Barker. Union Street & Blow Your
House Down. New York: Picador, 1999. In the edition used here, they are numbered in
Roman numerals, from I – VII.
6 Maggie Dunn and Ann Morris have noted the astonishingly wide range of generic labels
that have been proposed for the kinds of texts that Ingram describes: “story cycle, short
story cycle, multi-faceted novel, story novel, paranovel, loose-leaf novel, short story com‐
posite, rovelle [sic], composite, short story compound, integrated short story collection,
anthology novel, modernist grotesque, hybrid novel, story chronicle, short story sequence,
genre of return, short story volume, and narrative of community” (4; original emphasis).
While readily conceding that “terminology is hardly the most important factor in genre
identification and theory,” they themselves express a preference for the term composite
novel, for three partly related reasons: (a) the term composite novel highlights the “kin‐
ship to the novel, the modern era’s predominant literary genre”; (b) it emphasizes the
“integrity of the whole”; and (c) it lacks the emphasis on “a circular path, a return to
the beginning” that is implied in short-story cycle. I will, however, retain the term pro‐
posed by Ingram, only adding a hyphen to distinguish ‛short-story cycles’ from ‛short
story cycles’ (i.e. story cycles that are short).
on the front and back covers of various editions.4 Moreover, the fact that the
text’s subdivisions are numbered from one to seven (and even labeled “chapters”
in some editions) serves to emphasize whole-text coherence and thus to
strengthen the association with the genre of the novel.5 In fact, however, Union
Street is divided into seven stories that can easily be read independently of each
other (unlike the chapters – particularly the later ones – of a typical novel; see
Fordham 142; Kirk 612). Forest Ingram has proposed the label short-story cycle
for texts of this kind, which he sees as poised somewhere between, at one ex‐
treme, the typical novel with its tightly interwoven plotlines, and, at the other
extreme, collections or anthologies of entirely unrelated stories (14). For In‐
gram, it is thus the individuality of the stories in terms of plot that separates the
short-story cycle from the novel, while short-story cycles differ from a ‘mere’
collection of tales in the way in which they highlight “bonds of unity which
make the many into a single whole” (19; see also Dunn and Morris 1).6
In other words, while the individual sections of short-story cycles usually lack
any overarching coherence in terms of novelistic plot, such texts (e.g. James
Joyce’s Dubliners or Sherwood Anderson’s Winesburg, Ohio) tend to be unified
by other means, including the use of a common setting and a symbolically sig‐
nificant ordering of the individual units (Dunn and Morris 13 – 15). And indeed,
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the seven stories in Union Street are each set in the same Northern-English in‐
dustrial town, as well as named after progressively older female characters:
I. KELLY BROWN (an eleven year old girl);
II. JOANNE WILSON (not yet twenty, unmarried but pregnant);
III. LISA GODDARD (married to an unemployed man, and pregnant with her third
child);
IV. MURIEL SCAIFE (mother of two teenage children);
V. IRIS KING (about fifty years old, and mother of three daughters);
VI. BLONDE DINAH (a prostitute roughly sixty years of age);
VII. ALICE BELL (seventy-six years old, and very frail).
Thus, if in Shakespeare’s As You Like It the character Jacques speaks of “the
seven ages of man” (2.7.140 – 166), then the sequence of stories in Barker’s text
can be said to comprise “the seven ages of woman” (Rawlinson 20), from the
onset of puberty through pregnancy and motherhood to old-age and death (see
also Jolly 241). John Fordham may thus be oversimplifying matters when he
regards the lack of any overarching plot coherence in Union Street as indicative
of the “breakdown of working-class social coherence” (142; see also Kirk 612),
since he neglects the countervailing elements of unity in Pat Barker’s short-story
cycle.
In fact, one of the key debates regarding short-story cycles centers precisely
on what the genre’s characteristically contradictory pull toward both unity and
fragmentation implies for its representation of community. For Ingram, each
short-story cycle’s various strands “draw the co-protagonists […] into a single
community,” to the extent that this community becomes the “central character”
in such texts (22). Similarly, for J. Gerald Kennedy the experience of the inter‐
dependence of individual units that characterizes short-story cycles “poses a
provocative analogy” to the basic structure of community (194). Rocío G. Davis,
finally, notes that the passage “from individual stories to the whole […] also
marks the shift from the individual to the community” (24). At the same time,
however, both Davis and Kennedy caution against an overly confident emphasis
on unity and wholeness; rather, Davis sees the genre as characterized by a
“struggle between cohesion and fragmentation” (17), and for Kennedy the
glimpses of connection afford only “a partial and problematic view, ordinarily
achieved by the suppression of […] fissures and incongruities” (J. Gerald Ken‐
nedy 196 – 197). We are, in other words, confronted with three possible assess‐
ments of how the short-story cycle represents community: for Ingram, it is a
form that gravitates toward communal unity; for Davis, a genre enacting a
struggle between unity and fragmentation; and for Kennedy, a type of text in
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which the semblance of communal unity will, on closer inspection, always turn
out to be founded on the suppression of gaps and fissures.
In the discussion of Moby-Dick in chapter one, we already encountered Rick
Altman’s idea of multiple-focus narratives, and it is illuminating to regard a
short-story cycle like Union Street as one particular instance of this type of tale.
Altman distinguishes multiple-focus narratives both from dual-focus narratives
(which alternate “between two groups whose conflict provides the plot”; 55) and
single-focus narratives (which follow a single individual on his or her narrative
quest; 189). Moreover, Altman notes that a multiple-focus narrative often looks
like a single-focus narrative at first, but then turns out to consist of a series of
independent single-focus narratives that it juxtaposes to each other both to cri‐
tique the single-focus system as such (254 – 256) and to “posit a level of unity
beyond that of single individuals” (248). Further, while according to Altman
dual-focus narratives revolve around conflicts over space and single-focus nar‐
rative around development in time, the multiple-focus form encourages readers
to seek out the abstract, conceptual links between the narrative units (what
Altman calls the “tertium quid of conception”; 269). Multiple-focus narratives –
and, by implication, short-story cycles – thus do not allow the reader to remain
comfortably immersed in the time and space of the multiple-focus world, but
encourage a more meta-textual frame of mind instead (e.g. the “search for a
hidden pattern”; 277). If we add to this Altman’s conviction that “[m]ul‐
tiple-focus narration is the form of the little people” because it emphasizes col‐
lective, rather than individual, significance (281), then his analytical framework
seems more than apt for a text like Union Street, in which dilapidated buildings
and textual fragmentation complement the narrative’s focus on the homeless,
the “derelict,” and the condition of the working-class.
Female Solidarity, Strife, and Surveillance
Union Street focuses in particular on the daily struggles of working-class women,
so perhaps we ought to begin our quest for the tertium quid of multiple-focus
conception by examining the text’s depiction of female solidarity – which turns
out to be sadly lacking even between women from the same family. For instance,
just as Union Street opens with an emphasis on the crumbling physical structure
of the Brown family home, the first interaction between female relatives that
the text depicts is conflictual rather than harmonious. When the eleven-year-old
Kelly is disturbed by the cardboard cover scraping over the sill of her smashed
bedroom window, she turns over, still half asleep, and inadvertently throws an
arm across the face of her sister Linda, with whom she shares a bed. The latter
complains, understandably: “I wish you’d watch what you’re doing. You nearly
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had my eye out there” (1). The two sisters then keep bickering for a while, and
soon their mother joins the fray, contributing to the atmosphere of conflict: “For
God’s sake, you two, shut up! There’s some of us still trying to sleep” (3). Indeed,
familial tension remains high throughout the first pages of Union Street, with
Kelly showing no attempt at disguising from the mother her hostile attitude to
Arthur, Mrs. Brown’s latest lover (5). More generally, conflicts between mothers
and daughters abound in Union Street: there is a heated exchange between Lisa
Goddard and her mother about whether or not she should leave her husband
because he beats her (112); there is Muriel Scaife, who suffers from “a conflict
of loyalties between her mother and her husband” (141); and there is a frightful
fight between Iris King and her daughter Brenda, during which Iris physically
assaults Brenda, calling her “a little whore” (184). In addition, we are told that,
for the most part, Muriel Scaife has had a rather strained relationship with her
sister-in-law (154 – 155). Likewise, Alice Bell is well aware that it would spell the
end of her son’s marriage if “he might one day have to offer her a home” because
her daughter-in-law is dead set against it (236). The family, in short, is far from
a bastion of female solidarity in the world depicted in Union Street.
The wider community of working-class women, moreover, is not a reliable
source of solidarity either. According to Sarah Brophy, one symptom of distance
rather than solidarity between women is the “gossip that forms the undercurrent
of the community” in Barker’s text (32). The shopkeeper Doris, for example, is
eager “to share her outrage” about Mrs. Brown’s supposedly scandalous love life
with Iris King, who listens “avidly” to this latest bit of gossip (9 – 10). Distance
is not limited to gossip, moreover, for we learn, too, that someone like Maureen
Sullivan, who has “a houseful of kids but no husband,” is respected for managing
to eke out a living – “respected but avoided” (94; emphasis added). We also find
Elaine Watson picking on her mentally retarded co-worker Lillian, with two of
Elaine’s friends, Barbara and Karen, excitedly watching the show, and Joanne
Wilson the only one willing to intervene (91 – 93). There are, to be sure, some
positive counter-examples as well, such as Iris King often taking care of other
people’s children (196), or the women from the community immediately offering
their help when Alice Bell’s health begins to deteriorate (236). Nevertheless,
there is little in Union Street that would allow us to draw a straightforwardly
idyllic picture of solidarity between its female characters.
This becomes particularly clear if for a moment we shift our attention from
the notion of gender to race and ethnicity, as in the second section of Union
Street racism clearly hampers female solidarity. In this section, we learn that
Joanne Wilson – like many other women from the community – works at the
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7 This, incidentally, may be an ironic reference to the famous phrase “Then let them eat
cake,” erroneously attributed to Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, as a response to the
idea that the poor lacked bread. (The phrase in fact comes from Rousseau and was
uttered by an unidentified “grande princesse”; see Ó Gráda 196.)
local cake factory.7 We are also told that “[n]obody liked it” when Big Bertha, a
woman from the West Indies, starts working at the factory because she is “the
first coloured worker there”; Elaine Watson in particular complains about Big
Bertha’s “nigger stink” (81), abusing and bullying her until one day Bertha has
had enough and hits Elaine “full in the mouth” (83). Though the other women
never approved of Elaine’s aggressive behavior – which gossip attributes to the
fact that Elaine’s eldest sister had three children “to a nigger” (82) – they also
refrain from taking Big Bertha’s part, either before or after her violent confron‐
tation with Elaine. Indeed, the women are “horrified” by Big Bertha’s actions
because “[m]en fought, sometimes man and wife fought, but violence between
women was unthinkable,” so that “[m]ore even than the colour of her skin,” the
ferocity of Big Bertha’s attack confirms her as “an outsider amongst them” (82).
Big Bertha, who for the longest time silently endured Elaine’s cruelty, is thus
left to fight on her own, only to be accused of unwomanly (and indeed, uncivi‐
lized) behavior when she eventually defends herself.
The name Big Bertha is significant in this context because it adds a layer of
historical depth to this episode of contemporary racism by creating a strong
intertextual link to Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (Troy 9). According to Pam
Morris, one long-standing problem for the relation between feminism and
racism has been white feminists’ assumption that they can speak for all women,
irrespective of race (Literature and Feminism 165). However, this assumption is
particularly problematic in Britain, where the development of feminism was
influenced profoundly by the country’s involvement in imperial endeavors
(Burton 2; Midgley 1; Parry 38 – 39). In literary studies, arguably the best-known
instance of this kind of entanglement is the character of Bertha in Jane Eyre, the
madwoman in the attic of Rochester’s mansion who, according to Sandra M.
Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s classic analysis, serves “as Jane’s dark double,” acting
out the white protagonist’s secret desire and, through her melodramatic death,
paving the way for the novel’s happy ending (360). We can thus say, with Simone
Heller-Andrist, that “the formation of Western female individualism in Jane Eyre
proceeds at the expense of Bertha” (212) – a circumstance famously critiqued in
Jean Rhys’s appropriation of Jane Eyre in her 1966 novel Wide Sargasso Sea. The
fact that Union Street features a West-Indian character named Bertha thus links
the seemingly local conflict between white women and a “coloured” co-worker
to the long-term historical conflict between feminism and racism. Together with
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8 I would thus be somewhat more reluctant than Roberto del Valle Alcalá to ascribe to
Iris a “sustained rejection of the subaltern position accorded to working-class women,”
or to posit that she “embodies an attitude of refusal which in large measure corroborates
the paramount importance accorded by revolutionary feminists like Federici to repro‐
duction as the strategic axis of the class struggle” (203).
the conflicts between members of the same family and between women in gen‐
eral, the focus on racism as a critical issue thus serves to challenge any
starry-eyed visions of female working-class solidarity as simply a given. Instead,
we are confronted once again with both unity and fragmentation: moments of
neighborly help and solidarity that alternate with episodes of tension and even
outright hostility.
As Sarah Brophy rightly notes, in Union Street the character of Iris King in
many ways epitomizes this tension between solidarity and female conflict. Iris,
Brophy argues, in some ways plays “the stereotypical role of indomitable
working-class mother,” as Barker’s text in fact makes quite explicit:
[Iris] mothered half the street. Kelly Brown and the Scaife children, Lisa Goddard’s
little lads – they all knew and loved their Iris. […] And she sat with women in labour.
Even laid out the dead, though there wasn’t as much call for that now. […]
All this was meat and drink to her. She loved life […] and took it for granted that
life included old age, suffering and death. (Union Street 196)
Iris is mother to “half the street” (a role complemented by the fact that she works
“full-time as a home help”; 185), so that one may be tempted to see her as the
very model of solidarity and domestic care. In addition, Iris plays an important
structural role in Union Street, as she is mentioned in each of Union Street’s seven
stories and therefore appears as the “embodiment of connectedness in the nar‐
rative” (Brophy 33). And yet, we have also seen that Iris “avidly” participates in
communal gossip (10), and that at one point she physically assaults her six‐
teen-year-old daughter Brenda for being pregnant (“I’ll murder the little bitch”;
184). We learn, too, that Iris is highly judgmental of women who, like
Mrs. Brown, fail to live up to her supposedly more respectable housekeeping
standards (39). It is thus safe to agree with Brophy, who deems it impossible to
regard Iris as an exclusively admirable character (33).8
Brophy also rightly observes that in Union Street the most troublesome aspects
of Iris’s character are related to her experience of growing up in a deeply trou‐
bled, ‘broken’ home. Abandoned by her mother when only six weeks old, Iris
grew up with her father “in a series of boarding houses,” some of which “weren’t
much better than brothels and some of them were brothels”; her father paid a
“long succession of women to look after her” – with many of the women failing
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to do a good job (187). Living in Wharfe Street, the poorest part of town, Iris was
so ill fed that she depended on vendors at the marketplace for free food
(187 – 188), and later, when she was in her teens, Iris’s father used to beat her
often (189). Though Iris has since worked her way up to a respected position in
Union Street, she knows that Wharfe Street is “still in her” (186), and that her
repeated bouts of depression – “a blackness she linked in her mind with those
early years” – are unlikely ever to cease (195). It is, moreover, due to the total
lack of safety during childhood that Iris falls “in love with the idea of mar‐
riage,” which she associates with the one thing she had never really had: “A
home” (189). It is precisely the respectability of her home – this “home that she
had toiled and sweated to create” (195) – that Iris now wants to protect at all
cost. Accordingly, when Iris urges her daughter Brenda to have an abortion, this
is only in part because she wants to avoid her being “stuck” with a baby for
several years (201). Another important motive is that Brenda’s ‘stupidity’ poses
a threat to Iris’s reputation in the community: a reputation that matters “more
to her than anything else” because it is “the measure of her distance from Wharfe
Street” (196; see also Brophy 33 – 34; Lucy Gallagher 42).
It is important to be clear about the extent to which Iris’s understanding of
respectability corresponds to ideals of domesticity that are bourgeois in origin.
Nancy Armstrong has shown that, in the eighteenth-century conduct books
which were so vital to the rise of domestic fiction, one key characteristic of the
ideal bourgeois female was that she was able to regulate her desires in order to
allow her husband to accumulate capital: “Self-regulation alone gave a woman
authority over the field of domestic objects and personnel where her supervision
constituted a form of value in its own right” (81). As one conduct book quoted
by Armstrong puts it, a woman who does not possess these virtues will be “in‐
capable of perceiving her chief happiness to center at home,” and will instead
“sally forth in quest of adventures”; such a woman prefers to put herself on
display and be seen, rather than be vigilant and supervise her household – and
it is this, Armstrong avers, that constitutes such a woman’s crime (77). Regula‐
tion of desire and an economy of vigilance and supervision: it is a fitting de‐
scription for Iris King, who censures Mrs. Brown for going out pubbing and
neglecting her household duties; who is livid at her own daughter’s “fucking
and going on” (184), as well as “bloody sure” that sexual pleasure is not natural
(198); and who, with her vigilant gaze, surveys and censures the entire com‐
munity of female ‘malefactors.’
Of course, to say that Iris has internalized a particular ideology of middle-class
domesticity is not to suggest that her views are entirely wrongheaded. For in‐
stance, though thoughts of respectability are an important motive for Iris, an‐
242 5 “People Still Living in the Derelict Houses”: Barker’s Union Street
9 According to one survey, the overall poverty rate in the UK increased from 6 % in 1979
to 11 % in 1995, with the poverty rate among single mothers rising even more markedly,
from 11 % to 28 % (Huber and Stephens 299). Matters were in many ways even worse
in the USA, where the overall poverty rate rose from 17 % in 1979 to 19 % in 1994, with
the poverty rate among single mothers increasing from an already staggering 42 % to
49 % (Huber and Stephens 299). Similarly, in a survey of Switzerland in 2010, of all forms
of households, it is single parents – and particularly single mothers – who are at the
highest risk of being poor (Guggisberg, Müller and Christin 18 – 20).
other reason why she wants her daughter Brenda to have an abortion is simply
that the sixteen-year-old girl does not even “earn enough to keep herself” (200).
This may appear like a brutally materialistic assessment on Iris’s part, but it is
difficult to dismiss her concerns as merely a kind of delusion, for the link be‐
tween single motherhood and poverty had been a depressingly constant feature
of twentieth-century British life (e.g. Kanji 131).9 Moreover, if we bear in mind
that “single mothers became a political debating point” in Britain in the late
1970s (McNeill, Blundell and Griffiths 48) – i.e. only a few years before Union
Street was published – then it is reasonable to assume that readers would have
recognized Iris’s fears about her daughter’s economic well-being as justified,
especially given that the willingness to provide welfare support to single women
was decreasing under the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher
(Kanji 132). In Union Street, Iris is thus correct in assuming that Brenda is likely
to descend into poverty if she decides to keep her baby and raise it as a single
mother: “The primary motivation for Iris’s self-improvement has always been
her desire for her daughters to have a better life than she did, and it is this that
Brenda’s pregnancy also undermines” (Lucy Gallagher 44).
However, rather than displaying any anger at the systemic conditions that
render this scenario probable in the first place, Iris blames her daughter for what
she sees as an exclusively individual failure – and this is the ideological point:
for Iris, it is only her daughter’s unregulated desire, and not at all the conspicuous
lack of societal support, that constitutes an act of both economic and moral
stupidity. Her daughter’s ‘domestic’ failure thus remains privatized in two
senses: hidden, as far as possible, from the gaze of others, and explained only as
a private and never as also a public issue: bourgeois ideology at its best (or worst,
depending on one’s political outlook). Iris, in short, thinks exclusively within
the framework of things as they are, and her particular, conservative brand of
respectable domestic realism fails to envision any possibility of social change.
Significantly, Iris’s very name intimates that she has internalized a class-based
ideal of respectability and domestic womanhood. We have seen the extent to
which Iris is in thrall to a bourgeois ideology of domestic respectability that is
curiously at odds with her working-class status. If, therefore, we bear in mind
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permanent visibility,” which will in turn serve to discipline the subject’s behavior (201).
that in Britain the middle class and the aristocracy have historically been far
more closely allied than elsewhere (e.g. Kocka 20), and that in the course of the
nineteenth century even the aristocracy began to represent itself on the basis of
the “model of middle-class domesticity” (Nancy Armstrong 74), then it seems
eminently appropriate for Iris’s last name to be “King”: the patriarchal pinnacle
of the ruling order. Moreover, if Iris’s family name points to the issue of class,
her function as guardian of respectability is aptly expressed in her first name,
“Iris,” which among other things refers to the part of the eye that controls the
amount of light reaching the retina and thus hints at the panoptic power of Iris’s
ever watchful, relentlessly judgmental, disciplinary gaze.
Admittedly, the link between the name Iris and the Foucauldian concept of
the panoptic gaze may seem far-fetched at first sight, but it ceases to do so once
we realize the pervasive emphasis on eyes in Union Street.10 The word eye ap‐
pears at least once on no fewer than 96 of the 265 pages of the Virago Classics
edition of Union Street – a remarkable 36 % – and in many of these cases, vision
and sight are quite directly associated with power, panoptic or otherwise. There
is, for instance, Lisa Goddard who, after losing her patience and hitting her
three-year-old son in the supermarket, “raised her eyes and found a young girl
staring at her,” looking on silently, passing judgment (109). There is also Richard
Scaife, twelve years old and afraid to be seen too often together with his mother
because people might otherwise think of him as a “[b]it of a pouf” (141). And
the examples could be multiplied at will: Big Bertha blowing out smoke that gets
“into Elaine’s eyes” (91); parents keeping “an eye” on their children (142); or Iris
King’s sister Laura, recently institutionalized and treated for schizophrenia,
having “staring eyes” that unsettle almost everyone, including the elderly at the
old people’s home where she is now employed (178). In each of these cases, the
gaze involves a sense of violation or power struggle, thus providing us with a
solid figurative basis for interpreting Iris’s first name as linked to her ambivalent
role as panoptic matriarch of Union Street.
Identity and the Eye of the Beholder
Precisely because eyes, sight, and the gaze are continually linked to the notion
of power in Union Street, they are also related to the construction and mainte‐
nance of identity. We find one negative image of this correlation in the scene in
which Iris King and Brenda, her daughter, are confronted with the sight of
Brenda’s aborted baby:
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At the last moment she [i.e. Brenda] looked down and – “Eyes!” Iris said, putting a
hand over her daughter’s face, as the bag of membranes bulged out and burst.
“I didn’t see it, Mam,” Brenda said. “I mean I just caught a glimpse … ” She stopped.
“I didn’t see it.”
“Didn’t you, love?”
“No. No, I didn’t see it.” (215)
Trying to repress the fact of the baby’s potential humanity and selfhood, Brenda
convinces herself that she never actually saw “it” – which implies that looking
at the baby would constitute an act of human recognition. This same link be‐
tween sight and recognition is apparent when Kelly Brown is approached in a
local park by a man who, she soon realizes, “had been watching her a long time”
(14). Though Kelly is disconcerted by the intensity of the man’s stare, it also
exerts an inexorable power:
He looked at her so intently. Other people – her mother, Linda, the teachers at
school – merely glanced at her and then with indifference or haste, passed on. But
this man stared at her as if every pore on her skin mattered. His eyes created her. And
so she had to go with him. She could not help herself. (16)
As readers, we may shrink from the image of Kelly’s only just pubescent body
exposed to the gaze of a much older man, “whose eyes created her.” At the same
time, the passage makes clear that the gaze and vision are not inescapably
threatening, alienating and objectifying; looking at others can also be a sign of
recognition, and the narrator suggests that it is precisely the lack of such rec‐
ognition from those closest to her that renders Kelly vulnerable to other, more
dangerous kinds of visual exposure (Brannigan 20).
Put in more philosophical terms, Union Street creates a tension between vision
as alienation and what Kelly Oliver has called the look of love. From Hegel
through Sartre and Lacan, Oliver contends, there is a long philosophical tradi‐
tion that regards the gaze as an inherently violent intrusion:
[S]ight only serves to remind us of the abyss separating us from others. In these the‐
ories, vision creates a sense of lack, castration, or alienation, the sense of being cut off
from the world, or being alone. [… W]hat we see when we recognize ourselves in or
against the other is the distance between us that alienates us, not only from others
but also from ourselves […]. (63)
Against such an exclusive focus on the alienating gaze, Oliver posits a look of
love devoid of mastery and domination – a conception she derives from readings
of Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, as well as from feminist
philosophers like Julia Kristeva, bell hooks, and, in particular, Luce Irigaray:
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11 As John Brannigan has noted (77), the appearance of a man in black at the fun fair is
one of many correspondences between Union Street and Pat Barker’s fourth novel, The
Man Who Wasn’t There.
Irigaray’s suggestions about the possibility of loving looks turn Sartre’s or Lacan’s
anti-social gaze into a look as the circulation of affective psychic energy. The gaze
does not have to be a harsh or accusing stare. […]. Loving looks nourish and sustain
the psyche, the soul, as well as the body. [… T]he caress, and the look as caress, do
not fix an object for a subject, but open a realm in which the two remain two but
cannot be separated. (71)
While at times Oliver’s prose may be overly mellifluous, she remains convincing
on the key point that there is not merely one kind of look; if there is a harsh
stare that threatens us with symbolic castration, then by contrast the look of
love – the “look as caress” – promises recognition and fulfillment. It is in this
light that we must read a terrible scene in Union Street that depicts the death of
Muriel Scaife’s beloved husband John, whose eyes, the narrator emphasizes,
“rolled about, frenzied and unseeing” (163, emphasis added): unable ever again
to offer the look of love to his terrified wife and son (163).
Importantly, in Union Street, the objectifying gaze of mastery and domination
is figured as non-seeing and thus death-like as well. For instance, when Iris King
learns of her daughter’s pregnancy, she is for a moment “literally blind with
rage” (181) – and shortly afterwards she physically assaults her daughter (184).
Perhaps the most forceful expression, however, of the link between the alien‐
ating gaze and bodily harm is Union Street’s association of non-seeing with rape.
The stranger who watches Kelly in the park does not actually hurt her at that
point in the story; he even protects her from a flock of geese who suddenly
attack the girl when she is feeding the birds at the lake (17). However, when
Kelly leaves to meet her friend Sharon at the nearby fun fair, a sense of menace
remains, and several times Kelly feels that she is being watched by the man,
“dressed all in black as he had been in the park” (19 – 20).11 Increasingly panicked
and queasy, Kelly leaves the fairground and soon finds herself doubled up, vom‐
iting in the gutter – where suddenly she realizes that the man from the park is
standing next to her: “Again she had the feeling that he had been there a long
time” (22). Though the man promises to show her the way to a bus stop from
where she can get back home, he in fact leads Kelly into an abandoned, derelict
part of town. Here, Kelly feels exposed “like an insect crawling over an eyeball”
(28), and when she ultimately finds herself trapped in a blind (!) alley, she turns
around to look into the eyes of the man who approaches her, finding that “there
was nothing there that she could reach”; she “closed her eyes, because his glazed
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12 In a classic essay on mainstream cinema, Laura Mulvey claims that the Freudian notion
of scopophilia – the pleasure associated with “taking other people as objects, subjecting
them to a controlling and curious gaze” (587) – is a constitutive feature of the male gaze
that structures the position of spectators in such films.
eyes and hanging face were too terrible to look at,” but the man forces her to
look at and touch his penis: a “single mucoid eye [that] leered at her from under
the partially retracted foreskin” (29). This, indeed, is the ‘male’ gaze as the most
extreme form of non-recognition: violating, objectifying, and blind to the female
subject that has come within the grasp of its impersonal desire.12 The man rapes
Kelly, and climaxing in “a final, agonised convulsion,” he looks at her afterward
“as if he hated her more than anything else”; indeed, Kelly sees the thought “form
in his eyes” that he could simply kill the object ‘tainted’ by his own lust (29 – 30).
The man, however, refrains from further violating the girl, and with neither lust
nor hate left to sustain the alienating gaze, he can no longer bear to look at her,
his eyes skittering about “like ants” when Kelly tries to make eye contact (32).
The castrating, annihilating, objectifying gaze, and the inability to offer the look
of love: it is difficult to imagine a more harrowing juxtaposition of these two
conflicting ways of seeing.
Union Street makes it clear that one consequence of the alienating gaze, as
opposed to the look of love, is a fundamental kind of homelessness – both in
Kelly’s case and in the story of Alice Bell. Kelly, after being raped, believes that
she “was what had just happened to her. It was between the man and her” – and
“he was … nothing!” (32). Later, Mrs. Brown will find Kelly determined to avoid
the mother’s concerned look (43). Conversely, other people will find themselves
avoiding Kelly’s “eyes of a curious naked amber: an animal’s eyes” (46). Kelly,
that is to say, is no longer able either to bestow or to receive the look of love;
she is alienated from everyone else, and accordingly the “street was her home
now” (48). The story of Alice Bell appears radically different at first sight. For
the seventy-six-year-old woman, who unlike Iris used to be better off in the past
(234 – 235), there are two main fears left in life: a pauper’s funeral and the Work‐
house (233). These fears explain why Alice, who has recently suffered an inca‐
pacitating stroke (245), is terrified by her son’s suggestion that she move to the
nearby “Home” (i.e. a home for the elderly):
“But I don’t want to go there.”
“Oh, you’ll soon settle in.” […]
“The Workhouse.”
“It’s not the Workhouse now. In your day it was. It’s all changed now.” (257 – 258)
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Ironically, the Home – which used to be that dreaded place, the Workhouse – is
in fact an unhomely space that signifies the fundamental loss of control and
belonging for Alice: “Her home. They were taking it away from her” (260). Alison
Blunt and Robyn Dowling underline that homes, as sites of memory, continuity,
and self-determination can become increasingly important for the elderly as
their ability to move becomes restricted (114). And indeed, we learn in Union
Street that, for Alice, everything in her home “was steeped in memory” (260) in
this house that over the years has become “almost an extension of her own
body” (234). John Brannigan thus rightly insists that, for Alice, there is a strong
equation between a certain idea of home and her sense of identity, which ex‐
plains why “Alice clings to what her home symbolizes […] long after it has ceased
to afford her the comforts of a home” (32). Or, as Alice herself sees it: “The dirt
and disorder, the signs of malnutrition and neglect which to them were reasons
for putting her away were, to her, independence” (260). It is this last symbolic
refuge of Alice’s self-determination that is being taken away on the recommen‐
dation of a social worker who, like Alice’s son and daughter-in-law, fails to see
how important her home is for the old woman: “She now understood the full
indignity of rape. That man [i.e. the social worker], the expression in his eyes
when he looked at her. The not-seeing” (260). If in Kelly’s case rape undermines
her sense of belonging, then in a kind of inverted mirror-image, for Alice it is
the loss of the home that feels to her like rape. Moreover, in both cases, there is
a refusal by others to recognize the needs and desires of someone who is unable
to defend herself: a kind of “not-seeing” that reduces other human beings to
mere objects.
A seemingly random episode in Union Street suggests that this kind of
not-seeing is related to a worldview in which human beings are seen as mere
means, and not as subjects who deserve to be regarded as ends in themselves
(cf. the discussion of slavery in the chapter on Absalom, Absalom!). We have seen
that Iris King’s sister, Laura, has “staring eyes” and was recently treated for
schizophrenia (178). When asked by Mrs. Sullivan, Iris explains the reason for
Laura’s temporary institutionalization:
She was cleaning for this old man and one day she just took it into her head to set him
on fire. One minute he was sat in his armchair, next he was up in flames. Or rather
the chair was. He wasn’t badly burned but […] at that age the shock could have killed
him. I said when I went to see her, I said, What d’ y’ want to do that for, Laura? She
just turned around and said, Why not? He was no use. (179)
If others become mere means in a larger process – human resources, as it were –
then there is no reason for them to continue existing as soon as they cease to
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be of use. It is an extreme view, and explicitly associated with mental illness in
Barker’s text. However, as Laura’s inflexible stare is similar in kind to the un‐
seeing looks in both Kelly’s and Alice’s stories, the political point is, arguably,
that there is a larger, social problem underlying Laura’s individual illness: a
social system that consistently regards humans as means to ends, to be discarded
if they cease to be ‘useful.’
A Common Vision
The parallels between Kelly’s and Alice’s stories are emphasized further in a
meeting between the two characters that is told twice in Union Street, the first
time from Kelly’s perspective. Crucially, for Kelly this meeting revolves around
the possibility of regaining a sense of home and belonging. At the end of Union
Street’s first section, on a cold late-winter day, Kelly is walking through the
park – the very place where she first met her rapist – and is startled by the sight
of the setting sun “obscured by columns of drifting brown and yellow smoke. A
brutal, bloody disc, scored by factory chimneys, it seemed to swell up until it
filled half the western sky” (64). Experiencing an odd “sensation of moving out‐
side time,” Kelly walks further into the park:
Then a murmuring began and mixed in with it sharp, electric clicks, like the sound of
women talking and brushing their hair at once. The noise became louder. She climbed
to a ridge of higher ground and there at the centre was the tree, its branches fanned
out, black and delicate, against the red furnace of sky. By now the murmur had become
a fierce, ecstatic trilling, and when she looked more closely she saw that the tree was
covered in birds that clustered along its branches as thick and bright as leaves, so that
from a distance you might almost have thought that the tree was singing. (65)
It is a disturbingly beautiful vision, to which we shall return shortly. For the
time being, however, the key thing to note is that Kelly does not find any con‐
solation in it because she cannot “break out of that room inside her head” in
which she is caught together with her rapist (65). As dusk settles, the lights go
on in the houses bordering the park – “Homecomings,” the narrator notes – and
this is the very moment when Kelly notices what at first seems to her “nothing
but a heap of rags” on a park bench in the cold February air (65 – 66). Soon,
however, the girl discovers that there is an old woman wrapped tightly in these
rags, peering back at Kelly “evidently unable to see her properly,” her “eyes milky
with cataract” (66). Kelly asks the old woman whether there is anybody ex‐
pecting her “back home” (67), to which the women replies that she has come
here to end her life, freezing to death on this bench in the park – an idea from
which Kelly tries to dissuade her:
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“At least in a Home you’d get your meals.” She paused. Then burst out, “And they’d
see you were warm. They’d see you had a fire.”
“Is not the life more than meat and the body more than raiment?”
She wasn’t quoting. She had lived long enough to make the words her own. (67)
The old woman’s biblical reply (cf. Matthew 6:25; KJV: “Is not the life more than
meat, and the body than raiment?”) resonates with Union Street’s general
themes, for while the text continually highlights that home must begin with
material security, it also acknowledges that this in itself is not sufficient. Accor‐
dingly, though Kelly knows that she could disregard the old woman’s wishes
and get ‘help,’ she accepts the woman’s claim to a modicum of agency and re‐
spect as a subject. “I won’t tell anybody,” Kelly says to the old woman, and if the
look of love, according to Oliver, “does not pry or gaze, but caress” (69), then it
is significant that the girl now reaches out and touches the old woman’s hand
(Union Street 68). Kelly stays with the old woman until her eyes are closed, “in
sleep, or unconsciousness, or death,” and then steps away from the bench, out
of the park, and back into the streets of her community: “She was going home”
(68 – 69) – and for John Brannigan, this conclusion to Kelly’s story suggests that
the girl “resigns herself” to what her imperfect home has to offer (24).
However, while resignation does play a role in the section’s conclusion, it is
arguably not the imperfect home to which Kelly resigns herself, but to the notion
of human frailty and mortality as such – which makes a crucial difference in
political terms. The idea that Kelly’s encounter with the old woman prompts
the girl for the first time to confront her own mortality is explicit in Union
Street: “[F]or the first time, she found it possible to believe in her own death.
There was terror in this, but no sadness” (67). We have seen that Kelly’s trau‐
matic experience of rape leads directly to a kind of homelessness on her part.
Now, however, it is the realization that human life as such – not only her own –
is vulnerable and exposed to suffering that makes it possible for her to regain
some sense of value, to imagine herself as part of, rather than outside, the
community, as well as to recover a concern for the others who live around her
(Brophy 37).
Crucially, resigning oneself to the idea that human life is fragile and provi‐
sional does not mean the same as condoning the kind of violation and dereliction
that we find everywhere in Union Street. Rather, it implies that such injustice
can only be remedied if first we are willing to face the full terror of human frailty,
and the full extent of present suffering, without resorting either to fatalism or
despair (“There was terror in this, but no sadness”). Or, in the words of Antonio
Gramsci: “It is necessary to create sober, patient people who do not despair in
the face of the worst horrors and who do not become exuberant with every
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silliness. Pessimism of the intelligence, optimism of the will” (172). Not resig‐
nation to the broken state of these working-class homes, then, but a remorse‐
lessly clear view of things as they are: human frailty and mortality, the depth of
economic privation, as well as the variety of conflicts that exist between
working-class women, whose “discordant” voices Kelly hears on her way home
(68; see Brophy 37). Realism, in other words, which in turn must serve as the
starting point for any progressive politics worthy of the name.
Such a reading helps explain why the implications of the meeting between
Kelly and the old woman are so different from the latter’s point of view. The old
woman, who remains unnamed in the first section of Union Street, is, of course,
Alice, who in the text’s seventh and final section experiences a moment of vision
similar to Kelly’s. The description of Alice’s vision repeats parts of Kelly’s almost
verbatim, and it is therefore worth quoting at length:
[A] murmuring began, as of the wind through summer trees or waves unfurling on
the shore [… When Alice] looked at the skyline she saw that one tree stood out from
the rest, its branches fanned out, black and delicate, against the red furnace of sky.
[…] At first, it seemed to be bare like all the others, though with a jaggedness of
outline that suggested not winter but death. By now the murmur had become a shout,
a fierce, ecstatic trilling; and when she looked more closely, she saw that the tree was
full of birds, clustering along its branches, as thick and bright as leaves. And all singing.
But then, as she came closer still, as her white hair and skin took on the colours of
blood and fire, she saw more clearly, and in a moment of vision cried. It isn’t the birds,
it’s the tree. The tree is singing.
The light was unbearably bright, bubbling in every vein, shaking her heart. She
could not bear it. She shrank, she fell back. […]
But there was a child there, now, a girl, who, standing with the sun behind her,
seemed almost to be a gift of the light. […] Then it was time for them both to go.
So that in the end there were only the birds, soaring, swooping, gliding, moving in
a never-ending spiral about the withered and unwithering tree. (264 – 265)
Shrinking away from her overpowering experience, Alice finds Kelly “almost to
be a gift of the light” – as if the girl herself were a symbol of solidarity and the
continuation of life. Phrases from Kelly’s vision (e.g. “By now the murmur had
become a fierce, ecstatic trilling”) are echoed very closely in this passage (“By
now the murmur had become a shout, a fierce, ecstatic trilling”), which can be
seen to suggest that the meaning of the vision is the same for both Alice and
Kelly.
Critics have generally assumed that this is the case, though there is disagree‐
ment as to the political implications of the two characters’ shared moment of
2515 “People Still Living in the Derelict Houses”: Barker’s Union Street
vision. For Peter Hitchcock, for instance, the meeting between Kelly and Alice
is “a strong statement on the sisterhood of class” (56). In a similar vein, Roberto
del Valle Alcalá interprets their encounter as a moment that highlights the “ir‐
reversibility of resistance” (204), rather than as “a concession of defeat or con‐
firmation of women’s victimhood” (205). John Brannigan, by contrast, is hesi‐
tant, arguing that Union Street’s conclusion serves, not “to transcend the bleak
depiction of dereliction presented throughout the novel, but to signal the pos‐
sibility of an imaginative transformation of the structures which produce these
material conditions,” thus compelling us “to conceive of the functions and forms
of ‘home’ and community anew” (33; emphasis added). Sarah Brophy likewise
holds that the final union between Kelly and Alice “is more emblematic than it
is political” (36), and Margaretta Jolly even wonders whether such visionary
moments in Barker’s work, which appeal to the body and spirit rather than the
mind, might also imply that “material change and rational agency” are no longer
feasible (236). The debate, in short, is reminiscent of the more general debate on
realism as a form, questioning as it does whether the final moment of vision in
Union Street carries with it a genuinely utopian impulse, or whether it merely
serves imaginatively to dissolve the text’s tensions in a politically void symbol‐
ical gesture.
What is lost out of sight in this debate is that, from the point of view of Alice,
there really is not much hope left at the end of Barker’s text, beyond imaginative
consolation. We learn, for instance, that after Alice’s stroke “it was obvious that
the situation could not continue” – obvious “even to Mrs. Bell herself, though
she would not admit it” (252). Later, when Alice tries to see herself “through a
stranger’s eyes,” she finds it “no wonder they wanted her put away,” and thinks
of herself as “[r]ubbish. Ready for the tip” (259). This, accordingly, is Alice’s
crucial insight: “She searched among the wreckage for some fragment of hope,
but there was none. Her life would not renew” (260). From Alice’s own,
single-focus perspective, in short, there truly is no hope left, only imaginative
consolation. However, seen from the multiple-focus perspective of Union Street
as a whole, the emphasis of Alice’s insight shifts: “Her life would not renew”
(emphasis added) – but others’ lives might, including Kelly’s, who thanks to her
vision of the tree filled with birds is “alive with hope” when she finds Alice sitting
on the bench in the park (67).
Put more abstractly, we may say that solving the interpretive puzzle posed
by the meeting between Kelly and Alice involves a shift in focus from its
meaning within the two separate stories to its significance for the reader as he
or she reconsiders the text as a whole. Paul Ricoeur is one critic who has com‐
mented on the effect of symbolism on the reader, and a key point he makes is
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that symbols involve what one could call communicative excess: a symbol “says
more than it says” and therefore “invites us to think, calls for an interpretation”
(The Conflict of Interpretations 27 – 28; emphasis added). Franco Moretti in fact
has made an intriguingly congruous suggestion, arguing that whereas ‘pure’
narrative is syntagmatic – in the sense that it concentrates on the relentless
forward-flow of events (i.e. ‘What comes next?’) – symbolic scenes could be
called paradigmatic because they entail an “urge to classify,” and hence a more
analytical attitude (i.e. ‘Where does this fit, in the larger scheme of things?’;
Way of the World 158). If this is the case, then the symbolism of Union Street’s
‘twice-told’ final scene constitutes a kind of wake-up call, akin to Slavoj Žižek’s
provocative advice in his book On Violence. There, Žižek suggests that too often
a “fake sense of urgency” pervades contemporary discourses on violence and
humanitarian crises – an urgency that is fundamentally anti-theoretical in that
it discourages us from inquiring into the underlying causes of such crises: “There
is no time to reflect: we have to act now” (5 – 6; original emphasis). However,
Žižek continues, it may sometimes be more productive not to let oneself be
drawn into the flow of current events, and instead to pause and reflect. In a
similar vein, Union Street’s symbolical conclusion serves to redirect readers’
attention, away from the forward-movement of the plot, and toward that tertium
quid of conception which, according to Rick Altman, constitutes the crucial in‐
terpretive quest of multiple-focus readings in general.
Female Identity: Birds of a Feather
Ricoeur’s ideas imply that symbolism may lead to a kind of alienation effect,
making it impossible for readers to feel too comfortably at home in the fictional
world of the text. Instead, symbols force us to examine the text from a certain
critical distance – as exemplified by the discussion in this chapter of the sym‐
bolical role of eyes, sight, and visions in Union Street. If we now shift our atten‐
tion to another figurative leitmotif in Barker’s text – birds – we must therefore
bear in mind Yuri Lotman’s point that, in the case of symbols, to stop and think
means at least two different things: on the one hand, to consider the symbol’s
“cultural memory” as it runs “vertically through the whole course of human
history,” and, on the other, to examine the network of symbolism as it is estab‐
lished and developed in one particular text (86). Put differently: though we must
follow the general trajectory of symbols as they have historically migrated from
one text to the next, we also need to find out how, precisely, these symbols are
deployed in the particular text under study.
Starting with the symbolism of birds in cultural history in general, one key
point for us to note is simply the wide array of meanings associated with avian
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13 chick, n1, 3b (OED Online, 3 August 2017; 2nd 1989).
14 A fuller list would include the albatross, cock, crow, cuckoo, dove, eagle, falcon, goose,
hawk, lark, nightingale, owl, peacock, pelican, raven, sparrow, stork, swallow, and swan
(see Ferber 27 – 28; Lurker 774; cf. Ronnberg 244 – 261).
imagery. Most dictionaries of symbols agree that in various cultures birds are
linked to the soul, poetic inspiration and flights of fancy, as well as to
prophecy: the winged messengers between Heaven and Earth (Cirlot 25; de Vries
47; Ferber 26; Lurker 773; Ronnberg 238). If we add to this Juan Eduardo
Cirlot’s description of the Tree of Life, with birds perched on the tree’s branches
representing the souls of the faithful (27), then we are immediately reminded of
Union Street’s final vision of hope and renewal. Another component of this first
cluster of symbolical meanings is that birds are frequently associated with
freedom, or at least the desire for it (e.g. Ronnberg 240), pointing to a sense of
possibility, transformation, and transcendence that forms part of the cultural
memory stored in avian imagery. Moreover, a second cluster of avian associa‐
tions revolves around femininity (e.g. de Vries 47), with the egg as a symbol of
creation and regeneration (de Vries 158), and words like chicks even used col‐
loquially to refer to girls or young women (OED).13 Evidently, this gendered
history, too, would render birds an appropriate symbol for Union Street and its
focus on the lives of seven women. Meanwhile, a third and final cluster of as‐
sociations relates birds to the notion of community and home, both because
many birds build nests and because migratory birds leave but also always return
home (Ferber 26, quoting Lévi-Strauss; cf. Ronnberg 238). In short, we have three
clusters of symbolical associations – transcendence (or at least the longing for
it), an association with femininity, and the link to the concept of home – that all
seem admirably suited to Union Street.
However, at the same time we need to bear in mind that there is a complex
and contradictory history of symbolism associated with individual birds (e.g.
the albatross, the dove, or the eagle).14 In this regard, the most basic observation
to be made is that, in Union Street, the more ‘aristocratic’ birds – the eagle,
nightingale, and owl, for example – tend to be missing (with the exception of
swans, which appear twice; 16, 98), while the more common and ‘homely’ birds
(geese, sparrows, and seagulls) take center stage. And once we think about it,
this is not really surprising, as it ensures that the text’s avian symbolism does
not clash too forcibly with its realist aesthetic. It would, in other words, put a
rather significant strain on the reader’s willing suspension of disbelief to include
soaring eagles and singing nightingales in the Northern-English industrial set‐
ting of a text like Union Street.
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15 If we take into consideration that the Greeks associated sparrows with fertility, which
is why in the Middle Ages sparrows could also be linked to unchastity and fornication
(see Lurker 774), then the image Joanne uses becomes even more humorously apt.
This last point also leads us away from the more general cultural history of
avian imagery to its particular use in Union Street, where birds appear in each
of the seven sections (either as symbolical objects in the fictional world, or on
the level of discourse, as metaphors and similes), and where there is a clear
tendency for figurative fowl to be linked to female characters – though the con‐
nection is not entirely unequivocal. This becomes readily apparent from a (se‐
lective) survey of the many examples from Union Street’s seven sections:
1. When feeding “the ducks and geese and swans” at the lake in the park, Kelly
Brown is attacked by the geese (17). At one point after having been raped, Kelly
is tempted to kill an injured bird (63 – 64). Kelly is also moved, however, to find
Alice Bell’s throat “as vulnerable as a bird’s,” and later a group of women talking
in front of a factory gate seem to her to make “a sound like the starlings had
made” (68).
2. Near the lake in the park, Joanne Wilson tells her boyfriend Ken that she is
expecting his child, and shortly after some geese and swans “begin sailing to‐
wards them in search of food” (98). Later in the story, Joanne confesses to a
friend that sex with her boyfriend was brief and disappointing: “A sparrow
couldn’t ’ve farted quicker” (104).15
3. Lisa Goddard remembers that her husband once talked about the “bloody sea‐
gulls” that seemed drawn to the factory where he used to work (“a pest”);
sometimes, a dead seagull would drop from the sky like a stone – killed, pre‐
sumably, by the toxic fumes emanating from the factory’s chimneys (121). Later
in the story, Lisa gives birth to a baby daughter, to whom at first she does not
feel any emotional connection. Eventually, however, Lisa manages to accept
the baby daughter as her own; she then walks to the hospital window, carrying
the girl in her arms, and sees “patches of trapped sky. Shadows of clouds and
birds drifted across them” (139).
4. When Richard Scaife tells his father that he is reading a book about birds, he
shows him the picture of a heron. The father, John, replies half-jokingly that
this kind of knowledge is useless because “round here” there are no herons:
“Only sparrows and starlings. And seagulls” (157). The father then points to a
photograph in the newspaper of a woman posing naked and adds: “Only birds
I ever fancy are in here” (ibid.).
5. Iris King, who is angry with her sixteen-year-old daughter for being preg‐
nant, accidentally breaks an egg when working in the kitchen (201) – which
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16 cock, n1, II.8 (OED Online, 3 August 2017; 2nd ed. 1989).
17 hawk, v2 (OED Online, 3 August 2017; 2nd ed. 1989).
seems doubly significant, given that the word ovary appears several times in
this section of Union Street (205, 209). In addition, Iris uses the word “cock” (i.e.
a male fowl) as a term of endearment for her daughter (217) – a usage derived
from the word’s metaphorical meaning as one “who fights with pluck and
spirit” (OED).16
6. George Harrison uses the phrase “hawking it” (OED: “to carry about from place
to place and offer for sale”) to refer to Blonde Dinah’s continuing to prostitute
herself even at her advanced age (225).17 George later has sex with Dinah, also
spends the night with her but in the morning leaves before Dinah wakes up,
feeling invigorated and encountering some birds on his way home: “Seagulls
screamed and dived in the air above the river. And one detached itself from the
rest to fly under the steel bridge; wings, briefly shadowed, gleamed in the re‐
stored light” (231).
7. Birds feature both in Alice Bell’s mysterious vision (264) and in the very last
sentence of Union Street, “soaring, swooping, gliding” around a “withered and
unwithering tree” (265).
There are at least three things worth noting here. First, while it is possible to
unify the various instances of avian imagery under the single umbrella term
birds, we could also choose to emphasize difference: seagulls as opposed to
sparrows, herons, or geese, for example. Second, though some images convey a
sense of liberation (Lisa seeing birds drifting across the sky after finally finding
an emotional connection to her baby daughter; a seagull whose wings gleam in
“restored light”; or the birds we find “soaring, swooping, gliding” in the text’s
final sentence), others create an atmosphere of threat and oppression (Kelly
being attacked by geese, but also herself tempted to kill a bird; seagulls falling
dead from the sky; and Iris breaking an egg). Third, it is true that most of the
images are related to female characters, yet some at least include a male per‐
spective (Richard’s father referring to women posing naked as birds; George
Harrison thinking of Dinah as “hawking it”), and at least one instance is quite
clearly directed at a male character (Joanne likening sex with her boyfriend to
a sparrow farting). In fact, if we accept that Iris King is in thrall to a patriar‐
chal, middle-class ideology, then it is peculiarly apt that she is the character who
uses a term of endearment for her daughter – “cock” – that derives from the
aggressive fighting spirit of a male bird and is also a slang term for penis. At any
rate, given the strong, but not entirely straight-forward link between femininity
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18 “Wir sehen ein kompliziertes Netz von Ähnlichkeiten, die ineinander übergreifen und
kreuzen” (36; § 66).
19 The notion of fuzzy sets has recently come to great prominence in the study of literary
genres (e.g. Marie-Laure Ryan 28. See also Michael Basseler on genre in general and the
short story in particular (58), as well as Terry Eagleton on the genre of tragedy, which
he sees as constituted “by a combinatoire of overlapping features rather than by a set
of invariant forms or contents” (Sweet Violence 3).
and birds in Union Street, Ricoeur’s notion that symbols invite us to stop and
think appears more pertinent than ever.
Perhaps what these somewhat equivocal clusters of identification imply is
that female identity is best conceptualized along the lines of what Ludwig Witt‐
genstein calls “family resemblances.” According to Wittgenstein, when we look
at a given category – for instance, the various kinds of objects we refer to as
games – then we will find it impossible to determine a set of features shared by
all the items belonging to this category. Instead, what we find are various degrees
of relatedness – “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and
criss-crossing” – and for Wittgenstein this kind of relationship is analogous to
the network of resemblances that links members of the same family to each
other (i.e. some have similar noses, others have similar ears, etc.; 36e, § 66).18
Interpreting the figurative pattern of birds in Union Street in the light of these
ideas, we can thus surmise that it is impossible to find one single set of charac‐
teristics that truly unites all women. Rather, there is a fuzzy set of features that
signify femaleness, and each individual woman will share some (but not, as a
rule, all) of these features. This not only makes it possible for two particular
women to have virtually no characteristics in common and yet still remain as‐
sociated with the category of woman as such; the fuzziness of the set also allows
for its boundary to remain porous and permeable, so that one or several of the
characteristic features of womanhood could, at the same time, be part of the
fuzzy set that defines masculinity or manhood.19 In other words, if in Union Street
the female characters are subliminally presented as ‘birds of a feather,’ then the
complexity of the text’s avian imagery also suggests that this does not at all
imply an essentialist reduction of womanhood to a single core that stands in
stable, binary opposition to manhood or masculinity.
Before proceeding to a third cluster of symbols in Union Street – mirrors, this
time – let us take stock of the argument so far. We have seen that, in Barker’s
text, the precarious state of the built environment finds a parallel in the “derelict”
state of human bodies, as well as in the fragmentation of the text into semi-in‐
dependent stories. Moreover, Union Street places strong emphasis on the con‐
flicts between women, whether from the same family (e.g. Iris King physically
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20 Note that the image of veins as similar to “the branches of a tree” is also used when
Alice Bell examines her body in the mirror: “Silver branches spread out across her belly,
springing from the sparsely-rooted hair. A tree in winter” (261). The metaphor is yet
another link between the community of women and the symbolical tree of life that
appears in Kelly’s and Alice’s moments of vision.
assaulting her daughter because the latter has violated the rules of sexual re‐
spectability) or between women in general (with racism as one particularly vio‐
lent conflict). At the same time, like other short-story cycles, Union Street bal‐
ances these elements of fragmentation with various kinds of unity: a common
setting (i.e. a Northern English working-class community); the ordering of in‐
dividual stories to depict the lives of progressively older women; and what we
could call figurative leitmotifs. Of these leitmotifs, eyes serve as symbols that
highlight the opposition between an alienating, objectifying gaze and the look
of love as a sign of intersubjective recognition. Both ways of seeing, therefore,
are related to the constitution and maintenance of individual identity. By con‐
trast, birds serve as a complex figure of collective female identity and, more
generally, of communal belonging – which is one reason why they feature so
prominently in the moment of vision that connects the stories of Kelly Brown
and Alice Bell, who as victims of the non-seeing, objectifying gaze had both
become isolated and, indeed, homeless.
Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Reflection, Representation, and Realism
Turning to a third symbolical cluster in Union Street – mirrors – we briefly need
to revisit the problem of individual identity because, in Barker’s text, mirrors
are shown to affect one’s sense of self through their ability to reflect the human
body. Joanne Wilson, for instance, who has recently found out that she is preg‐
nant, at one point examines the reflection of her naked body in a mirror:
She stood, pressing her hands fearfully against the still flat belly. No sign there at least.
But her shoulder, her arms, her breasts! Blue veins showed up all over them, as intri‐
cately linked as the branches of a tree; all leading down to the nipples which them‐
selves were bigger and browner than they had been a month ago. Some yellowish stuff
had dried to form a crust over the skin. […]
Her body, from childhood so familiar, had become frightening. It occurred to her
that it looked like another human face, with nipples instead of eyes, a powerful,
barely-human face. By comparison, her real face seemed childish and unformed.
She was afraid. ‘What the hell am I going to do?’ she asked that other, inhuman
face, which was aware of no problem. (72)20
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21 In psychoanalytic discourse, the key terms used to refer to our own self-image would
be the ideal-ego and the ego-ideal, in connection to the super-ego (e.g. Felluga 142; Lacan,
“Remarks on Daniel Lagache’s Presentation” 562; Žižek, How to Read Lacan 79 – 80). In
Jungian psychology, the key terms would be shadow and persona (e.g. Hopcke 13 – 16;
Stein 106 – 109).
As was the case with the “derelict” in the local library, the description here
focuses on the body as unruly matter: veins simply “showed up,” together with
some unidentifiable “yellowish stuff.” Moreover, though Joanne’s belly is “still
flat,” she knows that her body will soon betray the signs of her pregnancy to
others, as if the body had a will entirely of its own. The supposedly supreme ego
thus suddenly finds itself disturbingly powerless, lacking the sense of control
that would enable it to feel at home in the body, which indeed appears like an
alien, second self in the passage: “a powerful, barely-human face.” In confronting
Joanne with the sight of her body, the mirror thus forces a reassessment of her
own identity; though her “real face seemed childish and unformed” when com‐
pared to that “other, inhuman face,” she must somehow integrate the new
knowledge forced upon her by the body into her conscious identity. The body
thus constitutes the locus of the unconscious, which itself “is aware of no
problem,” but which through its symptoms and effects exerts a fearful pressure
on our disturbingly fragile egos, whom the mirror confronts with reflections
that may clash with our mental images of ourselves.21
We can in fact find the same mechanism at work in a different scene in Union
Street as well, and ultimately the text highlights that it is impossible for indi‐
viduals to escape the truth-telling function of the mirror. Kelly Brown, who in
the aftermath of being raped has taken to roaming the streets at night, at one
point in Union Street secretly enters the Victorian house of a well-to-do family
who, Kelly speculates, have left the house for a short trip (51). Kelly explores
the unfamiliar rooms and is particularly fascinated by the parents’ bedroom.
Though she knows that a “man slept there too,” to Kelly the room’s “flesh-col‐
oured satin” and its “pink, flabby cushions” make it “a temple of femininity” (53).
Suddenly, however, the girl is arrested in her exploration of this ‘foreign’
middle-class home when she sees her reflection in the bedroom mirror:
She looked as wild and unkempt as an ape, as savage as a wolf. Only her hair, glinting
with bronze and gold threads, was beautiful. […] But she looked bad. She peered more
closely in the glass and saw that the pores of her nose were bigger than they had been,
and plugged with black. When Linda [i.e. Kelly’s older sister] used the blackhead
remover little worms of white stuff came wiggling out of the unblocked pores. Sud‐
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22 Note that John Brannigan (21) also associates Kelly’s rage with Caliban’s.
23 This is not to say that Lucy Gallagher is wrong in suggesting that Kelly’s violence, her
“dirtying of herself and her environment is actually a step toward her recovery” (49).
It is merely to emphasize that the truths contained in mirrors are not always welcome,
at least not initially, and may trigger strong ‘defense mechanisms.’
denly, Kelly hated the mirror. On the man’s side of the bed was a heavy ashtray. She
picked it up and threw it […] against the glass. (54)
Once again, the mirror here appears as the harbinger of an unwelcome truth:
ostensibly of Kelly’s looking “bad,” but perhaps more importantly of the fact that
she is a young girl on the verge of sexual maturity – for this is, arguably, the
significance of the comparison to her older sister Linda, whose symbolic role as
a biologically mature female is made clear on the very first pages of Union
Street, when Kelly finds her sister’s bloodied sanitary pads in a bottom drawer:
“She looked at the hair in Linda’s armpits, at the breasts that shook and wobbled
when she ran, and no, she didn’t want to get like that. And she certainly didn’t
want to drip foul-smelling, brown blood out of her fanny every month” (3). Even
before the rape, in other words, Kelly felt decidedly uneasy about the prospect
of her body changing into that of a ‘grown woman.’ Now, after the rape, Kelly’s
reaction to the reflection of her developing body is telling, for not only does she
try and break the glass; she eventually fetches a pair of scissors and begins to
cut off her hair – the only thing about her that still looks beautiful – in a des‐
perate attempt to suppress her violated female body by making herself look
boyish. Oscar Wilde, in the preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray, wrote that
“[t]he nineteenth century dislike of Realism is the rage of Caliban, seeing his own
face in a glass” (3), and there is a sense in this passage, too, that Kelly’s ‘an‐
imal’ rage (she is “unkempt as an ape, as savage as a wolf”) is tragically mis‐
guided – against herself, and against the mirror as the medium of a certain kind
of truth, rather than against the man who raped her.22 It is, perhaps, for this
reason, that, by smashing the mirror, Kelly only ends up “trapping […] her shat‐
tered face” in it (54): the image of a fragmented self that the mirror truthfully
reflects.23
Crucially, it is not only reflections of the pubescent and the pregnant body
that pose a threat, or at least challenge, to a stable sense of female identity, for
in Union Street mirrors also reveal unpleasant truths about psychological and
physical health as they affect the ageing body. Muriel Scaife, for instance, who
has just lost her beloved husband, refrains from looking into her bedroom mirror
because “it could show her only what she most feared to see: a woman,
white-faced, sodden, and alone” (176). Similarly, when Iris King stands “in front
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of the mirror to tie the scarf around her head you could see that she wasn’t well”
(180). In both these cases, middle-aged women’s reflections in the mirror have
the power to reveal that something is amiss. Most brutally, however, the mirror
reveals the truth about her mortal and, indeed, dying body to Alice Bell:
Her hands came up. She hid herself from the mirror. For years she had avoided looking
into it: the head it showed bore no relation to the person she thought she was. Inside
herself, she was still sixteen. She had all the passion, all the silliness. Still there behind
the gray hair and wrinkled skin. Now the dislocation between what the mirror showed
and what she knew herself to be, was absolute. She would have liked to break the
glass. (225)
While Alice tries to hold on to an ideal, timeless image of herself as she used to
be (“the person she thought she was”), the mirror mercilessly confronts her with
the truth of her impending death.
We can restate these crises of identity provoked by mirrors in more philo‐
sophical terms as conflicts between idealism and realism. Idealism, according to
Pam Morris, “gives primacy to the consciousness, or mind or spirit that appre‐
hends” rather than to the material world, and in aesthetic theory it has long been
associated with art as an “intimation of timeless ideals” (Realism 50 – 52). In the
scene where Alice hides herself from the mirror, it is precisely such a timeless
ideal that is challenged by the mirror’s truthful reflection of things as they are,
not in the mind that apprehends, but in the world of objects, to which the human
body belongs. And realism, for Pam Morris, derives precisely from an “accept‐
ance that the objects of the world that we know by means of our sensory expe‐
rience have an independent existence” (Realism 49 – 50). Accordingly, one aim of
realism as an empiricist epistemology is to destroy idealist illusions about the
world, and it is significant that, in Union Street, this process may lead to denial
or, once again, feelings of rage, with Alice’s desire to break the mirror reflecting
Kelly’s earlier desire to destroy the source of unwanted truth.
It would, however, be misleading to frame realism’s “refusal of anodyne fan‐
tasy” (Eagleton, The Event of Literature 72) in exclusively destructive terms, as
merely the destruction of idealist falsehoods. This becomes clear if we focus on
the dual meaning of the word representation (Haywood 3). Just as political rep‐
resentation has historically been limited to certain groups (as a rule, prop‐
erty-owning men), aesthetic representation for centuries tended to exclude sup‐
posedly unseemly and low subject matter. The stuff of realism, by contrast, “is
not selected for its dignity and nobility” – that is, it attempts to include all kinds
of things, people, and experiences – and thus implies a truly democratic politics
(Pam Morris, Realism 3).
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In Union Street, the willingness to represent ‘unseemly matters’ is demon‐
strated forcefully in the chilling description of the abortion that Iris King’s
daughter has decided to undergo. As the doctors at the hospital refuse to perform
the abortion, Iris and her daughter depend on the help of Irene, who lives in a
run-down house on Wharfe Street. The procedure ends up taking much longer
than Iris expected, and it ends with a description of the aborted fetus: “The baby
clenched his fist feebly, lying on the floor of the lavatory with the News of the
World spread over him” (215). Significantly, the newspaper here does not ‘cover’
the appalling event in the sense of reporting on it, but instead ‘covers it up’ and
hides it from view. This, arguably, is a symbolic way of suggesting that certain
kinds of events are not represented in the newspaper media. Accordingly, if one
key function of the media in a democratic society is to represent the events that
matter, and thus to provide the necessary input for public debate and political
decision-making, then the image of the News of the World covering up the
aborted child may imply that the contemporary press is not fulfilling its function
properly. This, in turn, may explain why newspapers frequently remain “unop‐
ened” in Union Street (132), serving instead as blankets, padding, or fuel (4, 60,
232), as if the content of print media were entirely disconnected from the reality
of life in a working-class community – the very kind of life that Union Street, as
a realist text, attempts to represent.
At the same time, Barker’s text does not simply oppose its own, supposedly
more truthful realism to the failures of contemporary mass media, for Union
Street at least hints at the potentially productive role of the media in general,
and television in particular. To be sure, there are critical comments here, too:
George Harrison, for instance, at one point says that people were “better off”
when they did not have TV and had to make their own amusement instead (227).
And yet, there is also a scene in which Kelly, having switched on the TV because
her mother and sister are out, finds herself fascinated by a news report about
sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland:
[T]here was this young man, this soldier, and he was lying in a sort of cot, a bed with
sides to it, and he was shouting out, great bellows of rage, as he looked out through
the bars at the ward where nobody came. What caught her attention was: they’d
shaved all his hair off. You could see the scars where they’d dug the bullets out. His
head was like a turnip, a violent turnip, where they shot the bullets into his brain.
The cameras switched to gangs of youth throwing stones. But his eyes went on
watching her. (47 – 48)
Kelly, traumatized by the experience of rape, is suddenly confronted with an
image to which she can relate: a violated body filled with rage, which provides
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24 See Pam Morris on George Lukács's useful distinction between "realism and the reas‐
suring consensual convention of actualism" (Jane Austen, Virginia Woolf and Worldly
Realism 8 – 9).
a mirror-image to Kelly’s own situation as well as a model for future behavior,
for as we know she, too, will later cut off her hair until her head is “shorn” (54).
An identification with the situation of others is thus one of the positive poten‐
tials that mediated images harbor. Admittedly, there are other positive functions
that remain unexplored by Kelly (though as readers we are free to speculate, for
example, that the troubles in Northern Ireland and the situation of working-class
communities in Northern England may not be as unrelated as they appear at
first sight). At any rate, the key point is that Union Street acknowledges the
media’s potential to bring politics home in both senses of the term: to cross the
divide between public and private, and to help the audience understand the
world in which they live. In principle, then, such ‘daily mirrors’ can have an
emancipatory function, even if contemporary practice may at times be found
wanting.
And of course, mirrors have long served as symbols for the truth-telling
function of art as well – “to hold as ‘twere the mirror up to nature” (Hamlet 297;
3. 2. 21 – 22) – and in particular of realist representation. “As a true reflector of
external reality,” Robert C. Holub observes, “the mirror is quite obviously the
central image of realist aesthetics” (206 – 207). At the same time, however, Holub
reminds us that realism only ever offers the “illusion” of faithfully reflecting the
world (102), and one simple reason for this, Pam Morris notes, is that “words
function completely differently from mirrors”: they force the writer to order and
select (Realism 5). The error in positing a one-to-one correspondence between
fiction and reality is thus, according to Terry Eagleton, to regard “fiction as a
mirror rather than as a work” (The Event of Literature 218); the literary work
ought “to be seen not as a reflection of a history external to it, but as a strategic
labour” (170).24 In the light of such observations, the emphasis on the
truth-telling function of mirrors in Union Street suddenly threatens to seem em‐
barrassingly naïve.
This impression of naivety may become even stronger if we remember the
role of mirrors in Lacanian accounts of identity formation. Elisabeth Bronfen
has succinctly summarized Lacan’s ideas about the role of mirrors in this process
(see also the chapter on Moby-Dick):
We recognize ourselves only through reflections, notably the images we fashion for
ourselves, or the way we see ourselves reflected in the eyes of others. Yet as Jacques
Lacan notes in his seminal essay on the mirror phase in psychic development, […] the
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act of recognizing oneself in a mirrored image is always inscribed by a misrecogni‐
tion, for the image we see has undergone a double fracturing. It is not only an inversion
of the figure it mirrors, but it returns to the subject only by a detour through an
intermediary, namely as a representation. It thus harbors a disjunction between body
and image […]. (207; see Lacan, “The Mirror Stage” 78)
Two points are worth highlighting here: on the one hand, the importance of the
body as the visible sign of the self, and, on the other hand, the element of dis‐
junction between the body and the image formed on the basis of the reflection
of one’s body in the mirror. Indeed, Sean Homer likewise emphasizes the im‐
portance of the body in the Lacanian mirror stage, for it is the reflected image
of the body as “a total form” which, according to Homer, sustains the infant’s
developing sense of mastery over the body (25). The key element of misrecog‐
nition lies, in other words, in the fantasy of a self that is not only unified, but
also master in its own house: in full control of its own body. If this is so, however,
then the use of mirrors in Union Street is not, after all, entirely naïve, for we have
seen that one function of mirrors in Barker’s text is precisely to reflect back an
image of the body as unruly matter that the ego repeatedly finds impossible to
master.
Unspeakable: Reflections on the Limit of Discourse
While mirrors symbolize the possibility of recognizing the truth, Union Street
nevertheless acknowledges that there are certain limits to its project of repre‐
senting the real through the use of a fourth cluster of recurring symbols: gaping,
spluttering, and speechless mouths. “Death,” Terry Eagleton insists, “is the limit
of discourse, not a product of it” (The Idea of Culture 87), and we need to bear
this in mind when examining how Barker’s text depicts the death of Muriel
Scaife’s beloved husband, John:
She [i.e. Muriel] ran back into the living-room and there was John, blood gargling
from his mouth. Above the black hole his eyes rolled about, frenzied and unseeing.
The flow of blood seemed to have stopped. […]
[…] He was choking on the blood. She began pulling out huge clots of it from his
mouth. […] Her fingers found a thick rope of blood, twined round it, and pulled. The
clot slid out of his mouth, with the sound of a sink coming unblocked, and after it
flowed a frothy, bright-red stream of blood, looking almost gay against the blackness
of the other blood. (163)
If, as argued previously, the horror of John’s unseeing eyes is related to the loss
of intersubjective recognition – the look of love gone forever – then this is
complemented here by the frightening image of a human being silenced by his
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own blood: the body, our most intimate home, as at the same time the cause of
suffering and, ultimately, death. It is surely no coincidence that Alice Bell, after
her stroke, likewise experiences a profound sense of horror at “the sounds that
glugged out of her mouth” – sounds which only slowly regain “some resem‐
blance to speech” (245); indeed, even after Alice has recovered to some extent,
when she is excited “her speech went altogether” (246). Scenes such as these,
with their emphasis on mouths straining but failing to speak, are best under‐
stood as an engagement with the paradox of the unspeakable: to try and express
what is in fact impossible to say. In theoretical terms, we would thus be con‐
fronted with the Lacanian Real as that which signifies the limits of signification
(Homer 83).
This attempt to express the unspeakable surfaces repeatedly in Union Street,
and if death constitutes one limit of discourse in Barker’s text, then another is
the fact of sexual difference. As Laura Mulvey has pointed out, sexual difference
serves a key function in a patriarchal symbolic order: “The paradox of phallo‐
centrism in all its manifestations is that it depends on the image of the castrated
woman to give order and meaning to its world [… I]t is her lack that produces
the phallus as symbolic presence” (585). From a patriarchal point of view, in
other words, women can only serve as that constitutive absence that enables
the symbolic order to function. Mulvey’s comments help us unravel the meaning
of a scene in Union Street in which George Harrison, after having had sex with
Blonde Dinah, decides to inspect the sleeping prostitute’s naked body:
She was lying with her legs apart. […] He had never actually seen it before. It was
funny in a way. You spend your whole boyhood thinking about it, wondering what
it’s like; but when you finally get it you don’t really see it.
Almost against his will, he knelt down until it was on a level with his face. The lips
gaped, still dribbling a little milky fluid. And there it was. A gash? A wound? Red fruit
bitten to the core? It was impossible to say what it was like. (230 – 231; original em‐
phasis)
The fact that George Harrison refers to Blonde Dinah’s genitals only as “it”
already indicates that he lacks a precise expression to refer to the object that
has aroused his curiosity. In addition, the term “lips” to refer to Dinah’s labia,
as well as the use of the verb “gaped,” further intimate a sense of the unspeak‐
able, as if Dinah’s vulva were a gaping mouth, dribbling fluid, but remaining
stubbornly silent. As the passage continues, this sense of something that is im‐
possible to say slowly combines with an undercurrent of violence (“gash,”
“wound,” “bitten to the core”) – and of course this makes sense within a patri‐
archal logic that posits women as the sign of lack and castration. Moreover, we
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25 Roberto del Valle Alcalá also argues that, in Barker’s novel, the two extremes of rape
and prostitution frame the “circumscription of life itself within the axis of capitalist
accumulation. While rape embodies the most direct and extreme form of primitive ac‐
cumulation, prostitution […] represents the proletarianization of women’s reproductive
labor power” – even as sexuality remains a site “also of resistance” (199)
26 The fact that realism has not always succeeded in staying true to this materialist project
should not lead us to posit that it is an inherently idealist genre.
need to bear in mind that the perspective here is a man’s: George Harrison, the
only male character who serves as a main focalizer in the seven sections of Union
Street, and whose inquisitive, objectifying gaze is directed at a prostitute: the
very embodiment of woman as merely a commodity (Brannigan 22).25
However, if womanhood as such is unspeakable within a patriarchal frame‐
work, then motherhood and the maternal may constitute a related, even more
fundamental limit to discourse. According to Julia Kristeva, “the abject confronts
us, on the one hand, with those fragile states where man strays on the territories
of animal,” but also, on the other hand, with our earliest attempts to release the
psychological hold of the maternal (Powers of Horror 12 – 13; original emphasis).
Paradoxically, then, the womb as our earliest home simultaneously figures as
deeply unhomely in our psychic imaginary: the site of primal repression. It is
thus hardly a coincidence that, in addition to death and sexual difference, the
moment of birth also figures as well-nigh unspeakable in Union Street. In the
case of Lisa Goddard, for instance, the protracted pains of labor ultimately render
her inarticulate: “as the day wore on speech became too much of an effort” (128).
In a similar vein, in the course of her abortion procedure Iris’s daughter Brenda
grips “the head of the bed, mouth wide open, lips stretched to splitting, like the
other lips between her legs” (215). Lacan’s Real and Kristeva’s abject thus feature
as limits to discourse and representation in Union Street. Sarah Brophy describes
Pat Barker’s texts as “[n]either realist novels nor psychoanalytic case studies,
but partaking of and revising both genres” (25). However, if one agrees with
Terry Eagleton that the achievement of Freudian psychoanalysis lies in pro‐
viding us with “a materialist theory of the making of the human subject” (Lit‐
erary Theory 141), then it is perhaps better to say that Union Street uses the
insights of one materialist lineage of thought – psychoanalysis – to complement
and reinvigorate that older materialism implied in the empiricist epistemology
of realist aesthetics.26
The Body and Labor
The embodied nature of human existence is a necessarily central materialist
concern, and we have seen that the body as unruly matter features prominently
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throughout Union Street. Indeed, Margaretta Jolly argues that, in Barker’s work
more generally, the body functions as “the visible face of psychological and social
unreason” (235). In Union Street the best starting point for a detailed discussion
of this claim is the relation between the female body and labor. More specifically,
we can begin to understand how social pressures affect individual subjects by
focusing on how Union Street exploits the dual meaning of labor as signifying
both ‘work’ and ‘giving birth.’ This, for example, is how Barker’s narrator de‐
scribes the increasing intensity of Lisa Goddard’s labor pains:
There was something mechanical about their strength, their remorseless regularity.
She felt them as extreme heat, as though she were being forced to stand too close to
a furnace, to watch the door open, slowly […].
This rhythm went on hour after hour for most of the day until her whole being
was subdued to it. (128)
The act of giving birth is couched here in language associated with industrial
labor (“mechanical,” “regularity,” “furnace”), and John Brannigan rightly notes
that such images indicate the extent to which factory work extends “into the
mental and emotional life of the community” (26). The public, material condi‐
tions of working-class life appear, in other words, as powerful forces in the
shaping of these characters’ supposedly private interiority.
In this way, Union Street incorporates the Marxian notion that alienated labor
affects human beings in their totality, including in their relations with one an‐
other. We can see this, for example, in a scene in which Joanne Wilson tells her
unsuspecting boyfriend that she is pregnant. Ken, though far from pleased at
the news, assures Joanne that they are “in it together” (99). However, when
subsequently they have sex in an underpass, Joanne realizes that something is
amiss:
Ken was panting, and thrusting into her as though he hated her, grinding and screwing
and banging hard enough to hurt. She was afraid for the baby and immediately knew
what he was trying to do: he was trying to screw it out of her. She went cold, pressing
herself back against the wall, but he fastened onto her with a terrible, monotonous
power.
There was something exciting in being used like this, in giving way to this imper‐
sonal, machine-like passion. (101)
Just like Lisa Goddard’s labor pains, sex here is drawn into the sphere of indus‐
trial labor (“grinding and screwing and banging,” “monotonous power,” “ma‐
chine-like passion”), setting up a parallel between capitalist production and bio‐
logical as well as social reproduction. The same, moreover, is true for an earlier
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scene, in which Joanne, while working on the conveyer belt in the local cake
factory, is trying to decide whether or not to keep her baby:
She began the sequence of actions that she would perform hundreds of times that day.
It took little effort once you were used to it and […] it could be done almost automati‐
cally.
Almost. But not quite. Now that she was alone – for in this roaring cavern of sound
each woman was alone – she wanted to think about Ken, she wanted […] to work out
exactly how she was going to tell him about the baby. She couldn’t do it. Each
half-formed thought was aborted by the arrival of another cake. (85; original emphasis)
In terms of content, the passage makes clear that Joanne’s working conditions
affect her entire being, both interrupting her process of thought and isolating
her from other women (with such isolation from others being a key effect of
alienated labor for Marx). At the same time, the phrase “to work out” emphasizes
that thinking itself is best conceived as intellectual labor, with Joanne’s material
surroundings thwarting her potential for mental creativity, and her thoughts
continually “aborted” like unborn children (Rawlinson 27).
The relationship between creation, (re)production, and alienation is, however,
as Susan Brophy has noted, illustrated most forcefully in the case of Lisa God‐
dard and her struggle emotionally to relate to her new-born daughter. Early on
in Lisa’s story, we learn that she barely manages to make ends meet because her
occasionally violent husband is out of work and tends to spend far too much
money on drink. It is difficult enough, under such circumstances, to take care
of two little boys, and the mere idea of soon giving birth to a third child is
virtually impossible for Lisa to bear: “She did not want this baby” (112); indeed,
“[w]hen she first learned she was pregnant she had asked for an abortion,” but
the “doctor had told her there were no grounds” (132). Lisa, in other words, is
neither provided with sufficient resources to take good care of the baby, nor
legally granted control over her pregnant body. In this sense, it is entirely fitting
that Lisa at first fails to recognize the baby as her own (133); to use Sarah
Brophy’s words, “Lisa is alienated from the baby, the product of her body and
labor” (31). There is, in short, nothing natural or automatic about feelings of
motherhood in Union Street, as Lisa finds to her dismay.
The political point here is that motherhood as such also ought be appreciated
as cultural and, indeed, physical work. Kath Woodward, following feminist theo‐
rists like Adrienne Rich and Luce Irigaray, insists that motherhood “involves
more than carrying a foetus and giving birth, although the stresses, strains and
joys of delivery should not be underestimated”; more particularly, while “at some
point there has to be a woman’s body,” motherhood is an eminently cultural
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concept (128) – as evidenced, for example, by the fact that societies expend an
enormous amount of regulatory fervor to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’
mothers (131). This latter fact also documents that the supposedly natural phe‐
nomenon of motherhood is in many respects the result of (self-)discipline and
work. Lisa Goddard, at any rate, is aware of the extraordinary effort that moth‐
erhood involves: “It took her all her time to cope with Kevin and Darren, whom
she loved. How would she manage to care for this baby for whom she felt
nothing?” (136). Under conditions of alienated labor, even such seemingly foun‐
dational and unshakeable social relations as the one between mother and
daughter may thus slowly wither and die.
Crucially, it is the idea of common labor – in the sense of shared suffering
and struggle – that ultimately allows Lisa to overcome her alienation from the
baby daughter. Lisa experiences the first “stab of recognition” when one of the
Sisters working at the hospital gives the baby a bath:
Seeing it, red and howling, struggling in the nurse’s hands, Lisa thought, Yes. And
when it rose from the bath with dark and streaming hair the pain was so extreme that
she had to turn aside; she could not bear to look.
The feeling vanished. But it had given her hope. The time she spent simply staring
at the baby increased. And then, one day, as she was changing its nappy, she found a
smear of blood on the cloth. […] Her heart contracted with fear. (137)
Seeing the baby struggling against adversity, Lisa for a brief moment recognizes
something of herself in the daughter’s pain. Margaretta Jolly is thus right in
insisting that the body is also “a figure of hope” in Pat Barker’s work (235), as
it is in part the recognition of common suffering that serves as the basis of
identification with others. Moreover, Lisa’s “fear” for the baby’s health arises as
a by-product of the labor of caretaking that she devotes to her daughter’s phys‐
ical needs, as only the act of changing the baby’s diapers makes it possible for
her to discover the potentially worrying “smear of blood.” To her relief, Lisa
learns from a nurse that it is common for female infants to ‘menstruate’ at some
point after being born: “All the female hormones in your blood get across to her,
you see. Then when they stop, she starts to bleed” (137). And it is at this moment,
after having both recognized herself in the baby’s suffering and worked for the
infant’s physical well-being, that Lisa finally manages to accept the child as hers:
“My daughter” (139; original emphasis).
But, one might object, is this not a misguided attempt once again to reduce
femininity to women’s reproductive and maternal functions? This kind of bio‐
logical reductionism has, after all, been a strong tendency at least since the Age
of Enlightenment (Outram 89 – 90), and women’s supposedly natural role as the
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bearers of new life has frequently been used by men to deny them various rights
(e.g. the right to vote and full citizenship; see, for example, Frevert 424 – 425). Ian
Haywood is one critic who has raised such objections to the depiction of women
in Union Street (146), but Margaretta Jolly insists that these criticisms fail to do
justice to the complexity of Barker’s text:
[The] “feminine experience” of the body is problematized through its performance of
unconscious social desires of class and sexuality. […] A critique of “biological reduc‐
tionism” […] ignores the fact that within the societies in crisis that Barker explores,
biological questions of physical survival – “stoicism,” recovery, or simply birth itself –
are fundamentals that must not be underestimated. For the poor, ill, or war-torn, the
birth of new life and physical resistance are not necessarily “reductive” so much as
astonishing. (242; original emphasis)
Rather than shying away from the body altogether, that is to say, Union Street
uses those problems of human existence that arise from our embodied nature –
birth, the need for sustenance and shelter, sexual difference, labor, and death –
as a starting point for the recognition of commonality.
Moreover, Union Street does not posit such recognition as inherently com‐
forting, but instead acknowledges that it may at times be downright frightening.
This becomes clear in a harrowing scene that takes place right after Kelly’s rape.
When the rapist, after violating Kelly, wants her to leave as quickly as possible
the girl refuses, not wanting “to go home yet” (30). Instead, Kelly demands that
her rapist treat her to a drink at a nearby restaurant, threatening to shout for
help if he refuses to come with her. Soon, we thus find the two of them – victim
and perpetrator – sitting at the same table in a fish-and-chip bar whose walls
are “lined with mirror-tiles,” so that wherever Kelly looks, hers and the man’s
eyes meet:
[A]s she continued to stare, she saw a slight movement, a crumbling almost, at the
corner of the lids. Something was happening to his face. It was beginning to split, to
crack, to disintegrate from within, like an egg when the time for hatching has come.
She wanted to run. She didn’t want to stay there and see what would hatch out of this
egg. But horror kept her pinned to her chair. And the face went on cracking. And now
moisture of some kind was oozing out of the corners of his eyes, running into cracks
that had not been there a minute before, dripping, finally, into the open, the agonised
mouth. She watched, afraid. And looked away. But that was no use.
From every side his reflection leapt back at her, as the mirror-tiles filled with the
fragments of his shattered face. (33)
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Here, once again, we find the close attention to bodily matter so characteristic
of Barker’s prose: slight movements on a face, moisture oozing out of the corners
of the man’s eyes, and cracks forming where previously there had been none.
In addition, the scene evokes each of the four symbolical clusters we have dis‐
cussed: the image of something terrible hatching out of an egg (evoking the
symbolism of birds); the emphasis on eyes, staring, and the desire to see (or not
to see); the presence of mirrors and reflections; and, finally, the man’s gaping
mouth as yet another figure of the unspeakable. The terrible knowledge implied
in all this is that even the rapist cannot ultimately be excluded from the common
humanity that, for better or worse, we all share. And, understandably, Kelly tries
to avoid and repress this knowledge, so that when later in the story her mother
begins to cry the girl tries hard not to acknowledge Mrs. Brown’s pain: “Her
mother’s face, crumbling, reminded her of The Man. She could not allow herself
to feel pity” (59). The recognition of commonality can, in short, be a terrifying
thing indeed, as Kelly learns in Union Street:
His face remained. And would be there always, trailing behind it, not the cardboard
terrors of the fairground, […] but the real terror of the adult world, in which grown
men open their mouths and howl like babies, where nothing that you feel, whether
love or hate, is pure enough to withstand the contamination of pity. (57)
“The truth is rarely pure and never simple,” says a character in Oscar Wilde’s
The Importance of Being Earnest (258), and it is precisely this realization which
marks Kelly’s entry into “the real terror of the adult world” (Union Street 57).
Accordingly, if the common nature of the human body figures as a sign of hope
in Barker’s text, then once again it is not because our shared embodied nature
effortlessly leads to solidarity, but because the body serves as a starting point
from which community can be built, actively, as a difficult and wearisome kind
of labor (Waterman 7).
Common Women, Common Men: The Body of Domestic Fiction
To explore further the idea that the body may serve as a common ground for
the construction and maintenance of community, we need to return to the
problem of female solidarity in Union Street, which is acknowledged as a complex
task through the text’s repeated reference to distorting mirrors. Significantly,
mirrors at times distort reality to such an extent in Union Street that it becomes
difficult even to interpret the reflected image. For instance, while giving birth,
Lisa sees her face reflected in a steel surface so heavily curved that the
mirror-image becomes “too distorted […] to register anything so messily human
as fear” (126). At the same time, however, Barker’s text does not simply conflate
2715 “People Still Living in the Derelict Houses”: Barker’s Union Street
distortion with misrepresentation. When Kelly and her friend Sharon Scaife
attend a fun fair, for example, they meet Joanne Wilson – the protagonist of the
second section of Union Street – at the “entrance to the Hall of Mirrors,” a fair‐
ground attraction where the reflection of one’s body is distorted in various ways:
“Sharon Scaife, who was plump and suffered for it, had found a mirror that
showed her long and stringy as a bean” (19). This moment is significant for at
least two reasons. First, though the mirror clearly distorts, we must also note
that Sharon in fact prefers the ‘false’ image to her real, “plump” self: “I quite like
it” (ibid.). The text, in other words, acknowledges that distorted images can have
a kind of utopian dimension, with the reflection hinting at an alternative to the
present that is, or may be, preferable for the subject. Second, the scene is im‐
portant because the Hall of Mirrors functions as a mise en abyme of the relation
between the individual stories in Union Street, with each of the seven sections
serving as a distorted reflection of – and indeed, on – the other six (hence the
presence of Joanne Wilson, the protagonist of the second section, at the entrance
of the hall of mirrors). Mirrors, in short, are the bearers of three complicated
and interrelated truths in Barker’s text: about the importance of the body (as
well as ideal or idealized images of it) in the formation of identity; about the
productive side of distortion (i.e. its potentially utopian dimension); and about
the relation between the individual and the collective.
This latter point, incidentally, is the reason why figurative mirrors pervade
the text of Union Street, serving as symbolical explorations of the commonality
of women. For instance, at one point we find Kelly’s mother looking at her
daughter, startled to find that “we’re alike”: “There, in the lines of nose and chin,
was her own face, glimpsed in a distorting mirror” (58; emphasis added). Simi‐
larly, for Joanne Wilson suddenly “every older woman became an image of the
future, a reason for hope or fear” (94). More abstractly, Lisa Goddard’s story
mirrors Kelly’s and Joanne’s when Lisa reminisces about running through the
park as a girl or working at the cake factory (113) – scenes with which we as
readers are already familiar from the first two stories, but which now return in
distorted shape in the third section of Union Street. The point is, then, that though
each of these female figures is different from the other, they are nevertheless
alike in some ways, as even George Harrison recognizes when he looks at the
sleeping prostitute Blonde Dinah and realizes with a start that Dinah resembles
his wife:
She looked like Gladys lying there, her mouth open, a wisp of hair shaken with every
breath. It disturbed him. She ought not to look like Gladys. He had always believed
that there were two sorts of women: the decent ones and the rest. He felt that they
should look different, for how could you tell them apart, how could you remember
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27 For an illuminating discussion of these two distinct meanings of the word common (i.e.
what is shared vs. what is low) as they are contrasted in Great Expectations, see Pam
Morris, Dickens’s Class Consciousness (108 – 109).
they were different, if every sag, every wrinkle of their used bodies proclaimed that
they were one flesh? (230)
George would like to think of all prostitutes as common, in the sense of being
low and distinct from ‘decent women,’ but seeing his wife’s body mirrored in
Blonde Dinah’s instead forces upon him a realization that they have much in
common. Put differently, if there is a double meaning to the term representa‐
tion – one political and another aesthetic – there is also a similar double meaning
to realism’s focus on ‘the common’: an attention to what is considered low and
unseemly, but also, at the same time, an emphasis on what is shared, on our
common nature as embodied beings.27
This commonality in various ways explicitly extends beyond girls and women
in Union Street, to include boys and men as well. We have already seen that even
the man who raped Kelly cannot be entirely abjected from the human com‐
munity. Moreover, there are several moments of mirroring between male and
female stories in Barker’s text. For example, if Kelly Brown is disconcerted by
the changes of her pubescent body (3), the same is true for Richard Scaife, whose
“nose and ears seemed to have grown out of proportion to his face,” and who
does not know “what to do with his hands and feet” (140). Similarly, if Muriel
Scaife and Alice Bell do not like to see their reflection in a mirror because it
reveals unwelcome truths (176, 255), George Harrison for his part no longer goes
to the public library because he, as a retired husband unwelcome at home and
without enough money to spend all his time at the pub (221 – 222), hates to en‐
counter the “derelict” who truly have no home left: “George was horrified to
realise that the fear on everybody else’s face was reflected in his own. He left at
once and never went back” (223; emphasis added). In other words, George avoids
reflecting on the “derelict” as mirrors to himself in order to avoid the unpleasant
truth that, at some level, he and these smelly, homeless humans are, in fact,
profoundly alike.
Perhaps the best way to start bringing together the various strands of the
argument in this chapter is to address the criticism that some commentators
have leveled against Union Street regarding its depiction of men. Ian Haywood,
for instance, complains that for the most part men are depicted as violent and
threatening, with sympathetic males either “inert” (Muriel Scaife’s dying hus‐
band), ready to “undergo a feminist conversion” (George Harrison recognizing
that his wife and Dinah are alike), or sexually unthreatening (146). The example
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28 See also Roberto del Valle Alcalá, who notes that “Union Street is replete with male
figures who have somehow deviated or been displaced from traditionally productive
roles (as waged laborers and family breadwinners),” which results “in a general land‐
scape of crisis which is not only punctuated by relative material poverty, but also by a
radical disturbance of the sexual division of labor” (201).
Haywood gives for a sympathetic but ‘sexually unthreatening’ man is Joss, a
close friend of Iris, who is ready to help Joanne Wilson when she needs him.
However, Joss is also growth-restricted, leading Joanne to observe that he would
be “a husband in a million, if only his arms and legs were the normal length”
(Union Street 74). For Haywood, Union Street’s portrayal of men is thus overly
limited and, ultimately, unfair. In fact, however, the depiction of the men in each
of these cases is equivalent to the portrayal of women because of the Union
Street’s strong focus on the effects of, and limits imposed by, the human body:
illness and death for John Scaife (presumably due to toxic fumes he inhaled at
work), ageing and retirement for George Harrison, and restricted growth for
Joss.
Pat Wheeler is thus right in claiming that in Barker’s novels “you cannot
understand one gender in isolation from the other” (128).28 Barker herself, more‐
over, has eloquently defended herself against the charge of demonizing men:
I don’t think I’m making a judgment about the two sexes, in the abstract, as it were.
I think I’m writing about a scene in which the heavy industry which employed mainly
men, and on which so many men from the working class relied for their sense of
identity, is what’s going. And the essence of the social changes in the book is the
collapse of the men’s identity. The women seem to be far more resilient in the face of
this particular type of social change because they have their two roles in the home
and outside it. The men seem to me to be very vulnerable to it. I think this is why […]
the men sometimes seem weaker than the women. (qtd. in Moseley 40)
According to Barker, the double-burden traditionally imposed on working-class
women – wage labor as well as work in the home – suddenly becomes a resource
in a situation of chronic unemployment and deindustrialization, as unlike the
men’s, the women’s sense of worth is not dependent on one single scene of
action. At the same time, the fact that the “derelict” who live on the margins of
society are depicted in Union Street as anonymous beings of indeterminate
gender suggests that, when pushed to extremes of deprivation, the shared fra‐
gility of the human body even transcends the division of gender. It is therefore
the intersection of gender and class, rather than gender alone, which determines
Union Street’s portrayal of men and women.
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If the body serves as the crucial site where this interaction between gender
and class is negotiated and exposed, then this has to do with the repression of
the body in more traditional forms of domestic realism. Consider, for instance,
what Nancy Armstrong writes about the role of the body both in eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century female conduct books as well as in domestic fiction of
the period:
A woman was deficient in female qualities if she, like the aristocratic woman, […]
aimed at putting the body on display […]. For a woman to display herself in such a
manner was the same as saying that she was supposed to be valued for her body and
its adornments, not for the virtues she might possess as a woman and wife. By the
same token, the conduct books found the laboring woman unfit for domestic duties
because she, too, located value in the material body. […] By implying that the essence
of woman lay inside or underneath her surface, the invention of depths in the self
entailed making the material body of the woman appear superficial. (75 – 76)
Middle-class, female domesticity is thus defined through a double negative: nei‐
ther the spectacularly attractive, ornate body of the aristocratic lady, nor the
material body of laboring women; instead, middle-class femininity involves an
attempt “to subordinate the body to a set of mental processes that guaranteed
domesticity” (Nancy Armstrong 76). Gender, class, and a particular vision of
home, in short: these form the bedrock of English, bourgeois realism (together
with certain assumptions about race and ethnicity, as acknowledged in Union
Street through the story of the West Indian Big Bertha).
Synchrony, Diachrony, and the History of Class
Union Street focuses on seven working-class women, and it pays particular at‐
tention to the home and the body: to how it labors, to how vulnerable it is.
However, in addition to this thematic concern, we also need to bear in mind the
formal features discussed in this chapter, as they are the key to understanding
Union Street’s attempt at finding an adequate way to represent class. Crucially,
all of these formal features can be seen as revolving around the relation between
synchrony and diachrony. For instance, in the individual stories of Union
Street, we have what Rick Altman calls single-focus narratives, i.e. storylines
which mainly proceed from one event to the next: individual diachrony. But
individual diachrony is not good at representing community, as Hans-Georg
Gadamer acknowledges when he talks about subjectivity and its relation to his‐
tory as a collective experience:
[H]istory does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves
through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident
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29 “In Wahrheit gehört die Geschichte nicht uns, sondern wir gehören ihr. Lange bevor
wir uns in der Rückbesinnung selber verstehen, verstehen wir uns auf selbstverständ‐
liche Weise in Familie, Gesellschaft und Staat, in denen wir leben. Der Fokus der Sub‐
jektivität ist ein Zerrspiegel” (Wahrheit und Methode 261).
way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a
distorting mirror. (278)29
The focus of subjectivity is a “distorting mirror” – and it is only by trying to
take this distortion into account that we can understand the full extent to which
we as individuals are shaped by, to which “we belong to history.” Union Street
acknowledges this very problem in its use of distorting mirrors as a symbol.
Moreover, we have seen that the text’s symbolism (birds, eyes, moments of vi‐
sion, gaping mouths, and mirrors) constitutes a paradigmatic, analytical inter‐
ruption of the narrative’s syntagmatic flow – which is in fact another way of
saying that narrative emphasizes diachrony, whereas symbolism tends towards
synchrony.
While an emphasis of synchrony over diachrony is relatively unusual in Eu‐
ropean fiction, it is not uncommon in narrative traditions that emphasize the
collective rather than the individual. The classic Chinese novel, for instance,
tends to have as its protagonist not an individual, but a group or collective, and
Franco Moretti sees this as the reason why such novels continually attempt to
minimize narrativity (“The Novel” 168): “[W]hat really matters is not what lies
‘ahead’ of a given event, as in ‘forward-looking’ European prose, but what lies
‘to the side’ of it: all the vibrations that ripple across this immense narrative
system – and all the counter-vibrations that try to keep it stable” (“The Novel”
169 – 170). Synchrony as opposed to diachrony, in other words: a focus on the
collective, and an exploration of the social system. And this, we have seen, is
what the multiple focus of the short-story-cycle format allows Union Street to
achieve, with the text indeed showing how one event – Kelly being raped, for
instance (29) – ripples across the narrative system only to reappear, obliquely,
in the story of Muriel Scaife (149). Or, to give another example, in section two
we find Joanne Wilson remembering how she saw Lisa Goddard at the super‐
market, “weighed down with kids and shopping, pushing her belly in front of
her like another self” (94); later – another narrative ripple – we learn that Lisa
remembers seeing a “young girl” (Joanne?) watching her in the supermarket
(109). Union Street is replete with such narrative ripples, which signify a move
away from the individual life trajectory, towards the community and the social
system.
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And yet, there is a catch, because arguably what one loses by focusing on the
social system are the very notions of causality and agency. Frederic Jameson
writes about the relation between synchrony, diachrony, and causality:
[I]t is as though the ever greater accumulation of facts about a given period (very
much including our own) determines a gravitational shift from diachronic thinking
(so-called linear history) to synchronic or systemic modeling. It is a shift that can be
measured […] by the increasing frequency of attacks on causality […]. (Archaeologies
of the Future 87)
The key point, for Jameson, is that this shift from diachronic thinking to syn‐
chronic or systemic modeling tends to affect our ability to conceive of alternative
developmental paths:
Diachronic causality, the single string of causes, the billard-ball theory of change,
tends to isolate a causal line which might have been different, a single-shot effectivity
(even an ultimately determining instance) which can very easily be replaced by an
alternate hypothesis. But if, instead of this diachronic strand, we begin to posit cau‐
sality as an immense synchronic interrelationship, as a web of overdetermination, a
Spinozan substance made up of innumerable simultaneously coexisting cells or veins,
then it is harder to object some causal alternative: all causes are already there […].
(Archaeologies of the Future 88)
Increasing synchronic complexity thus comes at the cost of agency: “[W]inner
loses, as Sartre liked to put it: the more airtight the synchronic system laid in
place all around us, the more surely history itself evaporates in the process, and
along with it any possibility of political agency or collective anti-systemic
praxis” (Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future 89). This is in fact already implied
in Franco Moretti’s description of the synchronic narrative system of the Chi‐
nese novel, where we find vibrations and counter-vibrations that keep the system
stable – and perhaps this systemic paralysis explains why John Brannigan be‐
lieves that it is Kelly Brown’s “fate to live out the lives of all the women depicted
in Union Street” (27; emphasis added).
Given the conditions depicted in Union Street, stability – i.e. continuing dep‐
rivation, the permanence of crisis – is of course the last thing that is needed,
and one may now begin to wonder whether the text’s attempt to avoid the
domestic fiction’s ideological pitfalls have merely entangled it in a different kind
of realism that, despite everything, proves to be a form of the status quo. To this
pessimistic conclusion, we might object that Union Street’s realism is highly
self-reflexive, in the sense of interrogating and exposing its own discursive
limits. Think, for example, of the text’s use of mirrors as figurative leitmotifs:
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realism is a bit like a mirror – but how do mirrors work? How, in other words,
do mirrors relate to individual identity, to life and the body, to truth? Or think
of the gaping, speechless mouths in Union Street: What are the things that remain
impossible to say? Does the unspeakable constitute not only a limit to dis‐
course, but also its condition of possibility (in the sense of anchoring meaning
in a hypothesized Real that must always remain just outside the reach of lan‐
guage)? Take, finally, the third symbolical cluster, eyes and vision: Who looks
at whom, and with what purpose in mind? Is it the distanced, objectifying, ali‐
enating gaze, or a look of love that serves to connect and bind people together?
Mirrors, mouths, eyes – reflection, telling, showing: in other words, the
well-known literary critical problem of narrative perspective.
And narrative perspective is a vital issue in this context because the realist
novel has so often been accused of adopting a middle-class point of view on
working-class lives. John Brannigan has aptly summarized Raymond Wil‐
liams’s comments on the problem: “[O]ne danger with realist representation of
the working class is that it risks exercising a class division in its very form,
between the ‘us’ of the narrator and reader, and the ‘them’ of its subject” (29).
Brannigan has also shown in detail, however, that Union Street strives to avoid
such narrative distance by two related means: first, by seamlessly shifting back
and forth between a more objective narrative position and the subjectivities of
the individual characters, thus avoiding the potentially solipsistic perspective
of one single character (29 – 30); and second, by avoiding a narrative point of
view that is superior to the characters’ collective perspective, with the narrator
instead using an idiom that “is never far from the ways in which the characters
might describe their own experiences,” and with the limits to the narrator’s
knowledge corresponding, roughly, to the limits of collective communal knowl‐
edge (hence Blonde Dinah, the prostitute who lives on Wharfe Street, cannot
become the main focalizer of section six, whereas George Harrison – who lives
on Union Street – can; 30).30 The narrator in Union Street is thus not “an omnis‐
cient being hovering over the story” (Brannigan 28), and against accusations
that Union Street’s realism provides us with a cripplingly limited view, the text’s
eminently self-reflexive qualities may serve as a first line of defense. The trouble,
however, with this defense is that self-reflexivity is also a kind of irony that
merely allows one to have one’s cake and eat it (Jameson, Archaeologies of the
Future 177): one admits, in a meta-comment, that realism is limited and prob‐
lematic – but one nevertheless continues to adhere to its conventions.
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31 Jonathan Sperber, writing about the European revolutions of 1848, argues that general
theories of revolution tend to neglect “the role of memories and experience in human
events”: “What made 1848 different from 1789 was above all that in 1848 people re‐
membered what had happened in 1789 and acted on those memories, thus creating a
different outcome” (271). Memories, in other words, can lead to different historical out‐
comes.
A much stronger line of defense is that Union Street does not stop at con‐
structing a more complex but potentially paralyzing synchronic system out of
its individual, diachronic narratives. Instead, it takes this narrative system and
tries, as it were, to fold it back into a diachronic trajectory, thus preparing the
ground for a historical analysis of social class. To fully appreciate this idea, we
do well to bear in mind E. P. Thompson’s point that class is a thoroughly his‐
torical phenomenon; class is not a structure or category, but something that
happens (9):
If we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes but simply a multitude of
individuals with a multitude of experiences. But if we watch these men [and women]
over an adequate period of social change, we observe patterns in their relationships,
their ideas, and their institutions. Class is defined by men [and women] as they live
their own history, and, in the end, this is its only definition. (11)
Accordingly, Union Street does not follow the history of one individual, but at
the end of each section stops time, tracks back to another individual, starts again,
moves forward slightly, backtracks again: a synchronic multitude of individual
experiences, encapsulated in separate stories – but arranged in a meaningful
sequence, from the youngest to the oldest woman, which reintroduces dia‐
chrony into the narrative because humans, as historical actors, have memo‐
ries.31
It is for this reason that the older women in Union Street are so important, as
each new section adds, not only a new systemic ripple (associated with syn‐
chrony), but also an additional layer of memories (i.e. diachrony), reaching back
further and further into the past, with Alice – a committed socialist (241) –
serving as a veritable repository of memory: “There wasn’t much she’d learned
in the Depression that still made sense in the seventies. And yet. She was poorer
now than she’d been then. And worse housed. Then, she’d had a lovely little
Council house” (242). Economic crisis, in other words, is nothing new for Alice,
but she remembers that in the past there was adequate public housing – as there
is not in her present. We have seen that newspapers for the most part remain
unread in Union Street, but this is not the case with Alice, who follows the “con‐
tinued reports that the miners were about to go on strike” (239). Remembering,
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32 Incidentally, anyone interested in cinematic adaptation as brazenly ideological re‐
writing might want to start with Martin Ritt’s Stanley & Iris (1989). Ritt’s film is –
ostensibly – based on Union Street and tells the story of Iris (played by Jane Fonda!),
who works in a factory and, there, meets Stanley, who cannot read (i.e. who is based
on Muriel Scaife’s husband, John). The film in effect turns Barker’s account of the
struggles of a Northern-English industrial community during the economic crisis of the
1970s into a story of individual upward mobility in the United States under Ronald
Reagan, with Iris teaching Stanley how to read, and the two of them eventually getting
married and moving to a nicer neighborhood.
following the news, engaging in political arguments with Mrs. Harrison (also
elderly, but from a country background and a Tory; 241): Alice, the oldest woman
in the text, most explicitly adds not only a layer of memory, but also an aware‐
ness of history and politics to Union Street’s narrative system.
Let us, one final time, re-examine the key points. In effect, the argument
presented in the preceding paragraphs is inspired by Mark Rawlinson’s com‐
ments on the relation between synchrony and diachrony in Union Street:
[Union Street cues us] to start making sense of the diachronic or historical patterns in
the lives which are opened to view by the narrative’s synchronic snap-shots of female
experience. It also points us, ironically, to all that divides the individuals who live
check by jowl in the street […]. (21)
However, while Rawlinson argues that the women’s lives are “synchronic
snap-shots,” the seven sections in fact constitute individual diachronies that
Union Street juxtaposes with one another in order to create a higher-level, col‐
lective synchrony. To avoid the potentially paralyzing stasis that tends to char‐
acterize such synchronic systems, Union Street then re-introduces diachrony –
but a diachrony of a different order, which is only present in a virtual or symbolic
space: as the memory of individual characters (particularly Alice Bell), and in
the ‘chronological’ movement from the youngest to the oldest female character
that we as readers can see and interpret. A collective diachrony, in short: the
collective history of class, derived from a domestic realism that takes seriously
the implications of the fragile human body and its need for shelter as a precon‐
dition for home and a sense of belonging.32 It is with these findings in mind that
we may now turn to the exploration of memory, myth, and collective identity
in Jeffrey Eugenides’s The Virgin Suicides.
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2 In the German original, the corresponding phrase is: “ein solches Phänomen in der
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6 “Saddened by a History We Knew Nothing About”:
Collective Memory and Rituals of Mourning in
Jeffrey Eugenides’s The Virgin Suicides
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times”: though it may seem
far-fetched to begin this chapter with a comparison between Jeffrey Euge‐
nides’s The Virgin Suicides (1993) and Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities
(1859), the latter’s opening line would in fact be a fitting epigraph for the
former.1 In its original context, Dickens’s opening may be read as an expression
of the narrator’s ambivalence towards the world historical events depicted in
the text: the French Revolution as a fundamental moment of historical rupture
that, in the words of Immanuel Kant, “is not to be forgotten” (The Conflict of the
Faculties 159; original emphasis).2 Likewise, the notion of a fundamental break
in historical continuity, as well as its impact on collective memory, are among
the key themes of The Virgin Suicides. In Eugenides’s novel, a group of now
middle-aged boys find themselves unable to forget a sequence of events that
took place in the early 1970s, in the suburban community of their youth. In those
distant days, the boys’ sense of unquestioned belonging is suddenly disrupted
when Cecilia, the youngest of the five Lisbon sisters, tries to commit suicide by
slitting her wrists in the bathtub. Cecilia survives the attempt, and following a
psychiatrist’s recommendation Mr. and Mrs. Lisbon for a time relax their strict
domestic regime, even allowing their daughters to give a party. The sisters invite
some boys from the community, but just as the party gets going, Cecilia excuses
herself, goes upstairs and throws herself out of her bedroom window; her body
impaled on the staked fence in front of the Lisbon’s family home, the girl dies
immediately. And yet, this terrible event is only the first blow to the boys’ col‐
lective sense of belonging. Exactly one year after Cecilia’s first suicide attempt,
three of her sisters – Lux, Bonnie, and Therese – take their lives, with Mary, the
last daughter, following only one month later. Even as adults, the neighborhood
boys continue to be haunted by the Lisbon girls, their memories simultaneously
evoking the joys of adolescent love and the pain of personal trauma: the best
and the worst of times. Though the boys’ deeply personal recollection of his‐
torical rupture evidently differs from the world historical scope of Dickens’s
novel, the narrators in both texts display a deeply ambivalent relation to the
past.
In the case of either text, however, we should not focus exclusively on the
narrator’s ambivalence, but instead also keep in mind the problem of polariza‐
tion. The opening of A Tale of Two Cities, for instance, revolves around the clash
between two starkly opposed evaluations of the past:
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the
age of foolishness, […] it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, […] –
in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest au‐
thorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree
of comparison only. (5; bk. 1, ch. 1)
According to Dickens’s narrator, it is only the “noisiest authorities” who insist
on such a polarized view of the past, and perhaps our sense of the narrator’s
ambivalence arises precisely from his attempt to adopt a – supposedly – more
nuanced historical outlook: a synthesis, as it were, of two ‘simplistic’ interpre‐
tations. In the discussion that follows, we will see that the boys in The Virgin
Suicides, too, try to dismiss competing and sharply delimited interpretations of
the past in favor of their own, more cautious and provisional assessment.
In addition, polarization is a key concern in The Virgin Suicides because the
early 1970s – i.e. the period in which the novel is set – occupy a critical position
in American cultural memory. More specifically, 1974 is not only the year of the
final four suicides in Eugenides’s novel; it also marks the end of a period of
upheaval in American history that can be said symbolically to begin with the
assassination of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, and which witnessed
conflicts over the Civil Rights Movement, the emergence into mainstream dis‐
course of second wave feminism, a new politics of gay pride, the sexual revo‐
lution and countercultural experiments, race riots, peaceful as well as violent
protests against the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and an oil crisis which
brought to an end the postwar economic boom that Eric Hobsbawm, in The Age
of Extremes (1994), has called the twentieth century’s “Golden Age.” It is a
“Decade of Upheaval” (Blum et al. 851) that the historian James T. Patterson
explicitly describes as a time of “rapidly rising polarization” (676), and the period
has since become a focal point in discussions about the so-called culture wars
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See, for instance, Adam Laats’s Fundamentalism and Education in the Scopes Era, which
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in the United States – a term that James Davison Hunter introduced into the
debate in 1991, only two years before The Virgin Suicides was published.3
FIGURE 9: Patrick Chappatte’s cartoon “Kennedy, 50 Years Ago” seizes upon the wide‐
spread and problematic idea that the assassination of JFK in November 1963 marked the
end of American innocence. © Chappatte in The International New York Times
(21. November 2013)
Eugenides’s novel is thus not only set in a quintessentially American cultural
space (i.e. suburbia), but also at a time of crisis that continues to be perceived as
a defining moment in national history, albeit in sharply polarized ways: “It was
the best of times, it was the worst of times.” This polarization, moreover, is
frequently associated with the emergence of so-called identity politics. John
Anner, for instance, speaks of a gradual shift within social justice movements
in the wake of the 1960s from “broad, universalist goals” to “more specific strug‐
gles, often based on identity” (7; cf. Barbara Ryan 2 – 3). As we shall see, this
historical context is relevant to The Virgin Suicides because the novel explores
in detail the problem of collective identity – especially its construction and
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maintenance on the basis of a particular interpretation of the past, as well as its
potentially exclusionary nature. In contrast to the previous chapters, the dis‐
cussion of Eugenides’s novel thus allows us to confront the inner workings of
a group or collective: its myths of origins; its strategies of othering and mar‐
ginalization; and its ritualized home-making practices. Indeed, in foregrounding
the problem of communal belonging, we will be able to show that The Virgin
Suicides not only comments on the role of identity politics in the history of the
United States, but also critiques the widespread fantasy that the home – sub‐
urban as well as national – is, or ever was, entirely innocent (FIGURE 9).
The Voice of Collective Memory
As virtually all critics commenting on The Virgin Suicides recognize, it is crucial
to address its highly unusual narrative voice, which speaks to us in the
first-person plural. Francisco Collado-Rodríguez, for instance, observes that this
plural voice is “of an uncertain condition,” and that it represents “the collective
perspective of an indeterminate number of mature men” (30; cf. Ciocoi-Pop 84;
Dines 961; Heusser 179; Christian Long 359; Vanyova 49). Eugenides himself,
meanwhile, has spoken of an “impossible narrator,” whose voice it is difficult to
locate precisely (Kehlmann and Eugenides 88).4 Claudia Ioana Doroholschi, fi‐
nally, defines the novel’s plural narrator as a “shifting entity” with unclear
boundaries:
Any attempt to establish how many boys belong to this community, or what exactly
their names are, is bound to fail. Sometimes one or more of the boys are detached from
the group and become individualized, or referred to as “one of us,” but the exact iden‐
tity of those who tells [sic] the story remains indeterminate. (185)
Doroholschi rightly insists that one cannot tell for certain who belongs to this
constantly shifting ‘we,’ and even the grammatical ‘mistake’ in her description –
the phrase “those who tells” – is in fact peculiarly appropriate, as it encapsulates
the conflicting pulls of group identity and individualized selves that render the
novel’s narrative voice so strangely haunting.5
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As Brian Richardson notes (52), there is one passage in The Virgin Suicides
that indirectly reflects on this unusual narrative voice and its relation to col‐
lective identity. After Cecilia’s suicide, the girl’s diary eventually ends up in the
boys’ possession (41), and they proceed to study the book with well-nigh reli‐
gious devotion:
We know portions of the diary by heart now. […] We passed the diary around, fingering
pages and looking anxiously for our names. Gradually, however, we learned that al‐
though Cecilia had stared at everybody all the time, she hadn’t thought about any of
us. Nor did she think about herself. The diary is an unusual document of adolescence
in that it rarely depicts the emergence of an unformed ego. […] Instead, Cecilia writes
of her sisters and herself as a single entity. It’s often difficult to identify which sister
she’s talking about, and many strange sentences conjure in the reader’s mind an image
of a mythical creature with ten legs and five heads […]. (42)
Unlike most coming-of-age narratives, the narrator maintains, Cecilia’s diary
does not depict the “emergence of an unformed ego” (i.e. an adolescent’s path
toward a ‘fully-formed,’ mature identity), but instead confronts the reader with
an undifferentiated collectivity (“a single entity”). This, in turn, renders it diffi‐
cult for the reader to identify individual members of the group – an effect that,
according to Doroholschi, in fact applies to the novel’s own collective narrative
voice.
For Debra Shostak, these similarities are far from accidental. Rather, Shostak
argues that we are dealing here with a classic case of narcissistic projection by
a group of male voyeurs. The boys’ use of the pronoun we, Shostak contends,
“implies the effacement of the speakers’ individuality and prepares for their
conception of the Lisbon sisters as also de-individualized” (819). The narrators’
portrayal of the Lisbon girls is thus, in Shostak’s view, very much a projection
of their own image onto the objects of their desire – and indeed, the phenomenon
of narcissistic projection is itself indirectly acknowledged in the passage dis‐
cussed above, for according to the narrator, Cecilia continually “stared at ev‐
erybody all the time,” without, however, truly thinking about them. This, argu‐
ably, is a good description of the boys’ own voyeuristic idealization of the Lisbon
sisters, who are the center of the boys’ obsessive attention even as their reality
as independent human beings continues to elude their male observers.
Accordingly, both Bree Hoskin (216) and Ceri Hovland (266) have observed
that the Lisbon girls enter the boys’ “collective memory” in distorted form, and
it is precisely by exploring the idea of collective memory that we can understand
more fully in which sense Eugenides’s narrator is “impossible.” Deriving his
ideas about collective memory from the French sociologist Maurice Halb‐
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wachs, Jan Assmann observes that the most basic, “primal form” of a rupture
between the past and the present is the “irremediable discontinuity” of death,
for it is when someone dies that those left behind have to decide whether or not
that individual is worth the effort of being remembered (19). More generally,
Assmann contends that all groups face the question of what they must not allow
themselves to forget; conversely, each of the components incorporated into a
group’s collective memory may provide us with clues regarding that com‐
munity’s most cherished values (16). Collective memories, in short, should not
be envisioned as the random remains of times gone by; rather, according to
Assmann, a group’s stock of collective memories accumulates in a process of
negotiation about which aspects of the past are to be considered significant, and
this shared effort in turn fosters a sense of belonging among the members of the
community (24).6
One implication of Assmann’s observations is that we should not conceive of
collective memory and identity as something solid or given. If Iwona Irwin-Zar‐
ecka maintains that collective memory is “best located not in the minds of in‐
dividuals, but in the resources they share” (4), then this is in part to emphasize
that collective memory is not simply the sum of several individuals’ personal
memories. Rather, only those components form part of a group’s collective
memory that are, as it were, made publicly accessible (for example in the form
of written records and historical artifacts, but also in the form of shared oral
accounts of personal memories). At the same time, however, personal memories
form part of a group’s potential resources of remembrance even when they have
not (yet) been shared, for in principle these personal memories could be com‐
municated if and when the need arises – at least, that is, as long as the individuals
in question are still alive. Accordingly, though Irwin-Zarecka is right in em‐
phasizing the shared, ‘externalized’ nature of collective memory in real-life
groups, collective memory in the abstract also includes the information stored
in the minds of individuals as one of its potential or virtual resources. Even in
the case of real-life groups, moreover, Jan Assmann is careful to note that col‐
lective identity is necessarily “underpinned by factors that are purely symbolic,”
with the social body as such being “simply a metaphor – an imaginary construct”
(113). Collective identity, in other words, “does not exist as a visible, tangible
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reality” (ibid.), and any attempt to personify it will necessarily be reminiscent
of the ghostly: a disembodied, impossible voice.7
It is now no longer difficult to see that the first-person plural narrator of The
Virgin Suicides is precisely such an impossible, symbolic personification of a
group’s collective identity. Therefore, we should not think of the narrator as
merely a collection of individual voices (i.e. as a chorus of boys speaking to‐
gether). Rather, the narrator’s plural voice is the personification of an abstract,
collective entity, and while each of the boys constitutes an individual part of the
community of memory personified in this narrator, the collectivity itself remains
qualitatively distinct from the sum of its parts.8 A key passage from The Virgin
Suicides illustrates this point, reflecting as it does on the “unnatural” way in
which the narrator’s collective memories accumulate:
Our own knowledge of Cecilia kept growing after her death […], with [… a] kind of
unnatural persistence. Though she had spoken only rarely and had had no real friends,
everybody possessed his own vivid memory of Cecilia. Some of us had held her for
five minutes as a baby while Mrs. Lisbon ran back into the house to get her purse.
Some of us had played in the sandbox with her, fighting over a shovel, or had exposed
ourselves to her behind the mulberry tree that grew like deformed flesh through the
chain linked fence. […] A few of us had fallen in love with her, but had kept it to
ourselves, knowing that she was the weird sister. (40)
The narrator here explains how various individuals and subgroups (“some of
us”) contribute to the group’s collective memory, and initially one might imagine
that the boys must have gotten together at some point to share their memories
with one another. This, however, turns out not to be the case, for the narrator
states explicitly that some group members refrained from revealing their mem‐
ories to the others. More specifically, the narrator notes that “[a] few of us” had
fallen in love with Cecilia yet had kept it, not to ‘themselves’ – as would be the
more ‘logical’ way of putting it – but to “ourselves.” Far from being a simple
grammatical mistake, this phrase signals that the plural narrator, as a ghostly,
entirely symbolic entity, has access even to those memories that the individual
group members have refrained from sharing with their peers. The novel’s nar‐
rator is impossible, in other words, because he is the disembodied, plural voice
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of an abstract collectivity of middle-aged males engaged in a project of com‐
munal remembrance. And it is this plural narrator’s discursive strategies of his‐
torical reconstruction that we must now proceed to examine more closely.
Fall from Grace: Myths of Origin and Founding Trauma
While there is little doubt that the Lisbon sisters’ suicides would be perceived
as disruptive in any community, Martin Heusser has shown that Eugenides’s
plural narrator draws on a specifically American version of pastoral aesthetics
to portray the time before the suicides as a prelapsarian, suburban idyll. Ac‐
cording to Heusser, pastoral rhetoric has been a defining feature of American
self-descriptions from its earliest days, with the country being imagined as a
“Garden of the World”: a blessed new land in whose fertile soil a youthful nation
can take root and prosper (“Et in Arcadia Ego” 176). In turn, it is this kind of
imagery that, according to Heusser, informs American ideals of the suburb as a
garden-like landscape “equally poised between the city and the wilderness”
(ibid.). Moreover, just as the idea of a New World conjures up images of a space
unburdened by history, so do pastoral landscapes appear as both secluded and
outside the flow of historical time:
The cardinal convention of the pastoral […] is the opposition, explicit or implicit,
between the idyllic pastoral environment and the reality of the world at large – the
contrast between an ideal, secluded here and now, perfectly peaceful and timeless, and
the outside world, haunted by continual change and death. (“Et in Arcadia Ego” 177)
Neither history nor death, Heusser notes, are supposed to disturb the peace of
a self-enclosed, pastoral space – and if we examine how Eugenides’s narrator
describes life in the suburban community before Cecilia’s suicide, then we find
that his depiction of the boys’ communal home as an earthly paradise matches
these pastoral conventions precisely:
There had never been a funeral in our town before, at least not during our lifetimes.
The majority of dying had happened during the Second World War when we didn’t
exist and our fathers were impossibly skinny young men in black-and-white photo‐
graphs on jungle airstrips […]. Now our dads were middle-aged, […] but they were
still a long way from death. Their own parents, who spoke foreign languages and lived
in converted attics like buzzards, had the finest medical care available and were
threatening to live on until the next century. Nobody’s grandfather had died, nobody’s
grandmother, nobody’s parents, only a few dogs: Tom Burke’s beagle, Muffin, who
choked on Bazooka Joe bubble gum, and then that summer, a creature who in dog
years was still a puppy – Cecilia Lisbon. (35)
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In the narrator’s account, death as such had of course always existed, but only
in a different time and place. In the narrator’s description, history and death
form part of an external, historical wilderness of “jungle airstrips” and world
wars – until, that is, Cecilia, the youngest of the Lisbon sisters, takes the decision
to end her life.
The irruption of Cecilia’s death into this pastoral suburban world thus con‐
stitutes, for the narrator, a fall from grace into a world of exile and death that is
also imagined as the end of childhood innocence. As Heusser notes (“Et in Ar‐
cadia Ego” 181), the narrator portrays the immediate aftermath of Cecilia’s
suicide as a moment of intrusion by the world beyond the home community:
From the roof of Chase Buell’s house where we congregated […] we could see, over
the heaps of trees throwing themselves into the air, the abrupt demarcation where the
trees ended and the city began. The sun was falling in the haze of distant factories,
and in the adjoining slums the scatter of glass picked up the raw glow of the smoggy
sunset. Sounds we usually couldn’t hear reached us now that we were up high […] –
sounds of the impoverished city we never visited, all mixed and muted, without
sense […]. (35)
The irruption of violence and death is not only associated here with the realm
of the sacred (“where we congregated”); it also propels the boys’ gaze outward,
beyond the boundaries of their home community, and suddenly history – in the
form of industrial production, urban poverty, and pollution – manages to in‐
trude, even as the meaning of its disturbing signs continues to elude the boys
(“mixed and muted, without sense”). The boys keep watching for a while, and
though later, one by one, they turn towards “home” (35), they will never recover
their earlier sense of unquestioned and ‘childish’ communal belonging.
We need to be clear from the outset about the extent to which this image of
a fall from pastoral suburban grace is in fact an entirely artificial construct
(Heusser, “Et in Arcadia Ego” 179). Slavoj Žižek’s notion of “the Fall” as one
characteristic feature of ideological fantasies is useful in this context, for ac‐
cording to Žižek the Fall constitutes a decisive event in phantasmagoric narra‐
tives, but as such it has always already happened (The Plague of Fantasies 18).
In addition, Žižek suggests that the Fall is a moment of symbolic castration that
involves the “loss of something which the subject never possessed in the first
place” (19). Both of these characteristics of the Fall suit the situation in The Virgin
Suicides perfectly, for not only does the novel begin when the Fall has already
happened (i.e. after the five suicides, which are already revealed as past in the
novel’s very first sentence); the group of now middle-aged men are also still
turning their gaze back longingly toward girls whom they never actually “pos‐
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9 The fact that the girs are constructed as idealized adolescent fantasies has been widely
commented upon in the critical literature; see, for instance, Hayes-Brady (212) and
McLennan (30).
10 See also Martin Dines: “[I]t is not only the novel’s narrators who appear to dwell in a
‘timeless zone’; their parents also seek suspension from history” (963). Interestingly, the
narrators’ comments are echoed almost verbatim in Lynn Spigel’s discussion of real-life
suburbia in postwar America: “Postwar Americans – especially those being inducted
into the ranks of middle-class ownership – must, to some degree, have been aware of
the artifice involved in suburban ideals of family life. For people who had lived through
the Depression and the hardships of the Second World War, the new consumer dreams
must have seemed somewhat pretentious” (220).
11 See McLennan, who suggests that “the narrator(s) construct [the suicides] as their own
point of origin” (27).
sessed” in the first place. As we saw earlier, the Lisbon sisters are idealized
figures of youthful adoration – “a purely potential, nonexistent X,” in Žižek’s
terms (19) – and only in those rare moments when the boys actually spend time
with the Lisbons does the “revelation” come over them that the girls “weren’t
all that different” from their own sisters (123).9 Moreover, even the narrator
himself admits that the prelapsarian idyll of suburbia had in fact been a con‐
scious construct or fantasy world established for the children by their parents.
Accordingly, when they note that their parents remain surprisingly stoic in the
face of Cecilia’s death, the boys sense “how ancient they were, how accustomed
to trauma, depressions, and wars. We realized that the world they rendered for
us was not the world they really believed in” (55). The suburban community
may have appeared Edenic to the group of boys, but this had never simply been
the natural or true state of affairs.10 Instead, as a fantasied fall from grace, the
suicides become a kind of mythical moment of origin for Eugenides’s plural
narrator: an expulsion from the illusory plenitude of childhood innocence into
a fallen subjecthood founded on absence or lack.11
We may summarize the argument so far by noting that Eugenides’s novel
constitutes a fiction of home in at least two different senses. On the one hand,
The Virgin Suicides personifies collective belonging in the form of an impossible
narrative voice that is unlikely to occur in a non-fictional text. On the other
hand, the narrator draws on partly fictional models – a pastoral aesthetics, in
particular – in his (re-)construction of a childhood home whose innocence was
lost in one exceptional moment of rupture. The ideological fantasy of the boys’
shared innocence and its tragic loss sustains the narrator as a plural subject. This
loss thus constitutes the mythical moment of origin for the narrator as the per‐
sonified voice of the boys’ community of memory. Which begs the question:
What, precisely, is the relation between myth and collective memory?
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12 The German original runs: “Mythos ist eine fundierende Geschichte, eine Geschichte,
die erzählt wird, um eine Gegenwart vom Ursprung her zu erhellen. […] Durch Erin‐
nerung wird Geschichte zum Mythos. Dadurch wird sie nicht unwirklich, sondern im
Gegenteil erst Wirklichkeit im Sinne einer fortdauernden normativen und formativen
Kraft” (52).
13 In the German original, Assmann characterizes this ‘contrapresent’ as follows: “Sie geht
von Defizienz-Erfahrungen der Gegenwart aus und beschwört in der Erinnerung eine
Vergangenheit, die meist die Züge eines Heroischen Zeitalters annimmt. Von diesen
Erzählungen her fällt ein ganz anderes Licht auf die Gegenwart: Es hebt das Fehlende,
Verschwundene, Verlorene, an den Rand gedrängte hervor und macht den Bruch be‐
wusst zwischen ‘einst’ und ‘jetzt.’ Hier wird die Gegenwart weniger fundiert als viel‐
mehr im Gegenteil aus den Angeln gehoben oder zumindest gegenüber einer grösseren
und schöneren Vergangenheit relativiert” (79).
The Sacred Law of Authority
In the context of discussions about collective memory and identity the notion
of myth is not to be understood as a story that is, in any straight-forward sense,
untrue. Rather, as Jan Assmann rightly observes, myth is defined by its social
function:
Myth is foundational history that is narrated in order to illuminate the present from
the standpoint of its origins. […] Through memory, history becomes myth. This does
not make it unreal – on the contrary, this is what makes it real, in the sense that it
becomes a lasting, normative, and formative power. (38)12
Myth, for Assmann, is a performative discourse that creates, rather than merely
reflects, a social reality. Moreover, in addition to its foundational role, myth may
also serve as what Assmann calls a “contrapresent” – a function that sometimes
conflicts with myth’s foundational role because myth as contrapresent empha‐
sizes “what has gone wrong, what has disappeared,” and the present thus “finds
itself dislocated or at the very least falling short of the great and glorious past”
(62).13 It is difficult to think of a better description of how, in The Virgin Sui‐
cides, the boys’ loss of a mythical innocence provides the basis of their collective
identity even as it instills their present with a lasting sense of lack and impair‐
ment: “scarred […] forever, making us happier with dreams than with wives”
(169). The sisters’ suicides, as a foundational moment of loss, is the reason why
the boys, as grown-ups, still gather in their “refurbished tree house,” where they
keep the “sacred objects” that document the myth of the Lisbon girls (246). The
boys’ attitude toward their collective myth of origin thus also bears out Domi‐
nick LaCapra’s observation that an extremely destructive or disorienting event
may become both a founding trauma and an occasion of “displaced sacralization”
(Writing History, Writing Trauma 23) – a point to which we shall return shortly.
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First, however, we ought to state clearly that the narrator, as the voice of the
boys’ collective identity, cannot ultimately wish to resolve the trauma of the
girls’ suicides because this would unravel the myth that underpins the group’s
existence. Importantly, this is not to suggest that the boys’ desire for relief from
the inordinate pressures of trauma is feigned or unreal; on the contrary, there
is no doubt that “[s]ometimes, drained by this investigation,” the boys long “for
some shred of evidence, some Rosetta stone that would explain the girls at last”
(170). At the same time, however, even in this passage the narrator uses the word
sometimes to qualify the boys’ desire for a final explanation. The reason for this
is that the narrator himself cannot possibly desire the boys to overcome the
suicides’ negative effects because this shared experience of trauma is the only
reason why the group as a community of suffering – and hence why the nar‐
rator – exists in the first place. The narrator, as a personification of collective
memory, is thus caught in a double bind, for while on one level the whole pur‐
pose of the group he represents is to find collective ways of coping with
trauma, he must at the same time prevent the boys from ever leaving their trau‐
matic memories behind – for if this were to happen, then the community, and
thus the narrator himself, would cease to exist. Accordingly, Rachel McLennan
is right in insisting that, in the final analysis, the narrator is not truly interested
in explaining or resolving the enigma of the past; instead, he wishes to legitimize
his own mythical version of it: a version that sustains his identity as the per‐
sonified voice of a group of middle-class, white, heterosexual American
males (34).
Among the narrator’s strategies of legitimation, his recourse to two dis‐
courses of power and authority is particularly striking: the language of religion
and the idiom of the law. According to the narrator, for instance, the Lisbon girls
at times appear “like a congregation of angels” (25), while Cecilia’s “illuminated”
diary looks “like a Book of Hours or a medieval Bible” (32). By using these and
similar phrases, the narrator imbues the story of the Lisbon sisters with an aura
of the sacred and thus as beyond question or close examination: “Please don’t
touch. We’re going to put the picture back in its envelope now” (119). At the
same time, the narrator deploys the discourse of law and legal inquiry to prevent
accusations of downright mystification: “We’ve tried to arrange the photographs
chronologically, though the passage of so many years has made it difficult. […]
Exhibit #1 shows the Lisbon house shortly before Cecilia’s suicide attempt” (5).
Referring to “documents” and “Exhibits” (e.g. 101) as well as to interviews con‐
ducted with various witnesses (e.g. 78), the narrator evokes an atmosphere of
thorough investigation, trial, and judgment, with the boys meeting almost daily
to “go over the evidence once again, reciting portions of Cecilia’s journal” (238).
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14 As Bilyana Vanyova Kostova rightly notes, “the narrative clings unto uncer‐
tainty” (53).
Tellingly, in this last quotation, the rituals of law (to “go over the evidence”)
and the realm of the sacred (“reciting” scripture) do not truly remain separate;
rather, the narrator uses the combined authority of these two registers to bolster
his own discursive authority. In this, The Virgin Suicides as a novel can in part
be read as reflecting on the historical fact that the law, in ‘archaic’ societies, was
indeed inseparable from the religious realm of the sacred, and that even today
the law as a highly ritualized institution resembles the practices of religion (e.g.
Stollberg-Rilinger 149 – 160; cf. Girard 24).
If the narrator of The Virgin Suicides uses certain types of discourses to lend
authority to his account, he also continually works to dismiss as insufficient all
attempts by others to explain why the Lisbon sisters might have killed them‐
selves.14 Journalists like Ms. Perl, for example, are portrayed as distorting and
simplifying the Lisbons’ suicides:
Ms. Perl […] single-handedly initiated the feeding frenzy of speculation that continues
to this day. In her subsequent articles – one every two or three days for two weeks –
she shifted her tone from the sympathetic register of a fellow mourner to the steely
precision of what she never succeeded in being: an investigative reporter. Scouring
the neighborhood in her blue Pontiac, she cobbled together reminiscences into an
airtight conclusion, far less truthful than our own, which is full of holes. (222)
Just as he dismisses other “reporters” (224), the narrator here questions
Ms. Perl’s journalistic abilities (“what she never succeeded in being: an investi‐
gative reporter”) before faulting her for her “airtight conclusions.” More gener‐
ally, the narrator claims that the boys are “forced to wander endlessly down the
paths of hypothesis and memory” because no one has told the Lisbon girls’ story
to their “satisfaction” (224) – a word that has much to do with expectations and
desires, but leaves open the question of factual truth. In a similar vein, the nar‐
rator objects to other attempts at explanation:
Mr. Conley […] said, “Capitalism has resulted in material well-being but spiritual
bankruptcy.” He went on to deliver a living room lecture about human needs and the
ravages of competition, and even though he was the only Communist we knew, his
ideas differed from everyone else’s only in degree. Something sick at the heart of the
country had infected the girls. Our parents thought it had to do with our music, our
godlessness, or the loosening of morals regarding sex we hadn’t even had. Mr. Hedlie
mentioned that fin-de-siècle Vienna witnessed a similar outbreak of suicides on the
part of the young, and put the whole thing down to the misfortune of living in a dying
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15 As Terry Eagleton notes, the rejection by some postmodern thinkers of the very idea
of absolute truth rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of what this idea implies:
“Absolute truth does not mean non-historical truth: it does not mean the kind of truths
which drop from the sky, or which are vouchsafed to us by some bogus prophet from
Utah. On the contrary, they are truths which are discovered by argument, evidence,
experiment, investigation. A lot of what is taken as (absolutely) true at any given time
will no doubt turn out to be false. Most apparently watertight scientific hypotheses have
turned out to be full of holes. Not everything which is considered to be true is actually
true. But it remains the case that it cannot just be raining from my viewpoint” (After
Theory 108 – 109). Citing Bernard Williams, Eagleton adds that in effect “relativism is
really a way of explaining away conflict,” for if there is no such thing as truth, “then
political radicals can stop talking as if it is unequivocally true that women are oppressed
or that the planet is gradually being poisoned by corporate greed” (After Theory 109).
empire. It had to do with the way the mail wasn’t delivered on time, and how potholes
never got fixed, or the thievery at City Hall, or the race riots, or the 801 fires set around
the city on Devil’s night. (231)
However, even though the narrator ridicules the explanations put forward by
the adults from the community (“the loosening of morals regarding sex we
hadn’t even had”), he later admits that the boys are at times tempted to accept
such “general explanations, which qualified the Lisbon girls’ pain as merely
historic, springing from the same source as other teenage suicides” (238). Tell‐
ingly, the narrator refers to these explanations as “merely historic” (emphasis
added) – and thus as inappropriate to the sacred truth of the Lisbon girls, which
necessarily transcends the secular boundaries of history and reason, and which
must remain forever unknowable:
In the end we had pieces of the puzzle, but no matter how we put them together, gaps
remained, oddly shaped emptinesses mapped by what surrounded them, like countries
we couldn’t name. […] So much has been written about the girls in the newspapers,
so much has been said over back-yard fences, or related over the years in psychiatrists’
offices, that we are certain only of the insufficiency of explanations. (246 – 247)
Not entirely unlike some proponents of postmodern theory, the narrator is “cer‐
tain” that there is no such thing as an absolute or even adequate truth, and that
his version of the events is superior precisely because it recognizes its own
“insufficiency.”15
Of course, it would be unfair to regard the narrator’s account as simply ma‐
nipulative and misleading, for it clearly addresses the boys’ emotional and psy‐
chological need to find “a story we could live with” (241). Moreover, as David
Kennedy notes, “elegists are always faced with unsatisfactory resurrections,
unfinished and unfinishable conversations” (21). Nevertheless, we must recog‐
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16 See Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, who notes that in order to construct a sense of community,
“one almost inevitably needs the presence of the Other” (60).
nize that in order to legitimize this version of the story, the narrator strategically
discounts other versions of the past without really examining their respective
merits. The narrator’s construction and maintenance of the group’s founda‐
tional myth is thus far from politically neutral or innocent, but instead depends
on the systematic exclusion and disparaging of others: journalists, adults from
within the community, and – as we shall see – those perceived as ethnically
different.16
Old World Corruption and Ethnic Others
One example for the narrator’s disparaging of ethnic difference is they way in
which he subliminally attributes the irruption of death into the boys’ youthful
suburban idyll, not to conflicts arising from within the community, but instead
to corrupting influences from the Old World. For instance, the narrator places
great emphasis on the fact that, after Cecilia’s first suicide attempt, “the most
popular theory” held that Dominic Pallazolo, “the immigrant kid,” was to blame
(19). According to this theory, Dominic was hopelessly in love with a girl called
Diana Porter, who one day left on vacation for Switzerland – an event that
propelled Dominic into such depths of despair that he “climbed onto the roof of
his relatives’ house and jumped off” (without, however, hurting himself because
his fall was broken by the “yard’s calculated shrubbery”; 20). Dominic, the nar‐
rator observes, “looked frail, diseased, and temperamental, as we expected a
European to look,” and though he later distances himself from the theory that
Cecilia killed herself because of Dominic (32 – 33), the fact remains that the first
extended reference to ethnic otherness is also associated with the threat of dis‐
ease and corruption, as if the boy’s own, ‘real’ Americanness depended on
Dominic as a negative foil – which of course it does, given that their own grand‐
parents are immigrants who speak foreign languages (35; cf. Dines 970;
McLennan 28). Moreover, as Martin Dines observes (971), after Cecilia’s death
Eugenides’s narrator introduces more and more Old World figures into the scene
of the American suburb: the Hessens, an “old German couple” (56); the Stamar‐
owskis, whose house exudes an air of “Old World decay,” in part because of the
bats that circle over it and which, the boys believe, have “come with the Sta‐
marowskis from Poland” (88 – 89); and, finally, “Old Mrs. Karafilis,” who as a
young woman during World War I had to flee from the Turks (172), and who is
unsurprised by the Lisbon girls’ deeds because – her grandson Demo claims –
the “Greeks are a moody people” to whom suicide “makes sense” (174). In fact,
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even the Lisbons themselves are affected by this ethnic othering because their
family name links them to Portugal, the “first European country to acquire an
overseas empire” (Dias 68). In addition, the narrator continually emphasizes
their Catholicism (Eugenides 8, 20, and 37), as if this Old World religion, too,
played a part in the mysterious plague of death that has infected this all-Amer‐
ican suburb located, according to the narrator, in a county bearing the
“Anglo-Saxon” name Wayne (166).
And yet, things are not quite as straight-forward as that, for the narrator’s
own account continually reveals the precariousness of that Old World – read:
non-Anglo-Saxon – otherness that he so desperately wants to maintain. Martin
Dines, for instance, has observed that the Catholic Lisbons are also associated
figuratively with the early history of Puritan settlement (972); their home con‐
tains “stark colonial furniture” as well as a “painting of Pilgrims plucking a
Turkey” (The Virgin Suicides 25), and when dressed up for a ball the Lisbon sisters
look “like pioneer women,” with hairdos that have “the stoic, presumptuous
qualities of European fashions enduring the wilderness,” and wearing dresses
that “look frontierish” (118). The narrator thus portrays the Lisbons both as
archetypically American and as vaguely foreign (i.e. Catholics associated with
continental Europe), and perhaps this disturbingly insistent cultural hybridity
explains why the narrator feels unsettled in their sublime presence (cf.
Dines 972).
At any rate, the truly threatening Others for the narrator are not those ‘Eu‐
ropean’ others from within the community, but the ‛non-white’ people who live,
for instance, in that distant city beyond the demarcation line of trees. Tamara K.
Hareven argues convincingly that, historically, the pastoral desire for a harmo‐
nious life in the garden-like suburbs is closely related to white, middle-class
fears of racial and social Others, with the city representing immigration, ethnic
conflict, and poverty (244). We have already seen that, in The Virgin Suicides,
the city appears as “impoverished” (35), and the narrator also tells us that both
the Lisbon girls and the boys recall the Detroit race riots of 1967, “when tanks
had appeared at the end of our block and National Guardsmen had parachuted
into our back yards” (124). This, together with the gunshots that the boys oc‐
casionally hear “coming from the ghetto” (36), creates an underlying sense of
outside menace that binds the all-white suburban community together (Dines
967). The narrator himself is aware of the exclusionary nature of the suburb in
which the boys grew up:
Brave blacks had been slipping in for years, though they were usually women, who
blended in with our maids. The city downtown had deteriorated to such a degree that
most blacks had no other place to go. […] Even though we’d always chosen to play
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17 See Bilyana Vanyova Kostova: “Although the cultural story of the suburb might appear
ficticious, it is in fact a condemnation of the conformity, homoegenity and artificiality
of the time, and a reflection of their disruption through the effects of the influx of black
people, environmental decay, and people's disillusionment with the government in the
1970s” (51).
Indians and not cowboys, considered Travis Williams the best kickoff returner ever
and Willie Horton the best hitter, nothing shocked us more than the sight of a black
person shopping on Kercheval. We couldn’t help but wonder if certain ‘improvements’
in The Village hadn’t been made to scare black people off. The ghost in the window
of the costume shop, for instance, had an awfully pointed, hooded head, and the res‐
taurant, without explanation, took fried chicken off its menu. (99)
Even though the boys are accustomed to the sight of black maids, and perfectly
willing to admire dark-skinned Others on TV, the narrator confesses to a sense
of shock when confronted with non-hierarchical intermingling. Moreover, while
the narrator incorporates his reference to the Ku Klux Klan with great comic
subtlety (“awfully pointed, hooded head”), the underlying threat is no less se‐
rious. After all, the narrator also makes clear that the Board of Commerce had
long been worried about the “influx of blacks”; indeed, it is only temporarily –
“[w]hile the suicides lasted, and for some time after” – that the “outflux of
whites” becomes a matter of greater concern for the leaders of the com‐
munity (99).17
Moreover, if the presence of blacks just beyond – and sometimes within – the
boundaries of the boys’ home community proves disturbing to the narrator, he
also finds himself haunted by the repressed memory of America’s pre-Colum‐
bian past. There is, for instance, a brief but telling reference to cowboys and
Indians in the passage quoted above, and when the narrator mentions the
“Anglo-Saxon” name of the county in which the boys grew up, he explicitly
distinguishes them from “a parade of Indian county names, Washtenaw, Shia‐
wassee” (166). Moreover, though Martin Dines rightly observes that “the biggest
cliché in the book of American hauntings [is] the house built over an Indian
burial ground” (962), he also fails to mention that The Virgin Suicides, too, re‐
cycles this well-worn device, for right after Cecilia’s suicide, one boy insists that
he found “an Indian arrowhead” buried in the Lisbon’s lawn (55). Of course,
there is more than just a hint of parody about this reference (as, indeed, there
is about the bats hovering over the Stamarowski’s house, or about the ghost
with the pointed hood that evokes the Ku Klux Klan). And yet, if there is any
truth to Freud’s assertion that one function of jokes is to mask aggression, as
well as genially to bribe listeners into taking the side of the person who tells the
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18 In The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious, Freud writes: “The joke will allow us to
turn to good account those ridiculous features in our enemy that the presence of op‐
posing obstacles would not let us utter aloud or consciously […]. It will, further, bribe
the listener with his own gain of pleasure into taking our side without probing very
far” (98). The German original runs: “Der Witz wird uns gestatten, Lächerliches am
Feind zu verwerten, das wir entgegenstehender Hindernisse wegen nicht laut oder nicht
bewusst vorbringen durften […]. Er wird ferner den Hörer durch seinen Lustgewinn
bestechen, ohne strengste Prüfung unsere Partei zu nehmen” (Der Witz und seine Be‐
ziehung zum Unbewussten 85).
joke (The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious 98), then we should at least be
wary of dismissing out of hand the idea that the narrator’s remarks are ulti‐
mately more serious than they seem to be.18
What supports this idea is that the Lisbon girls themselves are repeatedly
associated with Native American culture. Cecilia’s diary, for instance, at one
point mentions a commercial with a “weeping Indian paddling his canoe along
a polluted stream” (44). In one photograph, moreover, the Lisbon sisters appear
“sitting Indian-style” on the lawn in front of their home. Most ominously, how‐
ever, we encounter the girls’ images in a series of photographs in which they
pose in “totem-pole shots, taken at a tourist attraction” (228 – 229). Mysteriously
attracting the signs of a past that refuses to stay repressed, the Lisbon sisters at
first appear as Catholic Europeans, then mutate into “pioneer women,” and ul‐
timately even seem to ‘go native.’ The narrator thus imbues the girls’ gender
difference with a haunting sense of racial and ethnic otherness: a porous, un‐
stable identity that unsettles the boys’ attempts at defining the boundaries of
communal belonging.
Indeed, the boys seem to fear and adore the girls in equal measure, and there
is a good case to be made that it is precisely for this reason that the narrator
constructs the Lisbon sisters in terms of the sacred. According to René Girard,
“[a]ll sacred creatures partake of monstrosity” (265), and there is indeed some‐
thing monstrous about the boys’ image of the girls as “a mythical creature with
ten legs and five heads” (The Virgin Suicides 42). For the boys, the sisters tran‐
scend all the ‘normal’ boundaries of identity – of gender and race and even
humanity – and some of them even imagine Lux as “a force of nature, impervious
to chill, an ice goddess generated by the season itself” (150). The girls are thus
both semi-divine objects of desire and castrating, racialized female demons who
bring death and corruption into the boys’ ‘innocent’ suburban world.
Gender Trouble: The Othering of Trip Fontaine
Once we recognize the narrator’s strategic link between ethnic othering and
gender difference, it no longer appears as an innocent detail that there is one
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other character whom we encounter “sitting cross-legged like an Indian” (76).
This other character is called Trip Fontaine: a focal point of gender trouble, and
crucial in terms of plot because, in the narrator’s account, he appears as the one
individual who is most directly responsible for the suicides of Lux, Mary,
Therese, and Bonnie (with the exception, perhaps, of the Lisbon parents). We
learn about Trip that he falls in love with Lux Lisbon and that, despite Mr. and
Mrs. Lisbon’s strict rules about dating, he ultimately manages to convince the
parents that he and three other boys ought to be allowed to accompany the four
sisters to the homecoming ball. While Mary, Therese, and Bonnie return back
to their family home by the agreed time, Lux and Trip stay behind to have sex
on the football field, where Trip simply abandons the girl, not caring “how she
got home” (138). Lux returns home much too late, and Mrs. Lisbon reacts by
shutting “the house in maximum-security isolation” (141). A simple, by no
means implausible explanation of the girls’ suicides lies precisely in this expe‐
rience of domestic entrapment, and Trip appears as largely responsible for their
imprisonment in the narrator’s reconstruction of the events. It is therefore sig‐
nificant that, from the very first moment that Trip appears in the text, the nar‐
rator describes him as disturbing preconceived notions about masculinity, de‐
sire, and gender difference:
Only eighteen months before the suicides, Trip Fontaine had emerged from baby fat
to the delight of girls and women alike. Because we had known him as a pudgy boy
whose teeth slanted out of his open, trolling mouth like those of a deep-sea fish, we
had been slow to recognize his transformation. In addition, our fathers and older
brothers, our decrepit uncles, had assured us that looks didn’t matter if you were a
boy. We weren’t on the lookout for handsomeness appearing in our midst, and believed
it counted for little until the girls we knew, along with their mothers, fell in love with
Trip Fontaine. Their desire was silent yet magnificent, like a thousand daisies attuning
their faces toward the path of the sun. (69)
Socialized in a world where it is a woman’s duty to be desirable rather than
actively to desire, and where – according to the (heterosexual) men at least –
“looks didn’t matter if you were a boy,” the narrator now witnesses the effect of
masculine beauty on girls and women whose desire he perceives as “silent yet
magnificent.” In this way, the narrator not only frames Trip as the villain of the
piece, but also identifies him as the source of anxiety regarding the meaning of
masculinity.
What further complicates the challenge posed to the boys’ beliefs by this male
object of desire is the fact that Trip is also related to homosexuality. Shortly after
Trip is introduced in the text, we learn that his father lives with another man,
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and the narrator is quick to conclude that this explains why the son’s frequent
(hetero)sexual exploits are tolerated by Mr. Fontaine: “[T]he iffiness of his own
conduct prevented him from questioning the susurrations coming from under
his son’s door” (73 – 74). The narrator here explicitly associates Trip’s disturbing
desirability with the ‘deviant’ lifestyle of the father, as if growing up in an ‘un‐
conventional’ household might explain Trip’s ‘perverted’ masculinity. Impor‐
tantly, the plural narrator never cares to elaborate how he – or indeed any of
the boys – could possibly know the reason why Mr. Fontaine allows his son a
considerable degree of sexual liberty; the narrator simply claims that it must be
“the iffiness” of Mr. Fontaine’s conduct that explains it all, without any evidence
to prove his point.
Interestingly, on several occasions the narrator also tries to fend off an un‐
derlying sense that the boys might themselves be susceptible to any homoerotic
interest in Trip. For instance, though the narrator describes Trip’s good looks
in lavish detail – noting the “tight seat of his jeans,” as well as a tan that must
have made “his nipples [look] like two pink cherries embedded in brown
sugar” – he also insists that Trip’s “musky scent, the coconut-oil smoothness of
his face, the golden grains of intractable sand still glittering in his eyebrows”
did not affect the boys “as it did the girls” (71). Read in isolation, the narrator’s
reassertion in this passage of the boys’ heterosexual position may appear inno‐
cent enough. However, as soon as we examine it in the light of a later episode
in which the boys fantasize about the taste of Lux Lisbon’s strawberry lipstick
the interpretive situation becomes more complex:
Woody Clabault’s sister had the same brand, and once, after we got into his parents’
liquor cabinet, we made him put on the lipstick and kiss each one of us so that we,
too, would know what it tasted like. Beyond the flavor of the drinks we improvised
that night […] we could taste the strawberry wax on Woody Clabault’s lips, trans‐
forming them, before the artificial fireplace, into Lux’s own. [… B]ut the next day we
refused to remember that any of this had happened, and even now it’s the first time
we’ve spoken of it. At any rate, […] it was Lux’s lips we tasted, not Clabault’s. (151)
The boys who, according to the narrator, remained relatively unaffected by the
sight of Trip’s cherry-like nipples are now even prepared to kiss another male –
and though the narrator emphasizes that they were drunk, and that of course
“it was Lux’s lips” they tasted, he is also hesitant to talk about the experience,
as if the boys’ identity as heterosexual males depended on a complete rejection
of any kind of queer desire. Moreover, what casts a particularly ironic light on
the narrator’s attempt to distinguish the boys’ supposedly normal desires from
‘deviant’ same-sex attraction is the fact that the narrator seems to find nothing
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queer about their continuing fascination with five girls who have been dead for
decades.
The best way to analyze the mechanism at play here is to use Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick’s concept of homosexual panic. According to Sedgwick, the notion of
homosexual panic attempts to describe the way in which “many twentieth-cen‐
tury western men experience their vulnerability to the social pressure of ho‐
mophobic blackmail” (Between Men 89), and Jason Edwards has elegantly sum‐
marized the gist of Sedgwick’s argument:
Because solidarity between men within patriarchy generates and requires certain in‐
tense male bonds that are not readily distinguishable from the most reprobated ho‐
mosexual bonds, Sedgwick believes that an endemic, almost ineradicable state of male
homosexual panic was the normal condition of male heterosexual entitlement from
the late nineteenth century onwards. (38)
In other words, in an environment of male privilege, tightly-woven groups of
men – such as the grown-up boys in The Virgin Suicides – are likely to feel a
continual need to portray their own homosocial community as free from, and
fundamentally different to, any stigmatized forms of queer desire. Accordingly,
it is possible for us to read the way in which the narrator of Eugenides’s novel
tries to keep Trip’s disturbingly attractive sexuality at bay as in part a symptom
of homosexual panic.19
As if to distance himself further from Trip’s unsettlingly ‘unmasculine’ eroti‐
cism, the narrator once again resorts to his characteristic strategy of associating
any kind of otherness with ethnic difference. We have already seen that Trip,
like the Lisbon sisters, at one point appears “sitting cross-legged like an Indian,”
but there are many similar examples of a subtle process of ethnic othering. For
instance, the narrator maintains that Trip’s supposedly excessive masculine
eroticism developed “during a trip to Acapulco,” where Trip had sex with a re‐
cently divorced, much older woman (70). Mexico, as Martin Heusser has shown,
often serves as a heterotopic space in American culture; the country is “associ‐
ated with romantic myth, on the one hand, […] and with backwardness and
banditry, on the other” – which explains why Mexico can represent an entire
spectrum of transgressions, “from the feared to the repressed to the secretly
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desired” (“Mexicanness” 70; cf. Allatson 1485).20 Mexico thus functions as a space
of deviance in the U. S. cultural imaginary, and Trip seems somehow to have
contracted the disease of sexual transgression on his brief stay in Acapulco.
Moreover, the narrator places conspicuous emphasis on the “lustrous” tans of
Trip and his father, which leaves their skins with a “mahogany hue”:
At dusk, Mr. Fontaine’s and Trip’s skins appeared almost bluish, and, putting on their
towel turbans, they looked like twin Krishnas. […] Marinated in baby oil, Mr. Fontaine
and Trip boarded their air mattresses equipped with back rests and drink holders, and
drifted beneath our tepid northern sky as though it were the Costa del Sol. We watched
them, in stages, turning the color of shoe polish. (74)
In the narrator’s account, Trip and his father are wont to engage in behavior
that is decidedly un-American: fitting perhaps for “the Costa del Sol,” but cer‐
tainly not appropriate within the boundaries of a white suburb. As if in conse‐
quence of their ‘foreign’ behavior, Trip and Mr. Fontaine soon turn into literal
non-whites, looking almost like “Krishnas” and “turning the color of shoe
polish.” Even though Trip and his father clearly form part of the boys’ home
community, the narrator’s discourse transforms them into racialized others.
However, even such blatant ethnic and racial othering is not sufficient for
Eugenides’s narrator, for he also links Trip’s difference to the ‘lower’ or working
class. For one thing, if Trip’s and his father’s skins turn “the color of shoe polish,”
then this phrase carries with it classist as well as racist overtones, for “boot‐
blacking” is one of the jobs where the historical link between race and class has
been particularly strong (Vogel 52n20). Moreover, the narrator points out ex‐
plicitly that the tans of Trip and his father were darker even than those of the
“Italian contractors, working in the sun day after day” (74). When compared to
the boys as a group of white, middle-class, male heterosexuals, Trip thus ends
up appearing as wholly Other; he is the son of a gay father, desirable ‘like a
woman,’ and poised precariously somewhere between a worker and a person of
different racial and ethnic background.
And yet, despite the various strategies of othering that the narrator deploys
against Trip, he nevertheless relies on him as a source of information, whereas
he cannot bring himself to trust anyone who truly comes from outside the
suburban community – a fact that is most readily apparent in the boys’ reluc‐
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tance to consult any actual members of the working class. As Rachel McLennan
notes (28), the boys notably shy away from trying to gain any information from
a character named Butch, who for a time is granted – limited – access to the
Lisbons’ family home:
Butch, who cut the Lisbon grass, was […] allowed inside for a glass of water, no longer
having to drink from the outside faucet. Sweaty, shirtless, and tattooed, he walked
right into the kitchen where the Lisbon girls lived and breathed, but we never asked
him what he saw because we were scared of his muscles and his poverty. (22)
Whereas in other instances the narrator dismisses potential informants because,
in his view, they “made terrible sources of information” (68), he admits that the
boys cannot even bring themselves to ask Butch any questions because they are
“scared” of his alien habitus (“shirtless, and tattooed”) as well as of his poverty
and the muscular body that testifies to Butch’s routine engagement in physical
labor. McLennan thus rightly speculates that the dismissal of the other potential
informants on the basis of their ‘improper’ manner of speech may in fact reflect
a middle-class bias against the supposedly coarse language of members of the
working class (28).21
Before proceeding any further, it may be useful to draw together the two main
strands of the argument so far: on the one hand, the narrator’s strategies of
othering, and, on the other hand, the ideas of myth and sacralization. We have
seen that the narrator of The Virgin Suicides both idealizes and de-individualizes
the Lisbon sisters, turning them into a kind of sacred monstrosity that is both
part of the boys’ home community yet also curiously other (as indicated by the
girls’ association with Europe, early American history, and Native American
culture). In order to lend authority to his mythical account, the narrator not only
combines the two discourses of the sacred and the law, but also disparages any
alternative versions of the story. More specifically, the narrator argues that no
one could ever fully explain the mystery of the Lisbon sister’s actions because
they are not “merely historic.” This is telling because historical guilt is precisely
what the narrator needs to erase from the boys’ suburban home community in
order to portray it as innocent: the history of Native American dispossession,
for instance, or the policies of racial segregation pursued by many U. S. suburbs
(cf. Millard 82).
However, in order to keep the suburb free from such intrusive forces, the
narrator continually has to police the boundaries of the boys’ home com‐
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munity, trying to stop it being ‘infiltrated’ or ‘corrupted’ by others. Conversely,
anyone seen to upset the suburb’s pastoral peace becomes the target of the nar‐
rator’s othering – a strategy that is most readily apparent in the case of Trip
Fontaine, who is associated with all kinds of others, and whom the narrator
subtly frames as the villain of his story. Tellingly, however, the narrator not only
admits that he had to “cobble together” the story of Trip and Lux’s love affair;
he also observes that it “began on a day when Trip Fontaine attended the wrong
history class” (75), as if obliquely to admit that Trip has simply stumbled into a
lesson about the past that happens not to be the right one for him. Trip, in short,
ends up playing the role of a discursive scapegoat for the narrator.22
The Function of Sacrificial Violence
In order to understand more fully Trip’s role as a discursive scapegoat, as well
as its relation to the narrator’s sacralization of the Lisbon girls, we need to ex‐
amine in some detail René Girard’s thesis that sacrifice is a means of deflecting
intra-communal violence. In Violence and the Sacred (1972), Girard argues that
all communities are threatened by the possibility of internal rivalry and con‐
flict, and that sacrificial rites are one means of re-directing this type of violence
in order to preserve the unity of the group in question (4 – 8). John Pahl has
usefully summarized Girard’s complex argument as a sequence of six basic steps:
1. MIMETIC DESIRE  /  ACQUISITIVE MIMESIS: A subject (individual or group)
imitates a rival’s desire for an object
2. CRISIS OF DIFFERENTIATION  /  RIVALRY: Conflict for the object is threatened,
or occurs
3. THE SCAPEGOAT  /  LEGITIMATION OF VIOLENCE: A scapegoat is identified
whose elimination can resolve rivalry without fear of reprisal or escalating
vengeance
4. SACRIFICE  /  ENACTMENT OF VIOLENCE: The scapegoat is expelled or killed;
the object’s possession is clarified
5. RESTORATION OF ORDER: Unanimity (temporarily) prevails
6. REPETITION, MASKING, AND PREVENTION THROUGH RELIGION: Myth,
ritual, prohibition, and (eventually) apotheosis of the victim (“the Sacred”)
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create a cycle of desire, enactment, and restoration that sanctions “legitimate”
violence, but rules out unchecked rivalry (29)
According to Girard’s model, an internal conflict arises from rivaling desires
that are centered on the same object (steps 1 and 2). This conflict can be resolved
if the group manages to agree on a surrogate victim or scapegoat (step 3) who
is “expelled or killed” in an act that restores the unity of the group (steps 4 and
5; see Girard 84 – 86). Myth, ritual, and prohibition subsequently serve as means
of stabilizing the outcome in order to prevent future outbursts of “unchecked
rivalry” (step 6). In assuming a “mythico-ritual character,” sacrificial violence is
not only directed outward, but also “conceals the site of the original violence”
(Girard 261).23 In the process, the original violence is masked or disguised, and
the group must to some extent misunderstand the nature of the sacrificial act
for it to be effective (7). Ultimately, Girard contends, by “channeling its energies
into ritual forms and activities sanctioned by ritual, the cultural order prevents
multiple desires from converging on the same object” (158), and thus ensures its
continuing existence.
The best way to apply Girard’s model to The Virgin Suicides is to begin with
the notion of internal rivalry and focus on those internal conflicts that could
potentially tear the group of boys apart. The first of two sources of rivalry has
to do with the role of the Lisbon girls as the objects of desire for the group of
boys. As mentioned earlier, in Eugenides’s novel we never learn precisely how
many boys form part of the group. We do know, however, that their number
exceeds that of the Lisbon sisters because, when Trip goes to the homecoming
ball with Lux, it is only “some of us” who are chosen to accompany Mary,
Therese, and Bonnie (115). The boys, in other words, are rivals in their desire
for the Lisbon girls – and it is precisely this kind of internal rivalry that, ac‐
cording to Girard, can undermine the unity of a group and, thereby, threaten its
very existence. Perversely, then, from the narrator’s point of view the fact that
the Lisbon sisters kill themselves constitutes a solution to the problem of internal
rivalry, and it is thus no coincidence that he presents the scene of Cecilia’s first
suicide attempt in terms of a sacrificial rite:
Mrs. Lisbon burst onto the porch, trailing Cecilia's flannel nightgown, and let out a
long wail that stopped time. Under the molting trees and above the blazing, overex‐
posed grass those four figures paused in tableau: the two slaves [i.e. the paramedics]
offering the victim to the altar (lifting the stretcher into the truck), the priestess bran‐
3056 “Saddened by a History We Knew Nothing About”: The Virgin Suicides
dishing the torch (waving the flannel nightgown), and the drugged virgin rising up
on her elbows, with an otherworldly smile on her pale lips. (6)
As part of his mythical reconstruction of the past (Shostak 818), the narrator
describes this scene as a sacrificial act that is, of course, traumatizing for the
boys as individuals. At the same time, from the point of view of the group the
Lisbon girls’ suicides constitute an act of terminal violence that, as Girard sug‐
gests, “can only be labeled sacrificial retrospectively, because it brought all hos‐
tilities to an end” (132). Put in the bluntest terms: had the girls lived, then the
boys’ friendship might not have survived.
If this interpretation seems disturbing and even callous, then this is in fact
part of the point, for as Moshe Halbertal has noted in his study On Sacrifice
(2012), feelings of guilt almost inevitably arise from the practice of sacrificial
violence. According to Halbertal, sacrifice in the biblical sense “is a substitute
for the violence that the offerer might himself deserve” (i.e. an act of atonement
in the face of God; 32). Halbertal also contends that this view of sacrifice is
incompatible with Girard’s model, as the offerer is not motivated by a desire for
violence, but instead by fear and anxiety. However, perhaps it is possible to
reconcile Girard’s and Halbertal’s positions, for if communal conflict were to
escalate, then everyone who is part of that community might become the victim
of violence – which in turn would explain widespread feelings of fear and
anxiety. A second disagreement between Halbertal and Girard relates to the
question of the victim’s innocence, for while Halbertal regards innocence as
necessary because this renders the victim “capable of becoming a vehicle for
ultimate projection” (33), Girard holds that the victim’s innocence or guilt are
simply irrelevant because it is the victim’s status as “relatively indifferent” to –
i.e. as not truly important for – the community that make him or her appear
“sacrificeable” (4). Despite these differences, however, both Halbertal (34) and
Girard (1) observe that the act of sacrifice itself always threatens to look like a
crime because the sacrifice does not constitute a just punishment of the victim
(for Halbertal because the victim is innocent, and for Girard because sacrifice
has nothing to do with punishment in the first place). Without glossing over
their fundamental disagreement, we can thus say that both Halbertal and Girard
view acts of sacrifice as ‘borderline crimes’ that are, for that very reason, likely
to lead to a sense of guilt on the part of those who commit – and benefit from –
the sacrificial act.
This last point is crucial for a reading of The Virgin Suicides because guilt and
mutual reproach are another factor that could lead to conflict within the group
of boys. We have seen that, from the perspective of the group as a whole (i.e.
from the narrator’s point of view), the Lisbon suicides constitute a ‘sacrifice’
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that solves the problem of internal rivalry. However, precisely because the boys
as a group benefit from the suicides, their collective identity is haunted by a
sense of guilt. In addition, there is the much more concrete sense of guilt that
each of the boys is likely to feel because, as John R. Jordan and John L. McIntosh
put it, in the aftermath of suicide “[g]uilt can be felt regarding what one did, did
not do, imagined one might have done, and so forth” (31). Jordan and McIntosh
also observe that one way of reacting to such feelings of guilt is to blame others
and thereby cast the focus “away from oneself” (30). In the case of the group of
boys in The Virgin Suicides, this could quickly lead to a vicious circle of mutual
reproach and so undermine the boys’ sense of communal belonging. There is
thus a need for yet another surrogate victim, and this is – as we have seen –
Trip Fontaine: the discursive scapegoat on whom the boys can shift the full
weight of communal blame.
In the case of The Virgin Suicides at least, Halbertal’s idea of the victim’s
necessary innocence thus works less well than Girard’s model; after all, Trip’s
extremely insensitive treatment of Lux may well have contributed to the sui‐
cides, but this is not the true reason why the group of boys choses him as their
primary scapegoat. Rather, what makes Trip ‘sacrificeable’ is that he is close to
but not truly part of the community; because of his good looks and success with
women (including Lux Lisbon), Trip has long been the object of envy and re‐
sentment for the boys, and his discursive destruction thus combines the sweet
taste of revenge with the relief that comes when one is, finally, absolved from
guilt. Tellingly, the final reference to Trip reports his dismissal in a letter clearly
written by Lux Lisbon, one of the ‘sacred’ and adored girls:
Dear whoever,
Tell Trip I’m over him.
He’s a creep.
Guess Who (192; original emphasis)
Trip’s eradication on the level of discourse is thus sanctioned on the level of the
story by an act of ‘divine’ rejection which simultaneously eliminates Trip as a
rival for the group of boys.
And yet, Girard’s model suggests that the sacrificial solution can only become
permanent if its true function is masked or disguised, for instance through myth,
ritual, or what Pohl calls the “apotheosis of the victim” (29). We have already
seen that the Lisbon sisters’ suicides constitute the primary act of ‘sacrificial’
violence in the sense that they solve the problem of intra-communal rivalry for
the boys, and we have also examined the extent to which the narrator portrays
them as semi-divine, mythical creatures. The discursive destruction of Trip, by
3076 “Saddened by a History We Knew Nothing About”: The Virgin Suicides
contrast, constitutes a secondary act of sacrifice intended primarily to ward off
mutual reproach and guilt, and accordingly Trip’s “apotheosis” remains subtle
and incomplete. Nevertheless, the narrator not only calls him a seducer “greater
than Casanova” (72), but also notes that he and his father look like “Krishnas”
(74). Trip is, in short, a sex-god, to whom all women from the suburban com‐
munity supposedly turn “like a thousand daisies attuning their faces toward the
path of the sun” (69), and whose stature in the narrator’s account may not truly
reach, but at least approaches the realm of the mythical.
Ritual, Rejection, and the Culture of Mourning
To say that the Lisbon sisters’ suicides on one level constitute the solution to a
communal problem is, importantly, not to deny its painful and traumatic nature
for the boys. Indeed, if one function of their commemorative rituals is continu‐
ally to retell their mythical story in order to disguise the troubling nature of
sacrificial violence, then on another level these rituals are simply an attempt to
cope with trauma. Moshe Halbertal’s comments on religious rituals prove illu‐
minating in this context, for according to Halbertal rituals serve to de-individu‐
alize the participants, who would otherwise have to face the overwhelming di‐
vine presence entirely on their own (15 – 16). Moreover, as a time-tested protocol
for proper behavior, rituals provide supplicants with a sense of stability and
security even in the presence of the sacred, and accordingly Halbertal describes
them as procedures that allow believers to overcome the “anxiety of rejection”
(18). Rituals, that is to say, symbolically express that one is not merely a forlorn
individual, but instead part of a community whose members all suffer from the
same fear: divine rejection and punishment.
Halbertal’s comments are pertinent to The Virgin Suicides because, for the
boys, the Lisbon sisters’ suicides constitute an ultimate act of rejection by their
semi-divine objects of desire. In the novel’s final sentence, the narrator movingly
expresses the boys’ lasting sense of violation and bereavement:
It didn’t matter in the end how old they had been, or that they were girls, but only
that we had loved them, and that they hadn’t heard us calling, still do not hear us, up
here in the tree house, with our thinning hair and soft bellies, calling them out of those
rooms where they went to be alone for all time, alone in suicide, which is deeper than
death, and where we will never find the pieces to put them back together. (249)
The boys’ love for the Lisbon sisters may have been idealizing and voyeuristic,
but nevertheless they did try to stay in touch with the Lisbons even after their
parents had imprisoned them in their own home. For example, the boys even‐
tually call the girls, barely saying a word but instead playing songs into the
308 6 “Saddened by a History We Knew Nothing About”: The Virgin Suicides
24 See Bilyana Vanyova Kostova, who rightly notes that it is virtually impossible to decide
unequivocally whether the boys should be seen as “bystanders, perpetrators or victims”
(49).
phone that “most thoroughly communicated our feelings” (195). When the sis‐
ters respond by playing songs like “Alone Again, Naturally” or “Candle in the
Wind,” the boys respond with “You’ve Got a Friend” or “Wild Horses” (196),
trying to offer some kind of consolation. When the girls secretly invite the boys
over to their home, pretending that they want to elope with them, the boys feel
genuinely elated, not knowing that the girls will commit suicide while the boys
are waiting for them, dreaming of their future together (212 – 213). It is therefore
understandable that the boys take the suicides as a gesture that is directed
against them personally, and they instinctively resort to the time-tested power
of ritual to try and deal with the annihilating power of this ultimate gesture of
rejection.24
If the precise shape of the boys’ ritualistic acts of commemoration neverthe‐
less appears pathological – one of their “most prized possessions” is the “titil‐
lating” report of one of Lux’s gynecological exams (155) – then this may be quite
simply because they have never been taught how to mourn. At school, for in‐
stance, during his speech at Convocation, the headmaster refers to Cecilia’s
suicide only obliquely, acknowledging that “it has been a long, hard summer for
some of us here today,” but also suggesting that “today begins a new year of
hopes and goals” (104). Moreover, while the headmaster’s wife in time manages
to convince most teachers that the school ought to schedule a “Day of Grieving,”
her main argument for the project is that grief may be “natural,” but “[o]ver‐
coming it is a matter of choice” (ibid.). In the end, the “Day of Grieving” proves
a total failure, at least according to the narrator’s account:
Most people remember the Day of Grieving as an obscure holiday. The first three hours
of school were canceled and we remained in our home rooms. Teachers passed out
mimeographs related to the day’s theme, which was never officially announced, as
Mrs. Woodhouse felt it inappropriate to single out the girls’ tragedy. The result was
that the tragedy was diffused and universalized. As Kevin Tiggs put it, “It seemed like
we were supposed to feel sorry for everything that ever happened, ever.” (104)
Not only is the day’s theme “never officially announced”; it is also an event that
fails to include either the Lisbon sisters (who “kept asking to be excused to go
to the bathroom”; 105) or their father (a teacher at the school who only learned
about the Day of Grieving when it was already “well under way”; 106). As a
result, “all the healing was done by those of us without wounds” (105), and it
therefore comes as no surprise that the success of the event remained a matter
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of dispute (107). Moreover, in the aftermath of the other sisters’ suicides, the
only act of mourning that the narrator records is the dedication of a memorial
bench to the Lisbon sisters: a “project that had been put in motion eight months
earlier” after Cecilia’s suicide and “was rededicated just in time to include the
other girls” (231 – 232). Though the genuineness of such gestures need not be
doubted, there nevertheless remains a sense that no one really tries to help the
boys truly to deal with their traumatic experience of loss.
Interestingly, there are hints in Eugenides’s novel that the suburban com‐
munity’s inability to mourn may have something to do with its broader cultural
context. For one thing, the Greek grandmother of one of the boys confesses that
she “couldn’t understand how the Lisbon’s kept so quiet, why they didn’t wail
to heaven or go mad”; more generally, she is unable to fathom why in America
“everyone pretended to be happy all the time” (175). The Virgin Suicides thus at
the very least raises the question of whether an inability to mourn may be a
more widespread problem in the United States. The other passage from the novel
that is relevant in this context relates to the ill-fated Day of Grieving, and more
particularly to the comment by the headmaster’s wife that “[g]rief is natural,”
whereas “[o]vercoming it is a matter of choice” (104). Intriguingly, the boys learn
about this comment from a former teacher who now has “a job in advertising,”
and who actually used the same formula as a slogan for a dietary product: “Eating
is natural. Gaining weight is your choice” (ibid.). The language is typical of
advertising, which insinuates endless possibility (“Just do it!”) and often involves
an imperative to enjoy (“Enjoy Coke!”; see Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom xvii).
Terry Eagleton holds that such “pathological optimism” ultimately reflects “a
fear of confronting loss” (Across the Pond 139), and if this is indeed the charac‐
teristic mood of capitalism in America, then The Virgin Suicides is at least partly
a critique of this state of affairs.
Identity Politics: An Impossible Perspective
The Virgin Suicides is many things. It is a moving account of a group of boys
trying to deal with the aftereffects of a traumatic experience of loss. It is also an
analysis of collective identity: how it almost invariable relies on ‘sacred’ myths
of origin; the extent to which it involves sacrificial practices of othering; and
the importance of rituals that not merely represent, but in fact serve to create
and maintain the unity of the group in question (Stollberg-Rilinger 13 – 14).
Moreover, the novel constitutes an indictment of those societies that fail to pro‐
vide its members with the adequate social resources for dealing with loss. The
boys in The Virgin Suicides may be guilty of voyeurism, narcissistic projection,
and exclusionary discourses of belonging; but while it would be easy to dismiss
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them as merely an unsavory collection of self-centered white, middle-class,
heterosexual males, it is difficult to deny the traumatic nature of their experi‐
ence.
It is crucial to insist that the boys’ sense of being wronged and wounded is
not merely illusionary because the novel’s critique of identity politics would
otherwise be far less convincing. Bilyana Vanyova provides a concise summary
of the harmful effects explored in Eugenides’s novel:
Progressively, the narrator’s narrative subtly connects the private suicides of the five
sisters to their capacity to shake off the repressed public conformity of the suburb
and, what is more, to expose its malfunctioning. Their refusal to live brings to the fore
the social effects of heavily repressed collective wounds such as race riots, lay-offs,
the impossibility of integration experienced by immigrants, or the ecological crisis. It
also highlights the smothered adolescent erotic desire that injures not just the girls’
sexual awakening […] but also the narrator's […]. (56)
For Vanyova, there is thus no doubt that the girls as well as the boys ought to
be seen as real victims, their developing identities thwarted by their environ‐
ment. On a more general level, Terry Eagleton contends that, though the cate‐
gories of identity politics may be “ontologically empty,” they nevertheless arise
from real experiences of oppression:
Women are not so much fighting for the freedom to be women – as though we all
understood what exactly that meant – as for the freedom to be fully human; but that
inevitably abstract humanity can be articulated in the here and now only through
their womanhood, since this is the place where their humanity is wounded and re‐
fused. Sexual politics, like class or nationalist struggle, will thus necessarily be caught
up in the very metaphysical categories it hopes finally to abolish; and any such move‐
ment will demand a difficult, perhaps ultimately impossible double optic, at once
fighting on a terrain already mapped out by its antagonists and seeking even now to
prefigure within that mundane strategy styles of being and identity for which we have
as yet no proper names. (“Nationalism” 24)
For Eagleton, the politics of identity arises from a sense of being wounded on
the basis of that ontologically empty identity, and just as it would be wrong to
deny the reality of these wounds, it would be counterproductive to turn the
wound itself into a kind of fetish. Instead, we need an “impossible double optic”:
staying firm in our commitment to these oppressed and wounded identities, but
simultaneously bearing in mind that “our social, sexual, or racial identities”
should not in fact be “all that important” (“Nationalism” 26).
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In The Virgin Suicides, this impossible double optic is in some way expressed
through the conflict between the collective narrator and the boys as individuals.
The narrator, who is a personification of the group’s collective identity, works
to perpetuate the group’s founding trauma, which is the only reason why the
group still exists. By contrast, the boys as individuals are desperately trying to
overcome their burdensome emotional and psychic wounds, and the support
they seek from the other members of the group is mainly a means to this ultimate
end (i.e. the particular group to which they belong is not all that important as
an end in itself). The novel thus depicts a conflict between, on the one hand,
identity politics as an end in itself, and, on the other, identity politics as mainly
a means for creating the social conditions under which the identity for which
one has been made to suffer and fight is no longer particularly important. We
can also rephrase this idea in the form of a simple question: How can we avoid
becoming trapped in an identity in which we have been forced to invest so much
effort, but that we did not actually want thrust upon us in the first place?
The idea that The Virgin Suicides gives narrative form to the “impossible
double optic” required in identity politics also allows us to formulate more pre‐
cisely why the novel’s setting, an American suburb in the early 1970s, is far from
negligible or accidental. In the introduction to this chapter, we have seen that
the period between, roughly, 1963 and 1974 is not only associated with an un‐
precedented polarization in American society – the so-called culture wars – but
also with the emergence of identity politics as such. Second-wave feminism,
black power, or gay liberation are among the most prominent examples of such
‘identitarian’ movements, and virtually all movements of this kind can be seen
as challenges to the hegemonic power of white, middle-class, heterosexual
males. From the point of view of those who happen to belong to this latter
category, there is thus a real sense that the Decade of Upheaval between 1963
and 1974 constitutes a historical experience of loss – though of course what was
lost were in fact the spoils of historical injustice and oppression. What The Virgin
Suicides does, in effect, is to place us in the position of those who, as a group,
are in a very real sense the victims of historical events beyond their control, but
who at the same time fail to (or perhaps refuse) to grasp the extent to which the
victimhood of others was not only far worse than their own, but in fact the very
precondition for their earlier, privileged position.
More specifically, in The Virgin Suicides, the boys hold fast to an image of
mythical innocence preceding the Lisbons’ suicides, refusing to probe deeper
into the exclusionary nature of the place they call home. Moreover, though the
boys are right in suggesting that the Lisbon sisters’ pain is not “merely historic”
(231; emphasis added), this does not mean that socio-historical pressures play
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no part at all. For instance, the fact that no one tries to prevent Mr. and
Mrs. Lisbon from effectively imprisoning their daughters in their suburban
home arguably reflects a deep-seated cultural bias in favor of what Isaiah Berlin
has called negative liberty (i.e. the freedom from interference; 121 – 122) – par‐
ticularly when it comes to parents ‘protecting’ their daughters (i.e. to restricting
the freedom of young women to participate in the life of the community, and
thus their freedom to belong). Likewise, while the Lisbon girls may not have
killed themselves exclusively because the United States in some ways looked like
a “dying empire” in the early 1970s (The Virgin Suicides 231), the general atmos‐
phere of pessimism may well have played a part. Accordingly, if the boys at one
point confess that Old Mrs. Karafilis had been “shaped and saddened by a history
we knew nothing about” (172), then perhaps this is an apt way for us to describe
the boys’ relation to the past of their own home community as well. At the same
time, The Virgin Suicides as a whole in fact anatomizes collective belonging and
the politics of identity, and as such the novel constitutes an attempt to under‐
stand its own historical moment: the emotional dynamics of the culture wars;
the vagaries of identity politics; and a culture obsessed with fetishistic memory
but lacking in historical understanding.
If Eugenides’s novel nevertheless refuses simply to portray suburban com‐
munities as mindless spaces of conformity, or to condemn the boys’ desire for
home as such, then this should not be misconstrued as a sign of critical weakness.
Rather, the degree of the novel’s affection is a measure of its strength, for it is
far easier to criticize those spaces of belonging with which we do not identify
than to expose ourselves to the alienating flaws at the heart of the homes that
we love and cherish. A critical but affectionate gaze: this has also been the aim
of the present study, which we must now proceed to bring to a close.
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1 I would like to thank Nicole Frey Büchel for her comments on the first draft of this
chapter, as well as Sarah Chevalier and Anja Neukom-Hermann for their feedback on
the final version.
2 On Emerson’s discussion of nomadism see John Durham Peters (“Exile, Nomadism, and
Diaspora” 30 – 31). Emerson’s conflation of a historical antagonism between “Nomadism
and Agriculture” with two conflicting types of mental attitudes “in the individual” is
not unproblematic, as it may serve to erase the specificity of nomadic existence (“His‐
tory” 161). Moreover, Emerson’s distinction between, on the one hand, the nomads of
Africa (who are “constrained” to wander), and, on the other, Europeans and Americans
(who follow the “nomadism of trade and curiosity”; ibid.) is clearly not immune to
postcolonial critique. On nomadic thought, see also Deuleuze, Difference and Repetition
45 – 47. The link between Emerson’s and Deleuze’s ideas is discussed in Tally, Melville,
Mapping and Globalization 65 – 68.
Conclusion – The End of Intellectual Nomadism
The rhyme between home and roam may be one of the more hackneyed in the
poetic repertoire, but it encapsulates beautifully the extent to which our inquiry
into the concept of home has led us to travel wide and far.1 Chapter one, for
example, among other things focuses on Ishmael’s attempts in Moby-Dick to
combat alienation through discursive constructions of universal belonging,
while chapter two examines the reasons why Maggie is ultimately unwilling to
reconcile herself to the prospect of a ‘nomadic’ existence in The Mill on the
Floss. A central theme in the discussion of Mrs. Dalloway in chapter three is
Clarissa’s willingness to evade questions of political responsibility in order to
maintain her sense of belonging, whereas chapter four explores Quentin’s
nightmarish inability in Absalom, Absalom! to abandon his love for a home that
in many ways would seem to deserve his hatred. Chapter five then turns to the
parallels between crumbling houses and ‘derelict’ human bodies in Union
Street, while the discussion of The Virgin Suicides in chapter six revolves around
a group of boys and their ritualistic reenactment of communal identity. In Emer‐
sonian terms, one might say that we have engaged in “intellectual nomadism”
in order to avoid the monotony and dullness that may easily befall a
“home-keeping wit” (“History” 161 – 162).2
At the same time, it is worth taking seriously Emerson’s warning that intel‐
lectual nomadism, if taken to extremes, “bankrupts the mind, through the dis‐
sipation of power on a miscellany of objects” (“History” 161) – for this warning
allows us to explain some of the theoretical limitations of this study. Emerson’s
idea that intellectual nomadism may involve a “dissipation of power” alerts us
3 Miranda Fricker provides a useful definition of what she terms hermeneutical injus‐
tice, which occurs “when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an
unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (1).
to the fact that human beings have limited energy and resources at their disposal,
and that the amount of power we are able to dissipate depends to a large extent
on our past and present experience of home and belonging. We are born helpless
and depend on others to take care of us during the first years of our lives. If our
basic childhood needs are met, then we have a greater chance of thriving as
teenagers and as adults. Similarly, if our education is suited to our talents (unlike
Tom’s and Maggie’s in The Mill on the Floss), and if there is a reasonable degree
of security in our lives, then we are free to expend some energy on nomadic
thought. Should these conditions not be met, however, then intellectual no‐
madism may either seem like a luxury that one cannot afford, or simply con‐
stitute a task that one does not know how to perform.3 In chapter four, for in‐
stance, we noted that Thomas Sutpen’s upbringing was extremely inauspicious:
inured to violence, racism, and poverty, and deprived of adequate formal edu‐
cation, Sutpen ends up lacking vital mental resources that, in turn, help explain
his obsessive quest for a fixed and destructive idea of home. Similarly, in chapter
two, we discussed the narrator’s idea in The Mill on the Floss that “light and
graceful irony,” as well as “extremely moderate” beliefs, are of “very expensive
production,” while those living in poverty and squalor tend to need strong and
clear guiding principles to help them cope with “the emphasis of want” (238; bk.
4, ch. 3). If, in short, one’s physical and mental development was thwarted in
childhood and youth, or if one is engaged in a daily struggle for survival, then
a desire for intellectual nomadism may simply be too much to ask. In addition,
there is an important difference between choosing to engage in intellectual no‐
madism and being driven to do so because one’s sense of home and belonging
has been disrupted against one’s will. It is this emphasis on home as a material
basis for, and limit to, our cognitive engagement with the world which explains
the relatively minor presence in this study of poststructural, postmodern and
deconstructive theories, which too often have little to say about embodidness
and human limitations – unlike postcolonial, psychoanalytic, feminist, and
Marxist approaches.
Other limitations of our intellectual journey can less easily be justified. This
study’s marked theoretical predelictions within the disciplinary boundaries of
literary and cultural studies are, for instance, compounded by a virtually com‐
plete absence of disciplines such as law (which are discussed, for instance, in
Maria Donata Panforti, “The Home and the Law”), human biology (e.g. Elizabeth
Cashdan, “Spatial Organization and Habitat Use”), or architecture and housing
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studies (e.g. Helen Long, The Edwardian House; Thomas Barrie, House and
House). Similarly, the fact that all primary texts come from the core nations of
the so-called Anglosphere (i.e. England and the United States), and that most of
the theorists consulted are either northwestern Europeans – predominantly
English, German, and French – or U. S. Americans must surely give us pause.4
Much has undoubtedly fallen outside the purview of this study, and our sup‐
posedly nomadic forays into the fields of home and belonging in many ways
stand revealed as decidedly provincial.
And yet, this is not to say that nothing has been gained from our inquiry into
home and belonging. The remainder of the conclusion will attempt to highlight
the most important findings. Rather than retrace our analysis of home and be‐
longing step by step, we will rephrase the argument by addressing three un‐
derlying themes that have rarely surfaced as explicit concerns in the six chapters
that make up this study: the concept of genre and its thematic as well as formal
relation to home and belonging; the recurring problem of suicide as a symptom
of unbelonging that allows us to reflect on the limited power of fiction; and the
idea that fiction itself constitutes a home-making practice because it offers
imaginary solutions to real-life contradictions (cf. introduction). We will exa‐
mine each of these three concerns in a separate section and, in so doing, provide
at least some sense of closure to this purposefully meandering exploration of
home.
Genre and Home: From Content to Form
The last of the seven precepts outlined in the introduction suggests that any
critical analysis of home must focus not only on the content or ingredients of
home, but also on their formal arrangements. This need to take into account
both form and content also applies to the discussion of genre and its relation to
home and belonging. Indeed, form is arguably the more important category of
the two because, on the level of content, the link between home and genre is
relatively straight-forward and, therefore, not particularly interesting. In the
case of the Bildungsroman or novel of formation, for instance, we are faced with
a genre that has as its key concern the problem of a young person leaving the
family home in order to find his or her place in the world (i.e. to establish a
broader sense of social belonging as a well-adjusted and ‘mature’ individual).
We have examined this generic tradition most thoroughly in the discussion of
George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss (see chapter two), but the specific challenges
associated with the transition to adulthood also play a role in other texts dis‐
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cussed in this study. In E. T., for instance, little Elliott must abandon his narcis‐
sistic self-absorption and learn to consider the feelings of others, while the
eleven-year-old Kelly Brown in Union Street must come to terms not only with
growing up in a precarious home, but also with the terrible experience of rape.
To some extent, Kelly thus resembles the traumatized group of male adolescents
in The Virgin Suicides, but while the latter remain trapped in a ritualistic re‐
enactment of their founding trauma, Kelly finds a way of reestablishing a sense
of belonging in a moving encounter with a frail and desperate old woman (i.e.
her meeting with Alice Bell, to whom we shall return in the following section).
A second genre discussed in this study that has a close thematic relation to
home is the Gothic, which at times even intersects with the narrative of Bil‐
dung. As noted in chapter four, in the course of the nineteenth century, Gothic
narratives increasingly turned away from sublime landscapes and gloomy cas‐
tles, and instead focused their attention on more domestic settings – a variant
of the genre that Fred Botting has called the “homely Gothic” (113). Absalom,
Absalom! is one example of this subgenre: a text that examines the ideology of
plantation domesticity as well as the horrors of slavery, highlighting how the
material remains of a supposedly superseded racial order continue to haunt
Faulkner’s protagonists, as well as the United States as a nation, well into the
twentieth century (and, arguably, beyond). Moreover, we can detect echoes of
the “homely Gothic” in the suburbs of E. T. and The Virgin Suicides. In the case
of Spielberg’s film, we have examined closely the way in which E. T. functions
as Elliott’s uncanny double, and we may now add the Gothic motif of a family
home being taken over by powerful forces beyond the inhabitants’ control (i.e.
the agents of a notably paranoid government bent on maintaining ‘homeland
security’). Similarly, in The Virgin Suicides, the motifs of female incarceration
and memories that refuse to stay buried have at least a remote kinship with the
genre of the Gothic.5 The ‘derelict’ people living in the crumbling houses of
Union Street, finally, are in some ways modern-day variants of Gothic revenants
or monsters: abject and unruly bodies that lurk in the marginal spaces of society,
continually threatening to encroach beyond their narrow confines, and unable
to live or die in peace.
Indeed, the list of genres that have some relation to home and belonging on
the level of content could be extended almost indefinitely. Among the genres
discussed in this study, for instance, there is tragedy as a genre of failure and
unbelonging (chapter two); pastoral as a literary tradition that tries to envision
an ideal, homely fusion between nature and culture (chapters three and six); and
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sionary if it relies on the “systematic humiliation of targeted groups” (105).
realism as the genre of the everyday, the familiar, the domestic (chapter five).
To these, we might add others that are not discussed in this study: the Western
as a genre of European settlement and native dispossession (e.g. Bronfen 96 – 97);
film noir and its concern with traumatized war veterans returning home (e.g.
Spicer 20); or comedy, which in its narrowest sense can be conceived of as cel‐
ebrating communal reintegration (e.g. Stott 1).6
The truly interesting link between genre and home, however, concerns the
level of form or style, and in particular the question of how genre theory con‐
ceives of texts as belonging to multiple genres. In recent decades, genre theorists
from across the critical spectrum have insisted that individual texts do not
simply belong to one particular genre, in the sense of being tied to the suppos‐
edly unchanging laws of a single category of texts; rather, a literary text belongs
to a genre to the extent to which it participates in certain generic practices:
engaging with genre conventions, revising and rejecting some of them, and as
a rule combining practices associated with diverging generic traditions (e.g.
Amigoni 58; Frow 3; Zagarell 502). In the case of Moby-Dick, for instance, we
saw that the novel’s strange opening sections (“Etymology” and “Extracts”) are
followed by several chapters that seem to set up Ishmael as the protagonist of
a ‘single-focus’ narrative of Bildung – only to thwart these generic expectations
later on, when the text’s focus broadens and becomes much more diffuse. Nev‐
ertheless, Melville’s text remains affiliated with the generic tradition of the
Bildungsroman: not fully or exclusively at home in it, but retaining significant
ties of belonging – just as individuals, too, can at least try to explore new ties
without necessarily abandoning all their former associations. The discussion of
other novels in the present study likewise focuses on intersecting and sometimes
conflicting literary lineages (e.g. in the case of Mrs. Dalloway, which sets up a
dialogue between the ‘rural’ genre of pastoral, the literary tradition of the mar‐
riage plot, and a series of texts focusing on urban flâneurs; or Union Street, which
pits the conventions of novelistic, bourgeois realism against the aesthetic of the
short-story cycle). Various generic affiliations may thus coexist in a primary
text – sometimes peacefully, at other times uneasily – just as an individual’s
sense of belonging may involve a set of diverse, potentially conflicting loyalties
(e.g. familial, professional, and national).
Moreover, if we agree with critics such as Aijaz Ahmad (251), Wai Chee
Dimock (1383), and John Frow (2) in regarding genres as fields of knowledge,
then there is an important cognitive dimension to the idea of multiple generic
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belonging. According to these critics, each genre constitutes a particular way of
knowing the world and therefore invariably includes a set of epistemological
blind spots. Each genre, that is to say, resembles Emerson’s concept of the
“home-keeping wit,” which would prefer to find “all the elements of life in its
own soil,” but which would quickly become dull and monotonous without sa‐
lutary “foreign intrusions” (“History” 162). Put in slightly different terms: a text’s
coupling of one genre with one or several others constitutes a discursive attempt
to make use of various sets of knowledge in order to come to terms with par‐
ticular narrative, political, and philosophical problems. Moby-Dick, for instance,
evokes the generic tradition of allegory – with its historical link to the discourse
of religion – as well as the secular empiricism of realist narration in its attempt
to grapple with man’s existential place in the world. It is an uneasy combination
at best, and one that helps us to relate the particular concerns of Melville’s text
to broader cultural and historical rivalries.
This also implies that, in tracing the affinities and contradictions between a
text’s generic lineages, we can gain a better understanding of what Mikhail
Bakhtin has called the “basic social tone” of a text’s individual style (“Discourse
in the Novel” 259). The discussion of The Mill on the Floss, for instance, has shown
how the realist novel’s appreciation of the common life serves as a corrective
influence on tragedy’s aristocratic prejudices, just as tragedy’s focus on intract‐
able moral dilemmas tempers the Bildungsroman’s ‘realistic’ aesthetic of home‐
coming, compromise, and social adjustment. Similarly, if Absalam, Absalom! is
in part a Gothic tale, it also evokes traditional versions of the historical novel
(with Thomas Sutpen’s stallion explicitly “named out of [Walter] Scott”; 63),
thus combining one genre’s focus on the dark recesses of the human psyche
with another’s interest in the way broader political conflicts shape the indi‐
vidual. To the extent that a given text participates in more than one single ge‐
neric tradition, it formally enacts the cognitive implications of multiple be‐
longing: its productive opening up of new horizons, but also its potential to lead
to conflict and contradictions that may prove daunting and, at times, psycho‐
logically crippling. It is this formal process of generic ‘cross-examination,’ rather
than any particular theme or content, that constitutes the most productive way
of linking the concept of genre to the ideas of home and belonging.
Not-Being-at-Home: Suicide and Unbelonging
The second underlying theme that we need to explore in this concluding chapter
is the problem of suicide, which features explicitly in many of the primary texts
discussed in this study: the traumatized war veteran Septimus Warren Smith,
who throws himself out of a window in Mrs. Dalloway; Alice Bell in Union
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cussion of the novel in chapter four: Clytemnestra, the daughter of Thomas Sutpen and
a slave woman, who at the end of the novel sets fire to Sutpen’s plantation manor,
perishing in the flames together with her half-brother Henry.
Street, who prefers to end her life rather than move to an old people’s home; or
the five Lisbon sisters, whose suicides continue to haunt a group of neighbor‐
hood boys in The Virgin Suicides. There is, moreover, something markedly sui‐
cidal about Ahab’s quest for the white whale in Moby-Dick, and we know that
Ishmael regards going to sea as a “substitute for pistol and ball” (i.e. for com‐
mitting suicide; Moby-Dick 18; ch. 1). In addition, we have seen that the conclu‐
sion of The Mill on the Floss in fact constitutes a fantasied fulfilment of an only
half-admitted death wish on Maggie’s part. Absalom, Absalom!, finally, is
haunted intertextually by Quentin’s suicide in Faulkner’s earlier novel The
Sound and the Fury (1929), and Quentin’s sense of despair at the end of Absalom,
Absalom! does little to lay this fearful specter to rest.7
The reason why it is important to acknowledge the pervasive presence of
suicide in the primary texts chosen for this study is that acts of suicide can be
understood as an extreme expression of unbelonging. In chapter six, we ob‐
served that the Lisbon sisters’ suicides are in part a fundamental act of rejection:
a disavowal of any claims on them by other human beings, including the group
of neighborhood boys. Accordingly, when Eugenides’s narrator speaks of “the
outrageousness of a human being thinking only of herself” (248), then this is to
register that suicide not only constitutes an act of self-violation, but also – in
effect, if not necessarily in intention – a violent misdeed against all those whose
sense of self is bound up with the person who decides to put an end to his or
her life. Christian Baudelot and Roger Establet describe the “disproportionate”
effect of a suicide on the lives of others:
Mourning following a suicide is not like any other mourning. […] It’s distinguishing
feature is an intense expression of suffering, but also of shock. It is a traumatic form
of mourning that lasts longer than other forms and is more likely to generate more
depression, anxiety, negative and painful feelings, and feelings of guilt and shame.
The scars it leaves on the suicide’s relatives remain indelible. The feeling of guilt it
generates is often so painful that it drives some to punish themselves or even to
commit suicide in an attempt to assuage their guilt. The suicide’s closest relatives are
the first to be affected, but the shock waves spread far beyond the inside circle. (2)
Accordingly, while some have argued that suicide can be seen as an assertion
of freedom (e.g. Seneca; see Dollimore 32), there are also those who, like Jennifer
Michael Hecht, emphasize that one reason why “suicide is wrong” is that “sui‐
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cide causes more suicide” (5). In other words, while suicide may constitute an
act of liberation or self-assertion for the person who takes their own life, it can
also rend apart existing communal and affective ties, thus escalating rather than
protesting against existing violent dynamics.
In addition, while on the one hand the rejection implied in suicide may force‐
fully unsettle the sense of home and belonging of those who are left behind, on
the other hand there is also strong evidence that suicide in fact arises from
problems associated with the family home and the wider community. According
to Mark A. Reinecke and Elizabeth R. Didie, for instance, suicidal behavior cor‐
relates strongly not only with “stressful life events” – e.g. “work or legal prob‐
lems, […] the loss of a loved one, and changes in residence” – but also with
experiences in childhood or adolescence of “negative peer relationships, abuse
and neglect, family instability, and a chaotic home environment” (214). Dis‐
rupted family homes thus feature prominently among the factors that influence
suicidality (as, indeed, they do in the case of Ahab and Ishmael in Moby-Dick
and, to a lesser but still important extent, Maggie’s in The Mill on the Floss). At
the same time, the existence of “at-risk populations” – including LGBTQ indi‐
viduals, Native Americans, military personnel, the homeless, and incarcerated
men and women (Worchel and Gearing 291) – suggests that larger socio-cultural
factors also play a crucial role in individual experiences of unbelonging.8
Moreover, in addition to unhomely pasts or socio-cultural conditions hin‐
dering belonging, the problem of suicide also involves a frequently neglected
dimension of home: the future as a subjective horizon of expectations. Reinecke
and Didie, for instance, emphasize the importance of hopelessness in triggering
suicidal behavior (209), and other researchers agree that a persistent lack of hope
is among the main indicators for an increased risk of suicide (e.g. Vaillant and
Blumenthal 4; Worchel and Gearing 92 – 94). If, in other words, a person stops
believing that he or she could ever again feel at home in the world, then suicide
becomes increasingly likely (as is the case with Alice Bell in Union Street, who –
unlike Kelly Brown – is no longer able to envisage a more homely future for
herself).
To the extent that literary narratives can mitigate stressful life experiences
or underlying feelings of alienation, fictions of home can quite literally become
a matter of life and death. Coming-out narratives, for instance, may alleviate a
gay or lesbian teenager’s current feelings of isolation and even help him or her
to imagine a future of communal belonging. More generally, fictional genres
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familiarize individuals with a wide range of different story templates, which
they can then use as cognitive resources when it comes to narrativizing their
life experiences – an ability that is widely held to be a crucial factor in main‐
taining mental health (e.g. Engel et al., Narrative in Health Care). Conversely,
the reiteration of negative stereotypes in fiction may have averse emotional
effects, particularly on those who already suffer from a precarious sense of be‐
longing (witness, for instance, Maggie’s complaint in The Mill on the Floss that
women who are “dark” like her always lose out against their “light-complex‐
ioned” rivals – a conventional pattern that Eliot’s novel repeatedly associates
with racist prejudices against ‘darker’ races; The Mill on the Floss 270; bk. 5,
ch. 4; see also the discussion of Victorian views of gypsies in chapter two).
At the same time, we ought to be wary of overestimating the power of fiction
to avert the tragedy of suicide (or any other real-life tragedies, for that matter).
In Mrs. Dalloway, for instance, a quotation from Shakespeare’s Coriolanus re‐
peatedly provides Clarissa Dalloway with a sense of consolation – but the very
same passage fails to prevent Septimus from committing suicide. In a similar
vein, the group of boys in The Virgin Suicides try to console the Lisbon girls with
rock songs played to them over the phone, but hopeful lyrics prove insufficient
in preventing the sisters from taking their lives. Likewise, though the recogni‐
tion of shared suffering constitutes a vital element of emotional support – e.g.
for Ahab and Pip in Moby-Dick, or for Alice Bell and Kelly Brown in Union
Street – the varied outcomes in each of these cases suggest that other factors
play an equally decisive part. Indeed, the argument in chapter four regarding
Absalom, Absalom! suggests that therapeutic storytelling has the power to alle‐
viate the symptoms of unbelonging, as well as to alert us to the roots of this
condition, but that long-term improvement may require more than continual
narrativization – including a willingness to engage in, and fight for, material
changes to communal homes. Fiction, in short, has the power to console, to raise
our awareness of hitherto unsuspected dimensions of human experience, and
even to instill us with utopian hopes for a better and more homely future. Nev‐
ertheless, in the final analysis it is collective human agency – and not narratives
of belonging alone – that will change the world and, perhaps, make it a more
hospitable place.
Home-Making: Imaginary Solutions to Real-Life Contradictions
Let us take stock. The first section of the conclusion focused on genres as fields
of knowledge that intersect with one another in literary texts, in a manner that
is akin to an individual’s multiple and potentially conflicting ties of loyalty and
belonging. We then turned to suicide as an extreme expression of unbelonging,
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and though fiction may at times serve to alleviate alienation, it is also crucial to
retain a realistic sense of the limits of fiction’s transformative, therapeutic
power. This latter point, in turn, requires us to reexamine the claim made in the
introductory chapter that fictions are best understood as home-making prac‐
tices. What the discussion of suicide forces us to state more clearly is that fiction
constitutes an attempt to enhance our sense of belonging. More precisely, the
fictional compromise tries to provide us with imaginary solutions to real-life
contradictions – which not only leaves open the possibility that the form of a
particular fictional compromise may be entirely unconvincing, but also ac‐
knowledges that even the most accomplished imaginary compromise may fail
to have any palpable effect in a given real-life situation. Fiction is a home-making
practice, and like any such practice it may very well fail. At the same time, this
does not reduce the heuristic value of fiction for cultural analysis, as it is the
formulation of a particular problem, rather than the success of its imaginary
solution, that tells us most about historical pressures and cultural needs.
In the case of Moby-Dick, for instance, one key contradiction that the novel
attempts to resolve is the clash, in the mid-nineteenth-century United States,
between a political culture embracing the value of individualism, and social
pressures on a steadily increasing fraction of the population toward economic
dependence and conformity. More precisely, cultural ideals of independence and
the free individual’s pursuit of happiness conflicted sharply with the reality of
increasing social inequality, the spread of standardized industrial production,
and the concomitant disciplining of a growing workforce engaged in
semi-skilled wage labor: “a form of dependency that seemed to contradict the
republican principles on which the country had been founded” (McPherson 23).
In terms of its story, Moby-Dick rejects the sovereign individualism of Ahab (who
dies at the end of the novel), and instead sides with the conformist wage-laborer
Ishmael (who survives the disaster to tell the tale). In terms of discourse or style,
however, few literary texts are as idiosyncratic and non-conformist as
Moby-Dick, and we can therefore say that the novel’s form salvages the very
‘extremist’ individualism that it rejects on the level of the story. In this way,
Moby-Dick attempts to have its cake and eat it: a (more or less) elegant imaginary
solution to an intractable real-life problem.
The distinction between story and discourse also allows us to understand how
The Mill on the Floss tries to reconcile a Victorian ideology of progress with a
political system built on the so-called respect for tradition. On the one hand, the
mid-nineteenth century constituted a period of relief in Victorian England: “the
huge debts left by the wars against the French had not proved crippling, the
working classes had not revolted, the Chartist movement of the 1830s and
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1840s had collapsed” (Colin Matthew 8). In addition, the hitherto fitful – and
possibly negative – development of workers’ living standards first stabilized and
then began to improve in the course of the 1850s (e.g. Floud et al. 162 – 163;
Hoppen 78 – 79); the concept of ‘evolutionary’ (as opposed to revolutionary)
progress “came to permeate every aspect of Victorian life and thought” (H. C. G.
Matthew 523). However, British political culture was at the same time deeply
averse to change, dominated by an aristocracy that was not only the richest in
Europe (Osterhammel 1068), but that had also been able to maintain a socio-po‐
litical position that was nearly as strong as it had been a hundred years earlier
(Niedhart 39 – 40). More generally, a ‘respect for tradition’ was as strong a force
as the belief in scientific and moral progress, and it is this conflict that lies at
the heart of The Mill on the Floss. On the level of the story, Eliot’s novel aligns
itself squarely with the forces of progress (e.g. Stephen Guest), and either kills
off or condemns to a childless, ‘barren’ existence all the characters who cling to
the past (Mr. and Mrs. Tulliver, Maggie, Tom, and Philip). On the level of dis‐
course, however, the narrator’s nostalgia belies the story’s endorsement of pro‐
gress, and while the story’s ‘reality principle’ works steadfastly and remorse‐
lessly towards Maggie’s extinction, the novel’s discourse increasingly abandons
any signs of ‘mature’ ironic distance toward the female protagonist. It is a
strained compromise, to be sure – but a compromise of sorts, nevertheless.
If The Mill on the Floss revolves in part around the conflict between faith in
progress and respect for the past, then a key conflict in Mrs. Dalloway is the
clash between, on the one hand, the freedom from interference, and, on the other,
the freedom to belong. Woolf’s novel, we saw in chapter two, revels in the ex‐
perience of urban anonymity even as it associates modernist fragmentation with
illness, trauma, and the continual misreading of some of its characters by others.
More precisely, on the level of the novel’s story it is Clarissa and the other
members of the Dalloway circle who appreciate most fully the freedom of
moving through the imperial city, while Septimus and Lucrezia are the charac‐
ters who feel most isolated and beleaguered amongst London’s teeming multi‐
tudes. At the same time, the sections focusing on the Dalloway circle are sty‐
listically more conservative (i.e. closest to the model of classic realism), while
the sections revolving around Septimus and his wife embrace most fully the
urban aesthetics of modernist fragmentation. Put differently, on the level of the
story the Dalloways are associated with the pleasure of solitary urban wander‐
ings (i.e. the freedom from interference), while the story of Septimus and Lu‐
crezia revolves around the lack of human connection (i.e. the freedom to belong).
Stylistically, however, it is the sections centering on the Dalloways that empha‐
size connection and coherence in point of view, whereas Septimus and Lucrezia’s
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perspective appears in free-floating combination with various and contiguous
others. This chiastic structure creates a sense of formal balance – and thus at‐
tempts to reconcile, in imaginary form, the class conflict between the small
social set of the Dalloways and the multitude of perspectives associated with
Septimus and his Italian wife.
In Absalom, Absalom!, the real-life problem that only too clearly confronts
the United States of the 1930s is the seemingly intractable history of racial
conflict. And yet, while Faulkner’s novel pits against each other conflicting in‐
terpretations and elaborations of this traumatic past (e.g. Miss Rosa’s and
Grandfather Compson’s), shuttling back and forth from one level of time to
another, its breathless, interminable sentences provide the novel with an un‐
derlying and unified stylistic rhythm. Using the terms developed in chapter four,
we could say that the stylistic technique of uncanny narration, used throughout
the novel, serves to reconcile the story’s conflicting interpretations of the past,
as each of the characters appears equally burdened by the novel’s onerous
syntax. However, the novel’s thematic insistence on the crushing weight of
history is in some ways mitigated by the ease with which the narrative shifts
from one temporal level to the next. If, in short, Faulkner’s story presents us
with characters locked in historical conflict, the novel’s discourse flows like one
great single stream across periods and individuals, counteracting the story’s
centripetal forces.
In Union Street, the conflict between fragmentation and unity is important,
too, but here it revolves more specifically around the conceptual nexus between
human agency and class. On the one hand, the novel continually insists on the
extent to which its working-class characters are the victims of social circum‐
stances, determined by environmental forces far beyond their individual con‐
trol. On the other hand, Union Street tries to overcome its protagonists’ entrap‐
ment in a single, overarching social structure by breaking its story up into seven
discursively discrete segments that, taken together, provide us with a synchronic
panorama of simultaneously independent and interconnected lives. At the same
time, the novel tries to reintroduce a sense of diachronic movement because an
emphasis on synchrony threatens to dissolve history and, along with it, any
room for human agency (i.e. if there is no horizon of temporal progression, then
it is difficult to see how one could possibly construct a better future). As dis‐
cussed in chapter five, Union Street attempts to overcome this potential deadlock
by arranging its seven stories in such a way that its more or less synchronic
‘story-time’ is combined with a discursive ‘life-time’ progression from Kelly
Brown, the youngest character, through to the oldest, Alice Bell. Barker’s novel
thus imaginatively opens up a space for historical transformation – at a time
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when the real-life industrial working-class of Thatcherite Britain was all too
evidently in disarray (Marwick 153: “The overriding economic fact was the
shrinkage of Britain’s industrial base”; cf Harris 112 – 115).
The Virgin Suicides, finally, attempts to reconcile two conflicting interpreta‐
tions of American history in the second half of the twentieth century. According
to the first of these interpretations, the postwar years up until, roughly, 1963
not only saw the United States at the height of its economic power; the period
was also a time of social stability and a broad political consensus directed against
the evils of Soviet communism. Over the next decade or so, this consensus fell
apart, as ‘special interest groups’ supposedly precipitated the country’s material
and moral decline, resulting in the culture wars that continued to cripple U. S.
political culture in the early 1990s. According to a second, competing narrative,
the 1950s were a period of mind-numbing conformism and widespread oppres‐
sion of women, ethnic minorities, and everyone who could be considered ‘de‐
viant’ or ‘queer.’ It was only in the 1960s that the new social movements began
finally to challenge these hegemonic structures, leading to landmark civil rights
legislation and culminating in the exposure of government corruption from
Vietnam to Watergate. The economic downturn of the 1970s then paved the way
for a resurgence of the political right, which remained in power until January
1993 – and thus until the beginning of the year in which The Virgin Suicides was
published. While in the first narrative, identity politics appears as one symptom
of what went wrong with the country, in the second it constitutes the very
foundation of the nation’s social and political progress. At the same time, the
early 1970s feature as a negative watershed in both these conflicting narratives,
and it is precisely at this point in time that the Lisbon sisters take their lives.
The key traumatic event of Eugenides’s novel is thus linked to a moment in U. S.
history that symbolizes a kind of negative consensus. Moreover, while the char‐
acters who remain traumatized by these events are male, white, middle-aged
heterosexuals (i.e. the social group most strongly associated with the first his‐
torical narrative), their representation as a group is formally analogous to the
wounded collective subjectivity that underpins the projects of identity politics
commonly linked to the second interpretation of the nation’s history. In this
way, The Virgin Suicides proposes an imaginary solution to the U. S. culture wars,
which in real life were (and still are) far from abating.
Admittedly, none of the fictional compromises outlined above will hold up to
critical scrutiny, as it is always possible to detect imbalances, contradictions, and
questionable assumptions that undermine or at least problematize the imaginary
solution that a given text proposes. However, to unravel a fictional compromise
tends to require a considerable amount of time and interpretive effort. If one
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9 See Franco Moretti’s point that “hegemony doesn’t need purity – it needs plasticity,
camouflage, collusion” (“The Novel” 177).
10 Writing from a Jungian perspective, Edward F. Edinger similarly emphasizes that “[a]ll
human relationship is based on the fact of human weakness” (129).
simply reads a text without thinking about it a great deal, then even a rough,
makeshift compromise may work perfectly. Indeed, a lack of stringency and
closure may in fact turn out to be an advantage because this renders the com‐
promise more pliable and thus less likely to cause palpable ideological fric‐
tion.9 In addition, we need to bear in mind that, like the symbolism of dreams,
literary fictions involve various kinds of displacement and condensation; they
are overdetermined and may therefore simultanously fulfill various functions
for one and the same reader, as well as different functions for different readers.
Nevertheless, if a given work of fiction enjoys widespread success, then it is
at least plausible to assume that some aspect of the work speaks to a common
social need. The intellectual labor of literary analysis may then help us to un‐
earth this shared socio-cultural need – and, more importantly, allow us to define
the underlying conflict(s) from which the need for a fictional compromise arises.
In this way, fiction and literary criticism, together, assume a diagnostic function:
unable to solve any real-life conflicts, they can – potentially – alert us to hitherto
unrecognized social problems. And since we must first recognize a problem
before we can attempt to solve it, the joyfully pointless game of fiction may at
the same time have a more directly practical use. By alerting us to unacknowl‐
edged real-life contradictions, fiction and literary criticism may – just possibly –
contribute in some small way to our efforts at making this world a more just,
more welcoming, more homely place for all.
Leave-Taking
Let us not be deceived: as mortal creatures, we will never be fully at home in
this world; no matter how strong our ties of belonging, they will always remain
haunted by the repressed but ineluctable knowledge that death will one day rend
them apart. At the same time, we are united in our finitude, and this shared
vulnerability must serve as the starting point for any truly progressive poli‐
tics.10 Moreover, as noted in the discussion of Moby-Dick in chapter one, we must
distinguish between, on the one hand, our human finitude as the precondition
for alienation, and, on the other, alienation proper, which to a large extent de‐
rives from social arrangements that inadequately distribute the burdens of
human existence (Richard Schmitt 46 – 51). Unlike the existential trauma of
human mortality and incompleteness, social arrangements may in fact be ame‐
liorated, in the hope that they will one day approach more closely the ideal of
327Conclusion – The End of Intellectual Nomadism
11 “Jeder nach seinen Fähigkeiten, jedem nach seinen Bedürfnissen!” (“Kritik des Gothaer
Programms 282).
12 In addition to the friends I have mentioned already, I would like to thank Daniela
Landert and Nicole Studer-Joho for allowing me to test even the oddest ideas during
coffee breaks, lunches, and other more or less ill-suited occasions.
a society that makes claims on each according to his or her abilities, and that
attempts to provide for everyone according to their needs (Marx, “Critique of
the Gotha Program” 321).11 In such a society, we would still not be completely
at home, but freer to belong to one another as equals who might even feel like
saying, before the time comes for the parting of the ways:
It’s wonderful to be here,
It’s certainly a thrill.
You’re such a lovely audience,
We’d like to take you home with us,
We’d love to take you home.
(The Beatles, “Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band”)
In the meantime, for some of us at least, Marx’s ideal of a society that is more
atuned to the needs and abilities of each of its members remains the most in‐
spiring fiction of home.12
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COVER ILLUSTRATION: © by Laura Barrett, used by permission
FIGURE 1: The idea of home ranges across various scales (diagram adapted from Fox 19).
FIGURE 2: The iconography of the Sacred Heart of Jesus is reflected in E. T.’s glowing heart.
(Image of the Sacred Heart of Jesus taken from https://infovaticana.com / wp-con‐
tent / uploads / 2013 / 10 / mar.jpg, 4 August 2017, public domain; screenshot from E. T.:
The Extra-Terrestrial – © Amblin/Universal Studios, used by permission.)
FIGURE 3: Michelangelo’s depiction of the creation is echoed in official ads for E. T. (Image
by Michelangelo taken from https://en.wikipedia.org / wiki / The_Crea‐
tion_of_Adam#/media / File:Creaci%C3%B3n_de_Ad%C3%A1n_(Miguel_
%C3%81ngel).jpg, 4 August 2017, public domain; ad for E. T.: The Extra-Terrestrial taken
from https://media.senscri‐
tique.com / media / 000 016 040 539 / source_big / E_T_l_extra_terrestre.jpg, 4 August
2017, public domain.)
FIGURE 4: Elliott is placed symbolically between a small child and two more adult figures.
(Screenshot from E. T.: The Extra-Terrestrial – © Amblin/Universal Studios, used by
permission.)
FIGURE 5: E. T. happens to hide right next to a monkey doll. (Screenshot from E. T.: The
Extra-Terrestrial – © Amblin/Universal Studios, used by permission.)
FIGURE 6: The globe next to E. T. shows two ‘non-white’ continents: Africa and Asia.
(Screenshot from E. T.: The Extra-Terrestrial – © Amblin/Universal Studios, used by
permission.)
FIGURE 7: Government officials invade the home they are supposed to protect. (Screenshot
from E. T.: The Extra-Terrestrial – © Amblin/Universal Studios, used by permission.)
FIGURE 8: Storm’s regionalism assumes a global dimension if one takes into account pro‐
jected spaces. (Map by Barbara Piatti, used by permission.)
FIGURE 9: Patrick Chappatte’s cartoon “Kennedy, 50 Years Ago” seizes upon the wide‐
spread and problematic idea that the assassination of JFK in November 1963 marked
the end of American innocence. (in The International New York Times 21 November
2013. © Chappatte)
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